Surveillance of Canadian communists: a case study of Toronto RCMP intelligence networks, 1920-1939 by Butt, Michael
CENTRE FOR NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES 
TOTAL OF 10 PAGES ONLY 
MAY B£ XEROXED 




NOTE TO USERS 
Page(s) not included in the original manuscript and are 
unavailable from the author or university. The manuscript 
was scanned as received. 
10-39,167,203 









395 Wellington Street 
Ottawa ON K1A ON4 
Canada 
395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A ON4 
Canada 
The author has granted a non-
exclusive licence allowing the 
National Library of Canada to 
reproduce, loan, distribute or sell 
copies of this thesis in microform, 
paper or electronic formats. 
The author retains ownership of the 
copyright in this thesis. Neither the 
thesis nor substantial extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author's 
permission. 
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting 
forms may have been removed 
from this dissertation. 
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, 
their removal does not represent 
any loss of content from the 
dissertation. 
Canada 
Your file Votre reference 
ISBN: 0-612-89688-9 
Our file Notre reference 
ISBN: 0-612-89688-9 
L'auteur a accorde une licence non 
exclusive permettant a Ia 
Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de 
reproduire, preter, distribuer ou 
vendre des copies de cette these sous 
Ia forme de microfiche/film, de 
reproduction sur papier ou sur format 
electronique. 
L'auteur conserve Ia propriete du 
droit d'auteur qui protege cette these. 
Ni Ia these ni des extraits substantiels 
de celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes 
ou aturement reproduits sans son 
autorisation. 
Conformement a Ia loi canadienne 
sur Ia protection de Ia vie privee, 
quelques formulaires secondaires 
ont ete enleves de ce manuscrit. 
Bien que ces formulaires 
aient inclus dans Ia pagination, 
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. 

St. John's 
Surveillance of Canadian Communists: 
A Case Study ofToronto RCMP Intelligence Networks, 1920-1939 
by 
@ Michael Butt 
A thesis submitted to the 
School of Graduate Studies 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. 
Department of History, Faculty of Arts 




The following study examines Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RC~lP) inter-
war surveillance, harassment and repression of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), 
primarily in Toronto from RCMP "0" Division, but also extends the discussion to 
include features ofcounter-subversion operations elsewhere, particularly in south\vestern 
Ontario. These counter-subversion operations traversed three periods of activity: the 
early years 1920-28: an interlude/ intelligence crisis \Vhich led to a debacle in 1931; and 
a period of reestablishing the intelligence network and an intensification of its counter-
subversion work from 1932 -1939. Each period in question was characterized by 
specitic types of intelligence network 'organization' and 'operation'. 
l:vly study of the rise, fall, and recovery of"'O" Division's core inter-war Toronto 
CPC intelligence network, examines the context in which the transformation took place 
linking it to the region's industrial and political order. I explain why intelligence 
networks, like the organizations they seek to infiltrate and the individuals whose 
activities they try to monitor, are anything but static and instead function as a part of the 
communities in which they live and face similar constraints. Intelligence networks 
expand and contract and shift both their investigative and operational focus. Their field 
investigations are malleable; their size, scope, and activities change for economic 
reasons and to meet both 'real' and 'perceived' threats. As local constructs intelligence 
networks are often best studied as a series of interactions established at the Divisional 
level. 
The expansion, contraction, and transformation of"O" Division's key Toronto 
intelligence network influenced the types and quality of the information they secured. 
How intelligence networks functioned and how effective they were reflected the extent 
to which intelligence personnel adapted. Through much of the inter-war period "0'' 
Division relied heavily upon the work of secret/ special agents. Sometimes, however, 
less obtrusive and more distant forms of surveillance activity best suited the needs of 
intelligence personnel. A great deal depended upon their abilities. Success was also 
dictated by many other factors such as the abilities ofCPC stalwarts and their subsidiary 
organizations. Only by paying close attention to these issues can we gain a more 
complete and accurate historical record of Canada· s intelligence past. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction to the Studv 
The following study examines Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCNfP) inter-war 
surveillance and repression ofthe Communist Party of Canada (CPC), primarily in Toronto, 
but also extends the discussion to include features of counter-subversion operations 
elsewhere in southwestern Ontario. My central thesis is that these operations traversed three 
periods of activity: 1) the early years 1920-1928; 2) an intelligence interlude from 1928-1931 
and; 3) a period of reestablishing the intelligence network and an intensification of 
operations from 1932-1939. Each period was characterized by a specific emphasis placed 
on certain types of intelligence work. These operations changed in terms of their size, scope, 
and shifted the focus of their activities, for economic reasons and to meet both 'real' and 
'perceived' threats. Like a Greek tragedy - a play in three acts - 'With a rise, fall and 
recovery, by the end of the inter-war period Toronto intelligence personnel had returned to 
their earlier modus operandi, namely a primary reliance on penetration agents run inside key 
party branches in the months prior to World War II. 
This study is organized in a chronological, rather than thematic, fashion. Following 
a brief introduction and literature survey it begins with an examination of the political, 
economic and social events which lead to the establishment of Toronto-based Western 
Ontario "0" Division in 1920. It ends in the fall of 1939 because the War demarcated an 
emerging new era in the Division's domestic intelligence history. At that critical juncture 
many of the organizations the intelligence section previously had targeted for two decades 
were outlawed and many members of these illegal bodies were forced to establish 
themselves underground or to leave the country. The fall of 1939 was a period of 
tremendous change for the Division 'With a rapid increase in personnel as hundreds ofRC:MP 
Reserves were hired and they joined the anti-subversive squads that roamed the province and 
protected strategic sites. A new security branch was also established 'Within the Criminal 
Investigation Branch (CIB) which separated personnel who conducted political policing 
1 
from those who conducted other investigations. This change at the Division was an 
extension of changes that had taken place several years earlier at Ottawa National 
Headquarters (NHQ). 
If a scholar was primarily concerned with international intelligence questions, rather 
than end the study in 1939, he might instead have chosen to adopt 1945 and the defection 
of Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko as the ideal ending point. However, such a decision 
would surely miss the larger claim that this study makes which is simply that domestic 
events at the regional and local level mattered enormously. Most intelligence decisions are 
made at the Division level, where operations often rise and falL Intelligence organizations 
and the networks they establish do not operate in a historical vacuum but as part of the local 
communities in which they live and exist. Thus their history deserves to be studied at this 
level from the "bottom up" and not simply viewed as the outcome of decisions taken by 
elites. 
The study of intelligence has not kept pace with the tremendous intrusion by the state 
and private agencies into the lives of citizens. 1 In fact, intelligence studies as a clearly 
recognizable field of academic enterprise only had its modem origins in the 1970s and the 
Canadian field is arguably even a more recent phenomenon. Although Canadians have 
engaged in secret intelligence operations for well over a century, they still know relatively 
little about their intelligence organizations. 2 We have nothing comparable to the remarkable 
Special Branch I W5 literature nicely surveyed in the 1980s by Bernard Porter with its 
'See Wesley K Wark, "The Intelligence Revolution and the Future," Queen's Ouarterlv 100,2 
(Summer 1993), 273-287; Wesley K Wark, "Introduction: The Fin-de-Siecle Phenomenon," in A Stuart 
Farson, David Stafford and Wesley Wark, Security and Intelligence In a Changing World (London, 1991 ), 2-
9; and Reg Whitaker, The End of Privacy (Toronto, 1999). 
2A point made in several writings, notably, Wesley Wark, "Security Intelligence in Canada, 1864-
1945: The History of a 'National Insecurity State,"' in Keith Neilson and B.JC. McKecher [eds.] Go Sov 
the Land: Military Intelligence in History (Westport, Conn., and London, 1992), 153; Carl Betke and S. W. 
Horrall, Canada's Security Service: An Historical Outline, 186-1-1966 (Unpublished, R.C.M.P. Historical 
Section, Ottawa, 1978), released by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in response to 
Access-to-Information request, 117-90-107; ix; John Sawatsky, Men In The Shadows: The RCMP Securitv 
Service (Toronto, 1980), xi-xii. 
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healthy mix of internal writings to its popularization by writers like Nigel West, and the 
work of its critics. 3 John Sawatsky's study Men In The Shadows, the published work which 
most closely resembles such a treatment, is by its own admission an incomplete story.'~ It 
paid very little attention to the early history of the security service and unconvincingly 
argued that structural reform and greater accountability was a solution for past intelligence 
shortcomings. 5 Lome and Caroline Brown's An Unauthorized Historv ofthe RCMP, was a 
project begun when fewer sources were available. It had as its primary objective to counter 
the Force's planned 1973 centennial celebrations. Although written for a broader audience 
it was a provocative and thoughtful study that deserved the wide readership it gained. It was 
extremely critical ofthe Force's operations, but in the final instance was concerned with the 
Force's actions against the groups it targeted and said very little about the institutional 
history of intelligence work.6 A third study that qualifies as a published history of the 
security service, Graeme S. Mount's Canada's Enemies: Spying in the Peaceable Kingdom, 
is largely anecdotal. 7 Its primary contribution is in its treatment of other foreign services' 
agents operating on Canadian soil and has very little new to say about RC!vfl' intelligence 
operations. 
In addition to the published monographs that have contributed to our understanding 
3Porter, "The Historiography of the Early Special Branch," 381-394; Nigel West, MIS: British 
Security Operations 1909- 1945 (New York, 1982); Nigel West, The Circus MI5 Operations 1945-1972 
(New York, 1983 ). 
4Sawatsky, Men In The Shadows; He also published For Services Rendered: Leslie James Bennett 
and the RCMP Security Service (Toronto, 1982) and Gouzenko: the untold storv (Toronto, 1984). 
5Unlike other writers Sawatsky failed to address the larger question about the co-existence of a 
political police and true and meaningful democracy Richard Fiddler, RCMP: The Real Subversives (Toronto, 
1978). 
6Lorne and Caroline Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP (Toronto, 1973); Lome 
Brown has also written When Freedom Was Lost: The Unemployed. the Agitator. and the State (Montreal, 
1987). 
7Graeme S. Mount, Canada's Enemies: Spies and Spying in the Peaceable Kingdom (Toronto, 
1993). 
of Canada's intelligence past are several internal unpublished studies. The most important 
of these is RCMP historians Carl Betke's and Stan Horrall's Canada's Security Service: An 
Historical Outline. 186-1-1966, produced in the 1970s as part of the Force's course materials 
for secret service training. 8 This study suffers from a number of problems. Most signiticant 
is its inherent bias that suggests Canadians were well served by their security service, a 
thesis overturned by the McDonald Commission and several journalistic accounts produced 
as the Force historians were completing their internal study. 9 
The emerging Canadian security and intelligence field remains fragmented, uneven, 
and riddled with major gaps. Stuart Farson and Wesley Wark have each offered 
historiographical overviews of the field's evolution and between them they have identified 
about a halt:dozen approaches. 10 I favour a simpler typology that keeps politics at the centre 
of the field's evolution. I believe that the Canadian field has gone through a similar 
8Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, ix; Larry Hannant, "Access to the Inside: An 
Assessment of 'Canada's Security Service: A History,"' Intelligence and National Security 8,3 (1993), 149-
159; A good number of agencies elsewhere have embarked on similar programs at various stages in their 
evolution; see Gerald Haines, "The CIA's Own Effort to Understand and Document Its Past: A Brief 
History of the CIA History Program, 1950- 1995," Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew [Eds.J 
Eternal Vigilance? 50 years of the CIA (London, 1997), 201-223. 
9Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (Ottawa, 1981 ); (Hereinafter cited as McDonald Commission); Robert Dion, Crimes Of The Secret 
Police (Montreal, 1982); Fiddler, RCMP: The Real Subversives; Jeff Sallot, Nobody Said No: The Real 
Story about How the Mounties Always Get Their ?v!an (Toronto, 1979); William Edward Mann and John 
Alan Lee, RCMP vs. The People: Inside Canada's Security Intelligence Service (Don Mills, 1979); On its 
successor organization, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) see Richard Cleroux, Official 
Secrets: The Story Behind The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Toronto, 1990); James Littleton, 
Target Nation: Canada and the Western Intelligence Network (Toronto, 1986); Jack Granatstein and David 
Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnot (Toronto, 1990). 
10Stuart Farson, "Schools of Thought: National Perceptions of Intelligence," Conflict Quarterly 
9,2(1989), 52-1 04; Wesley Wark, "Introduction: The Study of Espionage: Past, Present, Future?" 
Intelligence and National Security 8,3 (1993), 1-14; Farson identified seven areas of study: I) fiction (or 
fictive elements), 2) official documents, 3) semi-official documents, 4) unsanctioned accounts, 5) reports and 
documentaries in the media, 6) special interest studies and, 7) those studies attempting the 'big picture' such 
as cross-disciplinary and comparative perspectives; Wark identified five directions: 1) 'research' projects, 2) 
'historical' projects, 3) 'definitional' projects 4) 'investigative journalism' projects and; 5) 'popular culture' 
projects. 
4 
evolution to its richer US and British counterparts. The major difference is simply the tield' s 
depth which is both a reflection of the size of the academic community and is also driven 
by the size and kinds of services operating in the countries themselves. The Canadian field 
has gone through a pioneering phase with internal studies and piecemeal accounts by the 
Force's supporters, followed by a series of revisionist accounts much more critical of the 
agencies concerned. More recent still, is a post-revisionist phase that has benefited from 
access to new sources or has adopted new methodologies to challenge past assumptions. 
Having already considered the major monographs which span the entire history of Canada's 
intelligence past I will now provide a sketch of the other writings that have contributed 
significantly to the field with a primary focus on the domestic side of activities up until 
World War II. 
Most early writings that focussed on Canada's nineteenth-century intelligence 
operations did so as part of a larger project. 11 Therefore, they failed to provide more than a 
cursory overview of intelligence matters. Conservative historian Donald Creighton's 
biographies of Canada's first Prime Minister, biographies by other conservative and liberal 
thinkers on subsequent Prime Ministers, political elites, and some studies that touch upon 
the transnational aspects of the 19m Century Irish National movement are representative. 
Often this work has suggested that Gilbert McMicken, who headed the Western Frontier 
Constabulary (WFC) 1864-1867 and the Dominion Police (DP) 1868-1920, and John A 
Macdonald, his political boss, effectively 'managed' the early crisis' they encountered. 12 
11Again this is where the Canadian field is excruciatingly thin when compared to the US and British 
counterpart. 
12See C.P. Stacey, "Fenianism and the rise of National Feeling in Canada at the Time of 
Confederation," Canadian Historical Review, 12 (1931), 238-261; William D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in 
the United States: 1858-1886 (The Catholic University of America Press, 1949, Rpt New York, 1971 ); W. 
S. Neidhart, Fenianism in North Ameria (Philadelphia, 1975); Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald. The 
Young Politician (Toronto, 1952); K.RM. Short, The Dvnamite War (Dublin, 1979); S.W. Horrall, 
·'Canada's Security Service: A Brief History," RCMP Ouarterlv, 50,3 (1985) 38-49; for an alternative view 
see JeffKeshen, "Cloak and Dagger: Canada West's Secret Police, 1864-1867," Ontario Historv. 79,4 
(1987), 353-382. 
5 
Early concern with Irish Nationalists, incursions on both sides of the border during the US 
Civil War, and the Riel uprisings, led in the 1870s the federal government of Canada's to 
establish a Secret Service fund, that was also used for political purposes. 13 There is a 
substantial literature concerning Canada and Britain's most famous l91h century spy, Thomas 
Beach, who operated under the alias Henri Le Caron, including an autobiography, a 
biography, and another study by one of his early handlers who was British, not Canadian. 14 
Early Canadian intelligence services served many purposes. In addition to helping 
fulfil national objectives set by central Canadian elites they also originally functioned as part 
of Great Britain's imperial surveillance networks to maintain its EmpireY Canadian 
intelligence organizations have not only cooperated with the services of other western 
capitalist countries but also watched their activities and had theirs and Canadians' activities 
monitored by them. Working to assist the Empire is a theme nicely captured in the work of 
Richard Popplewell. 16 Surveillance activities targeting Sikhs during an attempt to emigrate 
to Canada in a slightly later period is effectively treated by the work of Hugh Johnston. 17 
Cooperation, competition, and integration between services and the role of 
technology and signals intelligence versus human intelligence are the central themes in the 
13Wayne Crockatt, "The Uses and Abuses of the Secret Service Fund: The Political Dimensions of 
Police Work in Canada, 1864-1877," MA thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1982. 
14Major Henri Le Caron, Twentv-Five Years in The Secret Service: The Recollections of a Spy 
(London, 1892); Sir Robert Anderson, Sidelights On The Home Rule Movement (London, 1906); J.A Cole, 
Prince of Spies (London, 1984); Kealey, "The Empire Strikes Back," 1-12. 
15Stacey, "Fenianism"; Keshen, "Cloak and Dagger" 
16Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and The Defence of 
the Indian Empire (London, 1995); See also his "The Surveillance ofindian 'Seditionists' in North America, 
1905-1915," in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes [eds.] Intelligence and International Relations 
1900-1945 (Exeter, 1987), 49-76; and his "The Surveillance of Indian Revolutionaries in Great Britain and 
on the Continent, 1903-1914," Intelligence and National Securitv 3,1 (1998); and his, "British Intelligence in 
Mesopotamia, 1914-1916," in Handel, Michael [ed.] Intelligence and Militarv Operations (London, 1990). 
17Hugh Johnston, The Voyage of the Komagata Maru: The Sikh Challenge to Canada's Colour Bar 
(Delhi, 1979); also his, "The Surveillance of Indian Nationalists in North America, 1908-1918," BC Studies, 
78 (1988), 3-27. 
6 
Canadian angle on the international intelligence literature. Much of the literature 
demonstrates that foreign political movements have operated networks of agents on 
Canadian soil, that foreign agents have also established a base in Canada as a weigh station 
to gain entry into the US, and that they have also succeeded in coopting Canadians to 
penetrate sensitive areas of American research in science, industry and the military. 18 
Canada's participation in the international intelligence community was examined by Jeffery 
Richelson and Desmond Ball, while Peter St. John has suggested how during World War IT 
the balance of power in the Atlantic-Triangle shifted to the US. 19 Much of Canada's role in 
the international intelligence community begins with World War II with Sir William 
Stephenson's BSC office in New York, the Manhattan project, Camp X, mass-production 
of deadly germs like anthrax at Grosse Ile and the establishment of the first germ warfare 
station among the western capitalist countries. The literature on these subjects is growing 
and subject to significant revision.20 
Since Canada did not have a foreign intelligence agency and since much of the 
RCI\1P's targeting concerned domestic organizations naturally the strength of the Canadian 
field resides in the study of intelligence operations that have targeted Canadians. The most 
prolific period of study in this respect has been World War I and the years immediately 
following. This scholarship has centered on the role of the Canadian state, and its 
18Littleton, Target Nation; Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage. 11, 18; John Price Jones and Paul 
Merrick Hollister, The German Secret Service In America. 1914- 1918 (Toronto, 1918), esp. 60-81; Phillip 
Knightly, The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Patriot. Bureaucrat. Fantasist and Whore (London, 
1986), 101; Ladislas Farago, The Game OfThe Foxes: The Untold Storv of German Espoinage in the 
United States and Great Britain During World War II (New York, 1971). 
19Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind (North Sydney, 1985); Peter St. John, 
"Canada's Ascension to the Allied Intelligence Community, 1940-1945," Conflict Quarterly. 4, (Fall1984). 
2
'navid Stafford, Camp X: The Incredible and True Story of Canada's School for Secret Agents 
1941-1945 (Toronto, 1986); John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War. 1937- 1947 (Toronto, 
1989); William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (New York, 1976); William Stevenson, Intrepid's Last 
Case (New York, 1983); Richard Cleroux, Official Secrets: The Inside Story of The Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (Toronto, 1990); Michael Frost and Michael Gratton, Spyworld: Inside Canada's 
Security Establishment {Toronto, 1994). 
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involvement in postwar class conflict. 21 Several genres dominate the field in this period and 
they include: memoirs and autobiographical studies by former Force personnel, a 
journalistic account and academic investigation. Of the three groups, the least-satisfying 
assessments ofthe RCNIP's intelligence work have been the anecdotal accounts written by 
former Mounties themselves. They are biased and allot little space to counter-subversion 
operations.22 For instance, Clifford Harvison's study grossly exaggerates his successes in 
intelligence matters, a fact not overlooked by scholars. 23 Journalists James Dubro and Robin 
Rowland favorably examined the career ofFrank Zaneth, an RNWMP (then RC:MP) agent. 
However, their study covers familiar territory as it moves forward in time and in its 
treatment of the 1920s and 1930s adds very little to our understanding of political police 
work. 24 
Gregory S. Kealey has assessed the intelligence apparatus' structure, and the 
21Gregory S. Kealey, "Introduction," in Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker [eds.] RC.M.P. 
Security Bulletins. 1919-1929 (StJohn's, 1995), 9-19; Gregory S. Kealey, "The Early Years of State 
Surveillance of Labour and the Left in Canada: The Institutional Framework of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police Security and Intelligence Apparatus, 1918- 26"', Intelligence and National Security 8,3 ( 1993 ), 129-
48; Gregory S. Kealey, "State Repression of Labour and the Left in Canada, 1914-1920: The Impact of the 
First World War," Canadian Historical Review 73,3 (1992), 179-210; Gregory S. Kealey, "The Surveillance 
State: The Origins of Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in Canada, 1914-21," Intelligence and 
National Security 7,3 (1992), 179-21 0; S.W. Horrall, "The Royal North-West Mounted Police and Labour 
Unrest in Western Canada, 1919," Canadian Historical Review 61,2 (1980), 169-190. 
22Charles Rivett-Carnac, Pursuit in the Wilderness (Boston and Toronto, 1965); Vernon AM. 
Kemp, Scarlett And Stetson: The Royal North-West Mounted Police on the Prairies (Toronto, 1964); 
Vernon AM. Kemp, Without Fear. Favour or Affection: Thirtv-Five Years with the RCMP (Toronto, 
1958); RS.S. Wilson, Undercover For The RCMP (Victoria, 1986) discusses his CIB work in the 1930s in 
greater detail than most; William Kelly with Nora Hickson Kelly, Policing In Wartime: One Mountie's Story 
(Regina, 1999); William Kelly with Nora Hickson Kelly, Policing the Fringe: A Young Mountie's Story 
(Regina, 1999); Alan Phillips, The Living Legend: The Story Of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(Boston, 1954). 
23Granatstein and Stafford, Spv Wars, 27. 
24James Dubre and Robin Rowland, Undercover: Cases of the RCl\IP's Most Secret Operative 
(Toronto, 1991 ). 
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operational work of its constituent branches. 25 In addition, he has begun to explore the 
Force's intelligence linkages to other government departments as well as its ties to 
intelligence organizations in Great Britain and the US. 26 Together with Reg Whitaker he has 
edited and published a multi-volume series of RNWMP/ RCMP Securitv Bulletins (SBs) 
from 1919 through 1945. Introductions in the series provide additional infonnation on the 
Force's intelligence past. They include an examination of the massive file sets the RC1v1P 
compiled. They explore issues surrounding their construction and their geographic 
representation, as well as the Personal History Files (PHFs) opened on agitators. 
Furthennore, they flesh out more infonnation on key agents and other RCMP personnel 
during the inter-war period, and their complex relationship with their political bosses.27 
Historian Mark Leier published a study of early agent Robert Gosden and other 
scholars have concerned themselves with the operations of special agent Sergeant John 
Leopold (aka J.W. Esselwein). In particular, Leier concentrated on Gosden's ties to the 
labour movement and to mysticism. His study also serves as a introductory primer to 
encourage future research on related topics. Where it is thin is in its exploration ofGosden's 
relationship to others serving in the Division in an intelligence capacity and in its 
examination of the Division and particularly its CIB. An article by Gregory S. Kealey and 
2sGregory S. Kealey, "Filing and Defiling: The Organization of the State Security Archives in the 
Interwar Years," in Franca Iacovetta and Wendy Mitchinson [eds.] On the Case: Explorations In Social 
History (Toronto, 1998), 88-108. 
26Gregory S. Kealey, "The RC:MP, the Special Branch, and the Early Days of the Communist Party 
of Canada: A Documentary Article," Labour/ Le Travail 30 (1992), 169- 204. 
27Kealey and Whitaker, [eds.] The Early Years; Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker [eds.] 
R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Depression Years. Part L 1933-1934 (St. John's, 1993); Gregory S. 
Kealey and Reg Whitaker [eds.] R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Depression Years. Part II. 1935 (St. 
John's, 1995); Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker [eds.] R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Depression 
Years Part lli 1936 (St. John's. 1996); Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker [eds.] RC.M.P. Security 
Bulletins: The Depression Years. Part N. 1937 (St. John's, 1997); Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker 
[eds.] R.C.M.P. Securitv Bulletins: The Depression Years. Part V. 1938-1939 (St. John's, 1997); Gregory 
S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker [eds.] R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The War Series. Part I. 1939-1941 (St. 
John's, 1989); Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker [eds.] R.C.MP. Security Bulletins: The War Series. 
Part IT. 1942-1945 (St. John's, 1993). 
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of suspected agitators to be supervised by the Divisions' senior officers and to include such 
particulars as: the name, age, occupation, home address, and a brief description of the 
subject in question, as well as their associations and peculiar habits. The second set 
concerned revolutionary organizations (designated 175) and the third was a file system for 
revolutionary literature (designated 177). 119 By the fall of 1919 these file sets were joined 
by weekly intelligence bulletins generated for Borden's Cabinet and senior officials in other 
departments as well as for the Force's own personnel. The idea for these files had likely 
originated overseas and had likely been patterned on those sets first devised by the Royal 
Irish Constabulary (RIC), the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP), and the London 
Metropolitan as well as Britain's Home Office to keep tabs on Irish Nationalists. The weekly 
intelligence bulletins produced for Cabinet in Canada beginning in the fall of 1919 had been 
instituted in Britain the previous year by Basil Thomson, the head of Scotland Yard. 120 
With a filing system entrenched in the CIB by early 1919 there was a rapid increase 
in the months ahead in the political work being conducted. Newton Rowell insisted that all 
labour organizations be investigated, including those conservative ones such as the AFL with 
the goal of separating out individuals who advocated revolutionary change through armed 
insurrection from those individuals who favoured reform. By the time the Western Labour 
Conference met in Calgary in March the Force had infiltrated many important centres of 
revolutionary activity in Western Canada. Undercover agents, either the Force's own, or 
those hired by private firms, and informants in several instances soon rose to positions of 
authority. They provided the CIB with detailed intelligence on events taking place in the 
revolutionary movement. The IWW, the One Big Union (OBU) were both targeted in this 
manner, as were many other organizations. 121 
119Kealey, "introduction," in Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Early Years, 13-15. 
120Porter, Plots and Paranoia, 146. 
mon the OBU see, David Jay Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men: The Rise and Fall of the One Big 
Union (Toronto, 1978). 
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Reco~:,rnizing the intense level of industrial contlict then aft1icting the country a 
labour sub-committee recommended to cabinet, that a Royal Commission on Industrial 
Relations (RCIR) be established to tour the country to hear testimony from workers, 
manufacturers and other organizations and private citizens. Cabinet accepted the 
recommendation and the RCIR under Manitoba Justice T.G. Mathers identified many 
grievances labour organizations had when it traveled to city after city in mid-1919 holding 
hearings in centres such as Cobalt, Sudbury, Sarnia, London, Hamilton, Kitchener and 
Toronto. In total, 137 representatives of various organizations and individuals at these 
centres spoke on issues such as the high cost of living and the terrible conditions which 
plagued industrial relations and society in general. 122 
A massive wave of industrial unrest commenced in the late spring and carried into 
the summer of 1919 as the RCIR was winding down its hearings. The Commissioners' report 
eventually recommended some "sweeping reforms" but was basically too little, too late. 123 
As of 15 May 1919, thousands of workers had downed their tools and walked off their jobs 
in Winnipeg in the building and metal trades and for the next six weeks the city was 
paralyzed by a general strike. Similar strikes erupted across the country. They were all part 
of an even larger international revolt even if the character of class conflict in each city had 
its own peculiar flavour. By this point intelligence networks were operating in all major 
western Canadian centres. The Manitoba networks were being run from "D" Division's 
Winnipeg headquarters by Sergeant Albert E. Reames. Many others (like Reames) who 
would play an important role in Toronto in the years that followed at "0" Division were also 
earning their stripes out west during these now familiar events. 12~ 
122Royal Commission on Industrial Relations (RCIR), 
123
"Royal Commission Hands In Report," The Labor News, 4 July I 9I 9, I. 
124For various arguments and interpretations on this event see especially Craig Heron [ed.] The 
Workers' Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925 (Toronto, 1998); Gregory S. Kealey, Workers and Canadian Historv 
(Montreal, 1995); also the second edition of David J. Bercuson, Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour 
Industrial Relations. and the General Strike (Rpt. Montreal, 1990). 
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After the bloody Winnipeg General Strike was ended, on 5 August 1919 Perry met 
with Borden to discuss the subject of federal police services. At the meeting Borden 
informed the Commissioner that the Government "was concerned as to conditions in Canada 
resulting from general unrest in the World and the pernicious propaganda which is being 
carried on, distinctly revolutionary in its tendency." He informed Perry that the idea of 
extending the RNWNIP throughout Canada with the amalgamation of the DP had been 
floated around Ottawa. He believed it would increase the efficiency of the service 
generally. 125 Perry left the meeting under orders to provide a blueprint sketching the 
possibilities for the establishment of a new national policing agency. 
In his final report Perry recommended that one individual be made responsible for 
all police services. He should be the "sole executive head" and report to a single Minister. 
This policy, Perry felt, should happen without delay. He presented two options to carry this 
out: 
First. Bringing under one Minister the R.N. W.M. Police and Dominion 
police and appointing one officer to the command of both, leaving each Force 
with its present jurisdiction, duties, and executive head. Second. Amalgamating 
both Forces into one, which might take the form of the absorption of one by the 
other. 126 
After weighing the positive and negative sides to both services Perry concluded that the 
country's interests would be best served by "extending the jurisdiction of the Royal North 
West Mounted Police Force throughout Canada" and that the DP should be absorbed into 
the RNWMP and made responsible for guarding public buildings. 127 
Perry also recommended that Eastern Canada be divided into four Districts: Western 
Ontario with headquarters at Toronto, Eastern Ontario with headquarters at Ottawa, Quebec 
125NAC RG 18 vol. 83-4/321 Box1 file G-2-6(1951), Commissioner Perry to Prime Minister 
Borden, 7 August 1919. 
126ibid. 
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with a headquarters at Montreal and the Maritime provinces with a headquarters at Moncton. 
Each district would be placed under the command of an officer. He also suggested that "To 
each district should be assigned such strength as may be found necessary, with as many 
Secret Agents as may be required." The total personnel strength required to maintain order 
in Eastern Canada needed to be set at a minimum of 1200. He also recommended that the 
headquarters of the Force be moved to Ottawa from where the Officer in Command would 
have full control and management of the Force under the minister. 128 Borden and Rowell 
accepted Perry's recommendations which served as the basis for the nationalization of the 
Force. The final report took affect as of 1 February 1920. 129 
With the passage of the RCNIP Act 188 new detachments were established East of 
the Manitoba boundary. Article ten (from a PC amendment) called for the division into 
districts all of Canada under the command of a senior officer "with suitable rank, according 
to the responsibilities and the number of men detailed for the district" in a manner similar 
to operations currently existing in Western Canada. The DOCs would report directly to 
Ottawa Headquarters. In time, each Division assigned to a district more often would be 
commanded by an officer of the rank of at least Superintendent. Superintendents would be 
provided with a staff officer who would also perform the duties of "District Adjutant, 
Paymaster and Quartermaster. " 130 With nationalization, the Depot (training centre) remained 
1~AC RG 18 vol. 3154/ 458(1920) Organization of Charges, Commissioner Perry's Report, 2 
January 1920. 
130ibid.; S.W. Horrall, "The Maritime Provinces District," RCl'vfP Quarterly 42,1 (Winter 1977), 5-
9: There were three Divisions established in Eastern Canada and from 1 920 until l December 1931 the 
Maritime command was of a slightly reduced status and known as a "District" not Division. As of the later 
date it became part of an expanded "C" Division which included the Eastern Arctic and Quebec which 
became known as the "Quebec and Maritime Provinces District". It only lasted as such for a few weeks and 
then eventually emerged as "H'' District in April 1932, with three Divisions for each of the Maritime 
provinces within it and the following year was broken up again with separate Divisions in each province. 
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in Regina, while the Supply Store was removed to NHQ in Ottawa. 131 
The RCMP Act's importance in repositioning personne I was phenomenal. The series 
of promotions and transfers that took place became the most significant opportunity for 
Perry to reward those individuals whom he felt had given undivided service to the institution 
during his long tenure as Commissioner. The process led to the establishment of a 
permanent, national police force, with a political police division within its CIB. Almost 
overnight the plans made to absorb the DP in the new organization meant that Canada had 
largely adopted the Irish model for its national police force. Whereas the DP was a civilian 
force the RNW1v1P had its roots in military style training. Whereas the British system of 
policing was rooted in the tradition of the local constabulary, the RCM.P model, like that of 
the Royal Irish Constabulary, favoured the uprooting and movement of personnel to 
Divisions where they had little personal attachment where they would serve for a few years 
at a time and then be uprooted and transferred again. 
Once public, news of the Force's intended expansion met with a cool reception by 
Canadian labour. In the pages of the One Big Union Bulletin, an author spoke frankly of"a 
once proud Force with some romance when the bold riders of the plains protected the 
sparsely settled districts against armed outlaws or cattle thieves ... " which was substantially 
transfonned. "Now the riders of the plains act as detectives, ransack newspaper offices, 
break into houses at night and frighten women and children. Once the R.N.W.M.P. were 
popular heroes: Now they are the gendarmes of a discredited government." Democracy in 
Canada functioned effectively for about two percent of society was the main thrust of the 
article and largely on account of the Force's activities. This author took brief solace only in 
the fact that "recruiting has been temporarily stopped" in the fall of 1919 since workers were 
worn down, tired from the war and mostly resting. Furthermore, he added, "[L ]ittle wonder 
that the men back from the front are not keen to join a force that may be called upon to shoot 
131NAC RG 18 vol. 3154/ 458(1920) Organization of Charges, Commissioner Perry's Report, 2 
January 1920. 
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down their comrades." m 
Cartoons also appeared with Mounties buttressing federal authorities and the arrested 
leaders of the Winnipeg General Strike in jail, both sides faced off against one another with 
the Minister of Justice saying "Ifi let you out will you be quiet?" 133 Another article in the 
Industrial Banner months later declared "Canada's Spy System In Full Operation." Its author 
accused the federal government of adopting "Kaiser Methods" to "Spot Citizens" and noted 
that the "Canadian Cossacks"went well beyond the limited scope of the "stool pigeon'' and 
rather acted as agent provocateurs. He quoted Winnipeg Alderman, and soon elected NiP, 
A.A. Heaps as stating that "This once proud force is being used for no other purpose than 
as a government tool in the interests of the employers of Canada. " 134 
In the Winnipeg General Strike trials that followed, the court room was transformed 
into a theatre of class warfare. As many progressives subsequently noted, it turned out to be 
little more than a "show trial" whose outcome was largely predetermined. During the trial 
further evidence of the NWMP's domestic spy system was revealed when Frank Zaneth, an 
undercover operative and member of the Force and several others like Sergeant Reames 
appeared as lead witnesses in the Crown's prosecution. Times had permanently changed in 
industrial relations in Canada and certainly had taken a tum for the worse. By 1920 with its 
new RCMP the Canadian establishment had a new weapon in its arsenal against Canadian 
labour. 
2.2 
The Rise of "0" Division 
under the 1920 RCMP Act. 
By January 1920 plans to nationalize the Force were already well under way. Three new 
132
"Democracy! (2%) XXX," The One Big Union Bulletin, 6 September 1919, 3. 
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Divisions and a Maritime District were to be up and running the following month bringing 
the total to eleven. 135 From offices above a postal outlet in downtown Toronto at the corner 
ofYonge Street and Charles Street "0" Division's RHQ would function through most of the 
1920s. 136 One major task confronting the Division's senior personnel was the establishment 
of a series of detachments throughout the southwestern portion of the province. 137 This 
cluster ofRClvfP offices would also double as nodes in the district's intelligence networks. 
It was from these detachments and subdistrict headquarters that constables would be sent 
out to monitor the activities of communists and other leftists. 
Officially transfers to "0" Division did not take place until the first week of May, 
when under RCMP General Order (G.O.) #296 eighteen personnel from Depot under the 
command of Staff Sergeant Walter Munday (who figures prominently later in this study), 
and five others from HQ, K, G, D, and N Divisions, arrived to establish the new Division. 138 
usNAC RG 18 vol. 3154/ 458(1920) Organization of Charges, Commissioner Perry to Comptroller, 
16 January 1920; Horrall, "The Maritime Provinces District". 
136RC'MP, Annual Report 1925, 33. Notes that in addition to RHQ, the single men were "suitably 
housed" in an upper floor of the Postal Station on Yonge Street as well. 
137ibid., 1920, 8. 
138RCMP, General Orders Part ll, Fiche 296-602, 08.05.20- 17.07.20, (Hereafter throughout 
study cited as RC:MP G.O.) G.O. 296, May 8, 1920. A complete list of the transfers to date from 1-5-20. 
From "Depot" to "0" Division is provided below. 
"0" Division Personnel 
Bv Name. Rank. and Location: May 1920 
Inspector W.J. Beyts 
Reg.No. Rank Name. 
A) Depot Div. 
2566 S/Sgt. Wilson, J.J. 
5740 S/Sgt. Darling, H. 
4493 Sergt. Birtwistle, A 
5491 Corp!. Whebell, C.J. 
6454 Const. Lynch, T.F. 








S/Sgt. Munday, W. 
Sergt. Macmillan, C.R 
Const. Atkins. L.R 
Const. Authier, L.P. 
Const. Elmore, W.W. 
For many from Depot the change in landscape alone, the return to the urban environment 
pumping with the pulse of the national economy, was a nice improvement over the harsh 
bleak and barren space with few trees. 139 
While these transfers took place in the spring several others had arrived well in 
advance to lay the groundwork for the Division. From the outset Division personnel were 
ordered to keep a watchful eye over the area and to report any suspicious comings and 
goings of organizers and speakers into their district. 140 The following section sets the context 
in which these activities took place by considering the towns selected for detachment sites. 
It briefly examines the political and industrial landscape of the places chosen and assesses 
how the arrival of the new agency was received at several locations. 
Ontario had undergone enormous change in the two decades after 1900. In fact, its 
northernmost boundary had only been recently extended to the Hudson Bay. 141 In these years 
the province was being transformed and its changes reflected those taking place throughout 
most of Eastern Canada as citizens were moving from rural to urban areas as part of a more 
integrated national economy. W.R. Young estimated that 200,000 people left rural Southern 
8272 Const. Wiebe, A. 
8673 Const. Simpson, F. 
8840 Const. Barnett, J.H. 
8976 Const Phillips, F.L. 
B) Elsewhere 
4693 S/Sgt. Millar, RM. 
3322 Sergt. McLaughlan, L. 
4919 Sergt. Joy, AH. 
5123 Sergt. Fish, G.W. 
9195 Sergt. Fahy, T. 
8769 
8936 
Const. Samson, F.A 
Const. Lea, RF. 
from Hdqrs to "0" Div'n 
K to"O" 
"" G to"O" 
" " D to "0" 
"" N to"O" 
13~vett-Carnac, Pursuit in the Wilderness, 174-175. 
1~AC RG 18, vol. 3 770 G 509-67, Circular Memorandum #807, 6 January 1919. 
1 ~ 1 Robert Bothwell, A Short Historv of Ontario (Edmonton, 1986), 97. 
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Ontario in the decade after 1901 and the following decade another 154,000. 142 This ongoing 
process of urbanization was largely the result of changes in agriculture and advances in new 
manufacturing, mass production, and mechanization of industry. 143 New corporations had 
emerged. A wave of mergers had followed. Even in the years just before World War I 
change was apparent. For instance, as Tom T raves noted, between 1909-1913, 221 firms 
with over $200 million in assets had been consolidated in 97 mergers, while the number of 
major corporations with over $1 million in annual sales had gro\ffi as well. In 1901 there 
were 39, in 1911, 150 and by 1921,410. Collectively they had accounted for 15 per cent of 
the country's manufacturing in 1901 and this number had increased to 51 per cent by 
1921. 144 
The RCN1P was a part of this transformation. It was an important part of the 
transition to a more integrated corporatized capitalist economy. The Force arrived in the 
southwestern Ontario corridor at this particular juncture in the region's history and was a 
stabilizing factor and at the same time marked a point of change, a departure in class 
relations as it established operations in various cities and to'-ffis. 145 Coercion in this new era 
of corporations, taylorism and the removal of skills also created spies, blacklists, company 
14~.R Young, "Conscription, Rural Depopulation, and the Farmers of Ontario, I 917 -1919," 
Canadian Historical Review 53 (September I 972), 318-319, cited in Naylor, The New Democracy. 122. 
143Changes are captured nicely in John Herd Thompson with Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1939: 
Decades of Discord (Toronto, 1986), 347; Jacob Spelt, Urban Development in South-Central Ontario (Rpt., 
Toronto, 1972), 180. 
144Tom Traves, The State and Enterprise: Canadian Manufacturers and the Federal Government 
1917-1931 (Toronto, 1979), l-12. 
145Craig Heron, "The Crisis of the Craftsman: Hamilton's Metal Workers in the Early Twentieth 
Century," Labour/ Le Travailleur. 6 (1980), 10; Robert Storey, "Unionization Versus Corporate Welfare: 
The 'Dofasco Way"' Labour/ Le Travailleur 12 (1983), 1 0-12; Craig Heron, "Hamilton Steelworkers and 
the Rise of Mass Production," in Bryan D. Palmer, (ed.] The Character of Class Struggle: Essays in 
Canadian Working-Class History. 1850-1985 (Toronto, 1986), 77-79. 
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police and labour se~;,rmentation. 146 "0" Division's personnel assisted the transformation of 
the industrial order which strove to push points of cont1ict in labour-capital relations on a 
new, often more sophisticated playing field. 147 
Commissioner Perry had been responsible for overseeing the establishment of 
hundreds of detachments during his career. He was an ambitious, yet cautious, expansionist 
when it came to the Force's operations and its role in society. He was sorely disappointed 
when the scope of the Force's responsibilities was not nationalized in 1914, but two years 
later pursued a cautious line. He then recognized that the Force was stretched beyond its 
abilities and knew full well that it needed to be relieved of provincial duties in the Western 
provinces to fulfil its obligations. In just eight years between 1913-1920 Perry had overseen 
the closure and opening of 378 detachments. 188 detachments were established in 1920 
alone. 148 
Commissioner Perry's philosophy towards stationing personnel at detachments had 
been developed early on when he recognized that, although detachments varied in strength 
from one to nine according to their workload, most served areas larger than they could 
properly police. He felt that a detachment of one constable was not effective, either from a 
"disciplinary" or policing "point of view." "None," he had asserted, "should be less in . 
strength than one non-commissioned officer and two constables." 149 Yet in practice fiscal 
146Craig Heron and Robert Story, "On the Job in Canada," in their [eds.] On the Job: Confronting 
the Labour Process in Canada (Kingston, 1986), 18; Robert Storey, "Unionization Versus Corporate 
Welfare'," 7-42. 
147Heron and Story, "On the Job in Canada," 3-47; Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: 
Labor Relations. Law. and the Organized Labor Movement in Amercia. 1880-1960 (New York, 1985), 61, 
76-77; Naylor, The New Democracy, 38, 45. 
148RCMP, Annual Report, 1921, 6; ibid., 1920, 9; In 1913 there were 211 detachments. By 1916 
the number had increased to 257. Yet with a departure of Force personnel to Siberia and France that number 
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constraints continuously undermined Perry's attempts to achieve the kind of detachment 
personnel numbers he desired. In Ontario more often his philosophy met with mixed success 
as we shall soon see. 
In January 1920 Commissioner Perry sent Inspectors W.J. Beyts and J. W. Phillips 
to a series of towns selected for future RC"Nll' "0" Division detachment sites. 150 Both 
officers had vast experience in the north and in western Canada, leading long-distance 
patrols and opening detachments, which no doubt influenced Perry's decision in choosing 
them to establish the Division. They prepared the groundwork for the arrival of constables 
and other Division personnel. At each town Beyts' and Phillips' first job was to survey the 
prospects for adequate housing, to find suitable office facilities, and to make the necessary 
arrangements to have the Force up and running within the region over the next couple of 
months. 
On 28 January Beyts arrived at Bridgeburg, the first site selected for a detachment. 
Nestled along the northeastern most point of Lake Erie in the Weiland District, the town of 
Bridgeburg had grown significantly during the two decades after 1900 even if it had failed 
15~AC RG 18 vol. File 0-160, Service Record ofWalter James Beyts; RNWMP, Annual Report, 
1911, 11; ibid., 1913, 44; ibid., 1915, 13-14; NAC RG 18 vol. 3451, File 0-173, Service Record of John 
Willett Phillips; RCMP Nominal Rolls, 1920-1921; RCMP Quarterly, 25,4 (April 1960), 343, "Old-Timers' 
Column, The Late Asst Cornmr. J.W. Phillips" 
Walter James Beyts was born in London, England, in 1870. He emigrated to Canada in his early 
twenties and joined the NWMP in 1893 after a failed attempt at fanning. He resigned in 1900 to fight in the 
Boer War. He rejoined the Force in 1901, led a draft to the Yukon during the height of the Gold Rush where 
he likely gained some of his earliest intelligence experience. For the better part of the next two decades Beyts 
worked extensively across the north where his assignments varied and on several instances earned 
Commissioner Perry's conunendation in annual reports. Beyts died in 1923 from complications surrounding 
a fire at Haileybury. 
John Willett Phillips was born in Belville, Ontario, in 1879. He joined the Force in 1898 and served 
extensively across western Canada and in the Arctic during the next two decades. He worked at "0" 
Division during 1920-192 i, briefly as its second in command. He was stationed at Haileybury as officer in 
charge of the Colbalt Sub-District, the Belcher Islands patrol and Fort William. He was transferred to "A" 
Division in March 1921. His subsequent postings included conunand of"C"' Division, "A" Division and "E" 
Division. He retired to pension at the rank of Assistant Commissioner on 1 January 1936 and died in 1959. 
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to keep pace with gro\.vth in the district as a whole. 151 Its ethnic, gender, and religious 
composition had also radically changed in these years. At the turn of the century there were 
more women than men; two decades later men vastly outnumbered women. 152 Always an 
English, Gennan, Irish and Scottish stronghold, by 1921 the numbers of Italians, Gennans 
and Dutch in the District had increased considerably. Its Protestant order was also being 
threatened by the large influx of Catholics. 153 
Not only had there been a notable shift in the region's gender, ethnic and religious 
composition, but people living there had become much more mobile as well. The Weiland 
region had become an increasingly important strategic point in the traffic of people and 
goods between Canada and the US. Increased traffic had stimulated local industry. In 
particular, shipbuilding had emerged as one of Bridgeburg' s most important commercial 
enterprises. 
Yet Bridgeburg' s shipbuilding industry faced accelerated change during the war and 
in the immediate post-war period. Like other industries, its workers had suffered through 
several years of high levels of inflation. Workers in Bridgeburg, like others throughout the 
region, had come together during the war recognizing the need for greater solidarity. In 1917 
ILP branches were fonned at nearby centres such as Chippawa, Niagara Falls, Weiland, Port 
Col borne and Thorold as labourers, fanners and veterans joined together in opposition to the 
ISICanada, Fourth Census ofCanada 1901, vol.l, Table 8, 86 [hereafter cited as census number, 
year, volume table, page]; Sixth Census of Canada 1921, vol.l, Table 8, 86; The village ofBridgeburg had a 
population of 1,356 (some 280 families) and .....as the 9m largest centre in the District in 1901. In 1911 
Bridgeburg's population had climbed to I 800 and by 1921 increased to 2,401; Fifth Census of Canada 1911, 
vol. 1, Table II, 355; Sixth Census of Canada 1921, vol. 1, Table 8, 86; In 1911 the population ofthe 
Weiland region had increased by 50 percent, risen to slightly more than 42,000 and a decade later it had 
climbed to 66,668. 
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153Sixth Census of Canada 1921, vol.l, Table 27, 486-87, ibid., vol.l, Table 38, 704-705. 
51 
two established parties. 154 
In March 1918 the federal government brought the shipbuilding industry's labour and 
capitalists together in a bid to secure "more harmonious working agreements" between the 
various parties concerned and to try to "control the entire production of these yards ... " 155 It 
was a subtle example of "industrial voluntarism" half functioning which was so often the 
case during the war. Failure to meet with the government and to comply with any measures 
it saw fit to introduce held the promise of further OCs being passed or other calibrated 
coercive measures to ensure compliance. 156 
Representatives from Bridgeburg's shipbuilding unions joined representatives from 
elsewhere in the provincial industry at a convention in Toronto in May 1918. The meeting 
was the first of its kind for the industry. It was held under auspices of the Ontario Provincial 
Council of Carpenters, affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners and 
resulted in plans to establish a federation. While recognizably a tactical move adopted by 
craft unions to stave off the industrial challenge, support for a federation also signaled 
recognition on the part of the industry's workers of the need to broaden their base by 
strengthening their lines of solidarity. 157 
In June 1919 225 Bridgeburg shipbuilders (roughly one in eight of the town's 
residents) struck for increased wages and shorter hours. The strike lasted almost three weeks, 
it polarized the community and the settlement ended in compromise. Yet the costs had been 
enormous. More than 3,150 work days were lost and even in settlement issues were still left 
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recognition. It lasted two weeks and cost a further 1,800 working days. This strike was 
settled in favour of the employees and events like these made Bridgeburg a particularly 
volatile point in the region's changing industrial landscape. The presence of the RCivfP 
would provide assurances to capitalists in the region. Several months later the RCNtP 
established a detachment at this point. 158 
When Beyts arrived in Bridgeburg he met with the local Department ofimmibrration 
Inspector stationed there. This department, like the post office and other government 
departments at all levels, typically should have proved a natural ally of the RC.N1P. 
Co-operation was part-and-parcel of small to'Ml Ontario life, especially when officials often 
had much in common as white, protestant, Anglo-Saxon males, paid by various levels of 
government. They had a great deal at stake in preserving their lucrative appointments, their 
status and authority within the communities they served. 
During the War, the DP and Department of Immigration officials shared the joint 
responsibility for keeping tabs on so-called "foreigners," enemy nationals, and guarding the 
international border in the region. 159 Although the DP had never established an office at this 
location it was likely that at Bridge burg as in many of the other to'Mls selected as future 
detachment and sub-district sites, the DP, private detective agencies and Department 
officials would have worked in a liaison capacity. Together they would have overseen the 
registration of enemy aliens, they would have carried out internment orders and conducted 
numerous investigations, as well as guarding important strategic and industrial concerns. 
Competition among small to'Mls to have Force detachments established in them was 
fierce. The presence of a detachment offered both a 'real' and ·imagined' sense of security 
to the local elite. A detachment could be used to entice manufacturers and merchants to 
establish operations in these communities. The Force's public presence reinforced so-called 
'norms' about gender roles, about ethnic hierarchies, of the dominant and dominated, hence 
158Canada, Labour Gazette. March 1920, [hereafter simply, Labour Gazette, year], 284. 
15~ount, Canada's Enemies, 28-43. 
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the maintenance of a social 'order' as well as a political and industrial one. It was a role that 
held up well in the public sphere but crumbled only in the private realm. For many early 
years in a Mountie's career the paramilitary barrack-style existence any clashed with the so-
called ideal family model predicated on that of a husband and wife. However, the Force also 
brought significant economic benetit to local manufacturers, retailers and shopkeepers. As 
consumers, RCtviP members, their families, and their offices turned to the local proprietors 
for resupply. 
When Beyts arrived in the town he tried to arrange shared accommodations for his 
constables with Department ofimmigration officials, but was ultimately unsuccessful. The 
local immigration inspector offered temporary office space for detachment work and tacitly 
promised to stay on the "look out for quarters" and to help the constables. But until more 
permanent accommodation could be secured, Beyts was forced to arrange to have them 
billeted at the local hotel. 160 
In early February, Constables H. F. Lea and F.L. Phillips arrived at Bridgeburg. Later 
that month they secured suitable detachment quarters which consisted of three rooms which 
Lea subsequently described in a report for RHQ: 
Two making small bedrooms and the largest an Office. These rooms are 
unfurnished. Have good lighting and heating arrangements and the use of a 
bathroom would be available. They would be especially suitable for our work 
as they are totally separate from the remainder of the building. Rent $25.00 
(Twenty-five Dollars) per calender month including light, heat and sanitary 
arrangements. These rooms are ready for immediate occupation. 161 
There were advantages and disadvantages to ha\ting living accommodations directly 
attached to the office. Some were obvious, some less so. Joint facilities significantly reduced 
the overhead which was always an uppermost consideration to the adjutant's office. In the 
1~G 18 vol. 3160 file G 1318-6-21 Bridgeburg Ontario, report, Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 
1 February 1920. 
161RG 18 vol. 3160 file G 1318-6-21 Bridgeburg Ontario, report, Constable Leas and Staff Sergeant 
Walter Munday to CO "0" Division, 20 and 23 February 1920. 
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very small operations, such arrangements also gave constables a greater degree of tlexibility, 
they could come and go quickly. The region's weather was a problem. Transportation was 
especially difficult in the snow belt during the winter months. In the spring months it had 
often little improved with muddy roads. So tying in office and private life ensured a level 
of efficiency. 162 Most important from an intelligence perspective tying in both living and 
work spaces was critical to the Division because it provided security for offices, for 
equipment and supplies. 163 When it came to the very secret intelligence activities that the 
Force soon undertook, this was no less true. Intelligence reports had to be filled out, and the 
other raw intelligence data acquired and stored. The downside was that anonymity was 
certainly lost in smaller centres and the Force invaded all spheres of their existence. 164 
Nevertheless, this was the lifestyle that many personnel such as Lea and Phillips had 
accepted with their signing of contracts. With little assistance from other government 
officials, the constables spent a month at a local hotel and boarding house until the 
Bridgeburg detachment was fully established. 165 
Once the groundwork for the Bridge burg detachment was laid, Beyts pushed onward 
to Niagara Falls to make similar arrangements at that point. The Niagara Falls detachment 
would eventually consist of a staff sergeant and two constables since the town was the 
largest center in the Weiland District and an important strategic point with considerable 
162G.P. de T. Glazebrook, A History of Transportation in Canada II (Toronto and Montreal, 1970); 
On the importance of technology to police forces in this period see, Greg Marquis, Policing Canada's 
Centurv: A History of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (Toronto, 1993), 168-174; also see, Bill 
Rawling, "Technology and Innovation in the Toronto Police Force, 1875-1925," Ontario History, 80,1 
(1988), 53-71. 
163Consideration of detachment quarters and modeling arrangements was largely a later 
phenomenon, see, N.A "Standard Detachment Quarters," RCMP Quarterly, 22,3 (January 1957), 200-201. 
164Harvison, The Horsemen, 60-63: Kemp, Without Fear, 85-89. Commissioner Starnes raised the 
marriage restriction to 12 years in 1927. 
165RG 18 vol. 3160 file G 1318-6-21 Bridgeburg Ontario, report, Constable Leas and Staff Sergeant 
Munday to CO "0" Division, 20 and 23 February 1920. 
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trat1ic across the international boundary. 166 
There was a large Immigration Branch stationed at Niagara Falls well equipped to 
handle the increased international traffic that came with the building of bridges earlier that 
century. First established in 1908, since then the Branch had flourished. In the years before 
World War I it had alreadv increased its staff to 12. Bv the end of the 1920s it had 35 
" . 
officers stationed there, many of them with decades of experience. 167 
The Immigration Branch had developed close ties to the region's industrial elite. 
They had established offices and conducted 'examinations' in the Grand Trunk Railway 
Station. They also undertook investigations at the Upper Steel Arch bridge, the Lower Arch 
bridge, the Queenston-Suspension bridge as well as at nearby Niagara-on-the-Lake and 
Queenston (for steamship passengers). Immigration inspectors met the train traffic through 
Niagara which increased substantially during these years with more than sixteen entering the 
country each day. Since the Falls immigration department was so-well staffed, they also 
invested a considerable amount of time and energy following up largely unsubstantiated 
rumors of social purists and other racists who feared that "Chinese" and "other illegal 
immigrants" were being smuggled into Canada from this point. 168 
Niagara Falls also had long history of industrial unrest. This concerned the RCMP. 
By World War I the industrial landscape in the Niagara Falls region was rather unique in 
Southern Ontario since it had two major projects in the area, the New Welland Canal and 
the Hydro Electric Power Commission's Chippawa Canal. Each employed about 2,000 
166See, Fourth Census of Canada. 1901, vol. 1, Table 7, 86-87; Fifth Census of Canada. 1911, vol. 
1, Table 1, 93; Sixth Census ofCanada. 1921, vol. 1, Table 8, 86. By 1901 Niagara Falls already had more 
than 4,000 people living there; a decade later it had passed the 9,000 mark (which now also included Niagara 
Village a town of slightly less than 1 ,500), and by 1921 it had almost reached 15,000. 
167Niagara Falls. Canada: A Historv of the Citv and The World Famous Beauty Spot. An Anthology 
(Toronto, 1967), 1 05; Charles E. Wilcox had opened the Branch in 1908 and he remained with the 
Department at Niagara Falls until he retired 31 years later in 1939. He was replaced by H.A. Hunt who had 
joined the Department in 1913 and remained there until he retired in 1949. 
168ibid., 104. 
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workers, mostly skilled. Socialists and other progressive joined forces there during the war 
and their power rose steadily. In 1916 the SOP also held several organizing meetings in 
Niagara Falls with the national executive in attendance to try to reinvigorate the party and 
they were rewarded as soon its membership numbers started to rebound. 169 In 1916 
progressives on Niagara Falls city council unanimously passed a resolution for government 
control of the country's food supply and unions there pressed for the conscription of 
wealth. 170 In 1916 an ILP branch was established in Niagara Falls. The Niagara Falls SDP 
pressured the ILP to adopt a progressive preamble and constitution in the weeks leading up 
to its founding convention and eventually to adopt a more progressive program of 
nationalization and collective ownership in transport, communications, and of all large 
natural resources. 171 
The Niagara Falls ILP sent delegates to Toronto in November 1916 to meetings that 
launched the Greater Toronto Labour Party. They also assisted in the formation oflocal ILP 
branches at nearby centres such as Welland, Thorold, and Port Colbourne which were 
organized by May the following year. 172 They joined branch delegates from fifteen other 
centres throughout the region in July 1917 at the ILP of Ontario's founding convention in 
Hamilton which was important for several reasons. 173 At that convention the party's clear 
cut platform was adopted: its main objective was to "promote the political, economic, and 
169
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social interests of people who live by their labor, mental, or manual, as distin!:,TUished from 
those who live by profit upon the labor of others. "m As well, the Industrial Banner was 
adopted as the official organ of the ILP and since the party was to contest elections, the 
thorny issue of affiliation was also debated. The report the Constitution Committee 
submitted to delegates noted that no member of the party could be a member of another 
political organization. However, while party branches were not allowed to work with the two 
old capitalist parties, they were allowed to endorse candidates and work in conjunction with 
farmers and other "bona fide" parties "which are clearly not capitalistic organizations." 175 
By October after several months of solid and successful organizing in the region, the 
region's ILP met in Weiland and formed the Weiland County Association and unanimously 
favoured running a labour candidate in the fall election. By election time it was also hoped 
that the Weiland branch by itself might have as many as 500 dues-paying members and 
growth was evident elsewhere including the Falls. 176 Although labour across Ontario (not 
just this riding) was unsuccessful in 1917, two years later after further organizing and a 
much stronger base was established, it was anything but surprising, that at the polls in the 
October 1919 provincial election, ILP candidates, Charles Swayze in Niagara Falls and 
Frank Greenlaw in nearby St. Catharines were both elected as part oflabour's total of 11. 177 
174
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It was only later, as Tim Buck noted, that the euphoria died, and that many progressives 
realized that a much more militant organization would be required to bring in substantial 
refonn.m 
Much of the political success in the region was a consequence of gains in the 
industrial arena. In 1916, 600 workers struck at the Weiland Canal and the federal 
government which oversaw the project (the province oversaw the Chippawa Canal) sent in 
the military. Reports in the New York Times and the Industrial Banner noted that the 
soldiers lined up the strikers with bayonets drawn, and searched them and their houses too. 
It was events like these that helped push support for a political labour party, as James Naylor 
noted, and made it easier for socialist and non-socialist organizations to join forces which 
was demonstrated by the convention held in Niagara Falls in September 1917. 179 
In 1918 and 1919 industrial unrest in the region accelerated. In July 1918 hydro 
electric employees went out on strike to protest the discharge of an employee, for extra rates 
for overtime and shorter hours. A compromise was reached and they returned to work at the 
end of the month. 180 Yet by August, a Niagara District Trades Federation (NDTF) had been 
organized. It represented 14 unions employed on the two canal projects. It was part of a 
larger move in the region to amalgamate the craft unions bringing them towards industrial 
unionism. 181 In 1919 workers at the canal struck for an eight-hour day, and relief from 
having to work compulsory overtime. They won the settlement from the Hydro Electric 
Commission. Again in 1920, 2000 members of the NDTF Hydro Chippewa project struck 
in an attempt to get a "straight" eight hour day, an unprecedented concession for work of this 
178Beeching and Clarke [eds.] Yours in the Struggle. 63-72. 
1~aylor, The New Democracy, 91. 
1S0Ubour Gazette. March 1919, 300. 
181Naylor, The New Democracy. 61-63. 
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type. 1 ~2 As Martin Robin's work suggests, it was this issue along with the taritT which 
became a thorn in the Farmer-Labour government's coalition and within labour ended any 
hope that the CLP/ ILP-Farmer fractures would be overcome. 183 
Strikes throughout this region in this period were legion. Hundreds of papermakers 
struck in nearby Thorold. Is.! So did motormen, painters, shipbuilders in several instances, 
pulp-and-paper labourers and machine tenders, carpenters, many of them for shorter hours, 
better wages, and union recognition. In the majority of instances, the workers won. 185 In a 
Thorold incident, in June 1919 employees at the Beaver Board Company (a US firm) 
organized into a local affiliated with the Pulp, Paper, and Sulphite Workers' International 
union. The union presented an agreement to management demanding an increase in wages 
and the eight-hour day (a similar condition that existed in the US mills). The manager 
informed them that he had no power to make a contract and that the president of the 
company was away so the workers would have to continue on under the existing framework 
until he returned. After some time the workers grew tired of waiting and went out on strike. 
Management responded by stereotyping the workers in a statement delivered to the Thorold 
chamber of commerce and the press, accusing "officers and members of the union of being 
Bolsheviks, irresponsibles, etc. " 186 Before long management "surrounded the plant with an 
armed guard- gunmen walking up and down, with guns on their shoulders, guarding a plant 
where the strikers were not even thinking ofviolence." 1&7 Events like these encouraged the 
arrival of a national police force in the region. 
182Naylor, The New Democracv, 208, 230-231. 
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Not surprisingly, a pattern began to emerge in the establishment of"O" Division's 
regional infrastructure. Once Beyts arrived in Niagara Falls he approached the local 
Department of Immigration Inspector for support. Again he was given a cool reception. He 
was informed that there was a similar "shortage" ofhousing in the Niagara region. Frustrated 
by his initial attempt Beyts upped the ante. He now realized the power that he carried among 
some elites in the local community. Since he feared a similar protracted search for suitable 
facilities and accommodations, he turned to the Mayor and to the local council for support. 
The Mayor, Beyts apprised the Commissioner, "informed me that he was very pleased to 
hear that we were opening a detachment at that point, and would do what he could to help 
us get a building." 188 
In Niagara Falls, someone applied pressure on the Department of Immigration 
Inspector stationed there. Arrangements were quickly made whereby Staff Sergeant Munday 
and his wife could immediately take residency at a local hotel. The two constables would 
be boarded at a nearby rooming house. The treatment of personnel varied according to rank. 
A couple of weeks later the Mundays were able to move to a house rented from a member 
of the Department of Immigration considered suitable for a detachment headquarters, while 
arrangements for quarters for the two Constables was temporarily postponed. 189 
From Niagara Falls, Munday was responsible for overseeing the work of the 
Bridgeburg detachment. In both towns he would see to it that the Force's regular and 
"special" policing functions were carried out. In no time relations with the Department of 
Immigration improved. RHQ confidential memos and orders arrived by mail, while those 
sent from NHQ arrived "in care of the Immigration Department." 190 Soon the Adjutant's 
office felt that expanded policing duties in this centre might require the services of as many 
188RG 18 vol. 3160 file G-1318-5-21 Niagara Falls, report, Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 1 
February 1920. 
189ibid., report, Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 2 February 1920. 
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as six personnel. Toward that end, Munday was instructed to arrange the long-term lease of 
a larger facility. 191 By April, the constables and the Munday's had moved into the new 
quarters. Completely equipped with patrol motorcycles, the Niagara detachment had now 
been established. 
Once the groundwork for establishing a detachment in the Wetland District was laid 
Beyts next traveled to the District ofNorth Essex to set up RCNIP offices in Windsor. Ifboth 
the case of Bridgeburg and Niagara Falls reveal that other Departments were not as 
accommodating as might have been expected during the Force's eastward march, then the 
Niagara Falls experience in particular, also suggested that the Force was not unwilling to 
apply political pressure to gain a toehold in the region. The experience in Windsor revealed 
yet a different problem. Eastern elites in Ontario and Ottawa had originally been among the 
Force's staunchest supporters in its great march West when it served their expansionist 
interests as part of the National Policy. Fifty years later when the Force returned "home" in 
1920 its reception was something less than many within its ranks might have envisioned. 
Windsor had a long history of secret service work ever since Gilbert McMicken had 
established the Western Frontier Constabulary back in December 1864 and had run his first 
spies from that centre until 1871. 192 Because of its close proximity to the border, early 
liaison took place between intelligence personnel at this centre and individuals involved in 
similar work at nearby Buffalo and Detroit. Since the earliest days Canadian spies had 
travelled freely across the border keeping tabs on Irish nationalists and trying to prevent the 
trans-border movement of recruits from Canada who planned to enlist in northern forces 
191RG 18 vol. 3160 file G-1318-5-21 Niagara Falls, report, Staff Sergeant Munday to OC "0" 
Division, 6 February 1920, ibid., memorandum, Inspector Beyts to Commissioner 7 February 1920; ibid., 
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during the American Civil War. 193 The detachment would be used for similar political 
designs in the inter-war period especially as a base to try to contain radicalism, to prevent 
the movement of revolutionaries from the US into Canada as well as those leaving the 
country. The Force would also establish checkpoints here, working in close cooperation with 
other government departments to prevent subversive literature from being smuggled into the 
country. This was all done in this period as in brief spurts earlier to maintain the existing 
political order. 
Like other locations selected for detachments, Windsor was chosen because of 
continued geographic, political, and industrial considerations. The population of North 
Essex had significantly increased in the two decades after 1901: it had risen from 12,000 to 
more than 38,500 in 1921. 194 A rather unique feature in the city was that Windsor's trade 
council was more closely tied to the Detroit Federation of Labor, than to the Ontario Labour 
movement. In fact, workers there only began seriously considering establishing an ILP 
branch during the winter of 1919 and finally applied for a charter in April. 19; But like many 
other centres Windsor workers were increasingly dissatisfied with existing wartime and 
postwar conditions described earlier in this study. At least seven significant strikes took 
place at Windsor in 1919 alone. The city's cigar makers, garbage collectors, woollen 
workers and molders all struck during that year. 196 Technology was transforming several 
193Kealey, "The Empire Strikes Back"; Betke and Horrall, Canada's Secun'ty Sen:ice, 29-102. 
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industries making old forms of organization and craft skills sometimes obsolete. In some 
respects it was an example of the ongoing battles over deskilling taking place in many 
industries during the period and aptly described by others in the works ofBraverman, Heron 
and Storey. 197 Street railway workers also struck twice during the spring and summer. 
Authorities were threatened by this event since the local police during one of these disputes 
refused to promise to protect strike breakers. It was rather easy to make the argument that 
constituted authority was being challenged, law and order undermined (although it was a 
gross exaggeration). Nevertheless, the city council thought so and responded by calling in 
the army. 198 Once again, it was clear that the presence of a national police force of some kind 
would serve a useful political purpose. 
What made Beyts' experience in establishing a Windsor detachment significantly 
different from either Bridgeburg or Niagara Falls was that Windsor was the first town 
selected in '"0" Division's District that had formerly had the services of a federal policing 
agency, the DP, whose national structure was in the process of being absorbed. 199 The DP 
had carried out their regional duties from Windsor and had established contacts within the 
community. But some persons in the community supported the old organization and wanted 
to see its presence maintained. Furthermore, somewhere in the RC.MP structure inadequate 
consideration of the process to phase out the DP at the local level had occurred. As a result 
the transfer was anything but smooth. 
Beyts and an undisclosed number of RC.MP personnel arrived at Windsor on 30 
January and lost no time in the transfer of power. They immediately assumed the duties 
formerly undertaken by the DP who had operated from quarters at the Windsor Armouries. 
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After a quick search for suitable office and residential accommodations for the sub-district 
headquarters, and finding none, Beyts pressed for an arrangement similar to the one the DP 
had struck with the senior officer in charge of the Armouries. Local military officials gave 
Beyts a cool reception. He was informed that such an arrangement would be granted for just 
a brief period, until an alternative could be found. The Armouries already had plans for the 
former DP headquarters: " [ t ]hey would shortly be needed by the Militia Department. "200 
Not only was the RCMP refused the offices formerly used by the DP, a first sign of 
conflict between the services in the region, but problems were compounded when the RC~fP 
moved to dismiss former DP staff Beyts was under orders to relieve two DP officers 
stationed there, and similarly its support staff, which consisted of a secretary, once RCMP 
personnel became "acquainted with that district." Beyts dismissed the secretary the day he 
arrived and subsequently wrote the Commissioner that he had taken such action. She 
produced a letter from the senior DP officer stationed at the detachment who at that time 
was away in Quebec on business, and who had told her to continue on in her job until further 
instructed by him. A. J. Cawdron, Acting Chief Commissioner of the DP, was planning to 
review the transfer of power and had also directed her to continue to work until he arrived 
on 5 February.201 Betys, who had acted too hastily in dismissing her, subsequently reversed 
his position (likely at Cawdron's insistence) and she was kept on for an additional week. Yet 
2~G 18. Vol. 3160 file, G-318-2-21, Windsor Ontario, report, Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 
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as soon as replacements for the DP personnel arrived they were immediately dismissed. :oz 
Friction in the transfer not only came from other organizations, either because of 
loyalty or the dismissal of fonner DP employees, but as it intensified, it soon turned to more 
petty issues like the basic furniture and office contents. The DP office had been well 
furnished; the RC!V1P was interested in securing its basic contents. Yet some of the furniture 
and equipment had been loaned to the DP from the Department ofPublic Works because of 
the close association the DP had forged with other departments in the city. The DP refused 
to release the contents, the Department of Public Works refused to allow a transfer to the 
RC:NIP and it was largely as a result of the Assistant Commissioner's intervention (in Ottawa 
being drawn into the conflict) that these items eventually were transferred to the Force. 
Chief Inspector Duncan who headed the Special Service Branch for Military District #1 
overzealously guarded the materials and forced the RCNIP's Sergeant Birtwistle to arrive 
in the city to fill out fonns. When the lists were compiled and subsequently forwarded the 
Commissioner, A.J. Cawdron made Inspector Duncan fill out a separate report covering the 
transfer. It is clear from the positions taken by the various departments that there was 
considerable conflict in this transfer. 203 
The transfer from DP to RC:tviP control in Windsor was poorly orchestrated. Clearly 
some DP personnel were hostile towards the new organization. During the month of 
February the detachment at Windsor was shuffled out of the old DP offices and stuck in the 
room formerly used as the Quarter Masters Store.204 Accommodations for the new Force 
were secured with no less difficulty and members were forced to rent a house in Walkerville 
which was two miles outside of Windsor. It was not until 1 May that the RCNIP finally 
2mRG 18. Vol. 3160 file, G-318-2-21, Windsor Ontario, report, Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 
1 February 1920; and Commissioner's scribble at the bottom. 
203RG 18, vol. 3160 file, G-318-2-21, Windsor Ontario, report, Sergeant Birtwistle to 
Commissioner, 7 February 1920; report, Inspector Duncan to Albert J. Cawdron, DCL 9 February 1920. 
204RG 18, vol. 3160 file, G-318-2-21, Windsor Ontario, report, Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 
25 February 1920. 
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secured a permanent office in Windsor located sufficiently close to accommodations for its 
men stationed there. Yet once again one of the overriding reasons for establishing the 
detachment in that centre was in further evidence when the Force delayed moving into the 
new quarters for several days. Sergeant Birtwistle stated "In view of the possibility of Labour 
trouble or demonstration I thought it advisable not to move in that day, but to hold ourselves 
in readiness for any emergency ... :os By May, despite the many hassles, the RCtvfP had its 
Windsor detachment up and running. 
The creation of new detachments in Southern Ontario continued during the spring 
and summer months. Samia, another site selected, was situated in the Lamb ton West district 
where similar issues conspired to make it a place the RCMP chose to establish a detachment. 
Its population had nearly doubled to 15,000 in the two decades after 1901.206 Originally a 
Methodist, Anglican and Roman Catholic stronghold, by 1921 it had also increasingly 
become a centre of German, French, Austrian, Dutch, Greek, Jewish, Italian, Polish, 
Russian, Scandinavian and Ukrainian activity, with far greater numbers than surrounding 
towns and villages. 207 
Samia was the location of considerable organizing during the war. By the fall of 
1917 progressives had begun organizing an ll..P branch in that centre largely through the 
support of an IAM lodge at the Imperial Oil Refinery. Once organized, even without a strike 
the ll..P branch and the IAM had managed to extract concessions from the Refinery's 
management such as the reduction from twelve to eight hour shifts once the company 
planned to keep its operations open round the clock. 208 
205RG 18, vol. 3160 file, G-318-2-21, Windsor Ontario, report, Sergeant Birtwistle and Inspector 
Beyts to Commissioner, 4 and 6 l'vfay 1920. 
206Sixth Census of Canada 1921. vol. l, Table X, 221. 
207Sixth Census of Canada 1911, vol.1, Table VTI, 222; Seventh Census of Canada 1921, vol.1, 
Table 27, 464-465. 
208
"Many Unions Are Being Organized In Border City," Industrial Banner, 28 June 1918, 1. 
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Still, many workers at the Imperial Oil Retinery were dissatistied with pay rates and 
working conditions. By March 1919 unskilled workers at the company who did not quality 
as boilennakers had organized into Federal Labour Unions. The company responded to this 
and other actions by trying to implement an industrial council scheme which was effectively 
rejected by the workforce, while many of its welfare provisions were accepted. The situation 
deteriorated, tensions escalated. Winnipeg General Strike leader William Ivens toured 
Southern Ontario during the fall on a speaking tour. At Sarnia, Imperial Oil's agents tried 
to prevent his meetings from being held. 209 Tensions escalated in that centre the following 
year.2Io 
Similarly, at Sault Ste. Marie, the fifth site selected for a detachment, once again 
location, industry, and population combined to make it an obvious candidate. It was a town 
where there had been considerable political organization and industrial unrest. In mid-1917 
it was in the process of fonning an ILP branch even if it was not represented at the ILP's 
Ontario founding convention in July that year. The SPC had a foothold there and so did the 
SDP. 211 Like other centres, during the war Sault steelworkers protested the soaring cost of 
living, the anti-strike legislation and other OCs. After the war, as David J. Bercuson reminds 
us, Sault steelworkers remained strongly sympathetic to the OBU. 212 In the October 1919 
provincial elections Sault area workers ran J.B. Cunningham as their candidate and he easily 
20~aylor, The New Democracy, 70-71. 
21~aylor, "Southern Ontario," 149; Naylor, The New Democracy, 179-185; On shop councils as 
one form of strategy employed throughout the region in this period see, Bruce Scott, "A Place In The Sun: 
The Industrial Council at Massey-Harris, 1919-1929," Labour/ Le Travailleur, 1 (1976), 158-92. 
211
"Sault Ste. Marie Will Be In Line," Industrial Banner, 18 May 1917, 4; "Independent Labor Party 
of Ontario: Provincial Organization Formed and Clear Cut Platform Adopted," Industrial Banner, 6 July 
1917, 1-2. 
212David J. Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men: The Rise and Fall of the One Big Union (Toronto, 
1978), 164. 
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unseated Premier Hearst. 213 Sewer workers had struck for increased wages and shorter hours 
that year and the town seemed poised for conflict at local steel mills. 214 In November 1920, 
200 Sault steel workers struck in protest in defense of employees who had been discharged. 
The strike was only settled in its third week after a loss of 2,500 working days. 215 
In Sault Ste. Marie battle lines were drawn between labour and capital over the 
establishment of an RCMP detachment. Shortly after its arrival in June 19:20 that centre's 
Trades and Labour Council held a meeting and passed a resolution asking the RCtvt:P be 
removed from the city because the Force's actions, "in regard to organized labour" the 
council felt, "are suspicious of an ulterior motive." The council knew the RCJvfP had created 
an "espionage system" with the goal of obtaining names of union officials "for the purpose 
of grading them in categories in accordance with the views held by them." The TLC officials 
asserted, that under "sound democratic government" responsibility for "order" and the 
"enforcement oflaws" resided with the municipality and not the RCMP. Furthermore, before 
the town council, local TLC representatives argued that since organized labour at all times 
"advocated the bringing about of reforms by constitutional methods, and there being no 
evidence of any movement in this district towards unconstitutional methods in rectifying 
grievances" that city council "exercise their rights in obtaining from the proper authorities 
just what jurisdiction this force posses, and their possible removal, as unnecessary, from the 
City of Sault Ste. Marie ... " They also demanded the support of the Board of Trade and 
GWV A in this matter. 216 
At first it was believed that this controversy had erupted because Sault Constable 
M.J. Walsh, who lacked experience, had been sent out by his CO Staff Sergeant R.M. Millar 
213
"Big Majority For I.L.P. Candidates," Industrial Banner, 31 October 1919, 2. 
214Labour Gazette, March 1920. 203. 
215Labour Gazette, February 1921, 181. 
216NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, file "Dominion Trades and Labor Congress," Sault Ste . .1\.-larie, 
"TLC" resolution of 25 June 1920. 
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to conduct an investigation into local labour organizations. Walsh had met with a TLC 
official and had "in reply to a question as to why we [the Force) wanted to know who the 
different officials were" stated that the Force was "grading them for their views."217 Walsh 
was sternly reprimanded for his disclosure by both his CO and the Commissioner. 
It was at that point that Millar met with several leading capitalists in the city, as well 
as the Board ofTrade and the GWVA, to discuss a strategy to counter the public outcry. One 
step taken was that the owner of the Spanish River Pulp and Paper Mills, one of two large 
employers oflabour in the city (it employed 800), wrote Commissioner Perry in support of 
the Force's continued presence in the city. He felt they were doing a fine job in the 
maintenance of "public safety" and in an anti-labour capacity highlighting the labour 
"troubles" his company had experienced recently, especially in its woods operations chiefly 
due to the "foreign element. "218 Similar letters were sent by officials at the Algoma Central 
and Hudson Bay Railway Company and the Sioux Dredging and Construction Company. 
Since Perry was overseas, the Force's Assistant Commissioner replied putting to rest any 
fears these capitalists had that the government had plans to withdraw the Force from the 
region. 219 
Labour had the backing of the town's Mayor and with his support the TLC refused 
to let the issue die. They kept the pressure up for answers to their questions concerning the 
Force's presence and demanding its withdrawal from the region for several months further 
217ibid., report, Staff Sergeant Millar i/c Sault Ste. Marie, Detective Staff Sergeant McLauchlan for 
Inspector Commanding Cobalt Sub District, and Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 21 and 22 July 1920. 
218 ibid., letter, source deleted, The Spanish River Pulp and Paper Mills to Commissioner Perry, 22 
July 1920. 
219ibid., letter, The Algoma Central and Hudson Bay Railway Company to Commissioner Perry 13 
July 1920; and ibid .. reply, 22 July 1920; ibid., letter, Assistant Commissioner of the RCl'viP to Soo Dredging 
and Construction Company, 21 July 1920 
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in the local press. 220 The city's Board of Trade and the GWVA responded with their own 
campaign. In addition to the private actions taken on the part of some of their members, 
publicly the Board came out in full support of the Force's continued presence in the city.~' 
The Board also kept Perry apprised of developments. They forwarded him copies of counter-
resolutions they sent the local TLC which he sent to J.A. Calder, the President of the Privy 
Council, preparing him in the likelihood that the issue was raised in the House of 
Commons. 222 
Probably no one hoped the issue would soon die more than Staff Sergeant Millar. To 
reduce the likelihood of further damage he "strongly impressed both Constables stationed 
[t ]here with the necessity of giving these individuals [Labour] no cause for adverse comment 
by word or deed." Millar had planned to travel up the Algoma Central Railroad (ACR) but 
wisely he delayed this trip on account of the incident. 223 He also felt the Force's position 
would be strengthened by Commissioner Perry coming out publicly with an "official" press 
statement to prevent the radicals who were "misrepresenting the reason for our presence in 
the City, making it appear that the Government is spying on labor organisations in the 
interest of the employer." This action, he felt would "go along way towards nullifying the 
mischievous efforts of these agitators. "224 
By October the issue had still not died. The Sault Ste. Marie TIC sent Perry a letter 
220ibid., "T.&L. Council Do Not Agree With B. ofT. 's Action,"The Sault Dailv Star, forwarded 
along with a report, Staff Sergeant Millar i/c Sault Ste. Marie detachment, Inspector Beyts OC "0" Division 
to Commissioner, 26 and 28 July 1920. 
221 ibid., "Labor Would Oust 'Mounties From Soo,"; ibid., "Board Of Trade Against Recall of 
Mounted Police," 20 July 1920. 
221ibid., letter, accompanied with a resolution, Secretary of the Sault Ste. rvfarie Board of Trade to 
the Commissioner, RCMP, 27 July 1920; ibid., letter, Commissioner Perry or Force Comptroller to J.A. 
Calder, President of the Privy Council, 29 July 1920. 
223 ibid., report, Staff Sergeant Millar i/c Sault Ste. Marie, Detective Staff Sergeant McLauchlan for 
Inspector Commanding Cobalt Sub District, and Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 21 and 22 July 1920. 
224ibid., report, Staff Sergeant Millar and Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 26 July 1920. 
71 
condemning the Force's anti-labour "motives" and protesting the Board of Trade's position. 
The debate continued to fester publicly that month in The Sault Dailv Star with the TLC and 
the Board of Trade at loggerheads. 215 Before long, the issue exploded in the Force when it 
was learned that Sergeant Millar, not just Walsh, was largely responsible for the events that 
had taken place. Not only had Walsh unwittingly approached TLC delegates but his CO 
Sergeant Millar had even gone further putting a similar request in wTiting to the Sault Ste. 
Marie and Steelton TLC, a fact only brought to light when the letter's contents were 
published in The Sault Dailv Star and forwarded by Sault's Chief Constable to NHQ. It read 
as follows: 
Dear Curry: 
I want to get hold of a list of the different craft unions, and the names 
of the officials, and would like to know if possible if they are opposed to 
Bolshevism, I. W. W. etc. There is no ulterior motive in asking for this. I simply want 
it so that I shall know whom I can turn to for assistance and infonnation in 
combating the spread of the other thing. It would make it much more easy for me if 
you could furnish me with such a list. I shall get it anyway in the long run, but your 
help would save me much time. 
Will you phone me at 1371 if you want to know anything more, and let me 
know if you can assist me. 
Yours Sincerely, 
R.M. Millar.226 
Assistant Commissioner Crawdon, the DCI, was furious when he received a copy of 
this clipping. He wrote "0" Division's OC demanding a full account from Sergeant Millar 
adding that he felt such action "was very indiscreet on Millar's part; particularly telling them 
what we are doing as regards Labour Organizations, which we endeavour to keep as secret 
225ibid., letter, Secretary of the Sault Ste. Marie Trades and Labour Council to Commissioner Perry, 
10 October 1920. 
226ibid., "T & L. Council Give Report On Mounted Police Resolution," The Sault Daily Star, 9 
October 1920. 
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as possible."227 Unable to rely on his own personnel stationed at the Sault Superintendent 
Crawdon, the DCI, asked Sault's Chief Constable to keep him apprized of developments 
in that centre and to forward clippings to NHQ. 2::8 
Millar tried to blame Walsh, but obviously both were at fault and neither escaped 
unscathed. "0" Division's Superintendent, in particular, felt that it was indeed certainly 
"most indiscreet" for Millar to write the letter. He added, "With his experience he should 
have known that a man of [word deleted] class could not be trusted. I am notifying Staff-
Sergt. Millar to this effect. "229 Basically that brought to a close this investigation. But it was 
neither the first nor the last time, that the Force would come under attack and demands made 
that it be removed from a part of Canada. 
By October 1920, in addition to Toronto RHQ, with considerable difficulty, the Force 
had established six detachments and sub-district headquarters in the Division. By then "0" 
Division had 31 NCOs and regulars, twelve were stationed at Toronto RHQ. 230 Outside the 
city the number of detachment personnel ranged from one constable stationed at Sarnia to 
four at both Haileybury and Windsor. 231 The Division's resources were stretched thin by 
their numerous responsibilities. Although Commissioner Perry never saw the day when his 
philosophy with respect to adequate numbers of personnel being stationed at detachments 
was met, nevertheless the Force's darkest hours were gone. 
"0" Division's detachment and personnel numbers ebbed and flowed during the 
227Ibid., "Confidential memorandum," Assistant Commissioner to "0" Division OC, 13 October 
1920. 
228ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Crawdon to the Chief Constable, Sault Ste. rviarie, 13 
October 1920. 
229ibid., report, Staff Sergeant l\1illar and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 15 and 19 
October 1920. 
230
"0" Division's senior officer was stationed at Toronto RHQ. Also at RHQ under his command 
were 2 Staff Sergeants, 3 Sergeants and 6 Constables. 
231RCMP, Annual Report. 1920, 34. 
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inter-war period. Neither kept up with the rapid population explosion, nor the growth and 
development of the region as a whole. Tables 1.1 to 1.3 at the back of this chapter sketch the 
contour of the Division's strent:,rth vis a vis national distribution for the inter-war period. 
They also identify eventual detachments and personnel numbers stationed at them. In the 
1920s "0" Division's total enlisted strength peaked in 1924 with 46, and fell again to 39 in 
1928. Similarly the number of detachments "0" Division opened increased modestly during 
the 1920s and rose from six to nine.:32 The major personnel shifts at "0" Division that took 
place in the 1920s led to increased centralization of Division resources. In 1920, 12 of 37 
of the Division's total personnel were stationed in Toronto, the rest were positioned 
strategically throughout the Division. By the mid-1920s, nearly half the Division was in 
Toronto. Through the 1930s, as one might have expected, as the perceived need to "maintain 
order" and other responsibilities shifted and increased throughout the region a slow reversal 
took place. By the end of that decade "0" Division had more than tripled its original number 
of detachments and subdistrict headquarters bringing its total to 19 and a greater 
centralization of the Division's resources occurred as Canada prepared for War. 233 
Even at Haileybury, the sixth detachment site selected the potential for industrial 
disorder entered into the equation. Haileybury was a strategic location, a transportation 
centre with rail access, and a good place to keep tabs on industrial unrest in nearby 
communities such as Colbalt and Porcupine where for years conflict had been present in the 
mines. Haileybury also had its own peculiar labour "troubles". It was a centre of 
considerable OBU organizing during 1919-1920. A company contracted to build a nearby 
dam facility hired labour spies to keep tabs on workers in their camps and in 1920 OBU 
232ibid., 1924, 29. 
233Table 1.1 below provides the total national strength of the Force from 1920-1939. Table 1.2 
provides the location, respective strength and the year specific "0" Division detachments were created 
(conversely went out of operation) up until 1939. 
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organizer Barilko was arrested on charges of sedition. 234 
Spying had a long history in Southern Ontario that dated back to the 1860s and 1870s 
with the creation of the \VFC and DP. Yet it was only during World War I that it achieved 
any permanency. Prior to this point, most of the intelligence carried out by services seemed 
to have been on a rather ad hoc basis. In 1914 at the start of World War I, unlike Great 
Britain, Canada lacked a national security and intelligence apparatus. Instead, its domestic 
security and intelligence service consisted of a disparate conglomerate of agencies 
responsible for certain policing tasks primarily in a regional capacity. By the end of the War, 
although better poised, Canada's security and intelligence apparatus still was not fully 
national. Its birth followed in response to meet the new industrial challenges in a changing 
industrial order especially after the Winnipeg General Strike. The CID was created in early 
1919 and was made fully national the following year when the new RCMP Act took affect. 
The establishment of the tirst RCMP detachments in Southern Ontario is noteworthy 
for several reasons. First of all, it offers considerable insight into the basic problems the 
Force had to overcome to secure its footing in the region. It also offers some insight into how 
the RCMP reflected the class-based or societal tensions as a whole. Detachment locations 
first and foremost were influenced by the Force's obligations as the agency responsible for 
enforcing federal statutes. Uppermost in the minds of those who made the decisions as to 
their location seems to have been geographic considerations (and in particular proximity to 
international borders). Yet selection of detachment site locations also appears to have been 
influenced by a number of other considerations such as the location of industrial and 
manufacturing concerns and the apparent potential for disorder and industrial unrest. 
Although some pressure was exerted by local politicians to have RCMP detachments 
established at certain points, the limited evidence available to us suggests that these attempts 
234E.J. ~lcMurray "Barilko in Haileybury," One Big Union Bulletin, 4 December 1920, I; RCI'vfP, 
Annual Report, 1920, 34; About the only place where labour unrest did not enter into the equation was the 
Special Duty to the Belcher Islands or the Belcher Island patrol as it was more commonly referred to 
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failed. 
The arrival of the first RCMP detachments met with ditTerent responses in the 
communities they entered. The societal tensions that existed were reproduced within the 
Force and in its relationship to the community and was evident in numerous respects. What 
was surprising was only perhaps where it found its least resistance and its greatest 
opposition. At Bridgeburg and Niagara Falls prominent persons lent assistance to the Force 
and came to their aid to help them get established. If the idea of establishing a detachment 
at these centres was not warmly endorsed, at the very least it encountered little overt 
opposition. Somewhat surprisingly, in the city where there had been an active DP 
detachment and perhaps where there was the greatest potential for 'labour disturbance' the 
arrival of the RCMP was less favourably received. But it was not labour that protested, but 
others. And while company officials probably supported the maintenance of a policing force, 
the transition from DP to RCJVU> at the local level seemed to have drawn Department of 
Militia officials at both the local and district level into the politics of absorption and 
reorganization. At Windsor and at M.D. #1 HQ in London, the Militia favoured the 
relationship already established between the DP and the Militia and any change was viewed 
with hostility. 
Even worse for the Force was the situation at Sault Ste. Marie. The experience there 
demonstrated how many in society viewed the Force's presence as a clear strike against 
labour in the ongoing battles between labour and capital as industrialization, mechanization, 
and consolidation of industry transformed Canadian society and the framework and 
conditions in which labour and capital faced off against one another. The picture there 
revealed just how inexperienced and unsophisticated some Force personnel were in early 
political policing operations. While the junior personnel lied to their seniors to conceal 
shoddy investigative methods, others more senior in rank lied publically to conceal their 
"anti-labour" agenda when confronted. 
It was in this context then, that the Force participated in the early "Cold War" which 
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began in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. Henceforth, systematic surveillance, 
harassment and repression began to unfold in a national context, even if it remained rather 
fragmented and lacked both the professionalism and sophistication of a later period. With 
the creation of the CIB and both the national and regional structure established, chapter three 
turns to assess the successes and failures of"O" Division's 1920s main counter-subversion 
operations conducted against the communist party's Toronto organization. 
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Table l. l 
Total National Strength of Force 1910-1939 
Year Officers NCOs Constables Total Personnel 
1920 73 1459 plus 1671 
(139 SCs) 
1921 70 1485 (125) 1680 
1922 64 1081 (82) 1227 
1923 58 1010(80) 1148 
1924 58 883 (79) 1020 
1925 53 842 (82) 977 
1926 53 823 (87) 963 
1927 52 952 (97) 1004 
1928 55 936 (96) 1087 
1929 54 1024 (121) 1199 
1930 56 1067 (122) 1245 
1931 59 1154 (138) 1351 
1932 91 1911 (346) 2348 
1933235 - - -
1934 88 2279 (137) 2504 
1935 91 2367 (137) 2573 
1936 90 2491 (136) 2717 
1937 92 2350 (131) 2573 
235lt should be noted that there is no Annual Report for 1933. The Force moved for.vard the date 
of its annual release from September to March in that year and reported in tvlarch 1934. 
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1938 91 2384 (123) 2598 
1939 95 2382 (126) 2603 
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Table 1.2 
"0" Division's Distribution of Strength, 
CO's. NCO's and Constables. 1920-1928 
1920 1921 1922 1923 192--1 1925 1926 
14 16 17 ~-~ 21 19 
5 4 4 5 5 2 
--1 3 2 2 1 1 
3 3 2 2 I I 
--1 4 3 3 3 3 
2 1 1 1 
I 1 2 1 1 1 
I 2 
I 1 1 I 2 2 
3 I 
5 6 3 
I I 
I 
3 1 1 I 1 I 
1 1 1 1 
3 
37 34 37 46 44 41 
Source: RCMP, Annual Reports, 1920-1928. 
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··o" Division ·s Distribution of Strength, 
CO's NCO's and Constables 19"'9-1939 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1934 1935 1936 
2-1 25 21 27 32 29 35 
I I I I 
I 5 I I 
I I I I 
3 
3 2 2 I 
I 2 
2 2 2 4 4 4 5 
3 1 I 
1 
I I I I 
I 
2 2 2 3 4 3 
2 I I 2 2 I 
I I I 5 4 4 4 
5 2 4 4 4 3 4 
I 2 2 
I I I I 
I I I 1 
I 2 2 2 
I 2 1 2 2 3 3 
I I 1 I 2 2 2 
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1937 1938 1939 
36 35 .j.j 
I 2 2 
I I I 
2 3 I 
5 -l 6 
I 1 1 
I 2 I 
2 2 2 
2 3 2 
2 2 2 
2 5 4 
4 4 4 
2 2 2 
1 1 1 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
2 3 1 
Simcoe I 
Sud bur;· 2 3 3 3 3 -l 3 
Timmins 2 2 2 2 2 
Walkcnilk R 
Windsor 3 2 2 ' 8 8 5 5 5 5 
-
Wdland l 2 l I l 
On ConunandJ 5 l 5 9 6 1 3 3 6 1 1 
Leave 
Total 40 43 -l6 -l7 78 80 80 82 85 86 89 
Source: RCMP, Annual Reports, 1928-1939. 
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"As a general rule the C.P. members are very satisfied with the probrress made 
at this meeting in the formation ofthe English Branch of the W.P." 
Special Agent Constable Harry Catt, 
5 January 1922 
Chapter III 
"0" Division and its 1920s Penetration Agents 
This chapter investigates RCMP counter-subversion work in Toronto in the 
1920s. It begins by setting something of the context in which these operations took 
place, describing the establishment of the RHQ CIB, identifying the Division's key 
intelligence personnel, as well as discussing their assignments and duties, and evaluating 
their contributions to this important work. Political investigations became too important 
by the 1920s to be left in the hands of private firms' operatives. 1 The Force's resources 
were extremely limited, so in bringing these operations under RCMP control and 
removing them from the hands of private firms in Toronto, Force personnel tailored their 
intelligence work accordingly. The principal fonn of intelligence gathering "0" Division 
RHQ' s CIB adopted during much ofthe 1920s in its core Toronto CP counter-subversion 
operations was reliance on a primary penetration agent developed inside the party. 
Penetration provided CIB personnel with better intelligence than did later forms of 
acquisition. 
The 1920s was a rather uneven decade for both the RC:rvfP and Canadian labour. 
For the Force the decade opened on a high note. Nationalization in February 1920 saw 
the RCl\.1P's strength increase. By September the Force stood at 1671 all ranks- a 
remarkable reversal from its fortunes two years earlier when in December 1918 its 
10n similar problems in the US see Robert P. Weiss, "Private Detective Agencies and Labour 
Discipline in The United States, 1855-1946," The Historical Journal, 29, 1 (1986), 87-107; also Rhodri 
Jeffreys-Janes, American Espionage, 16-28. 
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strenl:,rth was 303, exactly the same number at its time of inception.2 But before long, any 
gains it made in strenl:,rth following its "phoenix-like" rise out of the ashes of the 
Winnipeg General Strike were offset by rising workloads and attrition. 3 In 1921 alone 
the number of Acts it enforced on behalf of other federal departments more than doubled 
to 44.~ The duties its personnel undertook also multiplied: the Force provided guards for 
public buildings in Ottawa, on board harvester trains, and for dockyards in Halifax and 
Esquimalt. It joined the Department of Health's war on the illicit traffic in narcotics and 
provided assistance to the Inland Revenue Department's efforts to close thousands of 
illicit stills. For the Department ofMines the Force enforced the Explosives Act; for the 
Department of Agriculture the Force supervised the pari-mutual machines at race tracks; 
for the Department of the Interior and its provincial counterparts the Force rendered 
assistance in fighting forest fires. These were only a few examples of new duties it 
assumed and by 1929, workloads had more than quadrupled over the decade, while the 
Force's strength which stood at 1199 remained well below its 1920 level. 5 
The collapse of the labour revolt in 1920 and the economic downturn that 
followed sent many progressive organizations into a tailspin in the early 1920s. Union 
membership declined and labour militancy as evidenced by strike activity also 
decreased. In Toronto, the number of strikes fell almost by half They had peaked in 
1920 with 32, and in 1921 sat at 15 before falling to 12 per annum during the next two 
years. In general, the number of workers involved in these strikes decreased while the 
2RCl\1P, Annual Report. 1920, 9. 
3Longstreth, The Silent Force, 290-311; RCJ'v!P, Annual Report, 1922, 5; RCl'v!P, Annual 
Report, 1923, 6; For instance, in 1922 Force workloads increased 11.4 per cent and again by more than a 
sixth a year later, while its strength decreased by 27 per cent and by 6.4 per cent respectively. 
4NAC RG 18, vol. 2383, CIB Memorandum #44, "Re-Training," 4 January 1921. 
5Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 203-204; Nora and William Kelly, The 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 167; RCI'v!P, Annual Report, 1929, 6. 
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number of days lost remained high suggesting that the strikes were of longer duration. 
Outside the city in Southwestern Ontario the same basic pattern manifested itself 
although the decrease in the number of strikes in this part of the province was even more 
pronounced. It fell from 81 in 1920 to 44 in 1921 and then further to 18, 11, and 9 over 
the three consecutive years. 6 When the economy improved in the mid-1920s, growth 
was evident in a number of trades and sectors, labour rebounded, as new alliances were 
forged in both the political and industrial arenas. 
"0" Division was established in February 1920. From its beginning the Division 
operated under less-than-ideal circumstances. By comparison to many western districts 
the Division's resources were meager even if both the relative area the Division 
supervised was smaller than elsewhere and it was little concerned with provincial 
statutes since the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) was charged with that responsibility. 
In May 1920 "0" Division's entire staff consisted of fewer than two-dozen personnel 
making it the third smallest of the eleven Districts the Force had established as only the 
Force's Quebec and Maritime Districts had fewer personnel. 7 
Records for half the Division's original members have survived posterity. They 
were all Anglo-Saxon males and all but one were first generation immigrants: two from 
London, and one each from Manchester, Norwich, Bedfordshire and Islington; while 
three more were from Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The sole Canadian among them was 
born in Belleville, Ontario. All but two had gained military experience serving overseas. 
Most served during World War I with the CEF in France or Siberia, a few in other 
organizations such as the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) and the 
Royal Air Force (RAF). One member had served earlier in South Africa during the Boer 
6Naylor, The New Democracv. 256. 
7RCrvfP, Annual Report, 1920,5. 
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Police training for the Division's originals and most inter-war Force personnel 
therefore was limited to that provided at Regina Depot, which as Greg Marquis has 
argued, remained much like an "army boot camp" throughout this period. 9 Only a 
handful of Force personnel had previous policing experience overseas and among "0" 
Division's originals there was only Sergeant Archibald Birtwistle, who prior to joining 
the Force in 1906 had served for a year in the Cheshire Constabulary and four years with 
the Scottish Guard. 10 The Regina program was divided into two parts and lasted a 
maximum of six months. The first half of the program consisted primarily of foot drill, 
physical training and military exercises, while the second half of the program consisted 
of equitation, studying federal statutes, instruction in revolver and rifle drill, jiu-jitsu, 
and other basic detachment duties. 11 A few minor modifications were made in the 
program during the 1920s and 1930s, which added emphasis on syllabus and curriculum 
development and refresher courses offered at District headquarters for personnel. 
Notably there was no intelligence training. 12 Not until the mid-1930s did the Force 
provide any specific intelligence training. Thereafter, it was often only available for a 
8This assessment was made by comparing Nominal Rolls with a combination ofNAC RG 18 
personnel records and obituaries in the RCMP Quarterly for Division Originals in mid 1920. Some records 
exist for the following individuals: Inspectors W.J. Beyts and J.W. Phillips; Staff Sergeants J.J. Wilson, H. 
Darling, W. Munday; R.M. Millar; Sergeants A Birtwistle, C.R. Macmillan, L. McLaughlan, AH. Joy, 
G.W. Fish; Corporal C.J. Whebell; Constables J.H. Barnett, L.R. Atkins, F.A Samson. 
~quis, Policing Canada's Century, 181. 
10RCMP Ouarterlv, 30, 4 (April 1965), 78, "obituary ofEx-Sgt. Archibald Birtwistle," was born in 
Norwich, Cheshire in 1876. He retired to pension in 1927 having accepted the job as Chief Constable at 
Charlottetown, PEL a position he held for the next 22 years. He died on I November 1964. 
11 Harvison, The Horsemen, 14-22; Kelly, Policing The Fringe, 10-33. 
12NAC RG 18, vol. 2383, "Circular Memorandum, No. 44" 4 January 1921; "Circular 
Memorandum, No. 44b." 7 October 1921; ibid., "Circular Memorandum No. 44d." 4 January 1924; ibid., 
ClB Memorandum, #44E, "Re: Training," 27 September 1927 
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select few senior officers who were schooled for a maximum of several months duration 
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) training academy or at London 
Metropolitan's Scotland Yard. Even then these courses devoted only a small amount of 
time to intelligence matters. u It was not until 1947 that NHQ first began to offer 
anything that amounted to an intelligence program. For the majority in our period 
intelligence training was entirely learned on-the-job. 
For the first six months of "0" Division's existence Inspector Walter James 
Beyts oversaw Divisional responsibilities as its Acting DOC. While the groundwork was 
being laid for the Division's detachments and subdistrict headquarters during the winter 
of 1920, Beyts returned to Toronto to concentrate on establishing its RHQ offices and 
single personnel quarters. Toward that end Beyts secured the top floors of a building on 
Yonge Street above a Toronto postal office. 14 Eventually eight personnel were stationed 
in Toronto directly under Beyts' supervision. By 1922 this number had increased to 17. 15 
With reorganization completed Perry's first task was to "find new and suitable 
personnel to carry out the Force's covert operations." 16 In February 1920 NHQ Assistant 
Commissioner Routledge informed Inspector Beyts that he was transferring an NCO, 
George William Fish, a British-born immigrant 'With CIB experience gained in Winnipeg 
13Harvison, The Horsemen. 14-26; Marquis, Policing Canada's Centurv. 179-184. 
14RCMP, Annual Reports. 1920-23. 
1596A TIP- 0271, Microfiche, Nominal Rolls, A-23's for Toronto Division 1920 -1922, (Hereafter 
simply cited as "0" Division Nominal Rolls, date) April 1920; Again, at least half this lot was British born, 
first generation emigrants with some previous military service"O" Division Nominal Rolls, April 1920. 
Under Beyt's the senior Toronto officer was Detective Staff Sergeant 1.1. Wilson, then came Detective Staff 
Sergeant Herbert Darling, Detective Sergeant C.R MacMillan, Detective Corporal G.W. Fish, Corporal C.J. 
Whebell, and three constables L.R Atkins, F.A Samson, and F. Simpson. Beyond their rank and regimental 
numbers there was virtually no further designation ofRHQ responsibilities in nominal rolls, not at least, for 
the first few months of its operation. 
16Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 446. 
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during the General Strike, to Toronto to establish the Division's CIB office. 17 By the 
time ofhis Toronto transfer Fish had become "thoroughly familiar with all C. I. B. work., 
- accounts, agents pay lists, etc ... " which Routledge informed Beyts, would certainly 
become an "asset" in establishing your "CIB offices. " 18 
In March 1920 Beyts reported to NHQ that Fish had "taken charge'' of the 
Division's CIB work and several weeks later in another memorandum added that since 
his transfer Fish had "organized the C. I. B. Branch in this District." Fish performed 
effectively so Beyts informed NHQ that he intended to let Fish carry on in this 
capacity. 19 Fish likely reviewed the cases of any human intelligence sources such as 
informants and agents who might possibly be transferred over from the DP into the new 
organization. 
Under Fish's guidance the Division's CIB began to take form. In Aprill920 Staff 
Sergeants Herbert Darling and John J. Wilson were transferred to Toronto from Regina 
to assist Fish in CIB investigations. John Wilson brought with him decades of detective 
experience, but his impact on "0" Division CIB's political investigations was minimal 
17NAC RG 18, RCMP, Service Record of George William Fish, 0-277 [hereafter cited as RCMP 
Personnel File- George Fish], "Memorandum For FYL W NO;- 0-277," ibid., "Cross Reference Sheet," 
letter of appreciation, from AJ. Andrews, 3 April 1920; ibid., memorandum, OC Manitoba District to 
Commissioner,15 December 1919; ibid., memorandum, OC Manitoba District to Commissioner, 15 
December 1919; ibid., memorandum, OC Manitoba District to Commissioner, 15 December 1919; ibid., 
memorandum, Assistant Commissioner to Inspector Beyts, 24 February 1920: RCMP Quarterly 30,2 
(October 1964), 83, "Obituary of George William Fish". 
George William Fish was born in London, England, in 1889. Prior to joining the Force he worked 
briefly at Tisdale, Saskatchewan, probably as a farm hand. Following Regina training in 1910 Fish worked at 
Battleford, Wilkie, Prince Albert, Wadena and Saskatoon. He worked at "'0" Division from 1920 until 1932, 
when following his promotion to Inspector he was transferred to Cranbrook, BC. Two years later he headed 
the Vancouver CIB and he assumed command ofEdmonton Sub-Division in December 1938. He moved to 
Peace River in 1940 and in 1945 was sent to Regina and was promoted Superintendent in April. He retired 
to pension on 1 January 1946 after 3 5 years of service. He died in Victoria, BC, in April 1964. 
1%id., memorandum, Assistant Commissioner to Inspector Beyts, 24 February 1920; and ibid., 
telegram, Superintendent Duffus to the Commissioner, 23 February 1920. 
19ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Duffus OC "D" Division to OC Toronto 6 March 1920; ibid., 
memorandum, Adjutant to OC "D" Division, 30 March 1920; ibid., memorandum, Inspector Beyts to 
Commissioner, 15 March 1920; ibid., memorandum, Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 23 March 1920. 
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since he was near the close of his career and he retired in 1922. 20 Darling, on the other 
hand, played an extremely important role in "0" Division's RHQ CIB operations 
becoming its north star, the compass that guided its work during the 1920s and into the 
l930s. 2 t 
Born in Cardiff, Wales in 1887, after a failed commercial career as a salesman, 
an accounts clerk and as a business instructor, Darling emigrated to Canada in 1912. He 
joined the Force in Regina the following year and served overseas during the war in the 
RC:tvlP CEF Cavalry Draft contingent under future "0" Division DOC George Leslie 
Jennings. Until his 1920 Toronto transfer most ofDarling's time in the Force was spent 
working in Perry's office as a stenographer.12 
With these personnel changes implemented "0" Division's CIB got off to a rocky 
start. Fish was a better detective than he was an administrator and was more interested 
in conducting outside investigations than running the office operation. He hated office 
politics and his authority was being challenged by sergeants such as Wilson and Darling 
who were higher in rank yet were often under his supervision, themselves conducting 
2
'1ie had joined the Force in 1891 and his most-celebrated case was his 1906 arrest ofBill Minor 
and his train robbing associates. 
21 RCMP Quarterly 1,1 (July 193 3 ), 3 8, "Obituary of Ex-Staff Sergeant J.J. Wilson," notes that 
Wilson's career was interrupted at some point so his total pensioned service was 23 years. He died in 1933 
on the Sunshine Trail, east of High River, Alberta in a motor vehicle accident. 
22NAC, RG 18, vol.3459, 0-232, vol. I, Herbert Darling service record [hereafter cited as RCMP 
Personnel File- Herbert Darling], statement 16 June 1913; ibid., memorandum, Darling to Adjutant, n.d. 
December 1919; ibid., memorandum, G.L. Jennings to the Commissioner, 16 July 1919; ibid., Medical 
Examination of Darling by Morrision, and RNWMP Engagement contract, 20 November 1919; ibid., 
memorandum, Commissioner Perry to Assistant Commissioner Starnes, 9 April 1920; ibid., memorandum, 
Adjutant to Commanding Officer "0" Division, 13 April 1920; and ibid., reply, Inspector Beyts to 
Commissioner Perry, 20 April 1920; RCMP Ouarterly 43, 2 (Spring 1978), 77-78, "Obituary of Herbert 
Darling"; Kemp, Without fear. favour or affection, 11. 
Herbert Darling in 1931 was promoted Inspector and transferred to Ottawa to work as assistant to 
the DCI. In 1935 he was loaned to the Vancouver city police department for two years to establish its CIB. 
He was appointed Acting Superintendent in 1931, confirmed in rank in 1941, promoted Assistant 
Commissioner in 1946 and retired to pension in 1949. During the later stages of his career he served as CIB 
officer in Regina for "F" Division, served as OC "K" Division, and held various postings at NHQ including 
two years as head of its Identity Branch. He died in Edmonton in November 1978 at age 90. 
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Herbert Darling was "0" Division's leading intelligence light from 1921-1931. 
This photo was taken in 1946 when Darling, nearing the end of his career, 
was appointed Assistant Commissioner and OC Edmonton. 
Source: NAC RG 18 Service Record of Herbert Darling, p320 
(Originally from the Calgarv Herald. 23 April 1946) 
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CIB investigations. More troubling still was that for months hardly any intelligence was 
being gathered by the RHQ CIB. For years the Force's sole focus had concerned its 
activities in Western Canada. 23 
Many of these problems were resolved once Division personnel adjusted to their 
tasks at hand and began ironing out wrinkles at their regional headquarters. Fish's 
complaint concerning his rank and status was resolved with a promotion. 24 Intelligence 
work also became more of a priority following a leadership change with the August 1920 
transfer of Superintendent Arthur Duffus to Toronto to relieve Beyts of his control of the 
Division. 25 Duffus had considerably more experience than Beyts in both administrative 
and intelligence matters. He had commanded subdistricts since the 1900s, districts for 
nearly a decade and served overseas during the war, where along with Worsley, Douglas, 
Wilcox and Caulkin, he had led the Force's contingent in the Siberian campaign. 26 
During the Winnipeg General Strike he was officer in charge ofBrandon sub-district and 
he came from a monied Halifax family and he made no pretense about both his 
privileged role in society and more specifically in the Force. He was an individual whose 
class background and experiences made him a beneficiary of the kind of orderly society 
23RCl'vlP, Nominal Rolls, G.O. 320; also see ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Duffus to 
Commissioner, 7 May 1921. 
24ibid., memorandum, Inspector Beyts to Commissioner, 23 March 1920; RCMP, Nominal Rolls, 
G. 0. 320; also see ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 7 Ivfay 1921. 
25 RCl'vlP Personnel File- Arthur Duffus, "Description Form 59," 25 August 1896; ibid., 
"Application Form 70," 
Anhur W. Duffus was born in Halifax in 1878. He came from a monied Halifax family. He joined 
the Force in 1896 and his position and early promotions came largely as a result of his father's connections 
to the Liberal Party- figures like Prime Minister Laurier, W.S. Fielding (Laurier's Minster of Finance) and, 
J.F. Stairs another Eastern businessman and Liberal politician. 
"
6Longstreth, The Silent Force. 282-283. 
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Actually Superintendent Duffus in the 1920s. One of few Canadian born 
senior inter-war "0" Division personnel. He was responsible for supervising some of the 
Division's earliest intelligence networks and was the liaison between Division and NHQ. 
Source: :--lAC RG 18 Service record of A.W. Duffus, p. 171. 
(Originally from the Regina Leader, 17 November 192?) 
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the Force was organized to upho!d:~7 
Shortly after becoming "0" Division's DOC Duffus took several steps to 
improve the CIB's functioning. First, he began reassigning duties. Beyts was transferred 
to Bridgeburg to focus on detachment operations, while another officer who had 
occasionally assisted Fish in CIB work was sent to patrol the Belcher Islands and 
eventually transferred to Ottawa. Other personnel better suited for intelligence work 
were repositioned within the RHQ. 28 Herbert Darling (who had been pulled off of 
Toronto CIB duties and sent to Kingston to operate undercover in the prison system) was 
returned to Toronto RHQ in January 1921 to the CIB office and placed in charge ofCIB 
accounts and records?> As a result Fish was freed up so he could "utilise his full time to 
outside investigations," which Duffus knew full well was where Fish's strength lay. 30 
These changes meant that control of"O" Division RHQ's CIB shifted from Fish 
47RCMP Personnel File- Arthur Duffus, "Officer's Record of Service," Form 253, n.d.; ibid., 
"Officer's Record of Service," Form 253, n.d. 
28 On Beyts' career see RCMP Annual Report.l923, 28; RCMP G.O. 3890, 25-l-23; On Phillips' 
duties and transfer see, "0" Division Nominal Rolls, April- August 1920, and RCMP G.O. 1369, 1-3-21; 
Beyts contracted pneumonia, the result of complications suffered in a fire that swept the town of Haileybury 
in 1922 and he died at Sault Ste Marie in January 1923. 
Z9R_CMP Personnel File- Herbert Darling memorandum, Commissioner Perry to Assistant 
Commissioner Starnes, 9 April 1920; ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 29 
January 1921; Darling was transferred with Staff Sergeant J.J. Wilson who also assisted Fish. Wilson's 
service record was destroyed so we know almost nothing about his career other than his involvement in CIB 
work was short-lived. 
3~CMP Personnel File - Herbert Darling, memorandum, Commissioner Perry to Assistant 
Commissioner Starnes, 9 April 1920; ibid., memorandum, Adjutant to Commanding Officer "0" Division, 13 
April 1920; ibid., report, Inspector Beyts DOC "0" To Commissioner, N.D. 1920; Detective Sergeant Fish 
would on occasion continue to work with the intelligence group. In May 1921 for instance, he signed several 
secret agents reports on behalf of Duffus and forwarded them to NHQ; See, NAC RG 146, 175/P1639, 
Florence Custance file, report, secret agent (name deleted) and Fish to Commissioner, 2 and 41\Iay 1921. 
RCl\.1P Personnel File- Herbert Darling , original request, Herbert Darling to Commanding Officer "0" 
Division, 13 October 1920; ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 14 October 1920; 
ibid., memorandum, Adjutant to Commanding Officer "0" Division, 20 October 1920; ibid., memorandum, 
Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 29 January 1921. 
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to Darling in early 1921. This transfer of power from Fish to Darling became the most 
significant development in the CIB' s operations to this point. Darling remained in charge 
of the Division's CIB for more than a decade. He only left this job in 1931 on an Ottawa 
transfer to become Assistant to the Director of Criminal Investigation (DCI), an even 
more important intelligence post. Both Darling and Fish excelled in their new 
assignments. They worked well together at "0" Division in the 1920s. Fish assisted 
Darling by sometimes serving as temporary officer in charge of the CIB when Darling 
was on leave, visiting detachments, or off conducting his own investigations. Close 
cooperation between them extended well into the 1930s elsewhere in the Force. 31 
Darling and Duffus also forged a close working relationship in 1921 which 
subsequently guided the Division's CIB operations. Darling eventually began sending 
out detectives and other plainclothes members to cover and report on meetings 
revolutionaries held. He also supervised the work of informants and was involved in the 
CIB 's other work such as mail thefts, narcotics and moonshine operations bringing many 
cases to successful conclusion.32 Duffus' role eventually increased. He also began 
supervising the Force's own undercover personnel, reviewing their intelligence reports, 
and making his own assessments of their work before forwarding materials to NHQ. 
Together these officers brought greater standardization to the Division's 
31RCMP Quarterly, 30,2 (October 1964), 83, obituary of Supt. George William Fish. Fish was born 
in London in 1889. He was in Vancouver from 1934-1938, then subsequently served as command Edmonton 
sub-division. In 1940 he headed Peace River and in 1945 was transferred to Regina and promoted 
Superintendent. He retired as of 1 January 1946 and died in April 1964. 
With Darling's transfer to NHQ in 1931, Fish was promoted Detective Staff Sergeant and he 
bridged the gap in Divisional headquarters heading its CIB and supervising its intelligence work until a 
suitable replacement for Darling was found. In 1934 Fish was transferred to Vancouver to head "E" 
Division's CIB where he remained stationed til 1938. In 1935 Darling was loaned to the Vancouver Police 
Department for two years to help them reestablish their CIB 
32lbid., Commissioner Starnes' "Memorandum for the minister in Control of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police," 26 September 1923. 
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intelligence work. They encouraged Cffi personnel to dispense with hand-written reports 
in favour of typed copies. Soon most intelligence reports opened with a similar 
phraseology. The date and subject matter were clearly identified at the top and file 
numbers were appropriately affixed so they could be quickly retrieved by personnel at 
both the Division and at NHQ. 33 These officers also made sure that CIB personnel 
responded as best they could in a timely manner to any requests the DCI and other NHQ 
personnel had concerning intelligence matters. If answers were not easily obtained, then 
they made sure that applications to extend "diary dates" were promptly applied for. 
Eventually a triumvirate of sorts became the dominant form of Toronto CIB 
investigations in the 1920s. Someone such as a detective, informant or operative 
conducted outside investigations. Their work was supervised by Darling in the Toronto 
office. And while Darling increasingly set the tempo ofCIB work, Duffus ultimately set 
the tenor of the Division's operations as a whole and its ties with NHQ. 
With the Division's CIB in place by early 1921 many other changes followed 
which improved its intelligence operations. A few of these are worth noting. Through 
1921 a clearer definition in the Division's personnel duties began to appear in nominal 
rolls. By April Toronto RHQ had officially designated an Orderly Room Clerk and a 
Toronto Clerk in the Division Office. 34 By November the position of a Toronto RHQ 
CIB clerk was established which split Divisional clerking responsibilities between 
general clerking duties and CIB clerking. Since no formal distinction between criminal 
and political intelligence work occurred within the RHQ CIB until late 1939, CIB 
33The kind of standardization they brought to the Division can be found by comparing early 
intelligence reports with later ones in the early 1920s and also alongside of early Confidential Memorandums 
(CMs) in RG 18 volumes 2381-2383. 
34
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, 1920s, The fonner position went to Corporal Le3 while the latter 
was given to Corporal Allen. "0" Division Nominal Rolls, April1921; Haileybury (the Cobalt sub-district 
HQ) also gained its first clerkship and this position went to Constable Authier. 
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clerking mushroomed in successive years along both fronts. To accommodate this rapid 
growth soon several constables were assisting in CIB clerking while others were placed 
on three-months probation as detectives (now standard practice) and tested for 
competency in plainclothes duty. 35 
By early 1922 the RHQ CIB 's total staff had increased to about seven. There it 
remained for most of the decade never climbing higher than ten., nor sinking lower than 
five regular personnel. Through most of the 1920s Darling and Fish were assisted by 
Constable John Rolph (another British emigrant with military service) who undertook 
the RHQ CIB's clerical work, maintaining the Division's records. 36 In a typical year in 
the 1920s a handful of low-ranking personnel, usually constables and corporals were 
tested out as detectives. Seven RHQ personnel were tested for competency in detective 
work during 1921-1922. They included: Corporal H. Cart, and Constables E. G. "Ted" 
Weeks, C. B. Alexander, G. A Hartnett, P.B. Caveny and two others (R.L. Allan and 
L.P. Authier who were soon transferred to Montreal). Nearly all made it and were 
confirmed in rank.37 At least three of this lot (Cart, Weeks and Alexander) were British 
emigrants. One of them (C.B. Alexander) had served for five years with the RIC. More 
35RCMP G.O. 1649; ibid., 2053; "0" Division Nominal Rolls, November 1921; This position was 
given to Constable Ralph; In July of 1921 Constable Westaway was transferred to the Division and four 
months later he was granted extra pay while appointed general Clerk in Division Office;RCMP G.O. 1906, 
Noted that Constable Harnett was transferred from "N" Division on 1-11-21;; September, That same month 
two other personnel (Constables G.A Hartnett and Constable C. B. Alexander) began to share CIB clerking 
responsibilities with Ralph. They did so periodically during the better part of the following year. 
3~CMP Quarterly 40,4 (September 1975), 79, "Obituary ofJohn Rolph," 
John Rolph, was born in 1898 in Essex, England. He joined the Force in 1918 at Lethbridge and 3 
days later enlisted in the Cavalry Draft. He was invalided to pension in 1930 having been stationed at Regina, 
Moose Jaw, Lethbridge, Ottawa and Toronto. He died in Aprill975. 
37RCl'vlP Ouarterly 40,4 (September 1975), 78, "Obituary ofEdward George 'Ted' Weeks" 
Edward George Weeks, was born in 1900 in Southhampton, England. He joined the Force in 
August 1919. He finished his career at the rank of Staff Sergeant and was retired to pension in 1946 having 
been stationed at Regina, Rockcliffe, London, Muncey, Hamilton, Niagara Falls, Windsor, Walkerville and 
Toronto. He died in Winnipeg in April 1975. 
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constables were tested m successive years in the 1920s as demands required and 
resources allowed. 38 
Elsewhere by 1921 the Division had SIX detachments and subdistrict 
headquarters. Niagara Falls, Windsor and Haileybury each had three personnel stationed 
at them, while Sault Ste. Marie and Bridgeburg each had one. 39 The senior officers at 
each of these points were all British born military men and these individuals became the 
key point men in the Division's enforcement of federal statutes.40 They also began 
conducting intelligence work and funneling information through the system to NHQ. 
Their work was supervised by an officer at the RHQ who was sent uriannounced on 
monthly inspections of subdistrict headquarters and detachments. Nevertheless, as 
workloads increased for all Division personnel, supervision in this respect slackened 
somewhat by the mid-1920s creating a situation in which sub-district personnel 
exercised greater autonomy than was considered prudent. This tension escalated between 
centre and periphery within Divisions and between Divisions and NHQ in the 1920s and 
1930s. Both Starnes and his successor were aware of this problem and through 
reprimands in Confidential Memorandums ( CMs) encouraged a tightening up of control 
38
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, 1921-1922; RC:MP Ouarterlv, 4,2 (October 1936), 142, "Obituary of 
C.B. Alexander" 
Charles Bernard Alexander, b. 1893, joined the Force in 1910 and took his discharge in August 
1914 to serve overseas where he served with the Dragoon Guards and Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders. 
He was promoted to the rank of Captain and was granted the Military Cross for distinguished conduct. He 
served with the RIC after the war and rejoined the RCMP in November 1921. He left the Force in 1925 and 
was appointed an Inspector with the Department of Customs in Toronto. He died on 25 January 1936. 
39StaffSergeant Munday headed Niagara Falls, Windsor was headed by Sergeant Birtwistle, 
Haileybury was initially supervised by Detective Sergeant MacLaughlin, Sault Ste. Marie was run by Staff 
Sergeant Miller and Bridgeburg by Constable Lea. 
4
o.'O" division Nominal Rolls, April 1920; At Niagara Falls were J.H. Barnett and A. Wei be. At 
Windsor were W.W. Elmore and T. Fahey. At Haileybury were G.H. Joy and L.P. Authier. 
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between centres in all kinds of operations.'n 
While a more detined structure existed in "0" Division's operation by this point, 
for the most part CIB intelligence work remained a part-time affair. Not only was 
training largely learned on the job, but sustained undercover operations were something 
of an anomaly during this period at least for Force regulars. In most instances RHQ 
personnel probably devoted only a couple of hours here and there to covering a meeting 
or event being held and therefore were not granted extra pay. This makes it impossible 
to establish exactly how much time was devoted to political work in a Division or an 
RHQ during these years. Those recorded instances in G.O. 's of regular personnel 
drawing extra pay for detective and plainclothes duty varied enormously depending on 
their assignment. In the 1920s they ranged from approximately one to three months on 
average. In general, it appears as though several regular personnel conducted sustained 
political and criminal investigations at the same time. It is most likely, however, that 
much work was in the criminal realm and not concerned with policing political ideas. 
Taking 1921 as a representative example of the early 1920s, we note that Constable P.B. 
Caveny drew extra pay from late February to early April1921. Ted Weeks drew extra 
pay from mid-April to the beginning of June and then for an additional three weeks again 
starting on 22 June. Another constable spent 108 days from April to August 1921 on 
special plainclothes duty drawing extra pay.42 
In most instances it is impossible to separate out how much time was spent on 
'political' and 'criminal' investigations by each of these individuals. Therefore we can 
get only the broadest sense of what tasks for what periods of time occupied the attention 
41For instance, see, RG 18 vol. 2383, CIB Memorandum 52A, 17 December 1923; ibid., 52B, 2 
December 1924; ibid., 52C, 9 August 1928; ibid., 52E, 3 October 1932. 
~~or Caveny see RC:MP G.O. 1334, ibid., 1425; for Weeks see RCMP G.O. 1740; for Allan who 
worked undercover for l 08 days see RCMP G. 0. 1826. 
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of these CIB personnel. Second, we have no way of knowing with any certainty the 
volume of work contracted out to private finns (although in Toronto through 1921 it 
remained substantial, perhaps as much as 70-80 per cent of intelligence being acquired 
in this manner) nor whether or not other agents were operating within the District and 
whether they were hidden on other payrolls at NHQ or funded elsewhere through 
contingency accounts. 43 
As intelligence networks were established as part of the Force's larger 
responsibility, their foothold in communities was also strengthened over time. This was 
both a conscious and unconscious development, an evolution that reflected the Force's 
reality as an organic part of the society in which it existed. Detective work remained a 
part time and piecemeal operation. But clearly a growing number of individuals gained 
some detective· experience during these years. Some of it was in an intelligence capacity. 
This meant that the Division had individuals it could rely increasingly upon to cover 
revolutionary meetings and public demonstrations. 
Against the grain of"O" Division's basic continuity in senior Division personnel 
where few changes occurred in the 1920s was a massive continual flux as dozens upon 
dozens of lower-ranking personnel passed through the Division's rosters during the 
decade. Many individuals served for brief periods in the Division and built successful 
careers elsewhere in the organization. Others left the Force entirely, and became 
potential contacts for the Force elsewhere. Sergeant Birtwistle resigned in 1927 to accept 
the post of Chief Constable at Charlotteto\\ITI, a position he held for the next 22 years 
until he retired. Detective Sergeant McLauchlan retired in 1927 and accepted an 
appointment as police chief in Timmins which lasted four years. He eventually served 
43NAC RG 18 vol. 2380, CM 37, 24 April 1919? This CM from Routledge to an OC reveals that up 
until that point CIB telegram costs were hidden by being charged to a War Appropriation account One can 
only speculate what else might have been. 
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as chief at Toronto and Haileybury .. 14 Corporal C.J. Whebell joined the Bahamas Police 
in 1921 (first as Assistant Commissioner from 1921 -1926, then as Commandant from 
1926-1936) and returned to Canada during World War II to head an internment camp at 
Brantford. 45 As the Division established itself in the region, its ties in the community 
within which it functioned were increased. This would only help strengthen the 
Division's intelligence operations later on in the CIB's history. 
3.1 
Formative Period, Henry Cart 
And the First Campaign, 1920-1923 
Although the RHQ CIB was established in 1920, in the early stages its 
intelligence work was far from effective. Initially for its covert intelligence it relied 
heavily on outside sources such as private detective firms and even other Divisions, 
whose reports were examined at NHQ by readers in a tiny branch called the Central 
Registry (CR). 46 American firms such as Pinkerton's and Burns Detective Agencies, 
along with domestic ones were operating on Canadian soil at the request of both federal 
and provincial governments assisting private companies. In 1919-1920 eight firms had 
been granted licences by the Ontario government to operate in the province.47 Steps had 
44McLauchlan was also spelled in a myriad of ways in Force nominals and elsewhere such as 
McLaughlan, MacLaughlin, and MacLauchlin. In his 1971 RCMP Ouarterlv obituary it was spelled as 
McLauchlan which I have accepted. 
45Sergeant RM Millar quit in 1928 to join Whebell in the Bahamas. 
-16 A nice sketch of the CR is Inspector A Goodman, "The Central Registry, Ottawa," RCMP 
Quarterly, 6,1 (July 1938), 57-60. 
41Journals OfThe Legislative Assembly OfThe Province Of Ontario, Session 1919, Fifth Session 
of the Fourteenth Legislation, vol. LIII, (Toronto, 1919), 47; They included by date: 1) McDonald Detective 
Agency, Ltd., 9 March 1918; 2) Sherman Detective Agency, Inc., 10 May 10, 1918; 3) The Thiel Detective 
Services Co., I May 1918; 4) Toronto Detective Agency, Ltd., 1 May 1918; 5) W.A Pinkerton and A. 
Pinkerton, trading as Pinkerton's National Detective Agency of Chicago and New York, 17 May 1918; 6) 
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been taken in that province and in Quebec during the war to begin to regulate who was 
entitled to declare themselves as private "detectives. ""'a This step was long overdue. 
Obviously labour felt they should be outlawed altogether and repeatedly introduced such 
bills in the provincial house on a yearly basis to no avail. 
The labour movement had good reason to concern itself with the practices of 
private firms. They were an outgrowth of the Employers Agencies formed in Southern 
Ontario shortly following 1900 whose primary goals were to ensure maintenance of the 
"open shop." While Michael Piva's work has dra'Ml rather harsh conclusions with 
respect to "militant' labour's successes in Southern Ontario up until 1920, his 
assessment of the work of Employers' Agencies does reveal just how difficult it was to 
try to organize and combat anti-labour activities during these years. Private firms were 
part of the more coercive apparatus that could be employed when all else failed. -+9 During 
the War the so-called "famous American detective," Frank J. Burns, had been involved 
in numerous scandals in the US concerning anti-labour practices ranging from theft, 
unlawful entry, breaking and entering, bribery, other strikebreaking practices and was 
even tied to murder. In one instance he was "Rotten-Egged" by an angry "mob," 
Hamilton's conservative AFL paper The Labor News reported, and was "Driven Out of 
Marrietta, A Small To'Ml In the State of Georgia," the paper's headline declared. 5° His 
stories were often reported in Canadian papers. Some ofhis unsavory operatives in these 
The Employers' Detective Agency, Ltd., 17 July 1918; 7) The Wm. J. Burns International Detective Agency, 
15 January 1919 (although license was dated 12 l\1ay, 1919 it was not issued until 3 September 1918; 8) The 
Anglo-American Detective Agency, 15 January 1919. 
~''Quebec Private Detective Legislation," The Labor News, 29 October 1915, 2. 
4~chael Piva, The Conditions Of The Working Class In Toronto. 1900-1921 (Ottawa, 1979), 
esp., chap vi, 143-170. 
lO.·WM. J. Bums, 'Detective' Rotten Egged By Mob And Driven Out Of~larrietta, A Small Town 
In The State Of Georgia," The Labor News, 15 r-.fay 1914, 1. 
99 
US scandals turned out to be Canadians or had Canadian connections. 51 His activities 
were so reprehensible that even the International Association of Chiefs ofPolice ousted 
him from membership in their organization and ordered him to remove their insignia 
from their letterhead in 1914. But Burns soldiered on. He lobbied congress and following 
the early wave of Red Scare activity was even hired to head the US Bureau of 
Investigation (B I) from 1921-1924 before being dismissed and replaced by J. Edgar 
Hoover. Burns' private detective agency survived and the Ontario licencing bureau had 
granted the firm a license to operate in the province even after the war despite its 
unsavory reputation. 52 The intelligence reports that Burns' and other agencies generated 
were forwarded to "0" Division and deposited on its files. Through much of 1920 and 
1921 Division intelligence personnel relied upon these private firms for much of their 
information. As a result the contribution "0" Division's detectives and regulars made 
to this system was minimal. 
The Division's political investigations improved as CIB personnel began to 
follow more closely the shifts taking place in the labour movement. Still, this work 
remained challenging for several reasons and not simply because Division personnel 
lacked training and experience. State repression and the postwar labour revolt's collapse 
created uncertainty making it difficult for intelligence personnel to keep abreast of 
changes in the labour movement. 53 Many progressives already suspected that there were 
51
" Alleged Detective Is How Judge Termed W.J. Bums," The Labor News, 20 l\1ay 1914, 1. 
52
"Good Bye Burns. He is Ousted By Police Chiefs," The Labor News, 26 June 1914, 8. 
53Gregory S. Kealey, "State Repression of Labour and the Left in Canada, 1914-1920: The Impact 
ofthe First World War," Canadian Historical Review, 73, 3 (1992), 281-314; Barbara Roberts, Whence 
They Came: Deportation from Canada. 1900-1935 (Ottawa, 1988); Barbara Roberts, "Shovelling Out the 
'Mutinous:' Political Deportation from Canada Before 1936," Labour/ Le Travail. 18 (1986), 77-11 0; 
Gregory S. Kealey, "1919: The Canadian Labour Revolt", Labour/ Le Travail 13 (1984), 11-44; David 
Bercuson, Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour Industrial Relations. and the General Strike (Montreal, 1974); 
Craig Heron [ed.] The Workers' Revolt in Canada. 1917-1925 (Toronto, 1998). 
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spies at work among them. They had good reason to be wary. Stories about Pinkertons, 
Bums, and Thiel agencies' activities were widely reported. When their agents and stools 
were caught sentences often did not seem to be much of a deterrent. There was good 
money to be made in spying and strikebreaking, especially with the Employers' Agency 
willing to top off "scab'' wages as Piva has noted. 54 Even during the war one author in 
Hamilton's The Labor News, wryly commented, that the latter function "Pays Better 
Than U.S. Steel."55 At the Calgary Western Labor Convention in March 1919 Robert 
Godsen was confronted and accused of being a spy, and shouted down from the 
convention floor. He defended himself enough to avoid being ejected, but the episode 
served as a reminder as to what length the State would go to ensure its survival. 56 Frank 
Zaneth (aka Harry Blask) another one of the Force's spies present in Calgary had his true 
colours revealed during the Winnipeg General Strike trials. 57 Sergeant Reames, who led 
Winnipeg CIB political investigations during the General Strike, and the Force more 
generally, were also roundly condemned by the working-class press during these months. 
The "Mounties," the editor of the One Big Union Bulletin chided, were the "quick-
change artists" at least out west in the Crow's Nest Pass coal fields, where in collusion 
with the Dominion Government through the Minster of Labour and the Coal Controller 
"entered into a conspiracy with the coal operators and the International Mine Workers 
of America to do quite a number of criminal acts." While these claims were largely 
unsubstantiated, the presence of the Mounties was real and kept labour organizations on 
54
"Detective Slugger Sentenced To Five Years In Prison," The Labor News. 19 April 1912, 1; 
"Private Detective Strike Breakers Get Prison Terms," The Labor News. 20 l\Aarch 1914, 1; Piva, The 
Conditions of The Working Class in Toronto, 143-170. 
55
"Strikebreaking Pays Better Than U.S. Steel," The Labor News, 15 June 1917, 1. 
56Leier, Rebel Life. 75-1 08; Dubro and Rowland, Undercover. 44-45. 
57Dubro and Rowland, Undercover, 39-100. 
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their toes. sR This encouraged labour to remain alert for any signs of further infiltration 
and made the Force's job that much more difficult. 
To make sense of many of the changes undenNay in the labour movement the 
position of RNWNfP Secretary was established in Regina in 1919 and its title changed 
to Liaison and Intelligence Ot1icer (LIO) following the amalgamation of the DP and the 
RNWNIP. The LIO's position became one of the three principal offices and sections 
which shared intelligence responsibilities at NHQ (along with the Director of Criminal 
Investigations and the Central Registry) until a separate Intelligence Section was 
established in 1936. Until 1933 the position ofLIO was filled by Colonel C. F. Hamilton, 
a former war correspondent for the Toronto Globe in South Africa during the Boer War, 
Assistant RNWMP Comptroller, and Deputy Chief Censor for Canada during World War 
I. Hamilton's responsibilities as LIO included: 
Under the direction of the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. to have charge 
ofthe secret and confidential correspondence of the Dept., to make confidential 
reports on such matters to the government, to have control of all negotiations 
with Scotland Yard and similar institutions with regard to the Secret Service of 
Canada. 59 
As well Hamilton sat on various inter-departmental committees concerned with domestic 
security and produced regular weekly and bi·weekly intelligence summaries for Cabinet, 
the heads of other government departments and Force personnel charged with 
intelligence responsibilities. 
RHQ CIB reports and Colonel Hamilton's summaries both began regularly 
documenting the changes in the revolutionary community. Through 1920 Divisions 
58
"Mounties Quick-Change Artists," The One Big Union Bulletin, 17 April 1920, 1. 
5~etke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 386. 
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reported that the OBU's importance as a revolutionary centre had begun to wane. 60 
During the Winnipeg General Strike its leading members were arrested, even those who 
had no direct relationship to the Strike, while international leaders were left alone. 61 The 
OBU's influence had peaked by the October 1920 Port Arthur convention.r'2 Afterwards 
its decline was apparent in many centres. This was especially true in most parts of 
Southern Ontario. Early intelligence reports from Toronto described its membership as 
at best "stationary" and its finances as "completely broke. "63 OB U Ontario organizer Joe 
Knight's bi-weekly One Big Union Bulletin reports focused primarily on his work in 
Northern Ontario, while their silence on Southern Ontario activities often attested to the 
fact that little was being accomplished in that part of the province. By the end of the year 
when OBU units voted by referendum ballot on proposed amendments to the union's 
constitution only a couple of units still functioned in Southern Ontario, a general 
workers unit in Toronto and a second at Hamilton. 64 
With the OBU's days seemingly numbered, intelligence reports noted that a new 
threat was emerging since many of its members and SPCers, SDPers, and others were 
"going over" to support the Third International. 65 Shaped by events south of the border, 
60ibid., SB #5, 31 December 1919, 23; ibid., SB #37, 19 August 1920, 52-53; ibid., SB #48, 4 
November 1920, 262-263. 
61 Stuart Jamieson, Task Force On Labour Relations Study No. 22. Times Of Trouble: Labour 
Unrest and Industrial Conflict In Canada, 1900-1966 (Ottawa, 1968), 186-189. 
62David J. Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men: The Rise and Fall of the One Big Union (Toronto, 
1978). 
63Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Earlv Years SB #37, 19 August 1920, 61; ibid., SB #47, 28 
October 1920, 250; ibid., SB #36, 12 August 1920, 47; ibid., SB #48, 4 November 1920, 267: ibid., SB #47, 
28 October 1920, 250. 
&~<'Result ofReferendum Vote On Amendments to the O.B.U. Constitution," One Big Union 
Bulletin, 1 January 1921,4. 
65Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Earlv Years SB #5, 31 December 1919, 23; ibid., SB #37, 19 
August 1920, 75. 
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two communist parties had emerged in Toronto in 1919. They consisted of an eclectic 
mix of former SPCers, Russian Anarchists, and SDPers and a second wave that joined 
their ranks the following year as communists consolidated their position but their 
memberships remained smali.M Nevertheless, as part of their effort to draw in new 
recruits and to broaden their support in the community, the two communist parties also 
established educational associations. Before long, the first of these, the Plebs League 
(PL), emerged in the city. Several others followed. 
The Plebs League traced its origins to Great Britain to a similarly titled 
movement that sprung up during the War. The PL had taken its name from Daniel De 
Leon's pamphlet Two Pages ofRoman Historv. PL antecedents included late nineteenth 
century mechanics' associations, workingmen's libraries, self-help societies, and perhaps 
most importantly British Labour Colleges where, as Stuart Macintyre has noted, two 
aspects of Marxist education, an exegetical format and ties to a wider working-class 
culture had come together. 67 
In Toronto, the PL was established in January 1920 and run out of the Ontario 
Labour College's ( OLC' s) Wellington Street offices. Early intelligence reports suggested 
that the PL, like the Workers' International League (WIL), an opposition organization 
established during the same period with ties to the New York Workers' School, served 
the dual purpose of educating workers while at the same time acting as a transmission 
belt for CP recruiting.68 
66 Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 27-86. 
67Henry Pelling, The British Communist Partv: A Historical Profile (London, 1958), 1; On the 
British Labour Colleges and working-class education see, Stuart Macintyre, A Proletarian Science: Marxism 
in Britain. 1917-1933 (Cambridge, 1980), chap.3., esp., 73-75. 
68NAC RG 146, 175/ P1639, Custance file, report, EDA operative, 18 October 1920; ibid., report, 
source deleted, and Duffus to Commissioner, 26 October 1920; On the region's working class educational 
organizations see, Naylor, The New Democracy, 84-88; Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 65-66; Rodney, 
Soldiers ofthe International, 32-34; Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 64-66, 77-81; Joan Sangster, Dreams of 
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As colleges patterned on both British and American models began springing up 
in Canadian cities, Colonel Hamilton feared that they might achieve a similar success 
in this country. Frank Zaneth, who had assumed the alias of James Laplante in May 1920 
and was working undercover in Montreal, had attended an OBU meeting in August in 
that city where he learned that the Soviet Bureau was planning to finance an even 
stronger Labour College in Canada at several centres. 69 Drawing upon this intelligence 
and similar information gained elsewhere, in September, Colonel Hamilton twice 
reported to his political bosses that the PL had arrived and opened its doors in Toronto 
and in other centres. 70 
Anyone even remotely familiar with political developments in Toronto and 
Southern Ontario after 1916 knew full well the important role that educational 
associations had played. By October that year the Labour Educational Association of 
Ontario had been reestablished following many years of neglect. Under the leadership 
of Joseph Marks, it became active throughout centres in Southwestern Ontario where it 
had proved itself a successful catalyst, a source of inspiration and cohesion to a 
fragmented labour movement launching the ll..P which eventually culminated in the 
provincial electoral victory in 1919 and led to the formation of a Farmer-Labour 
government. With such a strong educational tradition in the province which had an 
influential role in shaping policies and forming the government, it was anything but 
surprising that intelligence personnel strongly felt that progressive educational 
Eguality: Women On The Canadian Left, 1920-1950 (Toronto, !989), 31,33-35,38,39.44-46,50,53, 60. 
6
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organizations such as the PL required immediate attention. 
If by mid-1920 the PL was becoming an important centre for progressives, its 
fluidity also made it an ideal point of entry into the progressive movement for both 
special agents and private detectives. Using the PL as a springboard agents and 
operatives could assume aliases and gain immediate access to many prominent political 
agitators. The PL provided spies with an opportunity to build a strong base for 
subsequent intelligence-gathering. At one of the PL's outdoor Toronto events a private 
detective finn operative learned that the Toronto PL planned to launch a series of 
courses in the city in the fall, whose "teachings" promised to be "far superior" to those 
offered by the university. Soon other events the Toronto operative reported predicted 
similar success for the College. 71 
By October 1920 a private Toronto based intelligence firm, the Employers' 
Detective Agency (EDA), was contracted by the Force to secure more information on the 
PL and likely the operative who had reported previously on local outdoor activities 
successfully infiltrated the League. He began attending the PL's bi-weekly business 
meetings that month and reporting on its finances. The CIB wanted him to learn how 
much money was being raised, how much was being spent, and its origin. 72 As important 
as tracking PL finances was reporting its strategies for expanding its influence in the 
community and providing any assessment as to how it might fare over the weeks and 
months ahead. This intelligence was promptly recorded too. 73 Through the private 
detective firm's operative the CIB tried to situate the PL and its activities in the context 
71 Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Earlv Years. SB# 40, 9 September 1920,115. 
12NAC RG 146, 175/ P1639 Custance file, report, 18 October 1920; ibid., EDA report, 22 October 
1920; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 22 November 1920; ibid., 
EDA report, 27 November 1920. 
73Kealey and Whitaker (eds.] The Early Years, SB# 45, 14 October 1920. 
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of a changing industrial and political landscape. 74 
Before long, as Colonel Hamilton feared, the EDA operative reported that the 
College's influence in Toronto was expanding. The PL was holding its meetings there. 
Furthermore, the OLC had become the central meeting place for the IWW, communists 
and other radicals who engaged in "revolutionary conversation" as well as an 
"organizing point" for many revolutionary activities. The OLC quickly emerged as the 
city's principal "depository" for revolutionary literature which was now arriving on a 
"regular basis." Not only had the PLunder Florence Custance's leadership established 
ties to like-minded organizations overseas, but both the OLC and PL's base of support 
had been broadened among the city's ethnic groups. Those they had reached with some 
success included: Russians, Russian Jews, Bulgarians, Greeks, as well as a handful of 
British-born. 75 
Since the CIB was getting its feet wet in local intelligence operations during 
these months and was understaffed especially with Darling away in Kingston it was not 
surprising that the Force had turned to the EDA for assistance. Commissioner Perry's 
previous experience with private firms in Western Canada might have been disastrous 
but there is little evidence to support Betke and Horrall' s claims that he shied away from 
employing them in Ontario despite their sordid reputation. On the contrary at least in 
Toronto their services were being widely employed during 1920 and 1921. In 1921 as 
much as 70 to 80 per cent of intelligence deposited on the core Toronto CP files 
74NAC RG 146, 175/ P1639 Custance file, report, N.A 18 October 1920; ibid., report, source 
deleted and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 26 October 1920; ibid., report, source deleted and 
Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 1 7 November 1920. 
75Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Early Years, SB# 40, 9 September 1920, 115; ibid., SB #47, 28 
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originated with private tirms. Their contributions to PHFs during this period was 
similarly significant. 76 
By the spring of 1921 both Canadian communist parties were actively recruiting 
members to join their ranks. In April discussions to amalgamate the two Canadian 
parties were initiated. The Communist International (CI) had established a Pan-
American Bureau earlier that year to unite the two US parties by June 1921 and if that 
was not possible then the Agency was under orders to create a new party. The same 
power was vested in the Agency for Canada. 77 The Pan-American Bureau sent Caleb 
Harrison (aka Charles Atwood) to Toronto in April to initiate discussions and to make 
as much headway as possible in uniting the two parties. 
In May communists came from across the country and met in secrecy for three 
days in a bam outside of Guelph. At the CPC's "founding convention" they made plans 
to strengthen the revolutionary movement, if not bring it out into the open. The existing 
historiography suggests that the RCtviP had infiltrated the organization by this point 
successfully enough to get an agent who was operating undercover to attend the event. 
The evidence to support this claim is simply not there. 78 
Instead, what is clear is that an EDA operative, who was not a participant, had 
gathered considerable intelligence on the event's proceedings. He produced a second-
hand account of discussions that had taken place there. His report was substantial. It was 
five foolscap pages in length, and its detail must have impressed Commissioner Perry 
and other intelligence personnel. The EDA operative's account of the Guelph 
Convention was derived from lengthy discussions with at least two event participants. 
76Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 240-241. 
77Rodney, Soldiers of the International, 36-3 8; Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 70-72. 
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One was likely the Pan-American Bureau's representative Charles Atwood and the 
second a close associate of Tom Bell. 79 
The EDA agent's report began by describing the troubles several participants had 
in reaching the convention site, its setting, and the steps delegates had taken to maintain 
"great secrecy" in holding the event. Twenty-two delegates in total were present, he 
reported, fifteen representatives of the Communist Party, five United Communist Party 
delegates and two members from the SPC. The delegates represented revolutionary 
pockets of activity in Winnipeg, Vancouver, Hamilton, Toronto, Montreal, Sudbury and 
Regina. The EDA operative identified several of the participants by name: Lome 
Cunningham, Tom Bell, Charles Atwood, Trevor Maguire, Florence Custance and 
Maurice Spector. Many others who had attended he was unable to identify since he was 
not a participant. The others names had likely not come up in discussion and the EDA 
operative obviously did not want to appear too interested in pressing his sources harder 
to obtain further specifics because he might compromise his own position. 80 
The EDA operative then devoted most of his report toward detailing the plans 
revolutionaries had for future work. He reviewed the proceedings highlighting the 
discussions held in many of its sessions. The opening session was led by Atwood who 
spent a great deal oftime sketching the events which led to the Russian Revolution as 
well as discussing the revolutionary climate in Europe and North America. The next 
session focused on plans the Pan-American Bureau had to establish five provincial 
organizers and to form a central executive body (as well as the issue of dues). The third 
session focused on the OBU question and whether it was better to try to "smash it up" 
or "try and form caucuses in each group to turn it into a Communist Party organization." 
7~AC RG 146, 175/Pl712, Spector file, EDA report, 29 May 1921; Rodney, Soldiers of the 
International, 36-3 8; 
8<NAC RG 146, 175/P1712, Spector file, EDA report, 29l\1ay 1921. 
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This issue was settled when agreement was reached to adopt a mixed approach. 
Communists would try to get inside strong locals and fonn caucuses pulling them into 
the CP's sphere of influence while the weak ones were to be smashed. At subsequent 
sessions debates focused on the issues of imperialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
mass action, parliamentary action and trade unionism. 81 
Before the event ended a temporary Central Executive Committee (CEC) was 
established. The EDA operative identified Custance, Spector, Maguire and a fourth 
person [name deleted] as the individuals who sat on the committee. Their election was 
at the "approval" of Atwood and they were instructed to fonn a pennanent Canadian 
Executive Committee which would ultimately be responsible for issuing instructions to 
places where the CP and the UCP had locals. The Canadian Executive Committee was 
to fonn an executive body in each city and district and to see to it that its orders were 
carried out. 82 
Finally, the EDA operative reported that the convention's proceedings were to 
be sent by special messenger to the Pan-American Bureau in New York, which in tum 
would see to it that it reached the Comintem in Moscow. If everything was satisfactory 
at that point, then Moscow would extend official recognition of the Communist Party 
of Canada. A stem warning was also issued at that point. Members arrested while 
conducting official work on behalf of the party would be provided for. Those arrested 
while doing something on their 0\\111 responsibility would be on their own. Furthermore, 
members who discussed the work of the party, even among their own group, outside of 




By the summer of 1921, with full knowledge of the plans revolutionaries made 
at Guelph and of the PL and other OLC ventures, CIB intelligence personnel felt their 
operations were inadequate. Both Superintendent Duffus and Colonel Hamilton became 
increasingly alarmed by the rapid [:,1fOwth of the revolutionary movement in the city and 
throughout the region. In fact for months, if not longer, the Force was also privy to 
United Kingdom CPC mail intercepts which provided further evidence of the stren&Jth 
of the movement internationally and its Canadian ties. 84 But there were many ironies 
even at this early juncture. At the same time Canadian intelligence personnel were 
becoming increasingly alarmed by the movement overseas, Lenin was abandoning any 
hope for revolution in the immediate future throughout Europe. Although Poland had 
been invaded the previous year, the German revolution had been crushed. By late 1921, 
the German KDP's membership (the largest communist party outside of the Soviet 
Union) had fallen to half its 1920 high of 360,000. 85 
In September 1921, Duffus forwarded Commissioner Perry a memorandum 
classified "Secret and Personal" which conveyed many of his fears: 
On reviewing the many reports I have submitted to you from time to time 
concerning the Communist Party of Canada I am of the opinion that the trend of 
the Communist movement has assumed such significance as to make it 
incumbent upon me to write you giving you my views of the situation in the 
Western Ontario District at the present time. 86 
Duffus wrote of his desire to step up intelligence operations and to cover the movement 
in a more thorough manner. He felt that ever since the CP had arrived in the city, in the 
guise of the PL, the OLC and several other groups, there had been trouble covering the 
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movement. The fact that party members had recently decided to take the movement 
underground had made this task more difficult. He wrote: 
Conditions today, as I view them, are serious and the continued steady growth 
of the Communist movement is to me no illusion but a dangerous reality to be 
grappled with. To my mind it is necessary that we should have at least another 
operative at work in Toronto whilst the Communist movement here is in its 
infancy. This can be accomplished more easily now than if we delay until later 
when the Party will have become more thoroughly organized. 87 
Duffus believed that at present the CIB was "only touching the fringe" of the party's 
operations, and added, that in making this claim he was not trying to devalue 
"operatives" already at work throughout the region. Nevertheless, he informed the 
Commissioner that the situation was "so grave" that "I consider the time has arrived 
when we must get in on the inside of the Communist ranks in Toronto so that at a later 
date we shall not be unprepared." Finally, he had noticed a general trend unfolding 
throughout the region: 
There can be no doubt but that the Communists are slowly but surely absorbing 
the Socialists and other radical elements in Eastern Canada into their ranks, and 
that there is a prospect of being faced at no very distant date, not so much with 
a multitude of small radical societies where strength is weakened by constant 
internecine strife, but rather with a strong and well organized body of callous 
revolutionists bent on achieving their aims by any means within their power. 88 
No sooner had Duffus written the Commissioner with his alarming assessment 
of the revolutionary situation in Toronto, than the CPC's Central Committee, in 
September, following through on May decisions, decided to launch a "legal party" to 
push for communist principles in Canada. Before long, both an underground and an 
above ground party would be established. 89 
It was at this point that intelligence personnel decided that a member of the 
87ibid. 
89 Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 75. 
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Toronto RHQ should be detailed to carry out more concentrated counter-subversion 
work. The first step likely taken by the RHQ CIB, particularly Herbert Darling its officer 
in charge, in conjunction with Superintendent Duffus, was to review the intelligence they 
had gathered on the CP over the past year, much of which concerned the PL's OLC 
activities. Any plans Duffus and other senior personnel had to successfully develop an 
agent obviously depended on protecting their pending agent's cover. This meant they 
needed someone who had little outside experience. That ruled out the vast majority of 
the Division's personnel. Even many recent arrivals (at least five) were likely ruled out 
because they had been placed in smaller communities and were easily identifiable or had 
failed when being tested for competency as detectives. 90 One constable, however, had 
only arrived to the Division months earlier. He had successfully covered several political 
meetings for Darling and was a good prospect. Ultimately, Duffus and Darling chose 
him for the operation. 
The detective was regular #9322 Constable Henry (aka Harry) Cart. Since Cart's 
service record has been destroyed we can only reconstruct his trajectory by tracing the 
scant evidence available to us through his reports and RC'tv!P General Orders (G.O.). He 
was engaged by the RCMP at Ottawa for three years service in June 1920, appointed a 
constable, and immediately posted to "N" Division. 91 In April 1921 Cart was transferred 
to "0" Division RHQ and the same month was selected for a trial run as probationary 
~C:MP G.O. 1334; RCMP G.O. 1424; "0" Division Nominal Rolls, April, October 1921 and June 
1922; They note Constable P.B. Caveny was tried as a detective and ultimately returned to regular duty. By 
June 1922, he had been discharged. 
91RCi\fP G.O. 545 noted that Reg. 9322 Henry Catt was taken on in Ottawa on 28-6-20; Just 
weeks after he was taken on a second G.O. 561 was issued. It read "G.O. NO. 545 Part 2, in so far as refers 
to Reg. No. 9322 Const. CATT, H. of"N'' Div'n, should read Henry CATT, D.C.M., C. de G., and not as 
stated." 
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detective. 92 He was con tinned in that rank eleven weeks later (and granted a pay raise). 93 
Under instructions trom Superintendent Duffus, Cart had attended several May 
Day demonstrations in Toronto. From these events he filled out what was likely his 
earliest intelligence report in the city. He attended the 30 April event at Queen's Park 
where along with 1,500 to 2,000 others, of whom, he reported, "about 60 per cent were 
foreigners," he listened to a series of speakers whose time was spent praising the Soviet 
Union and in a "general denunciation of all things British." His subsequent report 
identified the main speakers: Morris [sic] Spector, Mrs. J. Knight, J. Simpson, and 
"Beatty" McKenzie and the specific comments each made. He provided Duffus with a 
list of the literature being sold at the event which included: Lenin's "Against the Plague 
ofNations," Zinovieffs "N. Lenin, His Life and Work," McLaine's "Trade Unionsim 
at the Cross Roads," Somashke's "The Care ofHealth in Soviet Russia," and Lozovsky's 
"The Role of the Labour Unions in the Russian Revolution."94 
The following day Cart attended the May Day demonstration at the city's 
National Theatre. Attendance was again about 1,000 and mostly "foreigners," he 
reported. The speakers included Jack MacDonald, whose speech summarized the 
comments made the previous night. One question Duffus wanted Cart to answer was just 
how far were the speakers willing to go in their desire to transform the existing political 
and economic system? Cart concluded that "violence was not advocated by any of the 
speakers at either of these demonstrations." Before forwarding his report to Perry, 
92RCMP G.O. 1431, 3 April 1921; They were Corporal Rimmer and Constable Nelson; On Phillips 
transfer see RC~IP G.O. 1369, transfer to HQ as of 1-3-21. 
93RCMP G.O. 1467, 16 April1921, Notes Corporal Catt given pay of detective as of 11-4-21; 
RCMP G.O. 1684, Notes Corporal Catt's extra pay withdrawn 1-7-21; RC1'v1P G.O. 1685, Notes Corporal 
Catt made Detective Corporal and granted extra pay. 
94NAC RG 146, 175/P1712, Spector file, report, Henry Catt and Superintendent Duffus to 
Commissioner, 2 May 1921. 
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Duffus added '"The Moderate Labour Party took no part in these demonstrations and as 
I anticipated there was no disturbance of the Peace. "'~ 5 
The absence of any further intelligence reports signed by Cart until the fall, 
suggests that Cart conducted other types of CIB investigations during the summer. He 
joined Toronto's progressive community around September 1921 immediately following 
Duffus' discussion with Perry. Cart's British roots and the fact that he was an ex-
serviceman was most advantageous since his first assignment seemed to have involved 
reporting on the OBU and the Worker's Ex-Service Men's International League (WESL ), 
a progressive veterans' association. 96 Commissioner Perry and Assistant Commissioner 
Routledge had considered both groups a threat since their establishment. 97 The WESL 
was resolutely anti-capitalist, internationalist, pro-worker, and in Canada it was endorsed 
by the OBU. Established in Geneva in mid-1920 at a conference of ex-servicemen from 
Britain, Gennany, France, Italy, and several other countries, the WESL was presided 
over by Henri Barbusse, well known for his involvement in Foreign Affairs, and its 
delegates were unified under a common politics which recognized that capitalism was 
the ultimate cause of all modem war. They denounced secret diplomacy and passed a 
unanimous resolution condemning the League of Nations as "a league of capitalist 
Governments designed only to preserve the spoils of the conquerors. "98 The National 
9
'ibid. 
96NAC RG 146, 175/P1711, Thomas Bell file, report, secret agent Harry Catt and Superintendent 
Duffus to Commissioner, 30 and 31 October 1921; and ibid., report, secret agent Harry Catt and 
Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 9 November 1921. 
97NAC, RG 18, vol. 2380, Circular Memorandum 50, "Re Files, Diary Dates etc." Assistant 
Commissioner Routledge to Officer Commanding, 26 l'vfay 1919; NAC, RG 18, vol. 23 80, Circular 
Memorandum 50, "Re Files, Diary Dates etc." Assistant Commissioner Routledge to Officer Commanding, 
26 May 1919; Thousands ofpages ofmaterials on servicemen, for instance, are held in ATIP, Request 96-A-
00109, NAC RG 146 vol. 3261, CPC Ont., pt.l-6, "Information concerning the CPC, USA and GB as well 
as Communist Activities within DND". 
911 A. E. Mander, "The Ex-Service Men's International," One Big Union Bulletin, 3 July 19:!0, 1 ,4. 
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Union of Ex-Service Men's statement of aims and policy stood well outside the goals 
and demands of more conservative veteran's associations. 99 
There was a perceived need to confirm Colonel Hamilton's and other reports that 
the momentum was shifting in revolutionary quarters away from the OBU. If successful, 
Catt would provide further evidence. Joe Knight's Southern Ontario OBU reports which 
the Force obtained and based its assessments of existing conditions on were often 
contradictory since Knight provided a micro-level analysis and conditions changed 
monthly. Occasionally he was optimistic about OBU prospects in Southern Ontario. In 
one instance he noted that what it needed most "is a continuous circulation ofliterature" 
and in particular, "large quantities of the general pamphlet endorsed by the Winnipeg 
conference. " 100 What was the CIB to make of this and other similar statements? Knight 
attended the CI' s Third Congress during the summer of 1920 a fact that had not gone 
unnoticed by NHQ. 101 When he returned home as the Soviet Red Cross's Canadian 
Representative, his job was to persuade the OBU to join the Comintem Knight failed 
to get the OBU to affiliate at the OBU's Winnipeg Convention later that year and with 
his hopes dashed he swung over in support of the CP. 102 How many others were 
following him, intelligence personnel wanted to know? Another reason that the OBU 
remained a target was simply because there was already a vast supply of intelligence 
available on the OBU boosting both NHQ and RHQ CIB personnel's confidence and 
99<'National Union of Ex-Service Men," One Big Union Bulletin. 28 August 1920, 1. 
H>cJ"Organizer J.B. Knight's Report From May 18'h to June 1 ", 1920," One Big Union Bulletin. 19 
June 1920, 3. 
101Rodney, Soldiers of the International, 171. 
102ibid., 45. 
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helping insure that their preliminary round of investigations met with success. 103 
Superintendent Dutfus soon reported that Cart was performing etfectively and 
had developed the "the necessary skills" to become one of the movement's "prominent 
speakers." 104 Within weeks Cart was promoted to Acting Corporal. 105 Eventually he 
would be promoted to Sergeant. 106 Both his intelligence reports and others that Hamilton 
received from elsewhere that month confirmed earlier reports that the OBU's fortunes 
were declining. 
In late September the RHQ CIB obtained some additional intelligence from an 
EDA operative which was focused on specific plans revolutionaries had for the months 
ahead in the city. 107 An improved PL educational program was announced with classes 
set to begin in October. As Rodney noted, it "occupied much of the executive 
Committee's time. " 108 It also became the ideal opportunity for Catt to gain more access 
to the movement. With a brief experience limited to May Day events, and several OBU 
and veteran's meetings, the PL now provided Catt with a chance to further his work in 
103Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Early Years. 501;The first Southern Ontario file (numbered 
1332) was titled, "Members ofO.B.U. attending Labour Congress at Hamilton," which given what we now 
know about the functioning of the early "0" Division was likely opened by a private detective agent. 
Subsequent files on other centers such as "One Big Union Activities - Porcupine, Ont," and "OBU Samia, 
Ont" were also opened in these months; 
104CSIS 175/P1711, Bell file, report, secret agent Harry Cart and Superintendent Duffus to 
Commissioner, 30 and 31 October 1921; and ibid., report, secret agent Harry Cart and Superintendent 
Duffus to Commissioner, 9 November 1921; CPC TO 1920s, report, Cart and Duffus to Commissioner, 3 
December 1921; 
105RCMP G.O. 899, 2 October 1920, noted that Cart was appointed Acting Corporal from 13-10-
20. 
106RCMP G.O. 3577, 2 September 1922, noted that Cart is to be promoted Sergeant from 1-9-22; 
RCMP G.O. 4125, 30 June 1923, noted Cart re--engaged for 1 year at "0" Division from 28-6-23 
107CPC TO 1920s, report, EDA operative, 2 June 1921; ibid., report EDA operative, 27 September 
1921. 
108Rodney, Soldiers of the International, 44. 
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the revolutionary community. 109 Cart subsequently began attending the fall courses the 
College offered. 110 
Cart's first assignment was to identify the course instructors and to record the 
content matter of their lectures. He reported on Maurice Spector, who lectured on world 
history, and Florence Custance, who taught a course on "economics and economic 
geot,rraphy," both of whom offered a materialist interpretation of history. 111 In a matter 
of weeks Catt had concluded: "[T]he whole teaching appears to be an effort to justify the 
methods of the Bolsheviks in the spread of propaganda. " 112 
Some of Catt's earliest reports teach us something of his own politics. He was 
rather conservative politically and something of an elitist. For instance, when Custance 
described the deplorable conditions of early nineteenth-century British coal and cotton 
industries and how children were driven into the work Catt commented: "This is a 
typical example of what is handed out at the Labor College, and it is hard to exaggerate 
its effect on semi-educated men. " 113 With the courses the College was offering, the 
central theme, he concluded, "will be the failure of the present system of Society, the 
109CPC TO 1920s, report, EDA operative, 26 April 1921; ibid., report, EDA operative, 2 June 
1921; ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Cawdron to DOC "0" Division, 7 June 1921; ibid., report, EDA 
operative, 27 September 1921. 
11~AC RG 146, 175/P1639, Custance file, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus 
to Commissioner, 7 October 1921; NAC RG 146, 175/P1712, Spector file, report, Special Agent Catt and 
Darling to Commissioner, 13 October 1921; CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt, 24 October 1921; 
ibid., report, Special Agent Catt, 27 October 1921. 
111NAC RG 146, 175/P1639, Custance file, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus 
to Commissioner, 7 October 1921; NAC RG 146, 175/P1712, Spector file, report, Special Agent Catt and 
Darling to Commissioner, 13 October 1921. 
112NAC RG 146, l75/P1712, Spector file, report, Special Agent Catt and Darling to Commissioner, 
13 October 1921; NAC RG 146, 175/Pl639, Custance file, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent 
Duffus to Commissioner, 18 November 1921. 
113NAC RG 146, 175/P1639, Custance file, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus 
to Commissioner, 18 November 1921. 
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avarice of capitalism and the slavery of the working class, i.e. the usual stirring up of 
class hatred. " 114 
Catt' s second assignment was to assess the broader purpose of the school. 
Intelligence personnel wanted a clear indication of future plans revolutionaries had for 
the movement. They wanted Catt to either confirm or reject Duffus' and Hamilton's 
original hypothesis that the PL (and the OLC) was the principal hotbed of radical activity 
in the city. Midway through the fall program Catt provided them with answers. He 
confirmed their worst suspicions: both organizations were indeed very much under 
communist control and through them communists were consolidating their hold in the 
region. In fact, those organizations that party stalwarts could not "capture," he reported, 
were to be infiltrated and "smashed from the inside. " 115 These reports only confirmed 
earlier intelligence that the Division's EDA operative had acquired during the CP's 
Guelph Convention. Catt's reports reassured intelligence personnel of the accuracy of 
their agent's analysis of the movement and his understanding of its strategies and tactics. 
With these two tasks completed, Catt's third assignment was to shift his focus 
to gather intelligence that would enable him to make decisions about where and how to 
proceed deeper into the movement by eventually joining the CP. 116 His abandonment of 
11%id., report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 7 October 1921. 
115NAC RG 146, 175/P1712, Spector file, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to 
Commissioner, 4 November 1921. 
116CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt, 17 December 1921; CPC TO 1920s, report, Special 
Agent Catt, 24 October 1921; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt, 9 November 1921; CPC TO 1920s, 28 
December 1921, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 28 December 
1921. Catt was also trying to slide into the above ground Workers' Party which was having trouble getting 
off the ground. Catt reported, "The establishment of the central branch of the Workers Party in Toronto was 
also considered: party members are somewhat disgusted that nothing has been done here. Two attempts have 
been made to make a start with this work but owing to the failure of members to attend the meetings of the 
Workers' Educational League nothing was done. Lack of party discipline, laziness of some members, and 
overlapping of work, were in the opinion of the members, the cause of this failure."; NAC RG 146, 
1 7 5/Pl639, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 4 November 1921; 
NAC RG 146, 175/Pl711, Bell file, report, Special Agent Harry Catt and Superintendent Duffus to 
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the PL in favour of the party was cautiously pursued. Yet it was facilitated with the help 
of CP stalwarts like Bell and Moriarty with whose work he was already quite familiar. 
During the transition Catt was invited to attend many CP English Branch meetings where 
he identified committee members, the leaders of the City Central Committee (CCC) and 
members serving on various branch trade and industrial committees, proving his worth 
as an agent. 117 
After party meetings Catt sometimes held informal discussions with Bell and 
Moriarty. He hinted at joining the party and made subtle inquiries as to the initiation fee 
and regular dues members paid. 118 On at least one occasion following a meeting Catt 
visited Bell's house where they continued to debate the future of the 'political side' of 
the revolutionary movement. When asked by Bell what he thought the radicals' potential 
was for expanding their int1uence across Canada, Catt later reported that he had given 
Bell the answer he wanted to hear, namely, that if any attempt were to be successful then 
the "communists must surely take the lead." He told Bell that he had only just recently 
reached this conclusion because of the party's "experiences gained in Russia." 119 
In time Catt' s friendship with these stalwarts paid dividends. He overcame 
obstacles as the opportunity arose to become more active in the CP's affairs. Soon he 
began participating fully in the life of the party. At party meetings he sided with Bell and 
Moriarty in the CP's factional disputes and against Custance and Harry Reigate. 120 
Commissioner, 9 November 1921. 
117CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 11 and 
12 January 1921 .. 
118CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt, 24 October 1921. 
12~arry Rei gate served on a couple of CP committees in the early 1920s and little else is known 
about his career. 
120 
[nitially this seemed to have been a smart tactical move on the part of the agent since the 
former had the backing of Pan-American Bureau. Custance's credentials were being 
questioned because of her former ties to Alexandra Kollontai, the daughter of a Tsarist 
general who had toured the US during the War. At this juncture Catt also assisted Bell 
in trying to draw others into the party. 121 
Catt attended the CP' s December 1921 Toronto Labour Temple Conference. By 
that point he was close to Moriarty and Bell. He attended the caucus two days earlier at 
Moriarty's house where the CP's underground leadership joined Charles Scott in 
discussions over strategy and tactics for the pending conference. The conference was 
organized to broaden the party's base. At the event various committees were struck in 
preparation for the party's tirst national convention which was scheduled for later that 
year. 122 
Catt participated in party plans to 'liquidate' the PL since its int1uence among the 
working class of the city had begun to wane. 123 The PL's closure was a CI Executive 
condition of affiliation demanded of all western communist parties since the CI felt that 
reformist Labour College movements of any sort could not be "relied upon" to fulfil 
communist aims. Instead, communist parties were instructed to establish their own 
educational schools. The PL's demise in 1922 and its rebirth within the CP months later 
did not have the serious repercussions in Canada that it did elsewhere. The Canadian 
movement was small and it was controlled by the party hence making its rebirth within 
121 NAC RG 146, 175/Pl711, Bell file, report, Special Agent Harry Cart and Superintendent Duffus 
to Commissioner, 9 November 1921; Rodney, Soldiers of the International. 43; Although Alexandra 
Kollontai had swung over in support of the Bolsheviks, she ultimately broke ranks with Lenin and was 
accused of anarcho-syndicalist tendencies. 
122CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Cart and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 17 
December 1921. 
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the party apparatus a relatively painless feat. [n fact, the only reservation most stalwarts 
had concerning the PL's demise, was that they were under contractual obligations in 
Toronto at their present premises. t24 
Catt was also asked by Bell to assist him in organizing the February 1922 
Workers' Party of Canada (WPC) convention (intended to bring the party above ground), 
another milestone in the party's history. t 25 Knight attended the event as the newly-
established CP Calgary branch's accredited member. The RCI'vfP had another agent 
positioned in the Regina movement by this point. His name was John Leopold and he 
had assumed the alias ofJ. W. Esselwein. Jack MacDonald, party secretary, had met with 
him in that city during a western tour to drum up interest in the Toronto convention 
which was formally arranged to seek affiliation with the Third International. Scott was 
also sent secretly out west to gain support. The activities of both individuals were 
reported on during their tours. Neither were successful in convincing R.B. Russell and 
the OBU executive to join forces, nor was the SPC willing to join. 
"0" Division's CIB successes with Catt inside the party were many. The 
intelligence he gathered exposed some of the CP's own counter-measures taken to 
protect its membership from the RC:MP and other spies. t26 His sleuthing uncovered the 
CP's entire regional structure and revealed the true identities of party stalwarts who had 
assumed aliases to protect themselves during their period of underground activity. Catt 
also identified many of the District organizers as well as their plans for future organizing 
12~Pelling, The British Communist Partv. 22; Macintyre, A proletarian science. 80. 
125CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 11 and 
12 January 1921; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt, 7 February 1922; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt, 17 
February 1922. 
126CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 14 June 
1922; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 8 January 1922. 
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activity. m He secured party membership tigures (which were the most important checks 
intelligence organizations throughout the world had against budding revolutionary 
movements) and in so doing also tried to place them in context. 128 He reported the 
establishment of new party branches or groups in the city and the region as a whole and 
kept tabs on factional debates (both within the party and those that drove a wedge 
between the party and other left-wing organizations). 129 He also gathered intelligence on 
the state of party finances and made further contributions to advance the Force's 
knowledge of the CP activities in both the political and industrial realm. 130 He focused 
on the activities of foreign-paid agitators in Canada, such as the Pan-American Bureau 
and acquired intelligence for dossiers (PHFs) and 177 files securing copies of 
revolutionary literature. 131 Dozens of reports on key national CP stalwarts were filed 
thanks to Catt in 1921 and 1922. 132 His access to the party and his subsequent reports 
proved Catt's worth as an agent. 
127CPC TO I920s, report, Special Agent Catt, I2 January I922; NAC RG I46, 175/P1639 
Custance file, report, Special Agent Catt, 23 January 1921. 
128CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt, 13 November 1921. 
129CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 12 
January 1922; ibid., 13 November 1921; ibid., 17 November 1921; ibid., 17 December 1921; ibid., 28 
December 192I; ibid., II and I2 January 1922. 
13
°CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 17 
December 192I; ibid., What appears to have been his first Toronto CP main core report dealt with these 
issues see, report, Catt, 24 October 1921; also, ibid., report, Catt and Duffus to Commissioner, I7 December 
192I; ibid., 12 March 1922. 
131CPC TO I920s, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 23 and 
24 November 1922; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 23 
November 1921; ibid .. report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 28 
December I92I. 
132Following one conference alone in which Catt secured intelligence nine PHFs were ordered to be 
constucted by Cawdron proving his effectiveness as an agent. NAC RG 146 175/Pl753, 1\taguire file, 
memorandum, Cawdron to Commanding Officer "0" Division, 8 February 1921; J. Counsell earned RCMP 
PHF# 1749 see, Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Early Years. 419; again, ibid., for Maguire's PHF see# 
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Although Special Agent Catt accomplished a t:,'Teat deal as an operative, his 
surveillance of the party was also fraught with considerable difficulty. Catt encountered 
at least five major hurdles in trying to secure intelligence. First was a basic access 
problem; simply put there were limits to what could be achieved because of his 
relatively low· level penetration. Although he worked with Bell and Moriarty, he was not 
privy to some of the key intelligence on the national party and its operations that 
intelligence personnel most certainly would have liked him to obtain. In fact, some of 
his intelligence could be secured through open sources. 133 Catt' s ethnicity (hence his 
position in the English Branch), while an asset in many respects, was also limiting 
because it meant that he had trouble keeping tabs and securing infonnation on the 
Finnish, Ukrainian and other language branches in the city and the region whose 
numbers grew. 134 Then there was the question of the accuracy of the infonnation he 
secured. Sometimes he had grossly underestimated and in other instances overestimated 
the strength of the movement. 135 In part this was the result of his alliance building and 
in particular his siding with the Bell faction which sometimes clouded his judgement. 
Bell had the reputation for being something of a "fire·brand," a fact Catt even 
recognized. Yet ultimately his friendship with Bell constantly led him to conclude that 
133CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 28 
December 1921; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 28 December 
1921. 
134John Manley, "A British Communist MP in Canada: Willie Gallacher Builds the Popular Front, 
1936," Communist History Network. Newsletter 6 (October 1998), 5. Notes that upwards of 75 per cent of 
CP members were Ukrainians, Finns and other eastern Europeans. At times this number increased to 
upwards of 90 percent. 
mcPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 12 
January 1922; ibid., memorandum, Duffus to Commissioner, 24 February 1922; ibid., memorandum, 
Superintendent Cawdron, DCI, to Commanding Officer "0" Division, 31 March 1922; ibid., report, Special 
Agent Catt and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 24 March 1922; ibid., memorandum, 
Superintendent Cawdron, DCL to Superintendent Duffus, 20 September 1922; ibid., reply, Superintendent 
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the Custance faction (Bell's arch nemesis) would soon be finished and done away with 
and that she would no longer be a force within the party. Nevertheless, Bell had made 
a tactical mistake during the December 1921 Unity Convention in Toronto when he 
avoided trying to stand for any major party office supposedly in the "larger interests" of 
the party. This along with his personal problems ultimately helped ensure that Custance 
who was in Toronto afterwards eventually defeated the Bell faction. Catt failed to see 
this clearly. 136 A fourth problem Catt encountered was the overriding issue of 
completeness in the reports he generated. In several instances he left out key information 
or had no idea of how to obtain it. Finally Catt's intelligence seldom achieved the level 
of content consistency that other agents' reports would in subsequent covert operations. 
Some of his earliest intelligence had little or no direct bearing on the party's city 
organization or even its Southern Ontario District, but rather concerned Western 
Districts. While useful to the overall NHQ operation, it was clearly intelligence that was 
peripheral to "0" Division personnel's primary concerns. 
In the work that he conducted Cart often encountered "collection" as well as 
"analysis" problems. While his accomplishments were many, we can never know with 
any certainty the full extent of his activities and involvement in party life. While he had 
helped Bell and Moriarty by drawing in party recruits and as an organizer, Catt's 
operation was a rather cautious one compared to the RCMP' s activities in the 1960s and 
1970s as revealed in several Royal Commissions. Nevertheless, and conversely, when 
measured against the standards of the time, his involvement inside a party for such an 
extended period of time was a radical departure from what had taken place in Canada 
136CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Catt, 9 November 1921; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt 
and Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 8 February 1922; ibid., report, source deleted and 
Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 25 February 1921; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt and 
Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 1 and 2 March 1922; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt and 
Superintendent Duffus to Commissioner, 13 March 1922; ibid., report, Special Agent Catt, 9 November 
1921. 
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before the war. 
For reasons that are not known to us, Catt was withdrawn from undercover work 
at some point during the winter of 1922-1923. His withdrawal was a blow to RHQ 
counter-subversion operations. For many months thereafter, there was a significant 
reduction in both the quality and frequency of intelligence the Force was able to obtain 
against Toronto revolutionaries. To make matters worse, similar problems were 
encountered elsewhere in the national intelligence network at this juncture. In Winnipeg 
detective Constable J.L. Halliday, who had joined the OBU in 1920 and made the 
transition to the WPC by 1922, had to be withdrawn since he was 'unmasked' shortly 
thereafter. The exact same problem befell another agent in Western Canada, Robert L 
Trolove in Vancouver, whose story we shall examine in more detail later on in this 
study. 137 
The evidence is lacking to reach any definitive conclusions about whether Catt 
had fallen under suspicion or was simply withdrawn for other reasons. In October 1923 
Catt was transferred to "N' Division. 138 In May 1925 he was returned to duty and ceased 
to draw extra pay as a detective. 139 Several weeks later Cart purchased his discharge. 140 
137Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 445-447. 
138RC.l\lfP G.O. 4334, 13 October 1923, noted Catt's transfer from 1-10-23. 
13~Cl\lfP G.O. 5295, 23 May 1925, noted Catt had returned to regular duty and ceased to be a 
detective as of 14-5-25. 





Phase II: Special Agent J. T. Goudie, 1924-1927 
"0" Division had !:,'TOwn appreciably during its first three years of existence. By 
1923 its strength had risen from 20 to 37 personnel. Its number of detachments had 
increased by two during the same period, first in 1921 when one was opened at Hamilton 
and during the winter of 1922-1923 when a second was opened at Brantford bringing the 
Division's total to eight. Both centres were hotbeds of radical activity and had a long 
history of political and industrial strife. Both had established labour papers and had 
elected labour candidates by 1919 at the provincial and municipal level. 141 Workers in 
both centres had challenged the police and other authorities on numerous occasions 
during the war and afterwards. By 1920 Hamilton had the sixth largest number of union 
locals in Canada with 75 branches of internationals and nationals and of the 57 that 
reported to the Department of Labour for its annual report more than 5,200 members. 
Brantford was the 21st largest trade union centre in Canada with 29 branches and more 
than 1 ,400 organized. 142 
In April 1923 Henry Montgomery Newson arrived in Toronto to assume 
command of the Division. 143 Like his predecessor, Newson brought considerable 
administrative experience to the Division, some of it being in an intelligence capacity. 
Much earlier in his career Newson served as the Force's leading fingerprint expert 
before Edward Foster joined the Force with the DP's amalgamation. Newson had 
1 ~ 1 "0ntario Candidates," Industrial Banner. 7 December 1917, 1. 
1 ~2"0rganized Labor Grows By Leaps And Bounds," The Labor News, 18 June 1920, 1. 
143NAC, RG 18 vol. 3449, file 0-1~0, service record ofH.M. Newson, (hereafter cited as RC:MP 
Personnel File-- Henry Newson); Henry Montgomery Newson -born in Ilesworth, Middlesex, England in 
1880, in his early twenties Newson emigrated to America and eventually came to Canada. He arrived in 
Regina in 1906, applied to join the Force, and was engaged in September, days after his 261h birthday. 
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traveled extensively in the west introducing personnel to this new scientitic 
identification system then being adopted on a wide scale. 144 He had also provided escorts 
accompanying the Duke ofConnaught, Canada's Governor General, on two trips through 
the western provinces. He was sent to England and elsewhere in Europe on several 
occasions during the 1910s as a member of Perry's contingent representing Canada at 
King George V's Coronation, as a detective assisting in a fraud investigation, and during 
the \var as second-in-command of an RCNIP contingent of more than 800 troops. 145 
Newson's negotiating skills in the field of "industrial relations" were tested in 
1918 when a miners' strike broke out in Drumheller and turned ugly. He was the 
commanding officer of Regina sub-division at the time. The strike occurred largely 
because Rosedale mine manager and part owner James Moodie refused recognition of 
the UNIWA despite their success in organizing miners. When two hundred striking 
miners stood off against Moodie and two associates who had armed themselves near 
company property, Newson brokered a temporary peace by arranging a meeting between 
the two parties to settle the dispute. When conciliation failed because Moodie still 
refused recognition, Newson was largely responsible for sending in machine-gun 
equipped troops under the command of Major Fitz Horrigan enlisted on the side of 
1
-14RCMP Personnel File·· Henry Newson, "Col. H.M. Newson, R.C.M.P., Retiring; Inspector 
Ivfarsom Moving to Brandon," Edmonton Journal, 21 April 1938; ibid., Newson, "Memorandum for Fyle 
No:- Officer 160," Order-in-Council P.C. 13/2317, dated 19 November 1910; On Edward Foster's career 




5RCMP Personnel File·· Henry Newson, "Col. H.M. Newson, R.C.M.P., Retiring; Inspector 
Marsom Moving to Brandon," Edmonton Journal, 21 April 1938; RCMP Personnel File-- Henry Newson, 
"Col. H.M. Newson, R.C.M.P., Retiring; Inspector 1\tfarsom Moving to Brandon," Edmonton Journal, 21 
April 1938; On the Overseas Cavalry Draft see, Canada, Reoort of the Roval Northwest Mounted Police. 
I 918 (Ottawa, 1919), 9; (hereafter cited as R..""'WMPIRCMP, Annual Report, Year). 
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Assistant Commissioner H.M. Newson under whose tutelage 
the most important 1920s "0" Division penetration operations bore fruit. 
Source: NAC RG 18, Service Record ofH.M. Newson, p.384 
(Originally taken from the Calgarv Herald, 11 April 1938) 
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company owners. 14<> 
For three years until his Toronto transfer Newson served as Force adjutant in 
Ottawa which pulled him away from intelligence matters. The tenn "adjutant"' had a 
much wider implication in a para-military organization like the Force than it did in a 
strictly military one. At NHQ Newson's primary duties concerned the organization of 
the hundreds of detachments that the Force had in communities across the country as 
well as the larger Division formations. As adjutant he concerned himself with personnel 
and staffing issues from the moment a recruit was engaged until he was released. 147 It 
was not until much later in the Force ·s history that a separate Personnel Department \vas 
organized. 148 
By the time Newson had arrived in Toronto to assume command of'·O" Division, 
the RHQ's intelligence operations had virtually collapsed. The previous year had been 
a hard one for the Division, in general, and more specitically its CIB. The untimely 
withdrawal of Special Agent Catt from undercover work had closed down the CIB's 
most successful sustained operation in the city. Furthermore, while intelligence work 
was still being supervised by Darling and outside investigations led by Fish, a number 
146 RCMP Personnel File- Henry Newson,"2000 Miners Strike at Drumheller and M. Police on 
Pot," Lethbridge Daily Herald. 4 February 1918; "Mounties Held at Bay Infuriated Mob of Miners," 
Lethbridge Daily Herald. 5 February I 9 I 8; "Demand Removal of Machine Gun," Lethbridge Daily Herald. 
13 February 1918; "Drumheller Miners Nlay go Back to Work," Lethbridge Dailv Herald 16 February 1918; 
"Drumheller Strike Situation Unchanged," Lethbridge Dailv Herald, 19 February 1918; "District Board 
Orders Miners Back to Work," Lethbridge Dailv Herald, 20 February 1918; Canada, House of Commons, 
Debates, First Session, Fourteenth Parliament, 12-13 George V, 1922, volume CLL (King's Printer, 1922), 
4 April 1922, 671; (hereafter cited as Canada, House of Commons, Debates, year); See the debates for J.S. 
Woodsworth's reference to the Drumheller Strike. 
147RCMP, Annual Report, 1920, 30; RCMP G.O. 433,5 June 1920; RCNlP G.O. 43, 14 February 




8F.J Mead. "R.C.M.P. Personnel Department," RCMP Quarterlv, 12,2 (October 1946), 121-122. 
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of transfers and discharges had taken place which reduced the em's overall strength. 14') 
When replacements for constables discharged and transferred out of the Division tinally 
arrived for the most part they were stationed on a reservation at Osweken and were little 
concerned with the CIB' s counter-subversion operations. 150 The only boost the RHQ ClB 
got during this period was that Constable I.E. Robson joined its ranks during the spring. 
He had begun conducting piecemeal and ad-hoc investigations of a more passive nature, 
was given temporary detective status, and confirmed in rank in June. Nevertheless, he 
was never developed during this period as a penetration agent. 151 
For months following his transfer Newson simply focused on reacquainting 
himself with Divisional operations. 152 Most of the summer and fall was given over to 
basic personnel considerations such as transfers into and out of the Division which 
initially had little impact on the RHQ CIB. 153 His intelligence work focused primarily 
on pleasing NHQ by answering requests the Commissioner and the DCI made 
concerning communist activities. During the fall he sent Darling out into the field to 
149
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, October 1922; also Constables Alexander, formerly attached, was 
discharged under RCMP G.O. 3646 as of9-9-22. 
15o.'O" Division Nominal Rolls, June 1923; Those at Oshweken included: Corporal Coventry and 
Constables Jacomb, Smaridge, Chisholm, Rodgers, McKenzie and McMahon. 
151
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, June 1923; also RGvfP G.O. 4629; noted Robson's promotion to 
Detective Corporal in March 1924 (Robson had been "present" from "N" since October 1922 and was 
placed on "0" Division nominal rolls as ofDecember 1922). 
152R.ivett-Carnac, Pursuit In the Wilderness. 173. 
153RCMP G.O. 4105; "0" Division Nominal Rolls, October 1923, transferred that month were 
Constables Curleigh, Goodfellow and Nelson; Constable Pearce was on leave from 3-10-23 (RCviP G.O. 
4342); ibid., November 1923, transfers that month included Sergeant Henderson, Constables Covell, Veitch, 
from "HQ", "N" and "N" as of 1-11-23 under RCMP G.O. 's 4398 and 4418; Constables Goudie and 
Chartrand were transferred to "0" Division as of 1-12-23 under RCl'vJJ> G. 0. 4434; Those transferred out 
during this period included Constable Grier who was transferred to "N" as of 1-9-23 under RCl'viP G.O. 
4289; Constable Rogers transferred to "N" as of 1-7-23 under RCMP G.O. 4133; Constable Mortimer 
transferred to "N" as of l-7 -23 under RCl'viP G. 0. 4161; Corporal Rimmer transferred to "Hdqs" as of l-8-
23 under RCl'viP G.O. 4241. 
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conduct an investigation of revolutionary literature. Darling, however, had turned up 
little new intelligence. 154 Perhaps the collapse of the Fanner/Labour government and the 
resurgence of conservative forces had temporarily reduced the perceived sense of 
urgency in monitoring revolutionary activities. 
Developments elsewhere, especially in Britain since 1920, certainly encouraged 
continued monitoring of communist activity. In 1920 Britain had signed an Anglo-Soviet 
trade a!:,JTeement. As a consequence Soviet representatives established offices in London 
that year and kept the British security services busy because their trade office quickly 
became a centre and source of revolutionary activity. In late 1922 Comintern special 
representative Michael Borodin, was caught 'spying' by the police in Great Britain and 
eventually deported. 155 In the General Election of November 1922, two of seven 
communist candidates, one under the Labour Party banner, the second as a communist 
(but without Labour opposition) won seats in Britain for the first time. 156 Tension only 
increased in 1923 after the Curzon ultimatum which was monitored between May and 
the fall and with Britain's Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS) inability to 
intercept and decode Soviet messages being transmitted to London from Moscow once 
the Soviet Union introduced new codes and ciphers. 157 The Labour Party in Great Britain 
campaigned in the November 1923 elections on the full restoration of diplomatic 
15~CPC TO 1920s, report, Detective Staff Sergeant Darling to Superintendent Newson, 16 
November 1923. 
155Pelling, The British Communist Partv, 21. 
156Pelling, The British Communist Party, 25. 
157Bala\\fYder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, 60-61; Andrew, Secret Service, 295-296; British Forei.gn 
Minister Lord Curzon demanded compensation from Russia for the loss of property and life of ten British 
Fisherman engaged in fishing off the coast ofMurmansk who drowned because of Russian neglect. As well 
he pressed for compensation for the execution ofC.F. Davison, an alleged British spy, and for the arrest of 
Stan Harding a journalist, and a serious of other charges. Russia had ten days to reply or the British would 
move to abrogate the 1921 Anglo-Soviet Agreement. 
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relations with the Soviet Union. So too, did the L1berals. Following Labour's success and 
formation of a minority government conservative concern steadily increased. 15s 
Many developments taking place elsewhere intluenced the Canadian service and 
suggested a greater need to cover communist activities in a more thorough manner in 
centres like Toronto where work had fallen oti during the proceeding year. The federal 
government of Canada was undi!r considerable pressure to follow the lead of the British 
government and to adhere to the terms of the trade agreement even if continentalist 
impulses helped to off-set some of the British influence in Canadian-Soviet relations. By 
mid-19:2:2 Canada had si.~:rned the Agreement even if it was a further sixteen months 
before a Soviet delegation established offices in Montreal and de;ure recognition was 
t,rranted. 159 
Only in hindsight are many of the period's ironies risible. For instance, while a 
lack of intelligence on the home front and knowledge of Soviet designs instilled fear, 
this analysis ran contrary to developments in the CI and its leading theoretician's 
assessment of events. Lenin's articles of this period displayed skepticism, doubt and 
hesitancy about the prospects for the future of the Soviet Union and for world revolution. 
It was in these months that the idea of revolution in advanced western capitalist 
countries was subjugated to second place in importance in favour of both possibilities 
in the "third" or developing world and this was also the platform which Stalin used a 
year later to advance the concept of"socialism in one country". 160 While the CI was on 
the defensive, like other services, "0" Division saw multiple opportunities and a need 
to act. 
1588alawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, 60-63. 
15~alawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations. 
160Claudin, "The Communist International," 66-71. 
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The decision to deploy another penetration agent in the CP's Toronto English 
Branch, occurred in late 1923 after months of inactivity. During this period sight had 
been lost of leading revolutionaries, dossiers not added to, and requests the ocr made 
went unanswered. 161 Probably \vith many of these issues at the forefront of his mind, 
Starnes had forwarded Newson a secret memorandum in December raising his concerns. 
It had been brought to his attention from a source outside the Division that WPC offices 
had recently moved. He had also learned that with the move party members felt that 
these new premises would likely "reinvigorate the party" and enable them to "get some 
life into the organization. " 162 Starnes must have questioned why was he unable to get this 
type of intelligence from within the Division. Furthermore, if such basic intelligence was 
slipping through the RHQ intelligence network, then how could any of the larger 
questions be adequately addressed? How could the DCI, the LIO and other senior Force 
personnel responsible for NHQ's intelligence work undertake the kind of analysis 
necessary to make informed decisions about the party, its relationship to the broader 
labour movement and its efforts to challenge the existing order? It was bad enough that 
some international sources had likely dried up and the need was now greater than ever 
to keep those at home open, especially in Toronto. 
Newson had "acknowledged" receipt of the Commissioner's "secret 
memorandum" and not wanting the Commissioner to believe that intelligence work was 
being neglected, he informed him that it confirmed information he had already obtained. 
Yet almost nothing during this period had been forwarded by "0" Division to NHQ and 
161 NAC RG 146 vol. 64, 96-A-00111, Tim Buck File, part.5; They had lost sight of him in late 
1922; NAC RG 146 vol. 64, 96-A-00111, Tim Buck File, part.3; Take as an example Buck's file which 
drops off at the end of 1922. There is only one report filed in March and April 1923 in Toronto. Then there 
is not another until the end of July in Toronto and in fact the next Toronto report is not until spring 1924; 
CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 13 August 1923. 
16
zCPC TO 1920s, memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to DOC "0" Division, 3 December 1923. 
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had the DC[ and the Commissioner not obtained this intelligence from sources outside 
of"O" Division's RHQ CIB, they would have been led to believe that few developments 
were taking place in Toronto. Receipt of this information only confirmed that until this 
point Newson had made intelligence gathering a low priority. 163 
With the Commissioner's prodding, movement to develop a new RHQ Cffi agent 
took place in January 19:24. Superintendent Newson learned that the Workers' Defense 
Committee (WDC) under the auspices of the IDLC were planning to hold a meeting at 
the Labour Temple in support of the release of J.B. McLachlan who was jailed for his 
leadership in Nova Scotia miners' strikes (and more generally for his progressive 
views). 164 Superintendent Newson had identified so-called "subversives'' such as Jack 
Young, president of the TDLC, James Simpson a prominent socialist, former SOPer, 
(later to become Toronto CCF Mayor), Jack MacDonald and Malcolm Bruce, as the 
individuals behind the move to secure McLachlan's release. 165 Newson saw both an 
opportunity and a need to reinvigorate his CIB and instructed James Thomas Goudie, 
one of his RHQ constables, to cover the event. Goudie attended the meeting and 
subsequently filled out what was likely his first intelligence report for the RHQ CIB. 166 
Goudie was one of the 150 British recruits the Force had engaged in 1920 when 
163 ibid., and reply, memorandum, Superintendent Nev.rson to Commissioner, 4 December 1923. 
164J.B. McLachlan earned PHF# 1253 (Springhill, N.S.), see Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker 
[eds.] R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Early Years. 1919-1929 (St. John's, 1994), 409; The meeting was 
not reported in The Worker; David Frank, J.B. McLachlan: a biography (Toronto, 1999); Since his life has 
been well documented, most recently by the work of David Frank, it need not detain us here. "0" Division 
RHQ was well acquainted with McLachlan's earlier agitation. Furthermore, his position on issues was 
regularly featured in The Worker. 
165James Simpson earned PHF #1660 (in Toronto); Jack MacDonald earned PHF #1741 (in 
Toronto); Malcolm Bruce earned PHF #962 (in Regina); see Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Earlv Years, 
417,419,403. 
166NAC RG 146 file 175P/1741 Jack MacDonald file, report, Superintendent Nev.rson to 
Commissioner, 21 January 1924 and; CPC TO 1920s, report, Superintendent Nev.rson to Commissioner, 28 
January 1924. The meeting took place on the 18th Goudie reported. 
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the RC0!1P had been granted permiSSIOn by the government to strengthen the 
organization brinf,ring it up to 2,500 personnel (which was later reduced to 2,000). 167 The 
Force hired LawTence Fortescue, a RNWMP original and former Comptroller, as a 
London-based recruiting agent, to secure these candidates. 168 After several months of 
searching, conducting interviews, and medical examinations (which proved less rigorous 
than required given the number of men later rejected after reexamination in Canada), 
Fortescue had basically met the quota. 16') 
Goudie was originally from Cheshire, England. Yet he was living at the time of 
his application at Lisgard, Wallasey. It is doubtful that he had any military experience. 
Likely he had seen local tlyers advertising positions in the RCMP and had applied at 
Fortescue's London office. He had met the height and chest requirements and passed the 
medical exam. He joined about 100 other recruits on the first of two ships, the steamer 
Minnedosa, which left Liverpool on 1 October headed for Quebec. 170 
After a brief stopover in Ottawa, Goudie left for Regina for basic training. By 
April 1921 he had finished up at the Regina school and was ready to work. He was then 
sent to "G" Division. 171 For unknown reasons, he purchased his discharge in December 
1921. Yet sometime between then and the fall of 1923 he re-enlisted because in 
167RNWMP, Annual Report, 1919,7. 
168Longstreth, The Silent Force, 278-279; Lawrence Fortescue, joined the Force in 1873 and by 
1913 had assumed the comptrollership. He had gone to England on at least one previous occasion to secure 
candidates in 1913 with Force Secretary Sergeant George Hann. Longstreth described him as "a short, stout 
man with a weak hold on urbanity, but a most competent passion for the Force and some determined views 
as to its improvement..." 
16~AC RG 18 vol.3149, file 185 (1920) Recruiting in England, "RCNIP Schedule ofRecruits." 
17<NAC RG 18 vol.3149, file 185 {1920) Recruiting in England, "RCNIP Schedule of Recruits." 
171 RCi\lfP GO. 1470, as of 1-4-21. 
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November 1923 he was transferred from ·'N'' to '"0'' Division. m 
Goudie's earliest forays were successful. 173 fn January and February 1924 he was 
sent out on numerous occasions to report on revolutionary activities. He began attending 
the popular WPC 'propaganda' meetings and Sunday night forums held in the party's 
Church Street hall. Like the PL meetings and the OLC forums that Cart attended two-
years before, these forums, attracted a broad group of committed progressives from the 
IWW, the OBU, and the CLP. These events regularly drew in an audience of80 to 100 
which helped facilitate his entry into the revolutionary community without drawing 
unwarranted attention. 17.j He added reports to many PHFs that had already been 
constructed but had had gaps for months. 175 His reports identified the speakers at events, 
the numbers who attended, and the main points of the speeches. 176 His work 
172RCNIP G.O. 301, notes that Constable Goudie purchased his discharge on 10-12-21; RC:VfP 
G. 0. 4434, notes that Constables J. T. Goudie was transferred from "N" to "0" Division as of 1 0-1 0-23; 
~AC RG 18 vol.3149, tile 185 ( 1920) Recruiting in England, "RCMP Schedule of Recruits". 
173RCl\IIP G.O. 4735, notes Goudie drew 50 cents per diem from 23-1-24 while employed as 
Detective on probation. 
m"Toronto Party Forum," The Worker, 19 January 1924, 4, Tim Buck spoke on "the unity of 
interests between unemployed and employed,"; ibid., 26 January 1924, 4, Mrs Lunday (Laura Hughes) on 
"International Obstructions to Peace,"; ibid., R.G. Ross on "How to Prevent Wars and Strikes"; ibid., 2 
February 1924,4, Leslie Morris spoke on "Karl Leibknecht: His Life and Work''; CPC TO 1920s, report, 
Special Agent Goudie and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 25 and 26 February 1924; NAC RG 
146 file 175P/1741 Jack MacDonald file, report, source deleted, 18 February 1924; Comrade Machin gave 
the talk on "Evolution or Revolution," "Toronto Labor Party Forum," The Worker. 9 February 1924, 4; 
ibid., 8 March 1924, 4, notes that Comrade Lockhart introduced the subject "Lessons from the struggles of 
the workers of Germany," but since he could not speak at any length on account of illness was followed by 
Mrs. Knight; ibid., 29 March 1924, 4, Mrs. Knight spoke on the "Paris Commune". 
mJ.R. Knight had earned PHF #13 (in Edmonton); Mrs. J.R. Knight, likewise, earned PHF #14 (in 
Edmonton); similarly, George Lockhart earned PHF #1869 (in Kitchener); see Kealey and \Vhitaker [eds.] 
The Earlv Years, 383, 422; Many of these stalwarts also wrote articles featured in The Worker. Their 
activities and travels were also regularly highlighted in the organ's "Party News" column. See for instance, 
"'Party News" The Worker, 15 January 1923; Perhaps least prominent of this group was George Lockhart, 
party organizer in the Kitchener region; Lockhart, for instance, penned, "Oil, War and the Working Class," 
The Worker, I November 1922,4. 
176 CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Goudie and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 28 
and 30 January 1924; ibid., report, Special Agent Goudie and Superinte.ndent Newson to Commissioner, 4 
and 5 February 1924. 
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suppkmented OSINT easily obtained through the CLB's and the CR's reading of the 
party organ. 177 
By early February Goudie had been invited to attend both English Branch and 
business meetings. 173 The party organ only commented briefly on these meetings so the 
Force relied upon Goudie's intelligence reports. Soon afterward Goudie joined the party 
and by the spring of 1924 he had managed to work his way onto the CCC which oversaw 
the party's work in Toronto and indirectly exerted great int1uence over the surrounding 
region. His advancement had likely occurred at the April city convention or just prior to 
it. On the CCC sat representatives of the English, Finnish, Ukrainian, Jewish and 
Bulgarian city branches and among its more prominent members were: Jack MacDonald, 
Fred J. Peel, Florence Custance, Amos T. Hill, John W. Alquist, and Mike Huculiak. All 
of them had earned PHFs and in several cases, Goudie gained their trust and 
friendship. 179 
As Goudie worked his way deeper into the movement it was not long before he 
was asked and had accepted the task of chairing the Young Communist League's 
(YCL' s) first Anniversary celebration. Before an Alhambra Hall audience of250 he had 
had the opportunity to listen to Leslie Morris, who spoke on "the history of the League 
and its activities." Morris had earned his PHF in Toronto only weeks earlier and likely 
1770pen Source Intelligence is simply information obtained through non-clandestine means. It 
generally refers to print materials, such as books, papers, etc. 
178CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Goudie and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 7 
and 8 February 1924. 
179
"Toronto City Convention," The Worker. 5 April 1924, 3; The convention was held on 5 April; 
see Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Early Years, 422, 428, 406, 429; In addition to those individuals 
previously mentioned, Fred Peel earned PHF #1876 (in Toronto); Amos T. Hill earned PHF #2175 (in 
Toronto); Mike Huculak [RCMP one spelling incorrect] earned two PHFs, PHF #1127 (the Pas) and PHF 
#2!96 (the Pas): CPC TO 1920s, "City Central Committee: Minutes of Meeting March, 18m" n.d. 
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as a result of Goudie "s work. 1xo Days after the Anniversary celebration Goudie was asked 
by two members of the 'vVPC to "to go in and try to reorganize the League and endeavor 
to put it on its feet... " 181 Intelligence personnel instructed Goudie to proceed cautiously 
and not to get drawn too heavily into the YCL "s work. 1R: This was probably because the 
YCL's best days lay ahead and Goudie was already too valuable as an agent to concern 
himself with this organization at that juncture. His handlers had other desibrns for their 
star Mountie. 183 
In only two months Goudie was having considerable success tn monitoring 
revolutionary activities and he was also expanding his own sphere of influence within 
the party. He soon became District #3's financial auditor and also temporarily served as 
the CCC's secretary. 184 On several occasions Special Agent Goudie was also sent out to 
monitor and report on A. E. Smith's public events. In short order, Goudie had befriended 
a group of key party stalwarts, Smith among them. 185 
Newson took some personal delight in the success his secret agent was having 
18~AC RG 146 175P/2440 Leslie Morris file, report, Special Agent Goudie and Superintendent 
Newson to Commissioner, 26 Febru:uy 1924; On Morris" PHF see Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Earlv 
Years, 434. 
181NAC RG 146 file 175P/2440 Leslie Morris file, report, Special Agent Goudie and Superintendent 
Newson to Commissioner, 27 February 1924. 
182Still the YCL city convention was held on the same day as the regular Toronto city convention 
and it was likely that Goudie was aware of its activities, "Toronto City Central Convention," The Worker, 
19 April 1924, 3. 
183Stewart Smith, Comrades and Komsomolkas: Mv Years in the Communist Partv of Canada 
(Toronto, 1993) 75-77. 
u4CPC TO 1920s, "l'vlinutes of City Central Committee April l "," fonvarded along w-ith a report, 
Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 4 April 1924; also see "Toronto City Convention." The Worker. 
5 April 1924, 3. 
185NAC RG 146 175P/392, AE. Smith file, see for instance, report, Special Agent Goudie and 
Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, II February 1924; ibid., report, Special Agent Goudie and 
Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, I 9 May I 924. 
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in intiltrating the organization. To reassure the Commissioner that RHQ CIB work was 
a priority, Newson sent him a memorandum highlighting some of his agent's results. 
Goudie's enthusiasm and his ability to rise quickly through the CP increased his worth 
as an agent. Furthermore, he elevated the stature of the RHQ CIB in the eyes of senior 
~nQ personnel. 186 
Goudie's initial success as an agent can be measured not only by study of his 
penetration of the party, but also by his intelligence contribution. The volume of 
intelligence he acquired was large and valuable. \V'hile Goudie's ability as an agent can 
be judged by the number of reports he deposited on core Toronto CP files, there are 
other ways to assess his contribution. One of the best ways to evaluate Goudie's 
performance were his additions to dossiers of many leading Toronto-based 
revolutionaries, which saw a substantial increase during these months. 
In March, building on his initial surveillance work, Goudie attended two 
'propaganda meetings' where party stalwart William Moriarty was the key speaker. 1 ~7 
Goudie subsequently filled out three reports for Moriarty's dossier. 188 He attended a CLP 
meeting addressed by Florence Custance the same month, filling out one report for her 
file and another from comments she made at a WPC meeting held a month later. 189 He 
had befriended these two stalwarts who soon became his best intelligence sources. In 
186CPC TO 1920s, memorandum, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 26 February 1924. 
187Ian Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks: The Early Years of the Communist Partv of Canada (Montreal, 
1981 ), 79-80; note that Moriarty emigrated from England in 1910. He joined the Socialist Party during the 
War and was one of the first SPC members to join the Communist movement. He became a member of the 
CEC at the May 1921 convention and was National Secretary of the Workers Party in 1922. He later on 
became the business manager of The Worker. 
188NAC RG 146 175P/2017 William Moriarty file, report, Special Agent Goudie and 
Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 3 and 4 March 1924; ibid., 6 March 1924. 
18
'>N"AC RG 146 175P/P1639, Florence Custance file, report, source deleted and Superintendent 
~evvson to Commissioner, 10 and 11 March 1924; ibid., 7 and 10 April 1924. 
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addition, between March and May Goudie tilled out several reports on Thomas Bell. 1')0 
Leslie Morris, too, was closely watched and his activities reported on. 191 Even Jack 
MacDonald, who was out of town during much of this period, had his activities reported 
on by Goudie through liaison with other party stalwarts who shared considerable 
information on the party's General Secretary. When MacDonald was in town, Goudie 
asked him many questions and gained considerable intelligence on the party's structure, 
its organization, and also when and where the City, District, and the National 
Conventions were to be held. 1n 
Goudie breathed new life into the RHQ CIB. For more than a year the RCrviP was 
without a composite assessment of the total number of party branches functioning within 
Ontario. Within months of Goudie's development as an agent Superintendent Newson 
was able to provide NHQ with a picture of the revolutionary situation in the region. One 
report forwarded in March and a second in mid-April explained to CIB personnel how 
the CPC had reorganized itself in District #3 and provided detailed membership figures. 
District #3 which comprised roughly 3,000 of the CPC's 4,800 members nationally had 
too large a membership so it was decided that the interests of the party would be better 
served by breaking the District up and reorganizing it into a series of five sub-districts. 
The new classifications saw the Port Arthur and Fort William area become the Western 
19<NAC RG 146 175/P1711, Thomas Bell file, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson 
to Commissioner, 6 and 7 March 1924; For instance, Goudie reported that Bell would soon travel to the US 
for meetings, that he would subsequently tour Canada and would also attend the party convention in April. 
He also reported that Bell was living at home (one assumes for financial reasons) and that he intended to 
make the city his base for the next few months. 
191 NAC RG 146 175/P2440, Leslie Morris file, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson 
to Commissioner, 16 May 1924; ibid., 29 March 1924; ibid., 30 April 1924. During this period Goudie 
reported that Morris was recently reelected Secretary of the YCL, that he was trying to get a paper started 
and would likely serve as its first editor. 
1nNAC RG 146 175/P1741, Jack NfacDonald file, report, source deleted and Superintendent 
]\;ewson to Commissioner, 21 March 1924; ibid., 14 April 1924; ibid .. 31 March 1924; ibid., 17 April 1924. 
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Sub-District with a special rocus on srrain shipping and a membership of 600: the 
Sudbury, Sault Ste. Marie region became the Middle Sub-District, with a membership 
again of600 and a special focus on copper mining, logging and smelting; the Timmins, 
Cobalt, region, forming the Northern Sub-District, with a similar membership of600 and 
a special emphasis on gold and silver mining; Toronto and Lower Ontario formed the 
new Southern Sub-District, its emphasis being manufacturing and a membership of 
1 ,000; and the Montreal area formed what comprised the Eastern Sub-District, with a 
membership of 200 and a special emphasis on manufacturing and shipping. Goudie 
predicted that this move was "one of the most important steps so far, in the effort to get 
the party more firmly established in Ontario," and he concluded, it "will certainly put 
more spirit into each District." 1 ~ 3 His report did not stop there. It listed the locations of 
the 11 branches functioning throughout Southern Ontario outside of Toronto and 
detailed the membership strength of each. 194 He also reported that various centres such 
as Weiland and Thorold, which once had healthy Ukrainian Branches no longer had 
functioning organizations, but that attempts were being made to reestablish branches in 
these important centres. In total this and another hand-written list noted that there were 
approximately 65 CPC Branches operating within various centres in Ontario during this 
period for which the RCMP had opened intelligence organizational files. While only a 
small portion of this work was undertaken by Goudie, his contribution was a seminal 
one. 195 
193RG 146, vol. 3261, file, 96-A-00109 pt. I, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to 
Commissioner, 8 and l 0 l'vlay 1924. 
194Guelph had an English Branch with 20 members, London an English Branch with 10 members 
and Oshawa a Ukrainian Branch with 10 members. Kitchener, Hamilton, Windsor and St. Catherines, his 
report noted, each had two branches often an English one and either a Ukrainian or Finnish one, or 
sometimes two "foreign language" branches with memberships of any>vhere between 5 and 57. 
195RG l 46, vol. 3261, file, 96-A-00 109 pt.!, list of "C.P. in Ontario," n. d. 
14! 
Goudie's work compared well especially when measured against other accounts 
of labour spies and stools being uncovered. Their stories, as well as the tactics private 
tirms such as the Sherman Detective Company employed, their instructions and training 
methods for labour spies, had been exposed and were being dragged through the labour 
press in a bid to warn workers. 196 Even the RCNIP months earlier had su±Tered a ±Iasco 
in Vancouver which led to the dismissal of several Force personnel who were charged 
for illegal activities. These events had resulted in stories of Zaneth being dredged up 
with calls for the Force's disbandment. 197 In Britain, in April 1924, political police were 
discovered hiding under the stage of a theatre where the CPGB were scheduled to hold 
an Executive meeting. This event was reported in the press and would have been known 
to both members of the CPC and Force personnel. 198 By comparison, Goudie's operation 
was a great success. 
Through the spring of 1924 much of Goudie's investigative work took place at 
indoor forums, then as summer approached he turned to street-comer meetings. In July, 
senior intelligence personnel at "0" Division rewarded their agent for his excellent work 
with a promotion to detective and a pay increase of a dollar per day. 199 During these 
months Superintendent Newson grew increasingly concerned by Goudie's intelligence 
reports which noted tremendous party growth. From Goudie's reports Newson concluded 
that the party was getting bolder. An early sign of its new-found strength, he believed, 
196
"Labor Spy Revelations Show How Sherman Agency Workers," The Worker, 28 June 1924, 2; 
"Labor Faker Found to Be Vicious Spy," The Worker, 17 July 1924, 1; '"Labor Spy Agency Revelations 
Continued," The Worker, 17 July 1924, 2; "Another Instalment Of The Spy Revelations," The Worker, 26 
July 1924, 3. 
197Editorial, "The Mounted Police," The Worker, 22 December 1923, 2; James Dubro and Robin 
Rowland, Undercover: Cases of the RCMP's Most Secret Operative (Toronto, 1991 ). 
198Pelling, The British Communist Party. 28-29. 
19~Ci'vfP G.O. 4893, Goudie was confirmed in his rank and appointed detective from 23-7-24. 
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was its April Convention when the party had taken itself into the open changing its name 
from the WPC to the CPC. For these reasons Newson tasked Goudie to get more 
involved in its activities and to devise a plan of action. 200 
The CI arranged a series of anti-war demonstrations in July and August 1924 and 
again the following year. They were held to protest aggressive Japanese and American 
economic activities in China and in South America. The CI argued that both Japan's and 
the US's interests in oil and other resources would "be the cause of the next war."201 
Communists, the world over, were drawing upon the works of leading revolutionary 
theoreticians such as Lenin whose analysis of capitalist development suggested that 
western capitalist societies were entering a new stage in their economic life as nations 
in which monopolies were giving over to higher forms of"Imperialist" organization.:02 
Both Japanese and US capitalist interests were an expression of this higher form of 
development. 
In Britain, these demonstrations grew in significance. Just a week before the 
events were set to be heldJ.R. Campbell, acting editor of the CPGB organ The Workers' 
Weekly, had published an article, "The Army and Industrial Disputes --An Open Letter 
to The Fighting Press" with what became a famous "Appeal to Soldiers," encouraging 
20
°CPC TO 1920s, report, Special Agent Goudie and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner 29 
April 1924; ibid., report Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 30 April 1924, "Communist Leaders 
Address Gathering," Globe and Mail, 21 April 1924, and; "Talks of Red Army to Force Anarchy Upon this 
Country," Globe and Mail, 21 Aprill924, and; "Communist Barque Now Sails Into Sight On Political 
Waters," Toronto Star, 19 April 1924. Days after the convention both Toronto Star and The Globe and l'vlail 
columnists had also reported its seemingly new-found strength; Smith, Comrades and Komsomolkas, 71. 
201 CPC TO 1920s, quote from "Declares War's Aims Ever Capitalistic," Toronto Globe, 2 August 
1924; ibid., report, source deleted, 29 July 1924; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to 
Commissioner, 29 and 31 July 1924; ibid., 5 and 12 August 1924; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector 
Frere to Commissioner, 3 and 5 August 1925; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to 
Commissioner, 5 and 7 August 1925; "Police Back Down," The Worker, 9 August 1924, 4; "Anti-
Imperialist-War Week Was Successful Concerted Campaign," The Worker, 16 August 1924, 1; also see, 
"Montreal Anti-War Campaign," The Worker, 16 August 1924, 1. 
202V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism esp. chap. 7. 
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workers to line up against exploiters and the capitalist class. Party members were also 
encouraged to organize among the soldiers and to get inside the military generally to 
sway their fellow labourers to the cause. Campbell was arrested on 5 August and was 
charged with 'incitement to mutiny' during what subsequently became knovm as the 
'Don't Shoot' anti-war appeal campaign. 
The British Labour Party (LP) was in power under Ramsay MacDonald during 
these events. The LP had established a minority government and was supported in a 
tenuous coalition by the Liberals. Circumstances surrounding the Campbell arrest 
consolidated Liberal and Conservative opposition to Ramsay MacDonald who was 
considered "soft on communism". MacDonald proposed a compromise proposition to 
appease Liberals by establishing a Select Committee of the House to study communist 
activities, but it failed to gamer support. A vote of non-confidence followed in the 
House. It forced the dissolution of the British parliament. During the election campaign 
that followed just before election day, the "Zinoviev letter," a so-called secret document 
was uncovered and released to the press providing further details of Soviet revolutionary 
designs on British soil. The "Zinoviev letter" became the icing on the Conservative 
party's cake and sealed the Labour Party's fate ensuring its defeat at the polls. The fact 
that the letter's authenticity was later rejected as a plot concocted by the British security 
forces and a tiny group of Conservatives did nothing to undo the initial political 
impact.203 
Goudie helped to organize and run these demonstrations in Toronto. His 
involvement in these anti-war demonstrations was a reflection of the RHQ CIB's 
continued expansion of its operational objectives. His work emphasized the ongoing 
international dimension of the struggle. These early anti-war demonstrations also 
203Pelling, The British Communist Partv. 29-31; Macfarlane, The British Communist Partv. 106-
l 09; Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain (vol. 1 ). 342-346, 366-367. 
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provided an opportunity to increase the party's protile in the community and hence its 
membership. For the 1924 demonstrations Goudie reported on the activities of the 
event's key organizers. 204 He also acted as one of the party's spokespersons and was 
interviewed by a local Globe reporter in this capacity. His comments were subsequently 
published in an article in which the reporter noted that despite the Mayor's refusal to 
allow anti-war meetings in the city, Communists were going ahead with plans to 
demonstrate: 
Yesterday, James Goudy, [sic] a secretary of a branch of the Communist Party, 
addressed a communication to Chief Constable Samuel Dickson, stating that the 
party proposed to hold an anti-war week, giving the dates and places of the 
meetings and stating he exRected the usual protection would be provided for the 
meeting in Queen's Park." 5 
Both the August 1924 and 1925 Toronto anti-war demonstrations proved a huge 
success. 206 Hundreds turned out in both instances and many arrests followed which also 
increased the publicity surrounding the party's campaign. 207 If in the August 1924 
. 
demonstrations Goudie was a spokesperson, he was also active in the 1925 
demonstrations on the streets assisting speakers. 208 In one instance, a detective who did 
204ibid. He reported that a 'lengthy bulletin' was being prepared for party branches and 50,000 
copies of a party anti-war leaflet were being printed and would soon be ready to go out for national 
distribution. 
205CPC TO 1920s, "Communist Party Persists in Plans," The Globe, 26 July 1924; "Orators On 
Street Take Up Collection and Police Appear," The Globe, 28 July 1924; "Police Break Up Red Rally, 
Confiscate $15 Collected," The Mail & Empire, 28 July 1924; forwarded along with a report, 
Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 28 July 1924. 
206
"Police Back Down," The Worker. 9 August 1924, 4; "Anti-Imperialist-War Week Was 
Successful Concerted Campaign," The Worker, 16 August 1924, 1; also see, "Montreal Anti-War 
Campaign," The Worker, 16 August 1924, l. 
207
"Anti-Imperialist-War Week Was Successful Concerted Campaign," The Worker. 16 August 
1924, 1; CPC TO 1920s, report, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 28 July 1924. 
208 CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 23 July 
1925: CPC TO 1920s, Clipping "Communists Plan Free Speech Week Police Are Active," N.D. 
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not know that Goudie was an agent reported: 
Moriarty and Goudie stood aside and let the Police break the meeting up, and 
Moriarty decided to hold a meeting on a vacant lot on Dundas Street, facing 
McMurray Avenue. Goudie got the box and took it over there and a meeting was 
then held with MorJarty as the speaker and Goudie the Chairman, but no further 
arrests were made. -09 
Moriarty and Goudie managed to hold the attention of200 persons on this occasion and 
prior to its close it was also reported that as: 
questions were called Goudie made an appeal for membership, stating that it was 
hoped enough members would come forward as they are desirous of forming a 
branch there. He also appealed for anyone who '.Vitnessed the arrests, if they were 
willing to give evidence on behalf of the accused, to come forward and give their 
names. 210 
By the middle of the week, Goudie was not only leading demonstrations, but was 
carrying out a variety of tasks. At one meeting a plainclothes detective reported that: 
Goudie was asked to see that the sidewalks were kept clear and that no 
obstruction took place, but towards the close of the meeting a religious speaker 
took over the opposite corner and started a meeting. As he could get nobody to 
listen to him, he came alongside the Communist Meeting and the sidewalk 
became blocked. Although there were several uniformed policemen and 
detectives there, they took no notice as Goudie endeavoured to keep the 
sidewalks clear, by mistake he asked two detectives to move as they were 
obstructing the sidewalk, and he was told that if he wasn't careful they would 
arrest him for molesting, so he quit keeping the sidewalks clear.211 
Goudie's involvement in the demonstrations as one of the CP's chief 
spokespersons enhanced his position within the party.212 Before long, he was chairing 
key meetings, sitting on the highest CP committees, and overseeing A.E. Smith's work. 
209 CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector Frere to Commissioner, 3 August 1925. 
210CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector Frere to Commissioner, 3 and 5 August 
1925. 
211 CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 5 and 7 
August 1925. 
212CPC TO 1920s, report. source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 20 June 
1924; With Goudie inside the party it was also easy for the SS to stay on top of these cases as they worked 
their way through the courts. 
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Through the tirst winter Goudie attended English Branch meetings, Sunday forums 
(which lasted until April), CCC mass meetings, expanding his contacts at the local and 
city level. 
When Marxist classes resumed in Toronto during these months with Goudie 
well-established there was little need to send another agent out to attend them.: 13 Instead, 
Superintendent Newson, Darling and Fish simply sent Detective Robson, Detective 
Constable S.M. Roberston and Constable J.E. Smaridge out to handle some of the more 
mundane investigations which did not require an agent. 214 
Goudie's involvement in local activities saw him climb to the pinnacle of his 
undercover career during summer of 1925 although he would continue to make his 
presence felt and remained influential through the following year. By this point he had 
been elected as the DEC's secretary and had chaired meetings in which as many as 1,500 
persons attended. He was stirring up crowds at these events demanding the withdrawal 
of troops during strikes, denouncing the use of the militia, and introducing party 
luminaries who followed with similar resolutions. 215 
Immediately following the August 1925 anti-war demonstrations Goudie was 
elected acting District #3 Secretary filling in for Tom Burpee, who was overseas, until 
213
"Marxist Course Starts in Toronto," The Worker. 1 November 1924, 2. 
214RCl'vfP G.O. 4565; "0" Division Nominal Rolls, January- February 1924, Detective Constable 
Robertson transferred from "A" as of 1-2-24. 
Stuart Millar Robertson, b. 1886 left the Force at the rank of constable. He died at Toronto on 23 
December 1944. RCl'vfP Quarterly, 11,1 (July 1945), 79, "obituary section". 
John Eric Thomas Smaridge, b. 15 May 1899, Newton Abbot, Devonshire, England. He joined the 
Force on ll October 1920. He served at Toronto and London until taking his discharge on 10 October 
1925. He re-engaged in 4 May 1932 and subsequently served in "A" and "0" Division until his retirement in 
1953 at the rank of Sergeant Major. He died on 27 November 1991 at Otta\\lli. RCl'vfP Ouarterlv, 57,2 
(Spring 1992), 79, "obituary of J.E.T. Smaridge." 
215CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 22 June 
1925. 
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the CP's Fourth National Convention. 21 (' fn short order he was also elected to represent 
the city at an approaching District Convention. 217 He was also serving in some capacity 
on the Central Executive Committee ( CEC), which gave him access to key intelligence 
since it was the CP's most powerful body, its inner circle. 
In less than eighteen months Goudie had risen to significant party leadership. On 
the CEC he was seated in the inner chambers of its Leninist central nervous system 
alongside Tim Buck, who chaired the sessions, and William Moriarty, Amos Hill, Trevor 
Maguire, Malcolm Bruce, A. E. Smith, John Boychuck and several others. The decisions 
this inner group made affected the Canadian party from coast to coast and its 
relationship to the broader international revolutionary movement. m 
After the fall 19:25 of Convention Goudie's standing within the party began to 
wane and the quality of the intelligence he secured also dropped. His intelligence lost 
its national perspective and increasingly focused on more regional and local activities. 
He managed to remain on the CEC as District #3 "representative" for its tirst post-
Convention meeting and had secured a copy of its official minutes.219 But when the 
Toronto CCC met shortly thereafter and decided that they would double as the District 
Executive Committee's (DEC's) "administrative body" during intervals between full 
sessions of the DEC, Goudie was not elected to any of its senior positions. This was 
116CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 17 August 
1925. 
217CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 23 and 24 
July 1925. 
218CPC TO 1920s, For instance, see report, source deleted, and Superintendent Newson to 
Commissioner, 15 June 1925; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 23 
July 1925. This reads "In addition to these both H. T. Burpee and J.T. Goudie will be at the District 
Convention from the District Executive, and will also probably attend the National Convention." 
119CPC TO 1920s, 1925, CEC minutes "First Meeting of the C.E.C. After the Fourth Conv'tn." 
(~D. probably September 1925); ibid., "Minutes ofCEC," 16 August 1925, W Moriarty, Acting Secretary, 
forwarded with, report, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 26 August 1925. 
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another sign that he had peaked in the party. 
What ultimately caused Goudie's drop within the party is not entirely clear. Tom 
Burpee had returned for the Fourth Convention and perhaps Goudie was simply shut 
down by his arrival. A second related development was the Convention election results. 
Superintendent Newson informed the Commissioner that a group which "Bruce dubs as 
the ·MacDonald clique,"' which included Spector and Buck emerged more fully in 
control at this particular juncture in the CP's history. Goudie had been much closer to 
Bell, Moriarty and this surely int1uenced his prospects. He had less in common with 
Spector as did Cart since neither of them were theoreticians. 2.::o Soon afterward, Bell 
permanently left Canada in search of work elsewhere. Before long, other concerns 
interested intelligence personnel. Most important was party reorganization and Goudie 
turned his attention to this activity. His descent in the party and fall from grace was 
cushioned at this point as he consolidated his support by returning to work actively in 
English Branch meetings and at Sunday night 'forums. ' 221 In the winter he resumed his 
party responsibilities with vigor. Soon he was chairing smaller meetings and was 
returned to the CCC serving as area group "O'"s representative.222 
For the next eighteen months Goudie's CIB work remained focused on counter-
subversion investigations. While Goudie never again rose to the highest levels of the 
party, he experienced some of his greatest successes as an agent in this period. Ever 
since A.E. Smith and his wife had joined the party back in 1924 Goudie along with 
22
°CPC TO 1920s, report, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 28 September 1925. 
221 CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted, 26 January 1926; ibid., report, source deleted, 
Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 22 and 23 February 1926; "Toronto Communist Party Open 
Forum," The Worker, 30 January 1926, 2. 
222CPC TO 1920s, minutes ofmeeting (title deleted), signed A.E. Smith, organizer, 25 February 
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MacDonald and Moriarty had secretly ··supervised .. Smith's work. 223 Goudie had been 
instrumental in monitoring many of Smith's activities and also helped to insure Smith's 
election to the Presidency of the Ontario Labour Party in 1926 by encouraging Branch 
delegates to attend the CLP London convention and to vote for Smith. 224 
In the winter of 1926 Goudie also assisted Smith in carrying out the CP's 
reorganization from shop and language groups into branches primarily along geographic 
lines. This was a massive undertaking, which began in Toronto and was carried out 
nationally. Goudie used this event and the ensuing organizational debates which were 
among the most divisive in the party's history until that point to foster dissension among 
the various factions when he ultimately spoke out against Smith in opposition to the CP 
leadership's plans at several CCC and mass membership meetings. 225 
z:3NAC RG 146 175P/392, A.E. Smith file, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to 
Commissioner, I and 2 December 1924. 
mcpc TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent New-son to Commissioner, 11 March 
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In th~ spring of 19:26 Goudi~ was also nominated by Custance to attend the 
CLP' s Convention. Yet he declined at MacDonald's request in favour of Buck who was 
expected back in town from a trip to Eastern Canada. 226 rn the summer of 1926 Goudie 
was elected to the City Central's Political Committee where h~ worked alongside Hill 
and Custanc~. 227 His timing in this respect was impeccable. It was only once city 
reorganization had been completed that he turned his attention elsewhere, in particular, 
to the Political Committee's activities. 228 
In the fall when Scott Nearing, a socialist author and former Professor of 
Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh, was scheduled to give a convention lecture in 
Toronto as part of an international tour, Goudie was in charge of the distribution of 
2,000 cards advertising the event. 229 The CP' s District #3 held its Annual Conference in 
mid-November at which point the Buck/NfacDonald faction further strengthened its 
control. 230 Although Goudie may have represented th~ CCC at the District Conference 
it was clear that his principal allies were no longer a force within the city. 231 
An intelligence report at the end of November 1926 suggested that party 
activities were dismal. One of Goudie's final intelligence reports noted that: "Up until 
226CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 29 and 31 
March 1926. 
227CPC TO 1920s, "minutes of City Central Committee meeting, June 1, 1926," signed A. E. Smith, 
Secretary of CCC. 
228Reorganization remained a contentious issue with stalwarts for years, well after Goudie was 
gone. Yet its heyday as an issue to stir up factionalism had passed. 
229CPC TO 1920s, "minutes of City Central Committee meeting, September 21, 1926," signed A. E. 
Smith, Secretary of CCC; ~fany months later an overture had been made to Nearing for a return visit to give 
a series of lectures. He declined. See ibid., report, source deleted, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 
15 and 16 May 1927; On Nearing's life see his autobraphy, The Making Of A Radical: A Political 
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present time no propaganda meetings have been held by the C.P. of C. on Sundays as in 
previous years, and it is very doubtful now whether any will be held at all this 
Winter...''232 Party activity within the region was at a standstill: 
This goes to further add to previous reports that no activity is going on 
in Toronto at all. No encouragement is being given to present members or to 
those who might become members. 
The ~only activity at the present time is the Educational Classes in 
Historv and Economics. No other classes could be formed owin2: to lack of 
interest. 233 ~ 
Goudie arrived late to a couple of fall CCC meetings. By early 1927 after three 
years of undercover work Goudie was withdrawn from counter-subversion operations. 
But he still remained stationed at "0" Division's RHQ and he worked there as CIB 
detective for the next two years undertaking many assignments such as race track duty 
and other unspecified regional investigations.~34 This suggests that Goudie had not tired 
of detective work although he might have grown tired of his work inside the CP. 
A new Pleb's League program was announced just as Goudie exited the party. 
It provided the ideal opportunity to develop another agent. Yet for reasons unknown it 
was never pursued. Instead as the key issues changed within the party and as it devoted 
increasing attention towards launching a "Hands Off China" campaign, the CIB 
responded by detailing another member of its RHQ staff, former RHQ CIB clerk 
Constable Rolph, to gather more passive intelligence on this activity. 
Intelligence personnel soon recognized the need to get another agent within 
Toronto CP branches since the limited intelligence they acquired noted that the party 
was growing and expanding its influence in the city. So in time, even while Goudie was 
23~CPC TO 1920s, source deleted (likely Goudie) and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 26 
November 1926. At best the report suggest one good rally might be held one Sunday a month. 
mcpc TO 1920s, report, source deleted (likely Goudie) and Superintendent Newson to 
Commissioner, 26 November 1926. 
23-~..'0" Division Nominal Rolls, 1927-1928. 
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working in Toronto's em another agent was developed. 235 Goudie eventually \vas sent 
for many months on command throughout the Western Ontario District where he 
conducted various assignments for the CIB, although not political investigations. On 18 
June 19:29 he was discharged "Time Expired.'' His contact with Force personnel was 
sustained once he left the service, although his subsequent occupation is not known. 
Many years later he turned up at a Force reunion . 
..., ...., 
.) . .) 
Phase 3: Special Agent, John Leopold, 1927-1928 
The withdrawal of Special Agent Goudie from covert Toronto CP counter-
subversion operations by early 1927 marked a turning point for the Division's CIB 
personnel. By then the RHQ CIB and NHQ were accustomed to having considerable 
intelligence gathered by a penetration agent at the CP' s national headquarters. Fortunate 
for intelligence personnel for several months little of consequence took place among 
Toronto revolutionaries.236 
After a general slowdown in activity during the winter of 1927, by the spring 
both NHQ and the RHQ CIB had begun to reassess their operational needs and to set 
new objectives in their Toronto counter-subversion program. 237 With Goudie withdrawn 
"0" Division CIB personnel had sent out Detective M.J. Walsh and Detective Constable 
2350nly in November that year was he listed on command (0/C) Western Ontario District CIB. By 
January 1928 he was returned to Toronto CIB. But from March til May once again he was listed as 0/C 
Western Ontario District then for July and September CSIS has deleted the months' nominal rolls so we can 
speculate with no certainty what activities preoccupied him. In August he was listed as 0/C Race Track 
Duty and then in October and November 0/C CIB. 
236CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 26 
November 1926. 
237 ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 2 February 1927. 
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~-· ____ ,. Gt:ESTS .\T THE R.N.'"'.~LP. VETERA:'<S' :\SSOC!.\TIO:-.: 3.\:-.:Qt:ET 
From left to right: (I) Reg. No. 9877, S/Sgt G. ~!cLewin; (2) Reg. :-.!o. 119:6, e<-Cst. 
F. W. Thompson; (j) Reg. No. 11116, D/Sgt F. E. Smith; (4) Reg. No. 4JZS, ex-Cst. R. L. 
Hornidge; (5) lnspr S. Bulbrd; (6) Rog. No. 12001, D/A/Cpl 'W'. Kelly; (7) Reg. No. 8861, 
cx-Cst. E. J. Quinn; (S) Inspr G. B. McClcllln; (9) Supt V. A. :\!. Kemp; ( 10) Reg. No. 61; 1, 
cx-Cst. E. A. Simmen; ( 11) Reg. N•J. 7677 ex-Cst. J. H. Ticchurst; (I 2) ex-Deputy Commr 
(L:-Col) T. Dlnn; (IJ) Reg. N•l. 704, cx-Sgt P. Kerr; (14) Reg. :-.:o. 9i20, cx-Cpl C. G. Flirm>n; 
(IS) Reg. ;-o;o, 3661, ex-C>t. E. H. Jones; (16) lnspr F. W. Schutz; (17) Rog. :-.:o. 467~, cx-Cst. 
T. G. Coventry; (IS) Rc.~. :-.:o. 9131, ex-Cst. ]. T. Goudie; (19) Reg. c-:o. IOSS9, ex-Cst. E. 
\L.:\ . ...:ity; (:U) R~g. :\o.--1"6:7, t:x~Csc. A. C. Armhtbt,_.,, t::t) Rl!g. !\o. 5-'9!, ex-S~c (L:-Co!) 
C.]. \Vhcbdl; (22) R,g, l\'o. 12197, ex-Cst. W. Windsor; (23) Reg. No. 1379, e<-Sgt A. :\loss; 
(:~) R~!g. ~o. 10162, ~x-Csc. ~L Inglis; (2!) Rt!g. ~(). :!131, ex.-Cst. J. \\', L.::\{..:s,uricr; (16) 
Reg. No. 6101, e.<-Sgt A.]. Stretton; (27) Reg. No. 3337, ex-Cst. W. H>p>>rd; (23) Reg. No. 
SSJS, ex-Cst. G.]. Purrott; (29) Reg. No. 1067, ex-Cst. B. H. Boultbce; ('0) l:nidentified; (J I', 
Reg. No. 2788, ex-Cst. H. P. E. Fr>ncis; ()2) Unidentiiied; (JJ) Reg. No. 6)09, e<-Cst. \\'. W. 
Allison; (H) Reg. No. H99, .x-Cpl R"·· R. ]. Shires, :\LA., B.D.; (JS) Reg. c-;,,, 691, n-Csr. 
]. Hl)'es; (J6) Reg. No. SJSS, cx-Cst. G. S. Dellinger; (J7) Rog. No. 107), ex-Cst. C. E. Holma. 
# 18 -Ex Secret Agent J. T. Goudie and other notables at a Mountie Veterans' Banquet 
in 1941. 
Source: RCMP Quarterly, 9,3 (January 1942), 317. 
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Rolph to monitor a few events. 23 ~ Yet Walsh, for reasons unknown, was ultimately 
withdrawn from conducting investigations into communist activities and fewer than half 
a dozen low-grade intelligence reports were tilled out on Toronto CP activities and 
deposited on Toronto's core CP file in as many months. 239 Perhaps he was unable to 
escape his notoriety during the Sault Ste. Marie fiasco years earlier? 
After months of inactivity, Commissioner Starnes again realized that "0" 
Division was providing inadequate coverage of Toronto CP activities. 240 He felt that it 
was time to resurrect Toronto CIB's covert counter-subversion operations. Toward that 
end, he transferred the Force's star Special Agent Sergeant John Leopold (aka J.W. 
Esselwein) from Winnipeg to Toronto. 241 
John Leopold's story has been the subject of several scholarly articles and 
therefore only a brief recapitulation of his early career is necessary. John Leopold (alias 
Ds "0" Division Nominal Rolls 1920s; Constable Walsh arrived to "0" Division in May 1920. He 
subsequently worked during the 1920s at Sault Ste. l\llarie, Toronto, Bridgeburg, London, Niagara Falls on 
various assignments such as motorcyclist and taxation guard. He spent the better part of 1925 and 1926 
working in "0" Division RHQ's CIB. He was floated on command throughout the Division in the late 
1920s, yet as of December 1928 he was listed back in Toronto as a Detective where he remained (with the 
brief exception of March 1929 when he was liste as On Command CIB Western Ontario) up until his transfer 
to "N" Division as of1-7-32. 
239CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Detective Constable Ralph, 12 and 14 February, 
1927; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 2 February 1927; 
ibid., 23 April 1927; ibid., 22 and 23 April 1927. Nearly all of the intelligence deposited was easily obtained 
by a plainclothes member sent out to monitor public meetings, most of it concerning the "Hands Off China" 
Conference, demonstrations, and the CP's preparations for its upcoming Fifth National Convention. 
240ibid., report and memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to OC "0" Division, 19 February 1927; 
ibid., report, source deleted (undoubtedly Leopold), Winnipeg, 28 April 1927. In fact, it was easy for them 
to see that Leopold's talents were being wasted elsewhere. Especially when their best intelligence on 
Toronto CP activities came from Leopold, who was stationed in Winnipeg, not Toronto. Even earlier in 
February 1927, the Commissioner had turned to Leopold to assist "'0" Division which was having trouble 
filling out a dossier. In April, Leopold had secured minutes from a Toronto CEC meeting which were also 
sent from "D" Division RHQ to NHQ to "0" Division RHQ. 
wSteve Hewitt, "Royal Canadian Mounted Spy: The Secret Life of John Leopold/ Jack Esselwein," 
[ntelligence and National Security 15, 1 (2000), 144-167; Andrew Parnaby and Gregory S. Kealey, "How 
the ""Reds" Got Their Man: The Communist Party Unmasks an RCl\llP Spy," Labour/ Le Travail -+0 ( 1997), 
253-67. 
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Johan Leopold) was born in 1890 near Rudolfstadt, in the Ukraine, to Jewish parents. 24 : 
He had emigrated to Canada in 1912, settling as a homesteader near Topland, Alberta. 
He applied for engagement in the Force at Regina in September 1918 and his language 
skills which were in great demand in the Force's counter-subversion work (he spoke 
t1uent English, German, Czech, and imperfect Polish and Ukrainian) secured him a 
position?u 
Leopold soon found himself engaged in plainclothes duty. By February 1919, he 
was used "to keep in touch" with radicals in the Regina District where he quickly 
developed a knack for spying and was soon performing the duties of a Secret Agent, 
rather than a detective. By September 1920, he was known to Regina's radical 
organizations as J. W. Esselwein. 244 He had infiltrated the OBU and as the OBU' s 
fortunes declined joined the wave of progressives who swung over in favour of the Third 
International. His handlers instructed him to try to secure a position as a 'vVPC party 
2~2RC.l\.1P Personnel File- John Leopold, "Questionnaire Setting Forth Qualifications In Profession 
or Trade," 25 November 1968; He had a college education, was a graduate of College of Agriculture and 
Forestry in Bohemia. He had worked as an Assistant Administrator on a large estate and for a period as an 
Instructor in Economics at the College of Agriculture in Bohemia. 
243RC.l\.1P Personnel File- John Leopold, "Royal North-West Mounted Police," reference sheet. 
Vol. 'Historical Carding' sheet, 16 August 1984; ibid., "Form 59 A" 26 September 1918; FrankZaneth 
entered the Force because of similar skills, Gregory S. Kealey "Introduction," Gregory S. Kealey and Reg 
Whitaker [eds.] RC.l\.1P Securitv Bulletins: The Depression Years. Part L 1933-34 (St. John's, 1993), 8-18; 
also his, "The Surveillance State," 205; which has a list of 25 agents who operated in 1919-1920, many of 
them whose names suggest "exotic" backgrounds; as well see, Gregory S. Kealey, "Spymasters, Spies, and 
their Subjects: The RC.l\.1P and Canadian State Repression," in Gary Kinsman, Dieter K. Buse, and Mercedes 
Steedman [eds.] Whose National Security?: Canadian State Surveillance and The Creation of Enemies 
(Toronto, 2000), 18-36; footnote 17; Kealey has also estimated that 50 per cent of early spies were 
European immigrants with "special language skills." On Zaneth see, James Dubro and Robin Rowland, 
Undercover: Cases of the RCMP' s Most Secret Operative (Markham, 1 991 ), 25; When Zaneth was paraded 
before Commissioner Perry following basic training, he learned that "he was the first man specially recruited 
for the new Royal North-West Mounted Police 'Secret Service."' 
c.WRC.l\.1P Personnel File- John Leopold, G.T. Hann, Departmental Secretary, "Synopsis of the 
serv·ice ofReg. No. 7495 Sergeant John Leopold," 12 April 1937; RCMP GO 128; noted that Constable 
Leopold was appointed a Detective and granted $1.00 per diem extra pay from 1-3-20. 
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onzanizer. c•s Shortlv thereafter he became a WPC district secretarv and a member of its 
- . . 
secret underground organization know as the "T' party. From that point forward he 
attended all the party's 1 920s national conventions until 1928."'46 
Leopold also became active in the Regina Trades and Labour Council and 
eventually he was elected its Secretary. 247 On two occasions in the 1920s, Leopold's 
mishandling by others nearly resulted in his being exposed. The tirst instance occurred 
at the TLC's annual convention in Vancouver 1923. Secret and confidential information 
Regina TLC Secretary Leopold had been privy to concerning fellow Regina delegate 
Bruce planning to attend the convention had been compromised and leaked and put to 
misuse in Vancouver. Later on, in a second instance, Leopold fell under suspicion 
because he was flush with money, and although unemployed was found by comrades to 
be travelling a lot which peaked their interest. 248 
Leopold performed effectively, although in several instances Commissioner 
Starnes forwarded a memorandum to his DOC encouraging more work from their agent. 
Starnes would begin by informing his DOC (Leopold's chief handler) that it had been 
"some time" since he had last heard from his agent, and his previous report had been a 
particularly "good one." When could he expect the next one? Starnes would remind his 
mParnaby and Kealey, "How the 'Reds' Got Their Man," 255; also cited in Kealey, "Spymasters, 
Spies, and their Subjects,"; RCMP Personnel File- John Leopold, report, Detective Sergeant Salt to OC 
Southern Saskatchewan, 2 July 1921; A search of the One Big Union Bulletin (OBUB) between 1919 and 
early 1922 has uncovered neither agent being mentioned. 
246Rodney, Soldiers of the International, 44-47; Parnaby and Kealey, "How the 'Reds' Got Their 
Man," 255; I searched The Worker during the early 1920s and Esselwein does not appear in any articles 
emanating from Regina or elsewhere. He worked silently in that centre. 
mibid., report, Detective Sergeant Kempston, Superintendent Lindsay and A.ssistant Commissioner 
Knight to Commissioner, 18 and 21 March 1927. 
mThe first near exposure took place in late 1923; see ibid., report, Special Agent Leopold to CO 
Southern Saskatchewan District, 1 November 1923; ibid., "Telegram," Superintendent Allard to 
Commissioner, l November 1923; ibid., 2 November 1923; ibid., 5 November 1923; ibid., memorandum. 
Commissioner Starnes to Superintendent Allard, 5 November 1923; ibid., 6 November 1923. 
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DOC, that Leopold should be gently nudged to produce something and whenever 
Leopold seemed to fall off the path he was never to be dealt with firmly because he was 
so "valuable" as an agent. Part of the problem was Leopold's own habits. He was 
difficult to control. At times he drank heavily and his handlers often complained ofhis 
tendency to act independently.m 
A general decline in revolutionary activities in Regina and a desire to step up 
their control over their agent earned Leopold a transfer to Winnipeg in the fall of 
19::26. 250 In Winnipeg, Leopold was instructed to get inside the CP to check out 
developments in that city. His DOC soon reported that he performed effectively, but at 
the same time raised serious concerns about his failure to report back. 251 
A third issue in understanding Leopold's trajectory by the time he arrived in 
Toronto was an operational matter. In Regina Leopold had been provided a safe house 
to store his materials such as intelligence reports. The safe house was a room located in 
his handler Staff Sergeant Mercer's (a future "0" Division OC) home. The room was 
rented by the Force for the agent's use. This practice had met with both Leopold's 
DOC's and Commissioner Perry's approval and was a common feature of early 
investigative work. For instance, in Calgary during the 1919 General Strikes, J.W. 
Spalding rented rooms so that both he and other handlers could meet with agents to 
249ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Assistant Commissioner Knight, 18 October 1926 
ibid., memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Knight to Commissioner Starnes, 8 December 1926. 
250RCNIP Personnel File- John Leopold, memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Assistant 
Commissioner Knight, Regina, Saskatchewan, 31 August 1926; ibid., report, source deleted (Leopold), 
Detective Sergeant Salt and Superintendent Allard to Commissioner Starnes, 17 and 19 July 1921; ibid., 
report, Assistant Commissioner Knight to Commissioner Starnes, 9 September 1926. 
251 ibid., report, Inspector Dann, OC "D" Division, to Commissioner Starnes, 12 October 1926; 
ibid., report, Inspector Dann to Commissioner Starnes, 29 November 1926; ibid., memorandum, 
Commissioner Starnes to Inspector Dann, 4 December 1926; ibid., Commissioner Starnes to Assistant 
Commissioner Knight, 4 December 1926. 
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discuss matters. So did other personne!. 25 : When he moved to Winnipeg, Leopold kept 
up this arrangement since he traveled periodically back to Regina on business. He also 
wanted a similar safe-house arrangement made in Winnipeg which resulted in an inquiry 
into the practice. Unlike Perry, Starnes was unfamiliar with this practice. He acted 
hastily and ordered the arrangement stopped which set a new precedent. 253 Henceforth 
only under exceptional circumstances would a room be rented to meet and to store files 
for an agent. Instead an agent was instructed to keep files hidden at his own residence, 
and drop offs would be made once reports were prepared. 254 
It was during this investigation that Starnes also reconsidered his allocation of 
human intelligence resources. Clearly, to operate effectively intelligence had to be 
collected from Toronto since it was the CP's national headquarters. Yet "0" Division's 
RHQ CIB was in a dismal state in the winter of 1927. Starnes concluded that Leopold 
would better serve the Force's intelligence operations by being transferred to Toronto. 
Starnes felt that the general slowdown in radicalism in Western Canada during the mid-
1920s could be adequately handled by regular personnel who would be sent out to 
conduct more passive investigations. DOCs at both Regina and Winnipeg were informed 
of Commissioner Starnes' decision and Leopold's own reluctance to relocate was 
252Dubro and Rowland, Undercover, 56-57. 
253RClV!P Personnel File- John Leopold, memorandum, Special Agent John Leopold, Sergeant 
Mercer, Superintendent Lindsay and Assistant Commissioner Knight to Commissioner Starnes, 7 and 8 
March 1927; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to OC Regina, 12 March 1927; ibid., memorandum, 
Detective Staff Sergeant Mercer to OC Regina, 18 March 1927; ibid., report, Detective Sergeant Dempster, 
Superintendent Lindsay, Assistant Commissioner Knight to Commissioner, 18 and 21 March 1927; ibid., 
memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Worsley to Superintendent Knight, 14 March 1927; ibid., Assistant 
Commissioner Knight to Commissioner Starnes, 21 March 1927; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes 
to Assistant Commissioner Knight, 25 March 1927; ibid., report, Special Agent John Leopold, Assistant 
Commissioner Knight to Commissioner Starnes, 28 March 1927. 
254The Force, never able to distinguish between Leopold's practice when he was based in Regina 
versus when he had relocated to Winnipeg, had made a hasty decision. Ultimately, the Force's penuriousness 
and its unwillingness to listen to its field officers, its handler, and its agent, at least in Leopold's case, would 
come back to haunt them. 
158 
overruled. 255 fn early May Leopold was on his way to Toronto. 256 His transfer was an 
example of the RCMP repositioning an agent to meet national objectives. 
On his way to Toronto, Leopold made a stopover in Ottawa to be briefed by 
Starnes. At Ottawa, they discussed both his next assignment and several operational 
matters, including his undercover status. Starnes informed Leopold that his tirst Toronto 
assibl11ment was essentially to pick up where Goudie had left off months earlier and "to 
prepare an appropriation of the situation in Eastern Canada (including the effect of the 
reorganization upon the Communist Party) as he finds it on arrival. .. " He was also to 
provide a similar analysis "of the situation in Saskatchewan and Manitoba on his 
departure from there. 257 Other issues discussed in Ottawa included: Leopold's concerns 
that he had fallen under suspicion once again (apparently some comrades again doubted 
his cover because of all his traveling and lack of employment); the idea of the agent 
travelling to Montreal occasionally to investigate revolutionary activities in that centre 
and; the need for a secure place - a safe house - where he could write his reports. 25& 
These issues were subsequently made known to Newson by Starnes in a secret 
mibid., report, Assistant Commissioner Knight to Commissioner Starnes, 29 March 1927; ibid., 
report, Superintendent Lindsay, Commanding Officer Southern Saskatchewan District to Commissioner 
Starnes, 4 April 1927; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Assistant Commissioner Knight, 6 April 
1927; ibid., report, Assistant Commissioner Knight to Commissioner Starnes, 11 April 1927; ibid., report, 
Inspector T. Dann, CO "D" Division to Commissioner Starnes, 2 May 1927. 
256ibid., report, Superintendent Lindsay, CO Southern Saskatchewan District to Commissioner 
Starnes, 9 May 1927. 
257RCl\r1P Personnel File- John Leopold, memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Superintendent 
Newson, 10 May 1927. 
mrntelligence would later reveal that a party stalwart had gone to California and while there had 
come into receipt of some information with respect to Leopold. 
159 
memorandum. But they w·ere never satisfactorily addressed. 259 
Commissioner Starnes and Assistant Commissioner Worsley both wanted 
Newson to keep a tight reign on their agent260 Montreal too was notified of the agent's 
Toronto transfer. 26 t From the outset Newson followed Starnes' instructions in this 
respect. He turned down Leopold's request to travel to Montreal until the CP's 5111 
National Convention was held because intelligence personnel were counting on 
Leopold's coverage of the event. 262 They did not provide Leopold with a proper safe 
house to store his files. Instead he kept them under lock and key in a trunk at his 
apartment along with his Mountie uniform. Nor did they have Leopold reporting to just 
one handler who should have been Superintendent Newson. Instead Leopold sometimes 
met with Constable Rolph, other times with Inspector T.H. Irvine, while on other 
occasions he met with Newson. This sort of chaotic handling arrangement was a breach 
of the RCtvfP's own internal protocol. "0" Division's own RHQ undercover personnel 
were to meet with the Division's OC. For whatever reason or reasons (perhaps to try to 
tighten up their control over the agent?), this guideline was not being followed in 
Leopold's handling. When Leopold missed a couple of meetings with Constable Rolph 
or informed him that he was busy working his way inside the party, intelligence 
"5~Cl'v1P Personnel File- John Leopold, memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Superintendent 
Newson, 10 !Vfay 1927. 
260ibid; RCMP Personnel File- John Leopold, memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Worsley 
(NHQ) to "0" Division's DOC, 7 June 1927. 
261 ibid., and reply, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 13 !Vfay 1927. 
~6zRCMP Personnel File- John Leopold, report, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 
2 June 1927; "Fifth National Convention Communist Party of Canada," The Worker, 9 July 1927, 1,4. 
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personnel panicked. 263 NHQ demonstrated restraint and instructed Newson to sit tight 
and to judge Leopold on the quality of the reports he secured. 2(,.. 
Leopold made the transition to Toronto without any major mishaps proving his 
continued worth as an agent. He and a second agent from Montreal (whose identity is 
not known but who was being handled by Montreal Detective Corporal A W. Appleby) 
both attended the CP's Fifth National Convention.:65 Leopold secured a copy ofBuck's 
Trade Union Report and Starnes wanted additional copies so after discussing the matter 
with Leopold, his handler Irvine promised Starnes that more would be forwarded to 
NHQ as soon as they were received.:66 In fonvarding Buck's trade union report to NHQ 
Leopold also whet his handlers' appetite for more intelligence by informing them that 
"the [full] report of the recent convention [expected soon] will be the most 
comprehensive report ever issued (covering approximately 90 mimeographed pages) and 
will be similar(in composition) to my report of the 1924 convention."'267 MacDonald and 
Moriarty had been working on the report for weeks and Leopold expected that they 
would have it completed in about ten days. 
Eventually Leopold secured a copy of the final convention report. His copy was 
shared with the Department of Labour's Deputy Minister H.H. Ward on the condition 
263 RClVIP Personnel File- John Leopold, memorandum, Superintendent Newson to Assistant 
Commissioner Worsley, 23 June 1927. 
264CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 2 
February 1927; ibid., 22 and 23 April 1927; ibid., 6 June 1927; RCl'viP Personnel File- John Leopold, 
memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Worsley to Superintendent Newson, 26 June 1927. 
265CPC TO 1920s, supplementary file on the 1927 Convention, report, Superintendent Newson to 
Commissioner Starnes, 22 June 1927; Convention activities were highlighted in the Toronto Dailv Star, 
copies of which Newson forwarded to NHQ. 
267 ibid., report, No. 30 and Inspector T.H. Irvine for Superintendent Newson to Commissioner. 14 
and 15 July 1927. 
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that it was returned to Starnes after review. Ward found the material so instructive that 
he sought pennission to publish a substantial portion of it in an upcoming Labour 
Gazette. Yet for Starnes, the tirst consideration was the possible repercussions this action 
might have on his network of agents and intonnants. The last thing Starnes wanted was 
a channel closed, an agent exposed by another Department, especially when the Force 
already felt that federal government departments and politicians were notoriously 
sloppy, already too careless with their handling of intelligence provided them. 268 
Leopold was consulted on the matter. 269 He felt that once the conference report was 
mailed to stalwarts there was no problem with the Department of Labour putting them 
to use since the party had no way of tracking reports and furthermore the post office 
would ultimately be blamed. 270 
After the Fifth National Convention there was a noticeable drop in the volume 
of intelligence deposited on "0" Division's core Toronto CP file. Leopold attended 
several sessions of the YCL's 4th National Convention held in the city in June but 
delayed submitting reports on the event. Through July he hardly contributed anything to 
"0" Division's core Toronto CP file. That month he filed two reports which dealt with 
students planning to attend Finnish summer camps in Northern Ontario and British 
268ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 21 July 1927; 
ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to H.H. Ward, Deputy .Minister, Department of Labour, 30 July 
1927; ibid., reply, H.H. Ward to Commissioner Starnes, 2 August 1927. 
269ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Superintendent Newson, 30 July 1927. 
270ibid., report, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 19 August 1927; ibid., report, 
Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 15 September 1927; ibid .. memorandum, Commissioner 
Starnes to H. H. Ward, Deputy Minister, Department of Labour, 19 September 1927; ibid., reply, 20 
September 1927; In forwarding a copy, Commissioner Starnes made a suggestion as to how the document 
might be put to use: "It had occurred to me that it may not be amiss to publish some portions of it, as it 
exhibits these people as regretting the absence of distress among the working population." 
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Columbia. 271 In mid-July Starnes wrote ·'O" Division's OC a curt secret memorandum 
noting the drop in intelligence being gathered and he added: "So tar I have received no 
report upon the convention ofthe Young Communist League. When may I expect it?'·:;: 
Leopold informed N'HQ that the YCL's executive were still working on a tina! report 
and he promised to forward a ·'comprehensive'' account of this event along with a copy 
of the final proceedings once the YCL executive made it available. Leopold also 
informed NHQ that he had not generated a report earlier since he did not have access to 
the YCL's resolutions. 273 
Toward the end of the month a full report was forwarded to Newson along with 
a copy of the YCL's 4rh National Convention tina! report. 274 What use Starnes made of 
this intelligence remains unclear, although previous YCL convention reports had been 
sent to other DOCs. 275 As well, since the YCL often passed resolutions condemning the 
Boy Scouts which it considered part of a larger militaristic culture that outlasted the war 
and dominated young boys lives, sometimes intelligence was also shared with officials 
from the Boy Scouts organization. 276 In 1925 Starnes passed the Boy Scouts' national 
executive intelligence on the YCL in the hope that steps could be taken to undercut the 
work of the CP' s Young Pioneers. In forwarding that report, he had cautioned: 
271 ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 22 and 31 
July 1927; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 30 July and 2 
August 1927 
272 ibid., secret memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to OC "0" Division, 11 July 1927. 
273 ibid., report, No. 30 and Inspector T.H. Irvine for Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 14 
and 15 July 1927. 
274 ibid., report, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 25 July 1927. 
275ibid., secret memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to OC "K" Division, Lethbridge, 16 October 
1925. 
:
760n youth and militarism see, Mark Moss, lV!anliess and Militarism: Educating Young Bovs in 
Ontario for War (Oxford. 2001 ). 
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You wi II observe that I have quoted from the League's own confidential 
report. It is important that they do not know that I possess this, and accordingly I 
must ask you to be extremely discreet in any counter-measures you may take in 
consequence of this information. I must ask you, for example, not to quote me as 
authority, and to betray no familiarity with the actual phraseolo~:,ry of these reports 
and plans. 277 
Before long, the defense ofSacco and Vanzetti, two American anarchists whose 
lives were threatened with execution after seven years of imprisonment in 
Massachusetts, captured the party's attention as it did progressives throughout the 
world. 278 Leopold's coverage of local communist activities had improved by this point. 
He reported that protest meetings were arranged for 6 August across Canada to condemn 
Massachusetts Governor Fuller's planned execution of the men, and that a follow up 
demonstration was to be held in front of the American Consulate on 9 August. 279 In 
forwarding these reports to NHQ Newson promised to keep Ottawa '·in touch with this 
matter. "2110 
Both Toronto Sacco and Vanzetti demonstrations were held as scheduled. The 
first at Queen's Park drew more than 2,500 people. The composition of the crowd was 
identified as were the main speakers and the comments they made during speeches given 
which was standard practice for covering an event of this kind. A city police presence 
277CPC TO 1920s, personal and confidential letter, Commissioner Starnes to Assistant Chief 
Commissioner, Boy Scouts Association, 16 October 1925. 
278This issue gained momentum during the spring and summer. At the CLP Ontario Section's 
convention it had caused a major row when two reactionaries refused to sign a petition condemning 
Massachusetts governor Fuller. See, "Ontario Labour Party In Annual Convention," The Worker. 30 April 
1927, 1-5; On Sacco and Vanzetti see Paul Avrich, Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background 
(Princeton, 1991). 
279ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 25 and 26 
July 1927; ibid., report, source deleted, 4 August 1927; "Sacco and Vanzetti," The Worker. 23 April 1927, 
4; "Get Into Fight to Release Sacco and Vanzetti," The Worker, 30 April1927, 1; "Capitalism Murders 
Sacco and Vanzetti," The Worker, 3 September 1927, 1. 
28
°CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent ;\!ewson to Commissioner Starnes, 7 
:md 8 August 1927. 
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was also noted as was "the ease'' with which they had dispersed the "orderly crowd."2R1 
The second demonstration took place as scheduled the following week in front of the 
American Consulate. It resulted in the arrest of five activists including Leopold.=~= 
Given what we know of Goudie's earlier participation in Toronto anti-war 
demonstrations, it is not the least bit surprising that Leopold was involved in similar 
activities. In fact, an agent's arrest at some point in Toronto operations was all but 
inevitable. The five accused were taken to Court Street Station and charged with 
vagrancy. They were released on bail, bond being set at $25 each, which was furnished 
by party activist James Blugerman. The following morning the five appeared before 
Magistrate Browne. They were defended by labour lawyer J. L. Cohen, and each entered 
a plea of ·not guilty,' but were convicted and fined $50 each and costs or sentenced to 
30 days imprisonment. Since the fines were not paid immediately, Darling added, they 
were taken to the Don Jail. Later on that day the Canadian Labour Defense League 
(CLDL) raised the money and the five were released pending an appeal. 283 
With his arrest Leopold was under heat from intelligence personnel. No doubt, 
fearing possible repercussions, they asked Leopold to account for his actions. In a 
lengthy report, days afterwards, Leopold provided them with his analysis. He reflected 
upon the event and explained the circumstances surrounding the demonstration. He 
made it "abundantly clear" in his report (which was only a half truth) that the 
demonstration was "spontaneous," not planned in advance in any detail. It was largely 
the result of"an eleventh hour decision arrived at the Communist Party Headquarters ... " 
mcpc TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 7 
and 8 August 1927. 
2~nBetcherrnan, The Little Band. 69, 167, 187; Rodney, Soldiers of the International, 138. 
183CPC TO 1920s, report, Inspector Darling to DOC "0" Division and Commissioner, 11 August 
1927. 
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in which he had not been involved. In fact, he had only shown up at Toronto party 
offices shortly before it unfolded. 284 Within ten minutes of his arrival at party 
headquarters, Leopold informed senior intelligence personnel, he had been selected as 
a "banner carrier" and there was little he could do. 285 Soon thev were at the Consulate, 
a deputation led by MacDonald inteflliewed senior consul officials and presented them 
with a petition. Since there was no press coverage afterwards, MacDonald had gone over 
to the Toronto Star offices to provide a full account of the event. It was while 
MacDonald was there that the arrests on the street had taken place. 286 
During the period bet\veen the initial arrests, the appeal, and the judge's final 
sentencing, Division personnel kept tabs on similar meetings held throughout Southern 
Ontario. Once again the Cffi's intelligence network was expanded as circumstances 
required. Detachments forwarded reports to NHQ along with clippings of protest 
meetings held across the country.287 On 8 September Leopold's case was dismissed and 
the Force escaped the episode unscathed. 288 This event only put a temporary brake on 
284CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted, Inspector Irvine for Superintendent Newson to 
Commissioner Starnes, 12 and 13 August 1927; He arrived there v.rith Trevor Maguire. It was not even all 
that surprising that Leopold had befriended Maguire. Maguire had become one of the more prolific of the 
party stalwarts during the previous v.rinter and spring and had penned a regular column in The Worker. In 
other words, he was a particularly good source for intelligence purposes. 
285Labour Organization in Canada. 1927, 24; As the Labour Gazette account later reported, the 
banners read "Stop the Hand of the Capitalist Murders." 
286CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted, Inspector Irvine for Superintendent Newson to 
Commissioner Starnes, 12 and 13 August 1927 
287CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 24 
and 26 August 1927; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 30 
and 31 August 1927. 
288CPC TO 1920s, report, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 2 September 1927; 
Blugerman, had already earned a PHF PHF #1856 at Crowland Lake for earlier labour activities: see "Jim 
Blugermann" [sic] in Kealey and Whitaker [eds.], The Early Years, 422 .. ; CPC TO 1920s, "Toronto 
Disturbers Pay Fines of $50.00: Paraded in Front of United States Consulate," Ottawa Journal, 12 August 
1927. 
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copy of the report ifpossibk. 2<) 2 
Leopold's coverage of communist activities continued through early 1928 with 
reports on the January Hart House debate over the "pro's and con's" of communism, and 
the YCL's celebrations in commemoration of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht."93 
In February, he provided NHQ with intelligence on the CP's annual Lenin Memorial 
Meeting in Toronto, as well as the the Party's Sixth Anniversary Toronto Celebration, 
and a report from an enlarged CPC Executive Committee meeting. 
Leopold was no slouch. In fact during his previous ten months of undercover 
activity in Toronto, Leopold was able to secure intelligence of national significance. He 
was most active in the work of the YCL and the CP's National Executive. But he never 
shied away from participating in many other local party functions. Leopold was 
successful in obtaining almost any intelligence that Starnes and other personnel formally 
requested of him in secret and confidential memorandums. He was truly a _great 
salesman. He effectively promoted his own worth as an agent by repeatedly emphasizing 
the quality of the intelligence he secured which cut him some slack when he meandered 
and failed to report. 
The major industrial activity that received coverage during this period in the 
Division was the General Motors Strike in Oshawa. Commissioner Starnes and other 
senior Force personnel were in constant contact with Deputy l'vtinister of Labour H. H. 
Ward during the dispute. Leopold made a significant contribution in the CIB's 
292CPC TO 1920s, report, No. 30 and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 19 December 
1927. 
mcpc TO 1920s,"Red Flag Seen At Hart House," Toronto Dailv Star, 17 January 1928; report, 
source deleted and Inspector G.F. Fletcher, 28 January 1928; "Hart House Debaters Oppose Communism," 
The Mail& Empire, 19 January 1928; "Votes of Students Against Communism," The Globe, 19 January 
!928: report, Inspector G.F. Fletcher, 19 January !928; "Red Doctrine Voted Down By Students," The 
Evening Telegram. 19 January 1928; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector G.F. Fletcher for 
Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 21 January 1928; ibid., report, source deleted and 
Inspector G. F. Fletcher for Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 24 and 27 January !928. 
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monitoring of these activities by generating reports that had detailed the travel of 
stalwarts between Toronto and Oshawa. "9~ 
Leopold's success lay in the fact that he had befriended many national tigures in 
the party. Through years of cultivating alliances and through his work he had earned the 
respect of many colleagues. Since his Toronto transfer he had spent many weekends 
during the winter months visiting the Buck and MacDonald homes. Right up until May 
during the winter slowdown in party activity he managed to secure considerable 
intelligence. 295 No wonder it was a shock to him when in mid-May the CEC sent him the 
infamous letter informing him of his expulsion and the steps they were taking to notify 
the labour movement at large of his position as a spy. 296 
It was subsequently revealed, but not until 1931, that although Leopold had 
drawn suspicion for some time, his downfall was the result of his intelligence reports, 
papers and other memorandum that had been kept at his home in a trunk. The documents 
were discovered by an Austrian acquaintance of his whom he had put up from time to 
mcpc TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 28 
February 1928; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to H. H. Ward, 30 1\-farch 1928; ibid., report, 
source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 29 and 30 March 1928; ibid., 
memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to H.H. Ward, 31 March 1928; ibid., report, source deleted and 
Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 30 March and 2 April 1928; ibid., report, source deleted 
and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 4 and 5 April 1928; ibid., memorandum, 
Commissioner Starnes to H.H. Ward and reply 10 and 11 April1928. 
295CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted, and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 
13 May 1928. 
296S.W. Horrall, "Canada's Security Service A BriefHistory," RCMP Quarterly 50, 3 (1985), 38-
49. The letter dated 15 May read as follows: 
"This is to inform you that the C.E.C. at a recent meeting decided to expel you from the Party. 
You are aware that there have been suspicions against you for some time, but we were not in possession 
of any evidence to substantiate same. 
We now have incontrovertible evidence that you are and have been for some considerable time in the 
employ of a certain department of the Government. 
We are notifying your group secretary and the general membership and also through the columns of the 
Worker the labor movement at large." 
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time when he visited Toronto. A Toronto Star reporter, frederick Griftin, brought these 
revelations to light in a piece written in February 1931 follovving an interview with Jack 
MacDonald, who had long since left the party. 197 
From an intelligence perspective the overriding lesson here was quite simple. The 
Force had repeatedly failed to listen to their star undercover sleuth in several instances. 
They never provided him with a proper storage place for his intelligence reports and 
Mountie regalia in Winnipeg nor in Toronto despite his pleas. For the most part senior 
intelligence personnel were more concerned vvith the quality and frequency of the 
intelligence that their star Mountie acquired and ultimately they spent far too much time 
trying to rein in and control their agent. Leopold's career in the 1920s was truly an 
example on the one hand of the parsimonious nature of the early organization. It was 
also a clear instance of the paramilitary nature of the Force interfering with its securit)' 
and intelligence work. Leopold operated without the full backing of his DOC and the 
Commissioner and that probably more than anything else led to his exposure. 298 
What lessons can be drawn from this narrative of the 1920s? "0" Division's 
1920s counter-subversion operations conducted against key branches of the communist 
movement occurred in a series of waves. By the end of 1921 reliance upon private 
detective firms' operatives in key branches of the Toronto communist movement was 
largely abandoned in favour of the Force's own personnel who were sent in to operate 
undercover. In the higher stages of capitalist development as class conflict became more 
pronounced further rationalization occurred in industrial relations. While regulating 
workers' collective aspirations in the legal arena saw something of a return to industrial 
297RCl'vfP Personnel File- John Leopold, report, Sergeant John Leopold to Commissioner 
:'v{acBrien, 15 November 1931; also see, Frederick Griffin, ''Leopold Was Betrayed by Man he Befriended," 
Toronto Dailv Star, 13 November 1931; Parnaby and Kealey, "How the 'Reds' Got Their Man," Labour/ Le 
Travail 40 ( 1997), 253-267. 
298Hewitt, "Royal Canadian Mounted Spy," !49. 
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voluntarism that had been suspended during the war, this shift happened in a larger arena 
of a sib-rnificantly transformed tield of government involvement in industrial relations. 
Against the backdrop of a ·'return to voluntarism·' the potential need to resort to more 
coercive instruments when this kind of conciliation failed resulted in an extension by 
government of new powers through the rationalization of a national policing apparatus 
with an anti-labour agenda and particularly the socialization of domestic intelligence 
operations. 
Henceforth, during much of the 1920s the RHQ CIB relied heavily upon the work 
of a single penetration agent placed inside the CP's key Toronto branches as its primary 
intelligence source. The agent's work was supplemented by detectives, plainclothes 
constables and other operatives sent out to conduct piecemeal investigations as the need 
required. The key Toronto agent was probably also joined by other agents in the Division 
who operated undercover in other umbrella organizations, although this is largely 
speculative and something that requires further investigation and lies outside the scope 
of this study. 299 
Each of the Division's major 1920s RHQ counter-subversion operations in 
Toronto began with the simple recognition that for a variety of reasons there was a need 
to get inside the revolutionary movement in a more thorough manner. As the 1920s 
progressed, more often NHQ prodded the Division's CO to undertake this kind of 
activity. From small beginnings, with an overriding dependence on private detective 
firms agents and operatives, the Division's senior intelligence personnel made 
adjustments and established the type of operation, which given their limited resources, 
they felt was the best solution to keep tabs on communist activities. The preferred 
method of entering the movement was through fluid associations such as educational 
c9'1 did not use the ethnic files for Toronto. 
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classes and public forums \vhich for various reasons provided the Force \vith an 
opportunity to avoid the issue ofbackstopping. Once inside the party an agent's success 
was measured largely by the intelligence they were able to secure as well as their ability 
to rise up through the organization. So both in terms of budgets and at the micro level 
in many respects intelligence organizations and the networks they established were 
intimately tied into capitalist markets which helped to account for their successes. 
While Division personnel such as Herbert Darling became more experienced as 
the 1920s unfolded and was better apprised of local developments NHQ's increased 
awareness of national and international developments ensured that penetration work was 
continued, albeit with a series of prolonged interruptions when agents were withdrawn 
from undercover work or exposed. Although the CP became larger and more 
experienced as the 1920s unfolded, it was unable to stop the Force from successfully 
infiltrating its party. The Division's tirst penetration operation inside the revolutionary 
movement in Toronto was tested during the spring of 1921, but not followed through 
until the fall of that year. It lasted until late 1922 or early 1923. The second operation 
commenced in early 1924; it was concluded by early 1927 and the third began in May 
1927 and it lasted for a year. Although the hurdles and challenges each agent faced were 
unique, on balance they performed remarkably well given the fact that they lacked 
training and much of their work was learned on the job. When they were successful 
agents provided both RHQ and NHQ intelligence personnel with information about the 
CP' s ongoing operations and future plans, perhaps even in a "timely" and "usable" 
manner. Chapter four turns to examine the consequences of 1920s penetration operations 




"'0" Division's Intelligence Interlude: 
Success and Failure in an Age ofOSTNT. 
1928-1931 
In May 1928 "0" Division's CIB entered a new period in its inter-war operational 
history. The uncovering of John Leopold had enormous consequences not only for the 
agent's career, but for the Division's intelligence operations too. For the next few years 
Toronto CIB personnel were unable to develop another penetration agent in any sustained 
capacity and their primary form of gathering intelligence on local CP activities therefore 
came from passive means. We know very little about this period in Canada's intelligence 
past, even less about the Division's history. Who was involved in this work? What 
preliminary results did this operational change produce in 1929 and 1930? Why by 1931 had 
intelligence personnel divided over its utility? Had its shortcomings become readily 
apparent? Where did it leave both NHQ and "0" Division by the end of that year? In 
answering these questions, and analyzing the successes and failures of "0" Division RHQ 
counter-subversion operations, we must turn first to changes in the Force and the objective 
conditions in which it existed. 
4.1 
The Changeover, 1928 
In 1928 the RCMP reentered into a contract policing arrangement with the Saskatchewan 
government. The absorption of the Saskatchewan Provincial Police (SPP) and the RC:tv1P's 
assumption of provincial duties took affect on 1 June. 1 In anticipation of these 
responsibilities, transfers between divisions were arranged during the winter and spring 
1Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 214; RCMP, Annual Report, 1928, 7-9; 
RC. Macleod, "The RCMP and the Evolution ofProvincial Policing," in his and David Scheiderman's, 
Police Powers in Canada: The Evolution and Practice of Authority (Toronto, 1994), 44-56; R.ivett-Camac, 
Pursuit in the Wilderness, 177. 
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months. In May, Superintendent Newson prepared to leave '·O" Division after tive years as 
its DOC. 1 His Toronto successor, Superintendent George Leslie Jennings, arrived in the city 
early that month. 3 
Jennings' appointment as DOC ultimately strenbrthened "0" Division in many 
respects. 4 He was originally from Toronto. He had strong establishment ties and he brought 
vast administrative experience to the position. Much earlier in his career he had served as 
officer in charge of Regina CIB, during the War he had commanded the RNWN1P CEF 
contingent sent to France. When he returned home in 1919, he was rushed by train with 
troops to Winnipeg to assist Starnes during the General Strike. 5 His professional relationship 
with "0" Division personnel predated his Toronto appointment and these ties were strongest 
with Newson, Darling, and Fish, those individuals directly responsible for the Division's 
intelligence work.6 
2His new assignment was OC Vancouver, "E" Division. 
3NAC RG 18, vol. 3487, file 0-147, Service Record ofG.L. Jennings, (hereafter cited as RCMP 
Personnel file- G.L. Jennings); George Leslie Jennings, was born in Toronto in 1875, educated at Paris, 
Ontario, and later Woodstock College (affiliated with McMaster University) and the Canadian Business 
College at Hamilton. He joined the 48th Highlanders in Toronto, later the 37111 Haldimand Rifles, and served 
as a Trooper with the zoo Canadian Mounted Rifles in South Africa. He joined the RNWMP in 1906, married 
Commissioner Perry's daughter in 1912, headed the RNWP CEF contingent in 1918-1919 and served 
extensively across the North and West. He became "0" Division's OC in May 1928, was transferred to 
Ottawa as DCI in February 1932, subsequently promoted to the rank of Deputy Commissioner and retired to 
pension in 1938. He died in 1958. 
~McDonald Commission, Second Report. Vol.1, 111, 155-156; He eventually became DCI in the 
1930s and could perhaps be considered as the Force's 'father of wire-supervision' for his role in encouraging 
its use after 1936. This was two years before they hired an electrician who specialized in these kinds 
operations and sent him to Montreal ~c" Division RHQ. 
5RCMP Personnel File- G.L. Jennings,"Deputy Commissioner G.L. Jennings, O.B.E." 1938; ibid., 
"Officer's Record of Service". As a CO Jennings had served briefly as Force adjutant during 1919-1920, 
then at Depot and at "G" Division at Edmonton and "F" Division at Prince Albert. 
6ROviP Personnel File- G.L. Jennings, "Deputy Commissioner G.L. Jennings, O.B.E." 1938; ibid., 
"Officer's Record of Service."; The Canada Who's Who 1938-39, Vol.3 (Toronto, 1939),352; Both Newson 
and Darling had served under his command in the RNWMP CEF contingent. Fish had worked with him in 
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Occasionally a picture tells all. 
Source: RClVIP Ouarterlv, 6,3 (January 193 9), 150. 
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Once he assumed command of"O" Division Jennings arranged an Ottawa meeting 
with the Commissioner to discuss matters of a "private and confidential"' nature. One issue 
concerned the sibrning of transfer papers, as the Division's stores and supplies were not in 
order. 7 It was at this juncture that Leopold's exposure took place. Jennings immediately 
worked to minimize possible repercussions and to assess what had happened. Force 
personnel, however, were without a clear blueprint of steps to be taken under such 
circumstances and as a result the investigation was poorly handled. 
The first mistake senior Force personnel made was that by trying to limit the 
potential fallout they only slowly expanded the scope of their investigation to draw upon 
intelligence personnel from outside "0" Division. 8 They demonstrated that they lacked the 
analytical skills needed to analyze the events surrounding the exposure. They were 
suspicious ofLeopold, felt he had not told them everything, and held him largely responsible 
for 'vvhat had happened.9 Leopold, who was instructed to submit a brief considering how he 
Winnipeg during the General Strike. Jennings had complete confidence in Darling: he had written 
Commissioner Perry a glowing letter of support to help Darling secure his reinstatement in the Force after 
the war · 
7RCwfP Personnel File- G.L. Jennings, 'telegram,' Adjutant Vernon to Superintendent Jennings, 
14 April 1928; ibid., reply, Commissioner Starnes to Superintendent Jennings, 17 April 1928; ibid., 
memorandum, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 7 May 1928; ibid., "transfer account 
form" Superintendent Jennings and Inspector LaNauze, 14 May 1928. 
8RCNIP Personnel File- John Leopold, report, Detective Sergeant Hildyard and Sergeant Drysdale 
and Inspector Acland to Commissioner Starnes, 28 May 1928; ibid., translation from ULN, 28 May 1928, 
CEC message, "Uncovered a Police Agent". 
~CNIP Personnel File- John Leopold, vol.4. 'Notes on word deleted's (Leopold's) Case," 
probably 29 May 1928; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector Phillips, OC Quebec District, to 
Commissioner, 2 June 1928; and ibid., 4 June 1928; ibid.,memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to OC "0" 
Division, 9 June 1928; ibid.,'Cross Reference Sheet,' 16 June 1928, (original report was dated 7 June 1928); 
ibid., report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 30 May 1928; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner 
Starnes to Inspector Fletcher, OC Maritimes District, 30 July 1928; ibid., report, Inspector Fletcher, OC 
Maritimes District to Commissioner Starnes, 3 August 1928; ibid., report, Inspector Fletcher to 
Commissioner Starnes, 3 August 1928; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Inspector Fletcher, 8 
August 1928; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Superintendent Ritchie, OC "G" Division, 
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had been exposed, blamed extraneous factors such as his handlers and those who shared his 
intelligence with Divisions and with other government departments. It took several years 
before the true circumstances surrounding his exposure became kno\\ITL 10 
Once Superintendent Jennings determined that Leopold's "usefulness" as an agent 
had ended, he recommended a further safety precaution that he be removed from this work 
and transferred to the MacKenzie District. 11 Leopold was sent to Ottawa to discuss his 
future with Starnes and the DCI. They agreed with Jennings' assessment. A contingency 
account was set up for travel and incidental expenses, and Leopold soon left Ottawa 
banished to the North. 12 But Leopold was not the only casualty. Herbert Darling, who was 
involved with the running of the agent, was also directly affected by the fiasco. Before 
Newson had transferred to Vancouver Darling was recommended for a promotion. It had 
been six years since his last one. The exposure had occurred before Starnes had made any 
final decision on the matter. The event shelved any such plans Starnes was considering and 
it would be several years later before Darling's position would again be reevaluated. 13 
With Leopold gone the Division's intelligence work collapsed. For many months 
Edmonton, 9 August 1928. 
1lRC:MP Personnel File- John Leopold, vol.4, (date marred best copy available), report, Sergeant 
John Leopold to OC "0" Division, (likely mid-l'vf.ay 1928); ibid., report, Sergeant John Leopold to OC "0" 
Division, 24 JV1ay 1924; ibid. memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Superintendent Jennings, 21 May 
1928; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to OC's Winnipeg, Regina, Edmonton, 21 May 1928; 
ibid., Frederick Griffin, "Leopold Was Betrayed by Man He Befriended. Fellow Native of Bohemia 'Sold 
Out' Mounted Police Investigator," Toronto Dailv Star, 13 November 1931. 
11ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 26 May 1928. 
12 ibid., memorandum, Inspector Vernon, Adjutant, to OC "0" Division, 28 May 1928; ibid., 
memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to OC "0" Division, 29 May 1928. 
13RG 18, vol. 3159, file 0-232, Service Record ofHerbert Darling, (hereafter cited as RCMP 
Personnel File-- Herbert Darling) vol.1, memorandum, Superintendent Newson to Commissioner Starnes, 
28 March 1928. ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Minister in Control of the RCMP, 25 
February 1931. 
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thereafter no intelligence reports were deposited on the core Toronto CP tile. 1'1 Twice earlier 
in the Division ·s history in 19:23 and 1927 when the RHQ CIB was without an agent the 
results were disastrous in terms of intelligence acquisition as ClB personnel had learned next 
to nothing from an operational standpoint. 15 Nevertheless, since agents had not been exposed 
(at least publically ), intelligence personnel had felt comfortable returning to covert counter-
subversion operations months later. Not so in this new era. 
Signs had already existed well before Leopold's uncovering that the Division's 
intelligence work had become a lower priority. A reduction in strength from 45 to 39 
personnel, added seasonal responsibilities such as race track duty and escort for harvesters' 
trains, cases which had become more difficult and required more individual attention, and 
much else took away from the resources available for intelligence work. They made late 
hours "compulsory" during much of the year, "[T]he pinch was occasionally so great," 
Jennings wrote, "that chauffeurs and staff men had to assist" in these "duties". 16 
Personnel changes also hurt RHQ intelligenc·e operations. In January Superintendent 
Newson had sent Staff Sergeant Fish to Windsor to oversee investigations in that part of the 
province. As a result his daily expertise was lost to Toronto CIB.l7 That month Darling also 
released Corporal Rolph from CIB clerking duties, further evidence that other work had 
become a priority as Rolph's subsequent assignments were not political in nature. Until 
April, when a permanent replacement for Rolph was found, several personnel shared 
14The one exception was a single report generated in Montreal and subsequently deposited on the 
Toronto CP files. It identified the six people working out ofCPC national headquarters. 
15CPC TO l920s, For instance, only 17 pages of intelligence was deposited in 1923 on the core 
Toronto CP file in the aftermath of the withdrawal ofCatt. 
16R0v£P, Annual Report, 1928, 46. 
17
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, January and February 1928. 
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responsibility for RHQ ern clerking, each on a part-time basis. But neither they, nor Rolph's 
eventual successor, Constable J.F. Sheridan, had any CIB records training. 18 Finally, 
Inspector Fletcher, who had occasionally assisted Newson in supervising the Division's 
intelligence work, was transferred out in March. 19 
Fortunately for the CIB, local communist activity slowed during much of 1928 
offsetting the Division's own shortcomings. Objective conditions had changed. The 
economy had improved. The annual unemployment rate had dropped and at 2.6 per cent 
nationally in 1928 reached its lowest level in the inter-war period. 20 Although strike activity 
increased in 1928 the CP's District #3 often failed to capitalize on changing conditions in 
either the political or industrial work it undertook. 21 Its enlarged Executive Committee met 
at the beginning of the year when Leopold was still operating undercover and he reported 
that it was accomplishing little.22 In February, District #3 groups reported activity was at a 
standstill. One reason was they were without a permanent organizer and the funds were 
simply not there to maintain one.23 Comrade Erlich eventually assumed this responsibility 
in addition to editing the Yiddish paper Der Kampf, but both jobs required a full-time 
worker which meant that neither task was performed satisfactorily. Not until the following 
18RCMP G.O. 7073, notes Constable J.F. Sheridan granted a pay raise of25 cents per diem as of 1 
April 1928; RCMP G.O. 7081, notes his transfer to Depot as of 29 April 1928. 
19<'0" Division, Nominal Rolls, rvfarch 1928. 
20John Herd Thompson with Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1929: Decades of Discord (Toronto, 
1985), Table XIITa, 350. 
21 Cruikshank and Kealey, "Canadian Strike Statistics," 134. 
22CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector Fletcher to Commissioner, 21 and 23 
January 1928. 
23ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector Fletcher to Commissioner, 21 January 1928; ibid., 
report, source deleted and Inspector Fletcher to Commissioner, 13 and 14 February 1928. 
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year was Sam Lapides appointed pennanent organizer.14 Often the turnout at CP District #3 
public events was poor. "Slackness'' was rampant across the District and factional infighting 
had increased. A group led by Annie Buller, Rebecca Buhay, and Sam Carr had emerged, 
and along with Spector they pushed the CP to adopt a more radical position on issues while 
an anti-Spector group led by Stewart Smith and Leslie Morris left the CP divided. 25 
The CP District #J's industrial work also accomplished little, intelligence reports 
suggested. In several industrial sectors such as mining, and pulp and paper, enthusiasm was 
tempered by seasonal downturns, uncompetitive pricing for exports, high energy costs, while 
elsewhere organizing work was less than satisfactory. The CP failed to establish a Canadian 
Auto Workers Industrial Union (instead an AFL union was formed) and Superintendent 
Newson felt that as a result all the CP gained there was increased exposure. 26 
In the summer of 1928 the Communist International's Sixth World Congress was 
held. The CI' s position radically changed and the CPC adopted its class versus class strategy. 
In the process conservative internationals were fully abandoned in favour of national union 
structures. Before long, for stalwarts it seemed clear that Lenin's tactics of broad alliance 
building from within organizations such as the TLC were less relevant since conditions had 
changed dramatically. Conservative unions had often demonstrated their commitment to 
~~AGO CP, 2A 1129, National Organizing Secretary to S. Lapides, Toronto, 25 ~larch 1931. 
25CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 25 and 28 
February 1928; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector Fletcher to Commissioner, 13 and 14 February 
1928; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 12 and 15 r>vlarch 1928. 
26John Manley,"Communism and Auto Workers: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism in the 
Canadian Automobile Industry," Labour/ Le Travail 12 (1986), 105-133; CPC TO 1920s, report, source 
deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 30 March and 2 April I 928; Ewen, The Forge Glows 
Red, 143-144; Ewen noted that it also eventually formed the basis for the Steel Workers Industrial Union. 
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containing militancy and reformism rather than class struggle. 27 These issues emerged front 
and centre in the late 1920s and along with "Trotsk-yism," Canadian Independence and the 
"war" question, and the threat of other forms of right deviation within the party, dominated 
the CP' s agenda during much of this period. 28 
Following the CI's policy shift fall work in shop nuclei, namely organizing at the 
point of production, in Toronto and throughout the District declined and by early 1929 it was 
entirely abandoned. 29 It was only much later in January 1930 that. the WUL, a new 
revolutionary centre for industrial unions, was formed. Even then its success was centred 
primarily in the mining sector and among clothing and textile workers. It was not until 1931 
that much headway was made in organizing the unemployed in Southern Ontario. 30 These 
were the conditions that Superintendent Jennings inherited from Newson. They indirectly 
influenced intelligence operations. 
Toronto's municipal police force (TCPD) was transformed in the late 1920s; this 
development also impacted the reorientation of the RHQ CIB's intelligence operations. The 
TCPD's war against subversion escalated following Brigadier-General Denis Draper's 
appointment as Toronto municpal police chief on 1 May 1928.31 Draper was a staunch anti-
communist who believed that communists were undermining the nation's political and 
27Ewen, The Forge Glows Red, 139. 
28CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Newson to Commissioner, 25 and 28 
February 1928; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector Fletcher to Commissioner, 13 and 14 February 
1928. 
29 Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada, 71. 
31~wen, The Forge Glows Red. 137 
31Betcherman, The Little Band; Smith, All Mv Life. 100. 
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economic system. 32 Shortly after assuming his new duties, Draper and the other Board of 
Police Commissioners passed an edict banning meetings held in foreign languages as part 
of a broad policy to stamp out bolshevism in the city. 33 Prosecutions increased, hall owners 
were intimidated, and Draper created his notorious Red Squad to enforce the edict. The 
campaign heated up in the fall and was simply the beginning of a major clampdown against 
the reds. 34 
With Draper's edicts in place the Toronto CP's public activities centred on the issue 
of"Free Speech."35 The issue gained broad support in the community. It was about more 
than simply deciding who would be heard in meeting halls, on street corners, and in other 
public places. Far more important it was about the essence of what it meant to be 
Canadian. 36 The Free Speech struggle encouraged "0" Division personnel to strengthen their 
intelligence operations without developing a penetration agent. Darling, who was frustrated 
and exhausted by the fallout from the Leopold affair, had taken leave during much of August 
but had returned fully reinvigorated in September. 37 A few months later he and other CIB 
32Lita-Rose Betchennan, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf: Fascist Movements in Canada in the 
Thirties (Toronto 1975), 58; Petryshyn, "Class Conflict and Civil Liberties," 43; D. G. Draper, "Good 
Citizenship," Empire Club of Canada: Addresses Delivered to the Members During the Year 1928 (Toronto, 
1929), 174. 
33Betchennan, The Little Band, 12-28.; Ewen, The Forge Glows Red. 171-182. 
3~CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 15 
May 1928; Betchennan, The Little Band, 1-28; Michie! Horn, "Keeping Canada 'Canadian': Anti-
Communism and Canadianism in Toronto 1928-29," Canada: An Historical Magazine. 3,1(1975), 34-47; 
Ewen, The Forge Glows Red, 171-182. 
35NAC RG 146 175/P1741, MacDonald file, "Head Of Communists Is Taken By Police To 
Interview Chief," The Globe, 21 December 1928. 
36Horn, "Keeping Canada 'Canadian,"' 34-47; Betchennan, The Little Band; Smith, All My Life, 
99-113. 
37
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, August I 928. 
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personnel turned to Draper and to Red Squad ot1icers Nursey, Simpson and Mann for 
intelligence on communist activities and over the next two years a close liaison developed 
between the two organizations. 3x 
By the fall Constable J.F. Sheridan, who assisted Darling in the CIB office, had 
several months' experience in records and had survived, largely through baptism by fire, the 
most difficult period in the Division's intelligence history. Fish remained in Windsor and 
although his skills were lost to Toronto, Jennings had the assurance that regional 
investigations, where the need was also great, were being supervised by someone with 
considerable experience. 39 In Toronto, in these months many outside investigations were 
supervised by Inspector C. D. LaNauze, the Division's second in command. While LaNauze's 
strength undoubtedly lay elsewhere, the fact that he concerned himself with CIB 
investigations following Leopold's exposure suggested Jennings' desire to have his senior 
personnel more directly involved in this work. 40 
Increasingly field investigations in Toronto were conducted by detectives Corporal 
R.E. Nelson and Constables H.P. Mathewson and AM Veitch, all of whom had many years 
of experience in this capacity.41 As the CIB relied more and more upon Veitch and 
38We will never know the full extent of this development since much information was transmitted 
orally and not committed to paper. Furthermore, the TCPD's minute books have been destroyed as have 
most reports. Still, the improvement was noticeable and the Force had gone a long way since Newson had 
informed Draper's predecessor that they had a secret service at work in the Division. 
39
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, 1928 . 
.w.'O" Division, Nominal Rolls, August 1928. La Nauze was transferred to the Division in l'vlarch 
1928. He briefly served as its Acting DOC during the transfer of power from Duffus to Jennings. He 
returned to the Division in the mid-1930s and eventually served as its DOC. 
41All of them joined in 1920. RC~tP G.O. 117, notes their transfer form Depot to "N" Division, 1 
March 1920; Hugh Patrick Mathewson, b. 1902 (place unkno'Nn), he joined the Force in August 1919 and 
retired to pension in 1954. Much of his career was spent at "0" Division. He eventually became its officer in 
charge of the CIB. Later on he was transferred to Saskatchewan where he was stationed at Swift Current 
and Saskatoon. He also served as OC Whitehorse Sub-Division and OC Calgary Sub-Division. He retired at 
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Mathewson, in particular, they carved their own niches in local investigations: "'As time 
went on, we formed a criminal investigation branch. I did the general investigations and 
Hugh Mathewson did the narcotics end of it.. .. gradually, we developed more until we had 
a real investigative organization going here .... "42 They also participated in the Division's 
secret intelligence work and Darling also had at least three fonner secret agents working in 
the Division sometimes serving as floaters throughout the District. Frank Zaneth was there 
and could be consulted. 43 Goudie was a second expert available and a third was Robert L. 
Trolove. 44 
In December 1928 Starnes began to piece together the circumstances surrounding 
Spector's expulsion. The Toronto infonnation he obtained on this matter was derived largely 
from Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and reports from several public meetings. 45 His 
most important source, however, was a closed CP mass-membership meeting at Alhambra 
Hall at the end ofNovember at which Stewart Smith, who had recently returned from Russia 
where he had studied since 1926 at the Lenin School, had spoken of the events that had led 
to the CP severing ties with the so-called working-class "traitor". Security was extremely 
tight at the event. Only members in good standing were admitted. Even some from outside 
the rank of Superintendent and died in 1956. RC:MP Quarterly 21,4(Aprill956), 360, "obituary ofH.P. 
Mathewson." 
Raymond Eric Nelson, little is known about this individual. His obituary simply notes he achieved 
the rank of corporal. He died in Toronto on 22 December 1982. RCJ\1P Quarterly. 48,3 (Summer 1983), 80, 
"obituary ofRE. Nelson" 
42Dubro and Rowland, Undercover, 104. 
43RCJ\1P G.O. 5792, notes Sergeant F.W. Zaneth transferred from Depot to "0" Division as of 1 
March 1926. 
44Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 374 B, 446-447. 
45Simply put Open Source Intelligence is material that can be obtained through non-clandestine 
means. It usually refers to widely dispersed public records such as newspapers, books etc., On intelligence 
types see, Hibbert, "Intelligence and Police,"; and Herman, "Intelligence and Policy". 
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the city who were paid up like Joe Gilbert and Trevor Maguire were refused admittance until 
they had proven their identity. 46 How the CIB managed to infiltrate the event is not known, 
although, the manager of the Alhambra Hall was cooperative with authorities and was 
resolutely anti-communist. Since October, the only events that RHQ intelligence personnel 
provided any coverage on (other than OSINT) were those held at Alhambra Hall. 
Tim Buck chaired the meeting and at its opening he announced that Smith would "go 
into full details of the Trotsky question and prove how according to the ruling of the C.I. it 
would be impossible to tolerate avowed advocates of Trotskyism within the ranks of the 
C.P." Annie Buller, Mike Buhay, Beckie Buhay, Buck, Carr and Shapiro all spoke in 
"justification" of Spector's expulsion seeking a unanimous resolution be passed endorsing 
this action. MacDonald was not present. 47 The event tested the executive's patience when 
a great deal of time was subsequently taken up by James Blugerman who came to Spector's 
defense, and who accused the CEC of railroading the membership at large. He was so 
critical of the CP leadership that the undisclosed source's report informed intelligence 
personnel that "[i]t is evident that he will be now regarded as a reactionary and steps taken 
to force him out of the party." The vote was not taken until4.15 a.m., the undisclosed source 
reported, and it was not unanimous, Blugerman and four others remained seated:~& 
The Spector expulsion was an event of historic proportions in the history of the CPC. 
This CP meeting to explain the so-called "true" circumstances surrounding the event to the 
membership was almost as important to intelligence personnel for the insight it provided. 
Perhaps most surprising from an intelligence perspective was Superintendent Jennings' 
~AC CP/DND file, "cross-reference sheet," 14 December 1928. 
47CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 30 
November and 5 December 1928. 
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delayed response. He was rather nonchalant in his handling of the report and it took him a 
week before it was forwarded to NHQ. Starnes was much more intrigued by these 
developments than his OC. His analysis of the situation was astute and he was especially 
interested in any comments Smith made. 49 
By December 1928 the RHQ CIB's intelligence apparatus had begun to rebound. By 
Boxing Day Jennings felt confident enough about Division intelligence work to issue a 
circular memorandum to all District NCO's to be on the "lookout" for two Ukrainian men 
whose whereabouts and movements he wanted established. 50 His faith in the network was 
rewarded. Days later, information from informants and Division personnel turned up 
valuable information on the subjects which resulted in the generation ofPHF s. 51 Slowly then 
the RHQ CIB's intelligence operations began to function much as they had earlier with one 
significant exception. In this new period RC:MP work against the core CP branches in 
Toronto was done without developing a penetration agent. The remarkable coverage of the 
CP mass membership's secretive meeting at the end of November to discuss Spector's 
expulsion was an exception to what generally transpired in the emerging age of OS INT. 
4.2 
The Heyday ofOSINT, 1929 
5~AC RG 146 Access-Request 96-A-00109, "Information concerning the CPC, USA and GB, as 
well as Communist Activities within DND," (hereinafter cited as NAC CP/DND file), "circular," 
Superintendent Jennings to All NCOs, 26 December 1928. 
51CPC TO 1920s, report, Corporal RE.R Webster to Superintendent Jennings, 29 December 
1928; ibid., report, Staff Sergeant F.A Blake to Superintendent Jennings, 12 January 1929; ibid., report, 
Sergeant G.W. Fish to Superintendent Jennings, 23 January 1929; ibid., report, Sergeant G. W. Fish to 
Superintendent Jennings, 27 January 1929; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to Superintendent 
Jennings, 14 January 1929. 
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By early 1929 the RHQ ClB's political investigations had become a balancing act. 
From an operational standpoint Jennings, Darling, LaNauze, and other RHQ personnel 
juggled their use of detectives and the occasional operative or infonnant during the next 
couple of years with their primary reliance on OS INT. The more confrontational policies 
announced at the Sixth Congress of the CI, which had explicitly emphasized the importance 
of"mass demonstrations" as a weapon of class warfare, increased the likelihood that events 
earned coverage by the non working-class press facilitating the CIB's reliance on OSINT. 52 
In particular, the press coverage atTorded the "Free Speech" fight helped convince some 
intelligence personnel that it might be possible to keep abreast of the CP' s general activities 
by essentially monitoring press clippings. 
"0" Division RHQ was at a comparative advantage over other Divisions who might 
attempt a shift to OSINT because Toronto had four mainstream daily papers. Each had a 
substantial circulation ofbetween 100,000 to 200,000. 53 Mounties such as Bill Kelly, who 
was eventually involved in intelligence in the Division later on in the decade, explained that 
Division personnel established a rapport with newspaper men. It was an extremely 
competitive market with reporters vying for scoops. The consequence was that many 
progressive events were reported in the local press. 54 
Clippings deposited on the CIB's core Toronto CP file rose dramatically as a result 
of the shift in the RHQ's intelligence operations. Whereas in 1928 just 7 clippings (and 25 
reports) were deposited on the core Toronto CP file, in 1929, a remarkable 122 clippings 
were obtained (almost three times as many clippings as other items in that year), which is 
52B. V. "Mass Demonstrations," The Communist International 6,1 (December 1928). 6-8. 
53Horn, "Keeping Canada 'Canadian', 36. The Star had the largest circulation followed by the 
Evening Telegram. the Mail and Empire, and the Globe. 
5~Kelly with Kelly, Policing in Wartime. 15-16. 
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by far the best evidence that in the absence of a Catt, Goudie or Leopold a new strategy was 
being pursued. Similarly in 1930 more than three times as many clippings were deposited 
as other materials. OSINT deposits in these years also increased in additions to dossiers 
made by "0" Division personnel. Furthermore, without an agent on the inside, in general, 
the reports produced during these years were of a poor caliber. 55 
Much could be accomplished through an operational strategy which relied on OSINT 
and passive investigations. 56 Through clippings CIB personnel kept abreast of the Board of 
Police Commissioners' edicts which upheld their ban on speaking in "foreign" languages 
at meetings as well as the Left's mobilization in opposition to the edicts. 57 Similarly the 
activities of umbrella and affiliate organizations such as the YCL and the CP's Opposition 
Group were reported in this manner. For instance, copies of the Young Comrade and J.P. 
Cannon's The Militant, were obtained and digested as were all progressive organs and later 
on unemployed bulletins, shop circulars, and many other materials. 58 For brief periods, 
55Examples of the material forwarded include: "Run Candidate for Free Speech," Mail and Empire, 
30 January 1929; editorial "Reds At Home and Abroad," and "Freedom of Speech is not Threatened, 
Commissioners Say," Toronto Globe, 25 January 1929; "The Communist Method," "Bridling the 
Communists,"and "No Reds Rampant in University; 'Varsity's Story Exaggerated," Toronto Globe. 31 
January 1929. 
56CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 24 and 29 
January 1929; ibid., "Meeting of Communists Is Dissolved in Tears," Mail & Empire, 23 January 1929; ibid., 
"'reds' Accuse Police of Using Tear Bomb But Draper Denies It," The Toronto Daily Star, 23 January 1929; 
Smith, All My Life, 103-1 04; Betcherman, The Little Band, 23-25. 
57ibid., "Ban Foreign Languages When Sedition Involved," Mail & Empire. 24 January 1929; ibid., 
"Non-Communist Bodies Protest Police Edict," Mail & Empire, 29 January 1929; ibid., "Reds Urge Crusade 
for Free Speech," Mail & Emoire, 28 January 1929; ibid., "War To The Finish For 'Free Speech'," Mail & 
Empire, 28 January 1929; "Freedom Of Speech Is Not Threatened Commissioners Say," Toronto Globe, 25 
January 1929; ibid., "Run Candidate for Free Speech," The Toronto Daily Star, 30 January 1929. 
58ibid., issue 2, 21 January 1929 of Young Comrade; ibid., report, source deleted and 
Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 14 and 15 February 1929; ibid., report, source deleted and 
Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 22 and 23 February 1929; "C.L.D.L. To Publish Paper," The 
Worker. 19 April 1930, 3. 
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almost every other day articles, mostly concerning the "Free Speech" fight, were deposited 
on the CP's core Toronto file which exemplified the intense monitoring of Toronto CP 
activities. 59 
Both public and private institutions played an enormous role in this process too. The 
CP's leading organs were printed in Toronto. Copies were readily available by paying 
printing establishments office visits. Copies were also easily obtained from the Post Office. 
So were subscription lists since the CP had to provide them to the Post Office if they hoped 
to receive bulk rates for domestic mail outs which were set by weight and further divided 
into two classes: rates for "regular subscribers," and rates for copies sent to non-subscribers 
which were fixed at a much higher premium.60 The Department of Labour also established 
its own "Labour Intelligence Branch" and created the position of Chief of Labour 
Intelligence, a position given to Frank Plant. Plant provided the Force with copies of their 
annual publications such as Labour Organi=ations in Canada. 61 He also diligently renewed 
subscriptions to many organs such as The Worker, Canadian Labour Monthly, and The Party 
Organizer, taking every precaution to ensure that subscriptions were not canceled, nor issues 
missed, and he was available to lend a hand to Force personnel.62 His work was undertaken 
59ibid., "Dance and Concert Banned By Police," Mail and Empire. 8 February 1929: "Demand The 
Right Of 'Free Speech," Mail and Empire, 15 February 1929; ibid., "Communists Speak to Hearts Content," 
The Globe, 18 February 1929; ibid., "Six Arrests Are 1\lfade At Open-Air Meetings Of Red Sympathizers," 
The Globe, 23 February 1929; ibid., "In Opposing Moscow Must We Copy Moscow?" Toronto Star, 26 
January 1929; ibid., "Senator Lewis On Education For Newcomers," Toronto Star. 26 January 1929. 
60 AGO CP, 7B 1972, letter, Arthur Webster, Secretary, Post Office Department to Ami! S. Buller 
[sic], Business 1\lfanager, Canadian Labour Monthly, Toronto, 27 January 1928; AGO CP, 7B 1913, "List of 
subs for Post Office," 15 July 1930; AGO CP, 7B 1913, "List of subs for Post Office," 15 July 1930; CPC 
TO 1930s, memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to DOC "0" Division, 25 February 1931. 
61Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 499. 
62 AGO CP, 7B 1926, letter, Frank Plant, Chief of Labour Intelligence Branch, Department of 
Labour, to The Manager, The Party Organizer. 21 April 1931; ibid., reply, Business Manager to Department 
of Labour, 22 April 1931. 
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separately from the Department of Labour's own library which also requested copies of the 
same party organs. So if one agency failed to obtain an issue there were always other 
branches in a position to provide CIB personnel with copies. 63 
Starnes was keenly aware ofthese changes to the Division's intelligence operations 
and what they meant with Leopold gone. When Division CIB personnel fell short of his 
expectations in conducting these operations he was quick to let them know that they had 
failed and encouraged them to improve the work being conducted. 64 A case in point came 
as a consequence of a Stewart Smith interview with a Toronto Star reporter in late 1928. The 
article is well known in the annals of Canadian labour history and therefore serves as a 
particularly instructive example. [n the published article Smith apparently had stated that 
before long "blood would be running in the streets" of Toronto. The interview was 
mentioned in Jennings' December monthly report on revolutionary agitators but no clipping 
was forwarded to NHQ. Starnes was disappointed. He ordered Jennings to improve OSINT 
work being conducted and to secure copies. Jennings sent an officer to the Toronto Star 
offices and had their personnel search their records, a copy was located and subsequently 
forwarded to Starnes. The Commissioner made several requests for additional copies and 
they were also secured. It was clear that something was planned. A week later Smith was 
63 AGO CP, 7B 1886, letter, F. I. Planet, Department ofLabour, Circulation Manager to "The 
Worker", 18 November 1927; ibid., 78 1889, Circulation Manager, Department of Labour to "The 
Worker", 31 July 1928; ibid., 7B 1887, letter, Accountant, Department ofLabour, to The Circulation 
Department, Toronto Worker, 22 December 1927; ibid., 7B 1895, Accountant, Department ofLabour, to 
The Workers' Publishing Association, 18 February 1929; ibid., 7B 1894, letter, Accountant, Department of 
Labour, to The Canadian Labour Monthlv, Toronto, 7 January 1929; ibid!, 7B 1896, Chief of Labour 
[ntelligence Branch, Department of Labour, to The Workers' Publishing Association, 25 March 1929; ibid., 
78 2011, Ethel Merifield, Librarian, Department of Labour to The Publishers, The Worker, 17 January 
1928. 
64 ATIP Request, 96-A-00149, NAC RG 146 CSIS Holdings, Stewart Osborne Smith, vol. 849, vol. 
1 (Hereinafter cited as NAC RG 146 175P/ Stewart Smith file), memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to 
Superintendent Jennings, 23 January 1929. 
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arrested by the TCPD and his interview became the basis of the charges laid. It was clear 
that much could be accomplished by OS INT. 65 An interesting twist was that several years 
later it was further revealed that "[T]his article was duly published and was so red hot, that 
the balance of the edition in which it appeared, did not contain it."66 That was why Jennings 
had probably not forwarded it to NHQ. In retrospect his CIB had been burned by its 
publication. 
The arrests and deportations oflocal political activists provided the CIB with a steady 
supply of available OSINT as demand for the CLDL's services increased. 67 In January 1929 
alone 74 political cases came before the police and county courts in Toronto, according to 
A.E. Smith, and 21 workers were imprisoned for 350 days for organizing street-comer 
meetings. 68 \Vhile Smith's numbers may be inflated his larger point that pressures had 
increased and the numbers of arrests and deportations surely were rising was accurate. 
Petryshyn noted that Toronto became a "hot spot" for CLDL "activity" and from January 
1929 until February 1930, he reported the League handled 88 court cases in Toronto. 
Barbara Roberts' work too, also points to increased numbers of the "mutinous" being 
6~AC RG 146 175P/2494, Stewart Smith file, Transcription of Toronto Star article, "Says that 
Toronto Streets Will Soon be Running Blood," 27 December 1928; ibid., cross reference sheet, 24 January 
1929; ibid., report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 26 January 1929; ibid., memorandum, 
Commissioner Starnes to "0" Division CO, 29 January 1929; ibid., report, Superintendent Jennings to 
Commissioner Starnes, 7 February 1929; ibid., report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 8 
February 1929; ibid., report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 14 February 1929; ibid., 
report, Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner Starnes, 23 February 1929. 
66NAC RG 146, 175/P2494, Stewart Smith file, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 23 and 24 October 1933. 
67J. Petryshyn, "Class Conflict and Civil Liberties: The Origins and Activities of the Canadian 
Labour Defense League, 1925-1940", Labour/ Le Travail. 1 0 ( 1982). 
68Smith, All Mv Life, 104-105. 
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"'shoveled out" in this period.c'9 Publicity through the medium of the non working-class press 
fed the intelligence machine. 70 This intelligence was often shared between Divisions and in 
February 1930, Starnes had even compiled and forwarded Montreal OC a substantial list 
called "members of the Communist Party of Canada arrested by Toronto City Police."7 t 
Deciphering OSINT became a skill that had a pseudo-scientific quality: one that some 
CIB personnel improved upon. They developed an eye for information that provided them 
with a better understanding of their respective targeted organization. Intelligence that CIB 
personnel often scoured papers for included membership figures or any information which 
would enable CIB personnel to hazzard a guess about a movement's strength and whether 
it was growing. This focus differed little from earlier periods since this kind of intelligence 
was also one of the earliest repeated requests handlers tried to obtain through their secret 
agents and operatives such as Catt, Goudie, and Leopold. 72 RHQ CIB personnel often 
pursued information dissecting the composition of crowds at events through press-clipping 
analysis. It was not uncommon for the press to comment that "most were foreigners," or 
69Petryshyn, "Class Conflict and Civil Liberties," 39-44; a fair number of cases are detailed in 
Betcherman, The Little Band; Roberts, Whence Thev Came. chap. 8; cited in Fudge and Tucker, Labour 
Before The Law. 155; The number of public charges alone deported increased from 444 in 1929 to over 
2,000 in 1930 and 17,229 between 1930 and 1934. 
7
°CPC TO 1920s, "Six Arrests Are Made At Open-Air meetings Of Red Sympathizers," The Globe. 
23 February 1929; ibid., report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 23 February 1929; ibid., report, 
Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 7 March 1929; ibid., report, Constable Foley-Bennett and Inspector 
LaNauze to Commissioner, 15 and 16 March 1929. 
71NAC RG 146, access request 96-A-00149, vol. 849., vol.1., Stewart Smith PHF, memorandum, 
Commissioner Starnes to Montreal CO, 11 February 1930. 
nsee Betcherman, The Little Band, 23-25; "Police Order Defied; Speaker is Arrested," The Globe, 
25 January 1929, 2; CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector Lru.'\fauze to Commissioner, 3 
August 1929; ibid., "Police Order Defied; Speaker is Arrested," The Globe. 25 January 1929, 2; ibid., 
report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner Starnes, 3 August 1929; "Communists Have 
Parade and Meeting," Manitoba Free Press, 3 August 1929. 
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Ukrainians, or even their socio-economic status such as "unemployed'' or"transient. '' 73 Both 
Force personnel and party stalwarts believed that one measure of the strenb,Tth of the 
movement was its ability to drawn in more Anglo-Sax:ons. Tom Ewen, noted that Slavic, 
Finnish and Jewish immigrant workers had a "higher development of socialist 
consciousness'' than British workers. 7" As well, the most marginalized and least likely to 
reap any economic and social benetits in Canada were Eastern Europeans and Asians 
according to the work of Donald A very among others. 75 
Through OSINT networks were expanded and penetrated deeper into the community. 
OSINT provided checks and balances for other intelligence. 76 A careful reading and analysis 
of clippings enabled intelligence personnel to identify potential contacts and allies in its 
fight against communism as well as enemies. 77 For instance, the relations the TCPD 
established with theatre managers and hall owners were sometimes monitored through this 
activity: 
73CPC TO 1920s, for instance see, "Dance and Concert Banned by Police," Toronto Mai I & 
Empire. 11 February 1929 and "Communists Speak to Heart's Content," The Globe. 18 February 1929, for 
identification of 'Jews'; Finns are also identified, as are other groups throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
74Ewen, The Forge Glows Red, 127. 
73 Avery, Dangerous Foreigners; Avery, Reluctant Host. 
76CPC TO 1920s, "Toronto's Efficient Police," Toronto Globe, 3 August 1929; ibid., "Re Speaker 
Led to Jail on Chain," l\tlail & Empire. 12 August 1929; ibid., "Batons and Feet Used Freely As City Police 
Rout Reds," Mail and Empire, 14 August 1929. 
77ibid., There are many examples, see, Rev. Frank Vipond, "Reds In Toronto," Toronto Globe, 2 
February 1929; CPC TO 1920s, Oscar Swinson, "The Right of Free Speech," Mail & Empire, 2 February 
1929; Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Earlv Years, 435. Bland had already earned a PHF (#2481) much 
earlier in the 1920s shortly after his arrival to Toronto; For a discussion of this incident see, Michie! Horn, 
"Free Speech within the Law": The Letter of the Sixty-Eight Toronto Professors, 1931 ,"Ontario History, 
72 ( 1980), 27-48; CPC TO 1920s, report, Constable Foley-Bennett and Inspector Lru'l"auze to 
Commissioner Starnes, 8 and 11 March 1929; ibid., The Observer, "The Law and the Courts Sufficient 
Protection," Toronto Star, 30 April 1929; ibid., "Free Speech", Civilization Monthlv, February 1929; 
ibid.,The Observer "In Opposing Moscow Must We Copy Moscow?" Toronto Star, 26 January 1929. 
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'When the Communists came here this afternoon I offered them their money back,' 
said [Alhambra Hall] manager Exler, 'They refused to take it, stating that they had 
made arrangements, and insisted I give them the hall. I saw the Chief Constable this 
afternoon and explained the circumstances. He was quite satisfied with my 
explanations. ' 78 
A cooperative manager was information worth recording and not surprisingly intelligence 
personnel highlighted this passage in the margin. Similar practices were eventually 
employed with rooming house and welfare department officials in the Depression. 79 
Sympathetic public administrators in the educational system, church officials and leaders 
of "respectable" youth organizations such as the YMCA were all identified in this way. 80 
Intelligence personnel followed up school trustees' efforts to learn the sources of communist 
literature entering the grade school. They secured copies of flyers and party organs which, 
for instance, announced an upcoming YCL event, an "Invitation International Concert," to 
be held at Alhambra Hall and deposited them on the Toronto core CP tile. 81 Here was the 
perfect tie in. As we have noted, the Alhambra Hall manager was cooperative. With a ticket 
in hand intelligence personnel could now expand their network further. Without an agent on 
the inside they could go to the concert in advance if they so desired. They could set up their 
scribes to take notes. They could even place a plainclothes officer in the crowd out front or 
close the facility to communist organizations which is what they did at the Alhambra Hall 
when"the caretaker" it was reported, "received instructions from the landlord to allow no 
78CPC TO 1920s, "Police Order Defied; Speaker is Arrested," The Globe, 25 January 1929, 2. 
79See, McDonald Commission, Second Report, vol.l; Similar techniques also mentioned in 
Sawatsky, Men In The Shadows. 
R°CPC TO 1920s, "Communist Propaganda Flooding City schools Alarms Education Board," The 
Globe. 7 December 1928; See the articles in, Kinsman, Buse, Steedman,[ eds.] Whose National Security. 
81 CPC TO 1920s, Young Comrade, 2, 21 (January 1929); flyer, "Under The Banner of The Young 
Communist League: Fight the War Danger!!" nd; "Invitation International Concert," 3 February 1929 (put 
on by YCL). 
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meetings in the rooms. ,g: Once alliances were established, it was not enough to sit back and 
be passive so Force personnel took an aggressive stance against the Communist menace. 
University of Toronto professor Frank Underhill was hounded during the 1930s. 83 Jeanne 
Corbin, likely lost her job teaching when she was placed under surveillance; "investigators 
claimed" she "was trying to recruit other students to the YCL," and ''teaching revolutionary 
propaganda" to ULFTA children. 84 
The explosion in the CIB's use ofOSINT which took place in Toronto in the late 
1920s, and particularly after 1928, was not without its limitations. Although it broadened 
the scope of the network's investigations, CIB reliance on newspaper clippings also shifted 
the location of their source of dependency. Simply put, when events were not covered, 
intelligence personnel were left in the 1 urch. 85 Quite often this was deliberate. Many cultural 
activities such as plays performed by progressive groups like the Toronto Workers' Theatre 
were downplayed non working-class newspapers. 86 Furthermore, there was always the issue 
of accuracy of newspaper coverage although with the kind of rapport RHQ CIB personnel 
like Kelly had established with some staff at the non working-class presses, it sometimes 
could be resolved by a simple phone call. Still many other problems were encountered in 
112CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 29 March and 2 
April 1929. 
83 ibid., report, source deleted and Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 24 and 29 January 1929; "No 
Reds Rampant in University; 'Varsity's' Story Exaggerated,"Toronto Globe. 31 January 1929, This \NaS 
used to also take a jab at Woodsworth; See, Paul Axelrod, "Spying on the Young in Depression and War: 
Students, Youth Groups and the RCMP," Labour/ Le Travail, 35 (1995),43-66 R Douglas Francis, Frank 
H. Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur (Toronto, 1986), 97. 
8~Sangster, Dreams ofEguality, 68. 
8
'The prison release dates of the CP's second-tier and tertiary activists was a prime example of 
where this system broke down since they were almost never reported in the press. The CIB often lost sight 
of individuals at this point. 
86Ryan, Stage Left. 44-45. 
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this work. As in other operations language barriers were sometimes insurmountable. There 
were hardly any translators available in the Force. CIB personnel also had trouble 
establishing the identities of individuals who wrote under assumed aliases such as Salem 
Bland, who wrote as "The Observer" during the "Free Speech" debates. It took a few weeks 
and several office visits before Force personnel had learned the "Observer's" true identity. 87 
OSINT often required follow up investigations which were labour intensive, time 
consuming, and narrowed the window of opportunity to respond. Finally, OSINT rarely 
provided the kind of advanced notice that intelligence personnel wanted, especially in times 
of crisis. 88 
Without a key penetration agent inside the CP "0" Division was occasionally unable 
to provide Starnes with the intelligence he requested. The most frequently recurring problem 
was "losing sight" of individuals and difficulties in tracking their activities. In February 1929 
an RCNfP operative in a Western Division reported that William Moriarty and Beckie Buhay 
were planning to travel to the Soviet Union. Starnes wanted Jennings to either confinn or 
reject this intelligence and also to provide their present addresses, activities, and 
occupations. Jennings was only partially successful.89 It took the Division months to 
establish Moriarity's whereabouts, they never did learn his "current occupation" and they 
were unable to reach any definitive conclusion with respect to his plans. 90 The same problem 
87CPC TO 1920s, The Observer, "In Opposing Moscow Must We Copy Moscow?" The Toronto 
Dailv Star, 26 January 1929. 
88ibid., report, Constable Foley-Bennett and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 8 and 11 ~larch 
1931. 
8~AC RG 146, 175P/3621, William Moriarty file, report, Superintendent Jennings to 
Commissioner, 16 February 1929. 
90ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 27 July 1929; ibid., report, 
source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, I October 1929. 
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occurred with Spector that year. 91 Reliance on OSINT made it impossible to keep close and 
careful watch on Toronto revolutionaries in a manner to which intelligence personnel had 
bTfOwn accustomed. A case by case analysis of dossiers suggests that Toronto suffered in 
comparison with other Divisions in terms of its intelligence acquisition as a result of its 
primary reliance on OSINT.n 
Whenever RHQ CIB personnel wanted exceptionally good, accurate, and timely 
intelligence on specific events, most often they needed an inside source. They had relied on 
Leopold to secure key documents and to provide full and detailed reports of every CPC 
national Convention from 1922 up until he was uncovered. 93 By early 1929, with Leopold 
gone, OSINT's limitations quickly became self-evident. With a National Convention 
scheduled for March an agent, operative, or informant was needed. This presented a problem 
since it was clear that Toronto RHQ would be unable to provide Starnes with an agent in 
time even if one could be developed. Fortunately for the Force at the last minute the CI 
intervened and postponed the Convention until May.94 Suddenly, even if there was time to 
develop an agent or operative to a level that would provide them with an opportunity to 
attend, would one agent be enough? After all, whenever possible, for important events such 
as National Conventions, senior intelligence personnel tried to arrange dual agent coverage. 
The examples are legion and can be traced back at least to the Calgary Western Labour 
91 NAC RG 146 175P/ 1712, Nlaurice Spector file, report, source deleted and Inspector Lru'iauze to 
Commissioner, 15 October 1929; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 8 
November 1929; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 3 December 1929; 
ibid., circular, The Militant. 
92NAC RG 146 175P/2035 Tim Buck file; NAC RG 146 175P/1741, Jack MacDonald file; NAC 
RG 146 175P/1712, Maurice Spector file. 
93Rex v. Bucket al., Testimony of John Leopold. 
94CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 2 April 1929; 
ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 11 April 1929. 
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Conference in 1919 which both Zaneth and Gosden attended. The Farmers' Unity League 
(FUL) founding Convention had dual agent coverage in 1925 according to Tom Ewen. 9~ 
Goudie and Leopold attended the same National Conventions in the mid-1920s and Leopold 
and another Montreal agent attended others. Dual agent coverage provided insurance and 
obviously additional intelligence even if it was sometimes contradictory. 
In March 1929 the RHQ CIB temporarily secured the services of an operative who 
attended springtime TDLC meetings arranged in defense of "Free Speech''.96 A broad 
amalgam of individuals of various political stripes was present at these events making them 
an ideal opportunity to gain access to the revolutionary movement.97 With an operative 
temporarily at work in the city and "0" Division RHQ CIB personnel forwarding clippings 
every couple of days, NHQ's appetite for intelligence was being satistied. Hence with the 
possible exception of concern over the forthcoming Convention, Starnes did not feel that 
there was a significant problem in Toronto CIB operations. He was able to take steps to 
contain the CP' s work through increased liaison with a number of government departments 
such as passport offices and Immigration. If he was allowing some opposition literature into 
the country to fuel dissension on the left, he worked with customs officials to prevent copies 
of other pamphlets such as "Red Action" that A.E. Smith and the CLDL had arranged for 
95Ewen, The Forge Glows Red, 119-123. 
96CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 25 and 26 
March 1929; ibid., "Howling Reds Ejected When Police Reserves Are Called by Labor," Toronto Globe, 25 
March 1929; ibid., "Near Riot in Labor Temple As Communists Try To Speak," Mail & Empire. 25 March 
1929. 
97ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 25 and 26 March 1929; 
ibid., "Howling Reds Ejected When Police Reserves Are Called by Labor," Toronto Globe, 25 March 1929; 
ibid., "Near Riot in Labor Temple As Communists Try To Speak," Mail & Empire, 25 March 1929; ibid., 
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delivery in Canada from entering the country. 93 
In April and May Superintendent Jennings and Darling instructed their intelligence 
personnel to attend several public meetings and demonstrations the CP arranged and to keep 
abreast of other arrests during these weeks. All evidence suggested that the local police 
forces were successful in keeping a tight lid on revolutionary activities. 99 When Jennings 
took sick, Inspector LaNauze supervised intelligence work and found it easy to follow the 
cases of arrested party stalwarts as they worked themselves through the courts. LaNauze also 
sent junior personnel out to conduct piecemeal investigations to add to dossiers. All these 
successes suggested Starnes had little grounds for criticizing RHQ CIB operations. 100 
For weeks Starnes' interest grew in anticipation of the CP's forthcoming National 
Convention. He informed Jennings that recent developments taking place in the CP [tive 
lines deleted by CSIS] also meant that "[T]here is reason to expect greater difference of 
opinion in the convention than have been customary, and some possibility, though slight, of 
a split. " 101 "0" Division intelligence personnel were to gather as much information as they 
could before the event. Their operative managed to compose a couple of reports which dealt 
with thorny issues likely to be discussed at the Convention such as the shop and area group 
98NAC RG 146, 175P/ 2017, Moriarty File, report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 5 
February 1929; NAC RG 146, 175P/ 392, AE. Smith File, memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to 
Commissioner of Customs, 20 February 1929; ibid., reply, 23 February 1929. 
99CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 29 March and 2 
April 1929. 
100 ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 29 March and 2 April 
1929; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 15 April 1929. 
101 ibid., report, Commissioner Starnes to CO "0" Division, 19 March 1929. 
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system and expulsions. 102 In April, he confirmed earlier intelligence Starnes had obtained: 
he reported that "a terrific internal fight is going on within the ranks of the C.P. of C., which 
is disrupting the party especially in Toronto. Practically all the English speaking members 
have left the Party, in Toronto they could all be counted on one hand ... " and he identified 
the factions presently at work in the city. 103 But following May Day demonstrations, for 
reasons that are not known, the operative was withdrawn. 104 He did not attend the CP's 
Convention at the end of the month. Nor were any other RHQ CIB personnel able to provide 
NHQ much intelligence on the event. 105 
Starnes must have obtained better intelligence elsewhere since he never requested 
that Toronto CIB personnel pursue additional information. In previous years "0" Division 
intelligence personnel in conjunction with personnel from other Divisions had secured as 
much as 159 pages on a single National Convention, some of which found its way into the 
core Toronto CP file, some of which was hived off and deposited in a separate file that was 
created. In this case it is clear that almost nothing was obtained by RHQ CIB personnel since 
almost nothing was being deposited on core Toronto files. 
A "C" Division Montreal RHQ source likely provided Starnes with the intelligence 
he wanted since this was where some of the best information on the CP's national activities 
102ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 2 April 1929. This 
concerned the way in which the CP branches were organized. 
103ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 11 April 1929. 
104ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 2 May 1929. 
105NAC RG 146, 175P/ 1639, Custance File, report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to 
Commissioner, 11 June 1929; ibid., report, Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 16 June 1929; NAC RG 
146, 175P/ 1712, report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings, 12 June 1929; They simply reported 
that some splits had taken place, that Custance was defeated for a position on the national executive because 
of her "right~wing tendencies" and that the issue of Trotskyism was not discussed as it was no longer an 
issue in Canada and the trouble has "blown over." 
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was being generated at this juncture. Prior to the Convention a Montreal operative had 
spoken with Buck who predicted that there would be no major split at the Convention, an 
assessment which surely dampened Starnes' enthusiasm about the Convention's potential, 
but it is rather unlikely that he would have reduced coverage as a result. Buck was of the 
opinion that pretty much the same executive would be elected even though he was 
moderately sympathetic to the idea of some change. Buck also informed the operative that 
he was "behind Smith" but also "thinks he is too young to be made secretary ... " and as a 
result, "is in favour of MacDonald remaining secretary and he will vote for him." 106 Ian 
Angus' interpretation of the pre-convention period and the convention itself gives Buck far 
more credit then he deserved. While there were three factions within Toronto Buck was 
nowhere near being entirely in the Smith camp in these weeks. 107 There was no solid Buck-
Smith alliance before the convention, nor immediately afterwards, even if he was willing 
to co-author and publish a draft resolution with Smith urging the CPC to break with the 
CLP. 108 
Montreal sources reported that during the spring Buck had become increasingly 
disillusioned with the CPC. In March he was so fed up with the CPC he had 'Written Moscow 
offering to make "communist propaganda in China or any other country." Moscow informed 
106NAC RG 146, 175P/2035, Buck File, report, source deleted and Superintendent Phillips to 
Commissioner, 15 and 16 May 1929. 
lll7 Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks, 230-232; The factions were: 1) those like Moriarty who rejected 
the Cfs new line outright and its criticism of the CPC in its leadership, organization and activities; 2) those 
such as MacDonald who accepted CI criticisms but were not willing to abandon Moriarty, nor were they 
willing to give up their independent stance as to some of the exceptional circumstances in the North 
American economy; and 3), a group led by Smith who completely endorsed the CI's view-point and its 
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him, however, that he was "needed" in Canada but that they would keep this offer in mind. t()<) 
By May Buck had become so "disgusted" with the CP's ineffectiveness that he was 
considering quitting his job in the CP and going back to his trade, but he planned to wait 
until the Convention "before he decides on anything." 11° For these reasons, Buck was willing 
to support MacDonald for the time being and if an opportunity to go somewhere else, in fact, 
anywhere else in the world arose, then he was certainly going to take it. Although 
Stalinization of the CPC had begun with Buck's, Popowich's and Smith's attendance at the 
CI's Seventh Plenum, where they witnessed the great debate over the issue of"socialism in 
one country" between Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Kamenev and Ryko, it was by 
no means a fait accompli even by the time of the 1929 National Convention. 111 
Viewing Buck's role and position in this context suggests a more complex transition 
to the class-versus-class position in Canada and the subsequent full-blown Stalinization of 
the CPC. Andrew Thorpe and other scholars, who have suggested that in the British 
experience, past failures influenced the transition, the rate of change and form the new line 
took, have found something overlooked by earlier writers. These claims apply with equal 
validity to the Canadian experience. MacDonald was outmaneuvered largely because his 
leadership and the direction he pushed the party had been found lacking. This made it easier 
for the others such as Buck to benefit. The Buck-Smith alliance, however, was only forged 
once Buck's future was decided. Even then, it was only temporary and half-hearted. Buck 
did his best to keep his eye on Smith whom he viewed as a potential threat to his own 
109NAC RG 146, 175P/ 2035, Buck File, cross-reference sheet, 4/'vfarch 1929. 
110ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Phillips to Commissioner, 15 and 16 l'vfay 1929. 
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201 
position. ll1 As Manley's work convincingly argues the "cult of personality'' surrounding 
Buck only began to be manufactured several years later with the publication of party 
pamphlets and eventually a book on Buck and his position was only further strengthened 
after his release from Kingston Penitentiary. tu 
During June, immediately after the Convention, monitoring of communist activities 
in the city slowed. When CIB personnel resumed their operation in late July and August they 
relied primarily again on OSINT as the staple of any information they acquired. Clashes with 
the city police over the issue of"Free Speech" increased. So did the coverage these events 
earned in Toronto's non working-class press. The CIB deposited 32 newspaper articles on 
its core Toronto CP tile during five weeks of increased activity beginning 22 July. 
Detectives and other intelligence personnel mainly concentrated on attending open-air 
meetings right up until December. In reading newspaper accounts of street-comer 
demonstrations LaNauze simply highlighted the fact that the CP's tactics were being 
expanded as its work was being broadened so that several clashes were taking place 
simultaneously at meetings in different parts of the city. ll4 
Without an agent inside the CP in Toronto in any meaningful capacity during the 
second half of 1929 intelligence was only trickling into RHQ. At the CEC's first post 
Convention meeting in mid-July both Buck and MacDonald applied for leave from the party 
on account of their health. Yet it took weeks before LaNauze became aware of this 
development. Furthermore, although it was suspected that MacDonald's request for leave 
on account of his health, was an "excuse" it could neither be confirmed nor denied by 
112Andrew Thorpe, The British Communist Party and Moscow. 1920-43 (Manchester, 2000), 117-
191. 
113l\.1anley, "Audacity" 
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strate!:,ry. 120 RHQ CIB personnel learned of them in advance through OSINT. LaNauze 
forwarded the Commissioner a list of places where demonstrations were planned and made 
arrangements to keep the protests well in hand. Detachments were notified, and NCOs and 
senior detachment personnel were instructed to attend meetings and submit reports. 
Hamilton's detachment was responsible for that centre and Guelph. Muncey was to cover 
London, Oshweken's personnel were to report on activities in Brantford, the Niagara Falls 
detachment was to cover St. Catharines, Windsor detachment was to monitor meetings at 
Lanspeary Park and Drouillard St. East, Toronto RHQ would take care of reporting on 
activities in that cente and send ClB staffer M.J. Walsh to Kitchener, while Oshawa would 
be handled by that city's municipal police chief. Eventually, anti-war demonstrations in 
these centres were monitored through a mixture of reports by plainclothes personnel and 
newspaper clippings forwarded to NHQ. If these events were preparing the communists for 
future struggles, they were serving in a similar capacity for Division personnel. 121 
In Toronto, 7,000 had turned out to the main anti-war demonstration (also held in 
defiance of "Free Speech") at "Queen's Park" on 1 August. LaNauze assured the 
Commissioner that the majority attended these demonstrations more out of"curiosity" than 
"interest in the Comintem". Furthermore, he added, 
there is a possibility that the Communists never intended to speak but knowing that 
the general public would probably be eager to see any clash which might occur, were 
content to simply put in an appearance to give color to their intention to speak, in 
opposition of the police instructions. 122 
Intelligence personnel at NHQ disagreed with LaNauze's assessment. It was clear 
12
°CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 2 and 6 
August 1929; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze, 3 August 1929. 
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that he did not understand communist motives and someone at NHQ, likely the 
Commissioner or DCI, scrawled in the margin of his report "[T]ell OC of 3rd International 
Instructions. "l23 Starnes subsequently forvvarded LaNauze a memorandum marked 
"SECRET" explaining that the CI had given the CP explicit instructions to hold 
demonstrations and therefore that he "doubted" his analysis of the event was correct. 
"[C]ommunists are especially ordered to assert their right and parade and hold meetings in 
the street" wrote Starnes. Furthermore, he added, "[T]he Third International laid stress for 
the holding of one-day strikes; no attempt was made in Canada to comply with this part of 
the instruction. "l24 But at the same time with paper headlines in the non working-class press 
such as "Police Determined to keep Red Element Under Submission," "Tales of Brutality 
By Toronto Police Branded as False," "Organized Labor Repudiates Reds,'' "Would Give 
Free Speech To All But Communists," Starnes' concern was minimized as the municipal 
police through coercion had control of the situation. l25 
William J. Brittain, a Toronto Star reporter, infiltrated the Toronto CP during this 
period for two weeks using an assumed alias and later reported his goal was to "become a 
communist ... to be able to show from the inside what power Communism is wielding in 
Canada. "t26 In September he published a series of articles in the Toronto Star, detailing his 
undercover experience. Jennings forwarded copies to NHQ and promised further 
123ibid. 
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investigation. 127 Brittain's action encouraged CIB personnd brietly to step up their work 
easing any reservations they may have had about developing another operative. So in late 
September they secured a contact who was in touch with party members. He reported on 
several public events and demonstrations and supplemented other intelligence being 
acquired by more passive investigations. 128 Yet he was unable to get very far into the CP. He 
was excluded from attending a trade union banquet in October at a local restaurant because 
he was without credentials. 129 Although CIB personnel often deferred to a balanced 
operational approach to monitoring events ultimately they relied heavily upon OSINT and 
in October alone, 37 clippings from Toronto's non working-class presses were deposited on 
the CIB's core Toronto CP file. 130 
Local clashes between the CP, its umbrella organizations, and the TCPD continued 
into the fall. Toronto arrests at demonstrations CIB personnel reported through its balanced 
operational approach included those of stalwarts such as Becky Buhay, Minnie Shelly, Lily 
Hirnmelfarb, Charlie Sims, Fred Rose, R.E. Knowles, Jean Corbin, Doris Liebovich, William 
Kashtan, R.E. Knowles, Edith Chaikoff and Diana Bisgould. 131 In each example above the 
127ibid., report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 5 September 1929; also forwarded were, 
ibid., William J. Brittain, ":Masquerading As Communist Star Reporter Lands A Job," Toronto Star. 5 
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names and addresses of those arrested were reported in the press. [n one instance so were 
the names of the arresting officers which allowed for even easier follow up and additions 
to dossiers. 132 
In the fall the "Free Speech" debate slowly left the streets as summertime CP arrests 
came before the courts. Nevertheless, OSINT still remained the primary source of 
information and RHQ CIB intelligence personnel simply adapted as circumstances required. 
Meyer Klig' sand Stewart Smith's arrests on August 13 came before the courts on September 
5 when charges against them of being members of an unlawful assembly were dismissed. 133 
Next was Emily Weir who was arrested with five others while distributing CP literature and 
again the case was thrown out. Similar decisions were reached in cases against Rebecca 
Buhay and Harvey Murphy and others. 134 What changed, however, was that as the weeks 
progressed the monitoring intensified in the cases that went before the courts. As time wore 
on they netted more lengthy individual reports which were filled out on each subject. 
Although the "Free Speech" fight remained the primary focus ofboth the CP's and 
RHQ intelligence personnel's core Toronto operations, both groups pursued other activities. 
LaNauze instructed CIB personnel to remain alert for any pamphlets and other literature 
being distributed near Massey-Harris company's premises since intelligence obtained 
Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 20 September 1929. 
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reported that both the CP and YCL were attempting to organize workers in its plants. IJj 
Sometimes both city police and CIB personnel were present at shop gate organizing 
meetings, but since party stalwarts did not appear to be making much headway, the city 
police refrained from stepping in. u6 No wonder company officials there were pushing 
forward the implementation of corporate welfare strategies and industrial councils. u7 Fall 
organizing meetings in Hamilton and London and communist involvement in a Hamilton 
steel worker's strike were reported in core Toronto files through a mix of passive 
investigations and OSINT. 138 
Whenever possible LaNauze had detailed someone from the RHQ CIB to attend 
demonstrations being held. At one fall event Maurice Spector was spotted. It was reported 
that although present and " a very interested spectator but [he] made no effort to assist the 
demonstration in any way." This passage was double highlighted in the margin by 
intelligence personnel. 139 Why? Well probably for several reasons. There was always an 
overriding belief among some intelligence personnel that Spector's expulsion was a ploy, 
a trap to try and get a sense of what others in the party thought about the leadership. There 
was a belief that he was essentially a spy for Moscow and that once he uncovered the 
opposition that he would be returned to his position of authority. More sensible was simply 
the fact that since his expulsion from the CP intelligence personnel had largely lost sight of 
mcpc TO 1920s, report, Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 2 August 1929; ibid., report, 
source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 25 November 1929. 
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Spector and his activities. They knew he had gone to New York to work with J.P. Cannon 
and the US opposition group the previous fall. They were also aware that he had been 
expelled from the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) at a Plenum 
meeting in Moscow at the end of July 1929. In mid-October intelligence personnel learned 
that Spector had returned to Canada. They had no idea what his plans were and this was his 
first public sighting in the better part of a year. So his appearance certainly was something 
of a surprise. 140 
The "Free Speech" campaign receded temporarily at the end of October as Toronto 
stalwarts concentrated on other regional activities and Provincial elections. Often life was 
"quiet around Toronto headquarters" as a result of the former effort and energy was 
channeled into elections for several weeks. 141 The provincial election also interested 
intelligence personnel who sent reports and clippings to NHQ. In October, two CP 
candidates, Buck and Sims, were both arrested and "literally pulled off of their soap boxes" 
when they attempted to hold an outdoor meeting. 142 Monitoring this issue as it played itself 
out in the public arena was continued through a balanced operational approach with a 
primary reliance on OS INT. When Buck and Sims issued a 'NI'it against Judges Coatesworth 
and Morrison, as well as Mayor McBride for damages for "alleged interference with [their] 
right as a candidate in the election ... " and for a declaration that they have "a right to rent and 
hire public halls in the City of Toronto for the purpose of holding public meetings ... " the 
14~AC RG 146, 175P/ 1712 Spector File, report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to 
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same mixed strategy with a predominant reliance on OSINT served as the em's primary 
modus operandi. 143 
Fall judicial outcomes encouraged police officials to respond with their own 
legalistic maneuvering by asking for a ruling on the CP's legal status, something that was 
not settled for another year and half. 144 The fact that the ·'Free Speech'" issue became less 
newsworthy to the non working-class press further reduced its visibility in the fall and 
eventually hampered continued monitoring of CP activities through OS INT. 
The costs were equally damaging to Draper and the TCPD. Morale among TCPD 
rank and file sunk so much that by mid-October reports leaked to the press noted that 
dissension was widespread. Overtime work, cancellation ofleave, and a "general abrogation 
ofleisure hours" were the condition many rank and file police personnel faced. Some TCPD 
personnel complained that Draper and other senior personnel "are making us look like a lot 
of fools, sending anywhere from 300 to 600 men to Queen's park to keep about 10 
Communists from speaking and giving us orders to keep the grounds clear." 145 
Still, Draper and the Red Squad soldiered on. He wanted to follow through with an 
even more heavy-handed approach to stamp out the CP and looked to OPP Police Chief 
Commissioner Williams for support. But Williams reportedly, "washed his hands" of the 
matter. Williams stated firmly that fighting communism in Toronto "is entirely up to 
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144ibid., "Two Meetings Held By Local Communists," Toronto Dailv Star, 22 November 1 929; 
ibid., "Police Take Record of Radical Spoeeches," Toronto Daily Star, 23 November 1929; ibid., "Police 
Officials Ask For Ruling On Legal Status," Toronto Daily Star, 26 November 1929; ibid., "Evidence 
Lacking Against Woman Garrow Finds," Toronto Daily Star, N.D., 1929; ibid., "Communist Meeting 
Broken Up By Police," Toronto Daily Star, 26 November 1929. 
1 ~5"Police Weary of Mobilizing For Red Gatherings in Park," The Globe, 12 October 1929. 
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municipal officers, and we have nothing to do with it. " 146 Many of Draper's junior personnel 
were probably just as happy that the battle had temporarily died and shifted to the courts. 
Commissioner Starnes had drawn the conclusion (somewhat prematurely) that the 
"Free Speech'' debate seemed temporary settled. OSINT had dried up and Commissioner 
Starnes felt it appropriate to take stock of the ''Free Speech'' debate's impact on the CP. At 
the end of the month he wTote "0" Division's OC: 
Now that the 'free speech' agitation in Toronto seems to have subsided, I 
should like an appreciation of it, with special attention to its effect upon the standing 
of the Communist Party. The assertion is made that the r~ressive measures have 
brought recruits to the Communist Party. Is that correct? 14 ' 
Starnes was not the only one asking these questions. At a CP street-comer meeting 
TCPD plainclothesmen and regulars attended someone shouted out to Charlie Sims was the 
CP gaining in membership? Not surprisingly, his response was "they certainly are," they had 
"gained considerably during the last six months ... " Although he also admitted, '·they are 
badly in need of financial help. " 148 
C.D. LaNauze felt otherwise. He was developing his skills in intelligence matters 
and had improved tremendously since the summer. "After due consideration ... " he informed 
the Commissioner, " .. .I have to reply in the negative to the assertion that recent repressive 
measures have brought recruits to the Communist Party." It would be fair to say the CP had 
earned broad support from "many who sympathized with their efforts to conduct meetings 
in Queens Park unmolested by the Police Authorities." That the communists had attempted 




"Williams Washes Hands Of Aiding Draper's Men Supress Communists," Toronto Dailv Star. 12 
October 1929. 
1 ~7CPC TO 1920s, memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to DOC "0" Division, 22 October 1929. 
uKibid, report, source deleted, and £nspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 2 December 1929. 
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their actions were not well received. The ''wider labour community,"" he insisted, made it 
clear that they were in support "only insofar as the right of'Free Speech' was involved.'' He 
added: "The general public attended the meetings simply out of curiosity and perhaps a 
desire to 'see a little fun. '" 14') 
Starnes agreed with his Acting CO's assessment for two reasons. First, he had no 
better intelligence upon which to challenge "0" Division's analysis of events. In fact, this 
position was supported by OSfNT and was a view shared by TCPD personnel. 150 Second, 
LaNauze had begun to root his analvsis more accuratelv in economic and material conditions 
~ "' "' 
of workers' daily existence. LaNauze, for instance, had written of the changing economic 
conditions within the region in the period, 
[h ]ad this all happened in 1919 or 1910 when there was a bTfeat deal of 
unemployment, it is possible the ranks of the Communist Party would have 
benefitted as a result of the measures adopted in Toronto to prevent their holding 
open air meetings. But conditions have improved considerably since then thereby 
restricting the scope of the agitators who have to appeal now to a working class 
enjoying a period of prosperity and as a consequence not so susceptible to 
revolutionary arguments as the Communists might perhaps wish. 151 
By the fall of 1929 LaNauze' s best estimate was that the CP probably had some 1,500 
members in Ontario. Of these, he concluded, most were from "foreign-born element of the 
lower class." LaNauze also felt that "It is they who, led away by the 'bold militant spirit' that 
the party organizers flaunt, form the rank and file of the party. But even amongst them 
common sense sooner or later prevails and they drop out of the movement." "The feeling 
of the general public towards them" he concluded, is "Let them talk, it pleases them and 
1
"'
9 ibid., report, Inspector Lu'\fauze to Commissioner Starnes, 6 November 1929. 
1 ~orn, "Keeping Canada 'Canadian'", 45. 
151CPC TO 1920s, report, Inspector Lru'\fauze to Commissioner Starnes, 6 November 1929. 
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doesn't bother us."' 152 
By December 1929 communists in the Finnish Organization were in open revolt and 
three months later those in ULFTA overwhelmingly rejected the politbureau's CPC 
directives. 153 These groups accounted for roughly 85-90 per cent of the CP's total strength 
and when the Jewish membership was added, the total of these groups climbed as high as 
95 percent. 154 One of the ECCI's major criticisms of the CPC was that it was largely an 
"immigrant one," that it remained disassociated from a large segment of the labour 
movement and that its failures were not just leadership and tactical ones, but also 
organizational and particularly at the CCC and District level where the CP was unable to 
centralize itself and do away with local language fractions. This problem stemmed largely 
from the uniqueness of the CPC in terms of western capitalist countries and in a small way 
was also attributable to the failures of A.E. Smith in the mid 1920s fully to affect the 
transfonnation in District #3 and elsewhere. Incidentally, as noted earlier in this study, 
Goudie had fought against the reorganization. 
As the CP' s membership numbers dropped in Canada, as the party lost many stalwarts 
over issues that were an extension of the left/right splits, internationally communism seemed 
to be in retreat. The US party was divided and embroiled in an even more vitriolic battle 
than the Canadian one. The destruction ofLovestone did not immediately signal Foster's rise 
to power, for almost a year he was ambivalent at best over the CI' s new tactics as one 
historian has argued, or as another more recently has suggested he may have resisted the new 
153 Avakumovic, The Communist Partv in Canada. 62; Kolask-y, The Shattered Illusion, 18-19. 
15~John Porter, "The Struggle against the Right Danger in the C.P. of Canada: The Dominion 
Problem," The Communist International, 6, 23(1929), 947; Kolasky, The Shattered lllusion, 6, 16-18. 
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line from Moscow and dual unionism altogether. 155 Each shift in direction in the US party 
disrupted the work of districts, by October a Com intern Agent "G. Williams·· arrived in the 
US to straighten out the mess, and by the end of 1929 there were just 7,000 communists left 
in the US party. 156 Months earlier, in the 1929 British general election, the only sitting 
communist Saklatvala lost his seat. The next communist to be elected there was Gallacher, 
but not until1935. 157 The CPGB's membership dropped in 1929 to 3,200, its lowest since 
1923, and then in November the following year it fell further to 2,525. 158 With communism 
in retreat and wrecked by internal dissension and massive abandonment of the CPC, the 
situation at the end of 1929looked promising for "0" Division RHQ intelligence personnel, 
even if the "Free Speech'' debate had dried up. All in all then, in 1929 through a primary 
reliance on OSINT and other passive investigations for the most part RHQ CIB personnel 
had weathered the first trial in reorientation of existing operations. 
4.3 
Crisis, Counter-Strike and Courts, 1930-1931 
During much of 1930 and 1931 "0" Division RHQ personnel gathered minimal intelligence 
on core Toronto communist activities. What little work was conducted in 1930 primarily 
was undertaken during the first six months of the year. Thereafter, with a couple of OSINT 
155James R Barrett, William Z. Foster and the Tragedv of American Radicalism (Urbana and 
Chicago, 1999), 148-162; Edward P. Johanningsmeier, Forging American Communims: The Life OfWilliam 
Z. Foster (Princeton, 1994), 242-248. 
156Barrett, William Z. Foster. 148-162; Johanningsmeier, Forging American Communism, 247-248. 
157Pelling, The British Communist Party, 87-88. 
158Thorpe, The British Communist Party and Moscow. 156; Pelling, The British Communist Partv. 
19~. 
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exceptions, nothing further was deposited on the core Toronto CP tile until 193 l. So what 
specific intelligence was acquired and what was accomplished during this period? Why did 
intelligence deposits dry up and why initially was pressure not being applied on Jennings to 
improve the situation? How did ''0" Division fit into the larger intelligence landscape in 
Toronto during 1931? 
The Depression had dire consequences for the Force even if it grew and was a direct 
beneficiary of acute unemployment and other problems that plagued the working class. 
Although the Force's strength increased (it nearly doubled in 1932 alone from 1,351 to 2,384 
all ranks) it was impossible to keep up with the growing expectations of the federal 
government. In 193 l a Globe editorial noted that "[T]he tendency in recent years has been 
to increase the responsibilities of the R.C.M.P ... " 159 
"0" Division entered 1930 with a staff of 43, of which 23 personnel were stationed 
at Toronto. 160 Its personnel gains were minimal when compared to the tremendous 
population increase throughout the region as a whole. Toronto's population had increased 
by 105,689 over the past decade, Hamilton's population had grown by 40,763, New 
Toronto's population soared by 131 per cent, Mimico's had risen by 81 per cent and 
Weston's by nearly 50 per cent. Bridgeburg, St. Catharines, and Niagara Falls had all seen 
increases too. Communist activities in these centres had become increasingly "problematic" 
for authorities, while the Force's strength had risen marginally. 161 
Many new duties occupied the attention of Force personnel and diverted them away 
159
"The R.C.M.P. Chief," The Globe, 15 July 1931; RCMP, Annual Report, 1932, 5; Rivett-Camac, 
Pursuit in the Wilderness, 293; The massive 1932 increase was the result of the assumption of provincial 
police contract duties in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba and Alberta. 
160
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, January 1930. 
161
"'Toronto Population Up More Than Fifth," Toronto Star, 14 August 1931, 4; In fuct, 21 cities 
and 83 towns had increased during the past decade in Canada, many of them in Southern Ontario. 
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from intelligence investigations. Increased papef\:vork requirements, more detachments to 
inspect, more distances to travel, more matters of stores and supplies, chauffeuring, clerking, 
in "0" Division's case a half dozen other city personnel attached on a semi-permanent loan 
to other government departments and usually one or two others on course leave at the 
Regina Depot, or absent on leave, either off sick or assisting another Division, all meant that 
only a handful of the RHQ's total staff were available for ern investigations. 162 Outside the 
city the same situation was occurring. Investigating smuggling operations, alcohol licensing, 
counterfeiting rings, enforcing the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act and the Indian Act had 
become a major focus ofDivision resources. 163 Labour unrest and communist activities went 
unmentioned in Jennings' annual report that year. 164 
The reassignment of duties and Division transfers also affected the work being 
conducted in 1930. In March, J.F. Sheridan was relieved of ern clerking obligations. For 
months CIB filing responsibilities were shared by several personnel and it was not until 
September 1930 that a new CIB clerk, Constable R.A.K. Jones, was appointed. He had little 
CIB experience and had only transferred into the Division months earlier. 165 In 1930, 
Mathewson, Veitch, and Nelson, who had previously conducted many CIB political 
investigations, seldom concerned themselves with communist activities. Mid-way through 
1930 Nelson was relieved of detective responsibilities and sent to provide guard service at 
162
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, January 1930; On similar work conditions elsewhere in this period 
see, Harvison, The Horsemen, esp., 58-64. 
163RCMP, Annual Report, 1930, 42-44; Dubro and Rowland, Undercover, l 0 l-128. 
1~RCMP, Annual Report, 1930, 42-44 
165RCMP G.O., 8204, notes Constable Jones transferred from Headquarters to "0" Division as of I 
January I 93o; "0" Division, Nominal Rolls, April andSeptember 1930 and March 1931; He remained on 
probation into the following year, but ultimately failed to be confirmed in rank and by March I 93 I was 
working as an Income Ta-x Guard for the Division in Toronto. 
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the Assistant Receiver General's office while Veitch was off investigating fraud cases. 1<"' As 
well, in June 1930 Inspector LaNauze was transferred out and although LaNauze's 
replacement Inspector Albert Edward Reames, (a future ·'O" Division DOC) had vast 
intelligence experience, immediately following his arrival Reames was sent to Moose 
Factory for months. 167 Furthermore, when he eventually returned to Toronto and began 
sharing supervisory intelligence duties with Jennings both officers took sick for significant 
periods. As a result there was little continuity in the supervisory work being conducted and 
eventually Fish had to be recalled from Windsor. 168 
By any account 1930 was an extremely bleak year for the CP in Toronto and 
elsewhere in the District. This compensated for the Division's own shortcomings. By 1930 
the CP had lost manv kev organizers for various reasons: William MoriartY, Mike Buhav, 
ol .; - "" .; 
Florence Custance, Maurice Spector and Jack MacDonald as well as a whole host of others 
during the mass exodus. By the time of its 193 1 Plenum, Sam Carr informed Comrade 
Vasiliov of the Organizing Department of CI that the CPC was in extremely bad shape. 
Ongoing struggles with right Finnish and Ukrainian stalwarts and '"MacDonaldism 
remnants" left the CP with only 1,300 paying dues (even if the centre officially reported over 
4,000) and although the mass exodus had forced the reorganization of the CEC and led to 
the establishment of a '"functioning" Central Organization Department, for many months 
166Dubro and Rowland, Undercover, 101-128. 
1670n his transfer see, RG 18, file 0-203, Service Record of A.E.G.O. Reames, (hereafter cited as 
RClV1P Personnel File- Albert Reames), memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Duffus to DOC Southern 
Alberta, 12 May 1930. 
168RCMP, Annual Report, 1930, 42-43. 
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little was accomplished. 1(''1 
The CP's leading organs were teetering on the brink of bankruptcy in 1930 ;vhich 
threatened to disrupt available sources ofOSlNT Out west The Furrow (which was brought 
tirmly under party control after the Fifth National Convention) was in difficult straights, 
while in Toronto the business manager of The Worker 'WTote that "money was tight'' and that 
any claim of "Moscow Gold" "seems very abstract around Party Headquarters." 170 
Successive sustaining drives for both it and the YCL's organ, The Young: Worker, were 
reported failures as in many instances "no money was coming in. " 171 George Wanden's and 
Harvey Murphy's summertime organizing tour and subscription drive in Southwestern 
Ontario was at best a mixed success. 172 
Work elsewhere was dismal. The Women's Labor Leagues (WLLs) had stopped 
functioning after the deathofCustancethe previous fall. 173 Toronto YCL and Young Pioneer 
work was at a standstill owing to ·'slackness and lack of attention ... " 17-1 Industrial organizing 
169 AGO CP, 4A 2728- 4A 2731, letter, National Org. Sect., CPC to Comrade Vasiliov, Org. Dept., 
CL Moscow, n.d.; Avakomovic, The Communist Partv in Cana~ 66; Sam Carr. "For Real Determined 
Struggle on the Two Fronts!" The Worker, 10 January 1931, 3. 
170AGO CP, 1A 0196- 1A 0198, letter, J.M. Clarke to T.A Ewan, 3 August 1929; ibid., !A 0253, 
letter, Business Manager to C.H. Kohls, Pembroke Ont., 12 March 1930; On The Furrow see, Ewen, The 
Forge Glows Red. 112-116; Rodney, Soldiers of the International. 131. 
171 AGO CP, 1A 0297, letter, Bill Kashtan, District #3 YCL organizer to Group #3 Toronto, 2 April 
1930. 
mBetcherman, The Little Band, 106-108; Manley, "Communism and the Canadian Working 
Class."; AGO CP, 1A 0312, CPC District 3, "Instructions on "Worker" Tour of Comrade Wanden, to All, 
L.E.C. 'sand Party Units," 31 May 1930; ibid., 1 A 0315, Business Manager to Comrade Wanden, 18 June 
1930; ibid., 1A0316, Wanden to Toronto Comrades, 19 June 1930. 
173AGO CP, 1A 0695, Circular, Canadian Federation of Women's Labor Leagues, Alice Buck, 
Secretary, 27 January 1930 
mibid., lA 0299, Bill Kashtan, District Organizer to Lily Adler, Director of the Children's 
Department. Toronto, 16 Aprill930. 
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took a downturn, in part, since no District speakers were available for tidd work. OSrNT 
repeatedly revealed the full extent to which radical union work in the RlLU barely got off 
the ground. The CP was alienated and had "disappeared" entirely from the international 
trade union movement since the adoption of the more confrontational tactics of the 'third 
period'. 175 
For several weeks in January 1930 the RHQ ern had an operative or an infonnant in 
close with party stalwarts. He provided a couple of reports on local CP activities which was 
the best intelligence "0" Division RHQ ern personnel acquired that year and then he 
vanished from the core tile. Who he was, where and how he entered the CP is not known. 17h 
He reported that during the past twelve months the Toronto CP had not grown, with the 
exception of the Jewish membership. He added, that the English membership had decreased 
and there was "no talk of any increase in membership amongst either the Finns, Ukrainians 
or Bulgarians."m The CP's industrial work was largely ineffective during the past year, he 
claimed, as only a few gains had been made in the auto industry and in textiles in Southern 
Ontario. Other intelligence he provided was less valuable though, since it only confirmed 
information easily available through open sources. His insight into factional infighting and 
the circumstances leading up to the expulsion ofMaurice Spector and several others fell into 
175CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 8 January 1930; 
ibid., "Reds Plan to Join In Demonstrations Throughout the World,'' Globe and Mail. 24 February 1930; 
AGO CP 4A 2787, J. Plott, AgitProp dept., CI, CPUSA rep., to S. Smith, Agitprop Dept., CPC, 22 January 
1930; ibid., 4A 2720, letter, source unidentified to CPC, 9 February 1930; ibid., 4A 2792, J. Plott, Agitprop 
Dept CPUSA, NY to S. Smith, Toronto CPC, 7 March 1930; ibid., 4A 2839, letter. Propaganda Department 
CPUSA to Buck, 27 February 1931. 
176Since he provided a general overview of CP activities and his duration was brief it is doubtful that 
we will ever be able to learn these answers. 
177CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector Lru'\fauze to Commissioner, 8 January 1920. 
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this category. 178 
Stewart Smith had hoped that the Toronto CP might reinvigorate itself by running 
a new CP course program, a school to gain recruits and to develop speakers and organizers. 
With that in mind between January and March 1930 both he and Buck made enquiries with 
the CPUSA as to courses that were being taught in the US as well as any future plans 
CPUSA leaders had in this respect. 17 'J Other signs of life included a WLL organizing 
conference held to elect a secretary and pro-tem executive in January to improve its work. 180 
Following May Day demonstrations Toronto YCL units were instructed to generate reports 
to account for their poor performance and to improve the work being conducted by this 
department. 181 But in the WLL's case it was not until the end of year that anything 
substantial was accomplished when Annie Buller, the fearless rebel, began organizing 
Leagues in the region along with the help of others such as Minnie Shur. 182 For the YCL too, 
there were no easy solutions and work did not improve for months. Nor was anything further 
on industrial and trade union activities deposited in the core Toronto file. 183 
179CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Inspector Lru'l"auze to the Commissioner, 2 January 
1930. 
180AGO CP, 1A 0695, Circular, Canadian Federation ofWomen's Labor Leagues, Alice Buck, 
Secretary, 27 January 1930. 
181 ibid., 1A 0303, Bill Kashtan, District Organizer, to Group #2 Toronto, 2 May 1930. 
1820n her life see, Louise Watson, She never was afraid: The biography of Annie Buller (Toronto, 
1976); AGO CP, 1A 0349, letter, District Organizer, Women's Department to Comrades Z. Hrinkiew, 
Ckrainian Fraction Section, District #3, 23 October 1930; ibid., 1A 0350, letter, Acting Women's Director 
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The Cffi missed many opportunities. District and city conferences were held in 
Toronto in January and February. tll4 Intelligence personnel were in no position to gain access 
to them. They went unreported as a result. In March, CIB personnel identified a typist who 
worked for Tim Buck at the CP's National office but they failed to develop this individual 
as a potential source. 185 Eventually CIB personnel became aware of the courses being offered 
by Smith but development of an agent in this manner was not pursued. 186 Tom Ewen had 
arrived in Toronto the previous year to assume responsibility as national Industrial Director 
when Buck became Secretary. 187 The WUL was established in January and its activities and 
Ewen's appointment as its head escaped comment in the core Toronto CP file. Weeks later 
Ewen's arrest with Harvey Murphy was reported, but only because ofOSINT. Nor did the 
core Toronto CP file make any mention of the WUL's first Southern Ontario Conference in 
May as there had been for other similar au.xiliary conferences in previous years. 188 
Without reliable sources inside the CP mis-analysis of existing conditions was 
commonplace during this year. The limited intelligence the RHQ CIB had acquired on the 
auto industry and deposited in core files suggested that although communists were making 
'"some headway" they had failed to disrupt the industry. This analysis proved wrong as 
184ibid., 4A 2716, letter, Buck to Comrade Inkpin, 2 January 1930. 
185CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Inspector Lru.~auze to Commissioner, 7 January 1930. 
186ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to the Commissioner, 2 January 1930. 
187 Ewen, The Forge Glows Red, 137. 
188CPC TO 1920s, "Communist Strife Breaks Out Again," Mail and Empire, 22 February 1930; 
ibid., "Communist Agitator Arrested in Toronto," I.Vfanitoba Free Press, 14 March 1930; Ewen, The Forge 
Glows Red, 160-161. 
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weeks later a significant strike in one of the plants with CP involvement occurred. 18~ 
Furthermore, work conducted was sloppy. Demonstrations went unreported and sometimes 
reports were generated weeks and months after events had taken place. When intelligence 
was secured, quite often the CIB relied on TCPD personnel. 190 In a good period of heavy 
acquisition this was a positive sibrn that networks were being expanded utilizing all available 
resources. rn poor periods such as 1930 contact RHQ CIB personnel had with their 
municipal counterparts simply highlighted that fact that Division operations were 
floundering. The CIB was so far removed from local communist activities that it barely 
managed to report that the CP's Toronto Offices were being relocated two days before the 
move took place. Furthermore, intelligence personnel offered no explanation of the 
circumstances surrounding the decision. 191 
Perhaps the CP became more sophisticated in 1930 in the work it conducted which 
made it more difficult to keep tabs on them? The CP learned from successive campaigns the 
Force and other police agencies operated against them. Following the uncovering of a labour 
spy in the early 1920s party stalwarts adopted aliases (for instance, Buck became "Page" and 
Bell "Gregg"). 192 The CP also took to the offensive and mounted their O'Ml "awareness" 
campaigns in its press warning workers to be on the lookout for individuals once spies were 
189CPC TO 1920s, report, source deleted and Inspector LaNauze to Commissioner, 8 January 1929; 
Manley, "Communists and Auto Workers," 123. 
19
°CPC TO 1930s, report, Constable Sheridan, 3 April 1930. 
191 ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 29 January 1930. 
1nRodney, Soldiers of the International, in Rodney's index at the back of his study many of the 
names members of the underground assumed are noted next to their names; Rex v. Bucket., al., 205-206. 
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uncovered. 193 They developed secret drop offs, and a system of cipher codes for 
corresponding. 194 
That the CP introduced these kinds of precautionary measures was not the least bit 
surprising since they operated in the most difficult circumstances. Especially, in 1930, as 
Tim Buck informed the crs comrade Inkpin, the CPC was "working here under conditions 
of sharp 'police terror. "' 19; In Toronto, building WUL unions, according to Tom Ewen, "was 
accompanied by the most extreme police interference, intimidation and terror experienced 
anywhere in Canada." 196 By the beginning of 1930 the CP had made arrangements so that 
any stalwarts arrested for deportation would be provided for by the Soviet Union and granted 
passports there. 197 In 1930 party organizers in the industrial field became more experienced 
and according to John Manley, they developed "social" and "personal" methods of work: 
shop-gate meetings were abandoned in favour of holding meetings at homes which made it 
impossible in an age ofOSINT for police to keep tabs on events. 198 While this evidence hints 
at a more experienced party, it is impossible to say with any certainty just how much better 
the CP became in preventative measures. 
The core Toronto CP file dries up almost entirely during the second half of the year. 
193CPC TO 1920s, translation from ULN, 28 May 1928, CEC message, "Uncovered a Police 
Agent"; ibid., report, source deleted, Superintendent Allard, OC "D" Division to Commissioner Starnes, 21 
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195 AGO CP, 4A 2716, letter, Buck to Comrade Inkpin, 2 January 1930. 
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So do many other tiles. ln Tim Buck's, A.E. Smith's and Stewart Smith's PHFs regional 
intelligence coverage on them stopped in the summer of 1930 shortly after several personnel 
changes previously mentioned took place and city coverage did not recommence until early 
1931. 199 [t seems clear that an intelligence crisis was taking place not only in core Toronto 
tiles, but in those files of leading revolutionaries and likely in all Toronto work being 
conducted. 
The slowdown in RHQ CrB surveillance of Toronto communists, in part, was a 
product of the "Free Speech'' debates' closure and the failure to place another agent inside 
the CP. Nevertheless, other factors were responsible too. The CP and its subsidiaries' ability 
to function was reduced for other reasons. Toronto and District #3 lagged behind the West 
Coast in organizing the unemployed and there was little to report in this area until 1931. A 
money shortage, worse than usual among the CCC, groups and branches because of 
increased police intimidation and high unemployment also contributed to the decline. 200 
Furthermore, the CP's analysis of existing conditions was misguided. It grossly exaggerated 
the "war danger" which was touted as one of two possible cures for capitalists to overcome 
the current economic crises. The other solution was "capturing" the huge markets of the 
Soviet Union. Both were unlikely scenarios. 201 
The Conservative victory of Prime Minister R.B. Bennett in the June 1930 election 
marked a turning point in the state's response to communism. Conservatives throughout the 
world were hostile to communism and generally were also the staunchest supporters of 
1~AC RG 146, 175P/2035, Tim Buck File; ibid., l75P/392, AE. Smith File; ibid., 175P/ :2494, 
Stewart Smith File. 
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police forces and intelligence services. Both groups had similar interests, at least they did 
in Canada in the 1920s in wanting to preserve traditions, maintain order, and often 
strenf:,rthen existing legislation that progressives found distasteful or utterly abhorrent. 
Sometimes there was quite a ditference between Liberals and Conservatives on policing 
matters in this period, stemming partially from the Conscription issue. 20~ In four successive 
years after 1926 Left Liberals passed a motion in the House of Commons to Repeal Section 
98 of the Criminal code only to have it quashed by the Conservative majority in the 
Senate. 203 
R.B. Bennett's anti-communism was no exception. He was a millionaire corporate 
lawyer from Calgary, who abhorred communist principles. He was a staunch defender of the 
Force which he viewed as a western institution. He had little sympathy for the downtrodden. 
He felt the failures ofthe existing system were largely the fault of the idle and weak who had 
failed to accept their own personal responsibility for their condition.104 King was not much 
better, of course. He had lost the election, in part, because of his insensitivity to citizens in 
provinces with Conservative governments and his unwillingness to recognize their plight by 
loosening federal purse strings. He had defended the Force's nationalization during the 
debates in the House of Commons when Woodsworth, other progressives and a small block 
of provincial rights .MPs wanted its powers weakened and in some instances the organization 
disbanded or confined to the Northern Territories. Yet King had also been willing to let the 
202Kemp, Wihout fear. faovour or affection, 78-84; Longstreth, The Silent Force, 313-323. 
203Fudgeand Tucker, Labour Before The Law, 155; S.C. 1930, c. 11, s.2,3. 
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Force's strenbrth erode during much of this period.:os 
Almost immediately after assuming ot1ice Bennett ordered Starnes to keep him fully 
apprised of Communist activities especially with an eye to foreign int1uence at work in 
Canada. At first Starnes reported that there was little concern at the present time. 206 While 
other Divisions' investigations into communist activities need to be examined, "0" Division 
was certainly not paying particularly close attention to CP activities (or at least to the level 
achieved earlier in the 1920s). Jennings' comments in the Force's September 1930 Annual 
Report told only a half truth when he wrote of the state of affairs in the work the Division's 
CIB had conducted during the previous year: 
All have laboured well and hard, both at detachments and at division 
headquarters, and several are deserving of special mention. Perhaps the bulk of the 
work has fallen on the Criminal Investigation Branch, which continues under the 
able direction ofD/S/ Sergeant H. Darling. Ofthis staff, D/ Sergeant F. W. Zaneth has 
been very energetic and has peen the principal means in bringing many important 
cases to a successful ending. -07 
Much of the work referred to in the above passage must have concerned activities that were 
not political. 
As Bennett settled into office, his election promise ofblasting Canadian exports into 
foreign markets quickly dissolved. One potential source for goods manufactured in Canada 
was the USSR. But Canadian-Soviet relations deteriorated. Accusations of Soviets dumping 
wheat on world markets, which reduced prices and potential buyers for Canadian product, 
sparked a minor economic war after September 1930. Dumping Russian anthracite in 
Canada, a contentious issue raised by Conservatives in 1929 and 1930 prior to their victory, 
205Longstreth, The Silent Force, 313-321; Fetherstonhaugh, The Roval Canadian Mounted Police, 
208. 
"
06BP, 94426, report, Commissioner Starnes to Bennett, 27 August 1930. 
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resurfaced again and was discussed in September t 930 in a special session of Parliament 
convened by Bennett. 20)\ 
In December 1930 the Canadian Furriers' Guild informed the government that the 
USSR had a deliberate plan to destroy the industry throughout the world. At the Canadian 
Forestry Association's annual meeting a month later a resolution was passed encouraging 
the government to take steps to protect against the importation of lumber cut and shipped 
by conscript labour. Premier Brownlee of Alberta and Winnipeg Mayor Ralph Webb wrote 
Bennett alarmed by the spread of communist activities. Brownlee demanded RC:rv1P 
investigations with the view of prosecuting offenders, while Webb encouraged the adoption 
of more stringent measures to deport subversives "back to Russia, the country of their 
dreams. "209 
Delegations of provincial politicians, the Chief Constables Association of Canada 
(CCAC's) representatives, also arrived in Ottawa to press for the adoption of more drastic 
measures. Commissioner Starnes joined CCAC delegates in a two-hour meeting with 
Minister of Justice Hugh Guthrie in which discussion focused on amendments to the 
Immigration Act to make it easier to deport subversives. In addition, the Chiefs clamored 
for changes to Canada's Criminal Code allowing for stronger action to be taken against all 
other potential forms of radicalism and subversive activity. Much time was spent addressing 
the specific "problems" posed by the communists. ChiefDraper, who attended the meeting, 
208Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, 118-130; In October the government decided against an 
immediate embargo, but would encourage coal importers to "refrain" from buying any more anthracite 
during the fall and winter months. If coal importers refused to follow Bennett's demand, then he was 
prepared to invoke a dumping clause in an amended Customs Act which gave the government discretionary 
powers to prohibit the important of goods from any country that was not a party to the Treaty ofVersailles 
such as the USSR 
2~alawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, 137-138, 180-181. 
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was most outspoken. Guthrie and Bennett needed little encouragement. :lu 
Trade pressures culminated in a embargo passed on 27 February of Soviet products 
under the clause in the amended customs tariff act. They atTected six products, mainly 
staples, and included: coal, woodpulp, pulpwood, lumber and timber of all kinds, asbestos 
and furs. 211 The Soviet government responded two months later with a counter embargo on 
all Canadian goods and further restrictions forbidding the employment of Canadian ships. 21 : 
These trade restrictions were not lifted until September 1936.213 
Communists in Southern Ontario began seriously organizing the unemployed in early 
1931. Direction came from the CI, and the CPC, like other affiliates, was instructed to 
arrange unemployed demonstrations for 25 February. 214 A signature campaign under Tom 
Ewen and the \VUL was also organized. 215 In preparation of the 25 February demonstration 
122,000 leaflets were distributed nationally. When the day arrived more than 75,000 took 
to the streets, including 13,000 in Toronto. It was a clear sign that the hard work of many 
WUL organizers and unemployed councils in their effort to mobilize the masses had begun 
to pay a healthy dividend. 216 That month the party's Central Organization Department also 
began generating weekly organization letters to be sent to all Districts, Sub District 
21~oberts, Whence They Came and; Avery, 'Dangerous Foreigners'; On inter-war CCAC 
developments generally see, Marquis, Policing Canada's Century, 127-228. 
211 0rder-in-council, 27 February 1931, Sessional Paper 442 (a), cited in Balawyder, Canadian-
Soviet Relations. 139-140. 
212Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, 148. 
2130rder-in-council, 10 September 1936, Sessional Paper, no. 179 cited in, Balawyder, Canadian-
Soviet Relations, 151. 
21~AGO CP, 9 C 0841. 
215Smith, All My Life, 119. 
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Organizations and National Fraction Sections which would ·'take up with the districts 
current Party activities and problems of Party organization'' a further sign that it was 
rebounding. 217 
In February 1931 Bennett applied pressure to have the Force step up its campaign 
against the radicals. 218 In this climate, the more Ottawa was enticed to act, the more the 
RC:tvrP were pulled into the prot:,rram. But the situation at "0" Division RHQ's CIB had 
improved little as Zaneth and Darling's investigations in Toronto focused on Italian 
mobsters and prostitution rings. Ever since the late 1920s these kinds of investigations had 
become increasingly central to the work the Division conducted. Through January and 
February 1931 no reports were deposited on the core Toronto CP file and with the exception 
of a few reports filled out elsewhere in the Division seemingly little intelligence work was 
being conducted.219 Making matters worse still, in early February Inspector Reames became 
ill and was off duty for weeks. Jennings believed that he likely had pneumonia and it was 
not until late March that Reames' condition improved. 220 
Pressure by this point by Ottawa political bosses was being applied on Starnes. It was 
not the least bit surprising that under these circumstances with little intelligence from "0" 
Division, Starnes became much more critical of his DOC and of his RHQ CIB. 
Betcherman' s characterization ofS tames' "dreamily" thinking about retirement during these 
217AGO CP, 9C 1218- 9C 1220, Central Organization Department, "Weekly Organization Letter 
#1," 24 February 1931. 
218The Globe. 24 February 1931; Betcherman, The Little Band, 159; Roberts, "Shovelling Out the 
'Mutinous,'" 90-91. 
219CPC TO 1930s, "Communistic Union Rears Against Labor, Calls 'Strike', Is Claim," Toronto 
Globe, 14 January 1931; "The 'Free Speech' Herring," Toronto Globe. 16 January 1931. 
Z2~CMP Personnel File- Albert Reames, memorandum, Jennings to Commissioner, 6 February 
\931; ibid., 21 February 1931. 
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heady winter and spring months of 1931 and therefore little concerned with CP activities, 
is largely unsubstantiated. m Far from a little band, the CP and its subsidiaries were 
becoming "a dangerous reality to be grappled with. "2~~ 
Starnes became more and more outspoken in the need for continued vigilance in 
combating communist activity. He increasingly felt that there was an intelligence crisis 
taking place at "0" Division RHQ. Starnes felt responsibility for "0" Division's poor quality 
of intelligence and its insignificant volume, lay with the RHQ CIB, and in the final instance 
with its DOC whose failure to oversee the secret service work was inexcusable. In late 
February, Starnes sent his "0" Division DOC a stern memorandum demanding he improve 
the situation. The current malaise in the Division's CIB work was unacceptable, he wrote: 
I also find that the information received from you regarding the revolutionary 
activities at Toronto during the past winter has been extremely meagre. This despite 
the fact that Toronto is the headquarters of the Communist Party, the Eastern 
headquarters of the U.L.F. T. Association and the Eastern centre for revolutionary· 
Jews, Finns and other foreihrners. 223 
For months Starnes had been forced to rely on sources outside "0" Division to gain 
insight into Toronto activities and those in the surrounding region. Through other DOCs and 
their networks he learned that the CP had been active in Toronto and throughout the 
Division's jurisdiction more generally during these months. For instance, its National 
Plenum had been held and had failed to receive 'adequate attention' by the RHQ CIB. 
Starnes was now under considerable pressure from the federal government and he lashed out 
at Jennings: 
Because of the wide spread unemployment and the consequent fertile ground 
for unrest, the Government is aiLxious to be kept fully informed of each development 
221Betcherman, The Little Band, 160. 
222CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, Commissioner Starnes to DOC "0" Division, 25 February 1931. 
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in revolutionary activity. This makes it all the more regrettable that it was not 
possible to have the Plenum covered. In this connection, I might say, that 
information was received from a Western District that the Plenum Meetings were 
held at Hamilton instead of Toronto so as to escape police attention.::~ ~ 
Deteriorating economic conditions, a growing fear and paranoia generated by 
intelligence reports from other centres, and a surge of activity by groups such the WUL and 
Unemployed Councils which were mobilizing on a provincial level and would in a few 
months federate into the National Unemployed Workers Assocation (NUW A), led Starnes 
to conclude that there was considerable intelligence material that the Division could obtain 
without a secret agent in place. Sternly, he wrote, 
I wish to emphasize the fact that there is a great deal of information which 
must be available to your plain clothes and uniform staff even though [1/2 line 
deleted]. The Toronto press has given considerable prominence to Communist 
activities recently, meetings, disturbances, arrests, Communist candidates in the 
municipal elections, etc., not one of which was covered by your staff. Such incidents 
as these can be checked and amplified through information obtained from the City 
police, and reported to Headquarters without delay. 225 
Starnes was losing faith in his DOC and he emphasized: 
The present situation is not satisfactory. I find that letters written to you on 
revolutionary activities are not answered for a great length of time. In one recent 
instance some of your staff showed what I cannot describe except as negligence. I 
refer to the important information contained in [ l/2 line deleted] your file 22-330, 
where reference is made to a list of contributors to the finances of the Communist 
Party. One of the names mentioned was that of[four words deleted] Toronto. In your 
forwarding minute you state that enquiries are being made in Toronto and in a 
further minute (to Sergeant Webster's report of January 21st) you say that no trace 
could be found of [name deleted]. 226 
The name had turned up in one of the Division's subsequent intelligence materials-
a list of subscribers to The Worker. With a simple check of a Toronto Directory Starnes had 
231 
also found the home address of the suspected agitator and he demanded that further 
enquiries be conducted. He also insisted that further intelligence be obtained by studying 
radical language publications such as Vagaus and DerKamgf. [n this period ofOSINT, he 
reminded Jennings that the Division had translators readily available for conducting this 
work. Dissatisfied with the way intelligence work was conducted at "0" Division, he 
concluded: "Until a suitable agent is developed, I must ask you to exercise a personal 
supervision over this important work, in order that infonnation from Toronto will be as 
complete as possible and without delay. "227 
Following Starnes' stem reprimand, Jennings brietly improved RHQ CIB 
surveillance and intelligence gathering. Nevertheless, \Vithout a secret agent positioned 
within the CP there were limits to what could be achieved. The RHQ's response to the 25 
February unemployed demonstration (the same day the Commissioner's stem memorandum 
arrived at the RHQ) consisted of a covering letter and a couple of press clippings.m Yet 
neither a plainclothes constable, nor a detective, had been detailed to attend the event. 
Subsequently when CIB personnel established a contact, their infonnant spent a great deal 
of time discussing the expulsions of Michael Buhay and Jack MacDonald rather than the 
event: "It is my opinion that too much importance should not be attached to these 
expulsions, as 1 have noticed that these expelled members try to gain the confidence of 
minor members of the Party, trying to find out what their opinion is of the leaders, etc."229 
The expulsions perhaps also explained the delay on the part of the DOC to try to get an agent 
mcpc TO 1930s, report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 27 February 1931; 
clippings included "4 Injured, 8 Arrested In Jobless Demonstration," Toronto Dailv Star. 25 February 1931; 
"Four Are Hurt In Queen City Police Clash," Ottawa Evening Journal, 25 February 1931. 
219ibid., report, informant and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 28 February and 4 
March 1931. 
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inside the party's fold. Still, when reports arrived at RHQ there was considerable delay 
before Jennings reviewed the report and forwarded it to NHQ. 230 Despite the brief flurry of 
intelligence gathering and monitoring of subversives that took place primarily to satisfy the 
Commissioner, intelligence gathering collapsed in Toronto the following month and until 
mid-May no reports on the main organization were forwarded to NHQ and deposited on the 
core Toronto CP file. 
It was at this point that Commissioner Starnes ordered Staff Sergeant Herbert Darling 
to report to Ottawa "as soon as possible for about a week's special work" which placed 
added strain on the already poorly functioning RHQ CIB. 231 Darling remained in Ottawa for 
close to two weeks and was eventually transferred there as of 1 April to take up duties as 
assistant to theDCI. 232 Fish subsequently assumed command ofToronto CIB operations until 
a replacement was found. But his strength as noted earlier in the study lay elsewhere. 
Pressure was being applied from elsewhere too. In March the Deputy Minister of 
Immigration requested that the RCl\tfP Commissioner keep him more fully informed as to 
when 'budding revolutionaries' were applying for passports. In taking such drastic action 
he added: "We will probably find that some of them are Canadian born but we will 
undertake to make things very interesting for them in establishing their status under the 
230ibid. 
231RCMP Personnel File-- Herbert Darling, Commissioner Cortlandt Starnes, "Memorandum for 
the Honourable The Minister In Control Of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police," 25 February 1931 and; 
ibid., "Memorandum To His Excellency The Administrator In Council," 25 February 1931; ibid., P.C. order 
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Immigration Act if they leave Canada and seek to return. "' 233 In March and April the Loyal 
Orange Association ofBritish America and the Employers Association of Manitoba wanted 
the power of the courts expanded to deal with agitators and urged the government to declare 
the CPC illegal. 234 
Bennett had decided by this point that some drastic action was needed to curb 
communist activities. Action on the domestic front might satisfy some "important" people 
who demanded an even stronger trade embargo against the USSR on moral or religious and 
not purely economic grounds. Bennett had little trouble stomping out "foreign agitators" 
whose principles clashed with his own views. But rather than provoke J.S. Woodsworth and 
Mackenzie King he felt it better that the action be taken by provincial authorities. Ironically 
even if Bennett had wanted to use "0" Division at this juncture Starnes was in no position 
to provide him with inside intelligence he might have required on specitic developments. 
Although it is also clear that probably few people other than Starnes and the DCI and 
perhaps readers and indexers at NHQ, outside the Division, knew that the RHQ CIB's 
intelligence operation was floundering. On 18 March Justice Minister Hugh Guthrie 
forwarded Ontario Attorney General William Price a private and confidential memorandum 
encouraging him to take legal action against communists and promising the full cooperation 
of both the Federal Justice Department and the RC.MP. 235 
Included with the letter was a voluminous report generated by RCMP Inspector 
Vernon LaChance, Director of Records, which tried to establish the CPC as an illegal 
233 Avery, Rei uctant Host, 1 15. 
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organization within the confines of Section 98 from its earliest days and also its ties to 
Moscow. No doubt Darling was originally called to Ottawa to help to prepare this report. His 
knowledge of communism was probably as good as, if not better than anyone else's, save 
Leopold who was still in the Mackenzie District and not particularly popular at NHQ. 236 
By this point all available resources were being tapped by Ottawa to build a case 
against the CP. Scotland Yard was contacted and further evidence in the fonn of cable 
intercepts between Buck and officials of the CI organ Pravda obtained by Captain Liddell, 
Scotland Yard's leading expert on subversion, were sent to Starnes and forwarded by 
Minister of Justice Guthrie to Ontario Attorney General Price. 237 
The main focus of the CP' s city activities during March and April were two further 
demonstrations scheduled for 15 April and 1 May. In March, the CP's organizing secretary 
infonned George Andrews, an organizer in East Windsor, that there was not much else to 
report from Toronto. 238 The 15 April wrap up to the signature campaign and the coincident 
demonstrations catapulted the CP into the forefront of national unemployed struggles. On 
15 April, 24 progressives from the CP and affiliates interviewed the Prime Minister. They 
presented 94,000 signatures along with their demands and received little satisfaction.239 
The CP was growing in these months throughout the region. In St. Catherines, party 
organizer A.H. Grewar wanted to start a CP unit and was instructed to take the matter up 
ZJ6 As quoted in Betcherman, The Little Band, 164. 
237Ronald A Adams, "The Anti-Communist Role of the RC~IP in the Depression," unpublished 
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with M.J. Forkin in Toronto, the Organizer for the Southern Ontario District. 2~0 In Hamilton, 
William Bateman, a WUL organizer, had arranged a number of successful unemployed 
meetings, conferences and demonstrations. 241 In Kitchener, in April, comrade Carey had 
formed an unemployment committee with the aim of organizing the unemployed in 
Kitchener and Waterloo. 242 Dozens of party membership cards and WUL cards were rushed 
to these centres during these weeks as were copies of literature and party organs to be 
distributed and sold. 
By April Commissioner Starnes was under incredible pressure from the federal 
government to assist provincial authorities in executing some large-scale plan to repress the 
party. A round up and arrest of communists was imminent. But still OSINT remained "0" 
Division RHQ's staple for intelligence. It was supplemented by passive investigations on a 
rather ad hoc basis. 
Starnes was in regular consultation with Joe Sedgewick, the Inspector of Legal 
Offices at the Attorney General's Department in Toronto, who was assigned to this case. 
Sedgewick wanted expert witnesses made available in the event of prosecution. So Starnes 
began assembling witnesses to corroborate evidence he had accumulated. Toward this end 
Leopold was recalled from the Yukon, while an attempt was pursued to reach another former 
unidentified operative who was active during the 1922-1924 period. This way, in the event 
of a trial they would have experts readily available who would not have to be subpoenaed. 
He even approached Scotland Yard with a request to have an ex-member sent to Canada as 
2~0AGO CP, 2A 1141, National Executive Secretary, WUL, to AH. Grewar, St. Catherines, 26 
March 1931. 
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an expert but was turned down because their contact was still working among communists 
in that country. 243 
Vernon LaChance was also liaising directly with Joe Sedgewick urging action and 
keeping tabs on similar legal developments in the United States concerning subversive 
organizations. He forwarded Sedgewick memorandums on cases such as one in New York 
City's US Circuit Court of Appeals, in connection with the prosecution of the Revolutionarv 
Age, a CPUSA periodical, barred from second class mail in July 1930 on the ground of 
''sedition." The action was based on a provision in the war-time Espionage Act and was 
upheld on an appeal made to the federal district court. The language in the Revolutionary 
A2e was even milder than that found in the CPC' s organs, LaChance informed Sedgewick. 
Furthermore, its applicability to Canada was doubly important since Section 98 had been 
based on the same 1917 US Act. 24-l 
During these months Attorney General Price received support for prosecution from 
elsewhere. The Mayor of Guelph forwarded him copies of The Worker recommending its 
suppression. 245 Sudbury's Crown Attorney forwarded NHQ copies ofVapaus, obtained from 
Kirkland Lake, requesting action. Hamilton's Crown Attorney and the city's Postmaster 
General had obtained similar transcriptions from the Canadian Hungarian Mutual Benefit 
Federation's official organ Kanadai Magyar Munkas (the Canadian Hungarian Worker) and 
passed them along to Force NCO Sergeant R.E. Webster requesting action. 246 In Hamilton 
243Betcherman, The Little Band. 165-166; AGO CP, 30L 0637-30L 0639, letter, Commissioner 
Starnes to Joseph Sedgewick, Attorney General's Department, 1 May 1931. 
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steps were being considered to prosecute under Section 98 and the Postmaster General was 
moving against the Kanadai Magyar Munkas, under Sections 217 and 219 of the Postal Act, 
which declared it illegal to post for delivery any materials which would "tend to injuriously 
atTect the commercial or social standing of the persons addressed. "w This intelligence was 
being gathered and reviewed by the AGO's office with an eye toward prosecution.m 
Yet through these many twists and turns Jennings continuously failed to keep the 
Commissioner infonned of district communist activities at the center of the Canadian 
movement. May Day demonstrations had taken place across the country once again. The day 
following Starnes wrote Jennings a stem memorandum: 
As previously stated the Government is keenly interested in the development 
of the revolutionary movement, and while I was able to furnish an authentic account 
of the May Day demonstration at every other centre in Canada, I was compelled to 
assume, in the absence of any report from you, that nothing happened at Toronto. 249 
Starnes turned to the pages of the Toronto Star and infonned his DOC that clearly 
his assumption was wrong. The Toronto Star, for instance, had covered the demonstrations 
at great length. He told his DOC that the event had led to arrests, the result of a "clash" 
between city police and party members. But where were his "0" Division RHQ CIB reports? 
He added, 
It is regretted that this demonstration was apparently not covered by your command, 
although it was previously advertised in the Communist press, to take place at the 
very point mentioned in the Toronto Star account-- the comer of University and 
Queen. Vapaus for May 2nd states that 2000 people took part in this demonstration, 
mibid., 30L 0658, letter, Deputy Postmaster General, Canada to E. Bayly, Deputy Attorney 
General, Toronto, 14 March 1931; included is a copy of pages 53-54 of the Canada Official Postal Guide. 
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Bayly, Deputy Attorney General, 9 March 1931. 
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and that twelve were arrested. You will notice the discrepancy between Yapaus and 
the Star. .. It is not necessary to have secret agents to cover this form of revolutionary 
activity; such demonstrations, meetings, etc., of a public nature are excellently 
covered, in other divisions, by plain clothes members of the Force. I must request 
that the necessary action be taken, in future, to cover and immediately report on all 
activities of this kind. ~50 
Intelligence operational considerations drove a wedge between the Commissioner 
and Jennings. Not only did tensions continue to fester concerning intelligence strategies over 
what could and could not be achieved without an agent on the inside, but as far as Starnes 
was concerned, it was increasingly the competency of his DOC that was in question. 
Jennings tried to defend the RHQ CIB's intelligence work (and implicitly his own 
conduct) in these months. He responded to the Commissioner's allegations of'negligence' 
and his charge that the Division had 'failed' to report the May Day demonstration by 
informing him that both he and Inspector Reames had personally visited the original site the 
party had selected for the demonstration. But apparently after several hours, when it seemed 
evident that no demonstration was likely to be held, Jennings and Reames left. Unfortunate 
for the RHQ, and likely in a move to throw off the police, the time and location for the 
demonstration had been changed by party members. The event had 'materialized' an hour 
after Jennings and Reames had given up. Jennings also informed the Commissioner that he 
did not write a report and forward it along with local newspaper clippings to NHQ simply 
because he believed that NHQ would have copies perhaps days before his would arrive. 
Jennings added: 
Referring to the last paragraph of your memorandum, please be advised that 
plainclothes men always cover demonstrations of this and similar kinds, in this 
Division. I believe you have been kept fully informed in the past of all details of 
250ibid. 
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importance in regard to such demonstrations, and will also be in the future. 251 
Regardless of the Commissioners' reaction, Jennings had displayed poor judgement by not 
reporting the event which was standard practice. 252 An RHQ constable was detailed to attend 
the trial ofthe six communists who had been arrested at the May Day demonstration. 253 He 
subsequently forwarded a report to NHQ. However, it is unlikely that this action did much 
to allay the Commissioner's concerns. 254 
By mid-1931 then it was clear that the RHQ Cffi was in a dismal state. It had still not 
recovered from Leopold's exposure. Its early successes in 1929 were more the result of the 
type of political investigation that became the focus of its energies. As the 'Free Speech' 
campaign receded, the allowances within the RHQ CIB network which made possible for 
a successful, more distant, and piecemeal approach to intelligence gathering seemed to be 
drying up. Darling too, in these circumstances was sorely missed. Increasingly, it became 
clear that while pressures trom the federal government was forcing Starnes to demand more 
intelligence from his DOC, the major problem within the network was that they simply had 
not developed a secret agent. Without an agent on the inside, Jennings felt challenged. For 
Starnes, the major problem had become Jennings. 
In June, the TCPD' s Inspector Marshall informed Draper that he had obtained secret 
documents from plainclothesmen detailed to watch communist propaganda in Toronto. The 
251ibid., report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner Starnes, 19 May 1931. 
253RCNIP nominal rolls, February 1928, the constable was R.W. Irvine who was transferred to "0" 
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intelligence he had secured included YCL plans to disrupt a YMCA World Congress, 
scheduled to open in Toronto on 17 July and copies of general orders being forwarded to 
ditierent district headquarters of the CP. At least one had emanated from a communist agent 
in New York. Inspector Douglas Marshall reviewed the materials and forwarded Attorney 
General Price a memorandum which stated that "after much thought I am more than ever 
convinced that some drastic action must be taken right away to combat this evil which is 
eating its way into the vitals of the country, fed to a great extent by the unemployment 
situation. "255 Marshall had concluded that there is "no way in which we can combat these 
people without force, as apparently the majority of Citizens do not realize how serious a 
matter it is, and what proportions things are getting to. "~56 
But according to historian Ron Adams, the most important evidence which prodded 
Price to act was a report of a East York township council meeting where Reeve Harry 
Meighen warned that unemployed unrest had become so militant that a force of more than 
a 1,000 unemployed veterans was organized and armed with bombs and rifles was drilling 
in North York township. 257 Price responded by alerting the army and dispatching the OPP 
to investigate the report. 258 He assured Torontonians that there was little cause for concern, 
but privately he took action and days later instructed Josepoh Sedgwick and OPP 
Commissioner V.A.S. Williams to prepare a plan to execute the arrest of the CP leadership 
for violation of Section 98 of the criminal code. 
255 Adams, "The 1931 Arrest," 10; AGO CP, 30L 0670, report, Inspector Marshall to D.C. Draper, 
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These fears never disappeared and until August reports of'·Well-t~d and well-paid 
agents of Moscow" who were ··meeting with a large ml;!asure of success in their etTorts to 
convert disgruntled and embittered men over to the side of communism" were noted in the 
non working-class press. "Drifters" in large numbers were coming into the major Canadian 
cities daily. "The Don Valley, in Toronto, is becoming a recognized rendezvous, and the 
time is fast coming when it will not be safe for a policeman to pursue his investigations in 
that quarter." "The situation was upon the government. .. "some like Col. F.F. Clarke, the man 
who organized the internment camp at Kapusksing during the war felt. Clarke feared 
"pending revolution" and that unless the government "acts quickly" he believed the country 
faced "a situation which is menacing in the extreme." Early on he floated the idea of 
bringing the unemployed under military control, reestablishing camps to segregate them 
from the rest of society. 259 
Through June and July the TCPD and the OPP worked closely with the Attorney 
General of Ontario's office gathering evidence that could be used in court against the 
communist party and its umbrella organizations. By the summer Draper had a police 
informant placed inside the Toronto CP who was providing frequent reports on local 
communist activities which he shared with Williams, Sedgewick and Bayley. 260 OPP 
Commissioner Williams also forwarded Sedgewick several reports on communist gatherings 
in Cochrane, Ontario, and elsewhere, where agitators were at work in the region. The 
"situation" in Cochrane was becoming ever more dangerous, its NCO reported, "since the 
'"' zs9 Address of Col. F.F. Clarke, at the Ontario Rifle Association Match in Toronto, quoted originally 
in The Globe, 4 August 1931 and in "Nlilitarists See Great Chances to Regain Their Past 'Glories"' The 
Worker, 8 August 1931, I. 
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prospect of men attaining work was not good.''2(' 1 
During much of this period ·'O" Division relied heavily upon both the TCPD and the 
OPP for intelligence it acquired. In June, evidence suggests that Inspector Reames was kept 
apprised oflocal developments over the phone and that any enquiries he had were followed 
up by TCPD and OPP personnel. 262 ·'O" Division only took steps to improve its intelligence 
program in mid-June when Reames arranged to have an operative attend a CP picnic in West 
York Township. The operative reported that 3,000 people had turned out to the event 
although the CP's "heads" were not present, there were no speeches made, and very little 
literature was sold. The operative reported that money was "very scarce among the 
Comrades, and at least 70% are out of work." He had obtained a sample of the material used 
during the proceeding week's recruiting drive, but added there is "very little activity now." 
Jennings informed the Commissioner that he was keeping the literature in Toronto for 
LaChance and that another picnic was being arranged by the CLDL and scheduled for Pelmo 
Park, just outside Toronto for 1 July. 263 
At the end of the month through his source Jennings forwarded the Commissioner 
a copy of the CP's "Resolution ofFirst Organization Conference District" and the "Outline 
ofPolitical Minimum Course of Party Training. Instructions for the Use of the Course" both 
of which were sent to all CP units earlier in June. The former provided the CIB with a 
261AGO CP, 30L 0663- 30L 0665 report, Sergeant F. Gardney, 30 May 1931, and letter, OPP 
Commissioner Williams to Joseph Sedgewick, 5 June 1931; ibid., 30L 0668, report, "The National 
Unemployed Association Cochrane Branch Council," 28 May 1931. 
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ibid., 30 L 0691, report, Chisholm, to Commissioner Williams, 11 July 1931; Betcherman, The Little Band. 
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blueprint of immediate CP plans for building the revolutionary movement in the District. 
Since the February Plenum, organizers were appointed in Oshawa, Toronto and Barrie. 
District #3's membership had grown from 375 to 576 by June as a consequence and it was 
hoped that this number could be increased to 750 by the fall. The latter dealt with concrete 
proposals to improve the quota for a CP school. Every stalwart had to participate since the 
course was intended to give every member an understanding of the basic principles of 
Leninism. Every unit of the party had to set aside time to go through the "minimum" in each. 
of its meetings. The course was to be kept in "permanent use," and every worker joining the 
CP was to be "acquainted" with about 14 subjects, issues such as the class struggle, 
exploitation of the working class, the capitalist state, imperialism, unemployment, social 
democracy, proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the working class, the CP, its allies, 
the YCL, and so on and so forth. 264 These reports were the first significant sign of life in the 
RHQ CIB' s political operations in many months. 
In early July "0" Division's operative also attended a meeting called by the CPC's 
District #3 Toronto Committee to report on the activity of the CP's District #3 units. 
Representatives from about 18 of Toronto's 23 units were present. They reported that every 
unit was financially handicapped. The city had about 400 members in total: "75 % are 
foreigners, mostly Ukrainians, Finns and Jews." Only 50 had paid their monthly dues in 
June, at least 70 per cent were out of work and just 5 of the 23 representatives present were 
employed. Meetings to improve the situation were to be held monthly. In forwarding his 
operative's report to NHQ Inspector Reames drew the Commissioner's attention to the "poor 
conditions of the Party .... "265 Afterward the intelligence reports by the operative stopped. 
26-libid., report, Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 26 June 1931. 
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The retirement of Cortlandt Starnes and the appointment ofMajor General Sir James 
Howden MacBrien took effect as of l August. :r,r, It commenced a new period in the Force's 
crusade against communism only in the sense that MacBrien needed even less prodding than 
Starnes to act since his politics was even more in keeping with Bennett's. 267 Like Bennett, 
MacBrien, the modernizer, believed that leadership demanded action, good leadership quick 
and decisive action, and there was little room for policy and bureaucratic process.168 
The House of Commons adjourned on 3 August and the following day OPP 
Commissioner Williams telephoned TCPD Chief Draper and Commissioner MacBrien 
requesting their cooperation in conducting a series of raids against the CP. For MacBrien 
participation in the raids could not have come at a better time. The raids became a way to 
det1ect any internal criticism over his appointment from outside the Force which was only 
announced weeks earlier. It seems only reasonable to believe that at least silently certain 
senior personnel privately had reservations about his appointment and felt slighted even if 
the evidence is not there. 269 He instantly became popular with at least some intelligence 
personnel whose work was often underappreciated. He came to be viewed in the Force as 
266
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a bold and imaginative leader, something missing during Starnes' years at the helm.:7n 
Warrants were sworn out for six CP leaders: Tim Buck, Tom McEwen, John Boychuk, Tom 
Hill, Malcolm Bruce and Sam Carr. MacBrien subsequently ordered Western DOCs to keep 
the absent Malcolm Bruce and Sam Carr under surveillance and after several delays, arrests 
were scheduled for 11 Aubrust. 
It was in this context, in an age of predominant reliance on OSINT and passive 
investigations, as far as "0" Division was concerned, that the events of 11 August unfolded. 
In Toronto six personnel from each Force were hand-picked to execute the raids and they 
met on 11 August in the utmost secrecy at 6 p.m., an hour before the raids were scheduled 
to take place at Commissioner Williams' office in the provincial parliament buildings. When 
most men arrived they had no idea of what was happening as precautions were taken to 
prevent a leak. 271 
The RCNIP contingent was headed by Superintendent Jennings and Inspector Vernon 
LaChance. The raids were to take place at precisely 7 p.m. Two police officers were to affect 
each raid. In Toronto, Buck, Ewen and Boychuk were to be arrested at their homes. In 
addition, raids were to be conducted at the CP's national headquarters on Adelaide Street, 
the Church Street offices ofThe Worker, and the Lombard Street headquarters of the WUL. 
Once arrested, the accused were to be taken to different police stations where they would 
appear before a Magistrate in the daily police court. Raiding officers were instructed to 
"make a very thorough search for all records, literature, correspondence, books and paper, 
and stay in possession until Mr. LaChance or some R.C.M.P. officer arrives to examine the 
27
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material seized. ''n: 
The specitics of the arrests, and the colour surrounding them, are well documented 
by Betcherman, Adams and others, and need not detain us here. From an intelligence 
perspective the arrests were a failure in the sense that by ten p.m. that night four of the "big 
six" as an article in the Toronto Star subsequently labeled them, for whom warrants were 
sworn out were not arrested and remained at large.m The failure to keep individuals under 
surveillance the day of the arrests was inexcusable. The operation led by Williams, Cuddy 
and Jennings, three military veterans, was perhaps a classic case of old-school military 
leadership being engaged where basic common sense, if not some intelligence savvy was 
required. It was also symbolic of the larger general problem that had plagued the Force in 
its monitoring of CP activities for several years. OSINT as the primary form of intelligence 
gathering, passive investigations, and operatives infrequently and poorly positioned within 
the CP had severe limitations. 274 
In editorials, The Globe and other non working-class papers celebrated the arrests. 
They viewed the Attorney General's actions as a "bit belated" in "coming to grips with the 
Communist menace" and only hoped that "the action is pushed to completion with the vigor 
the situation demands. "275 They got what they wanted. The trial and appeals that followed 
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were largely the "show trials'' that communists then and later suggested. '"The courts," A. E. 
Smith who attended wrote, "were never more detinitely employed as an agency of capitalist 
dictatorship."276 By the end of the trial it was dit1icult not to reach that assessment. 
The trial opened in Toronto on 2 November and was over in ten days. The case was 
heard before Justice W.H. Wright, well-known for anti-labour views, the prosecution led by 
Crown Counsel Nonnan Sommerville and Joseph Sedgewick, who were assisted by Vernon 
LaChance and an RCW lawyer who handled Force records and other technicalities which 
concerned RC.MP intelligence. Eight of nine defendants were represented by Hugh John 
MacDonald and Onie Brown. Tim Buck served as his own lawyer. 277 
In the indictment the accused were simply charged with being members of an 
unlawful association for a period often years. There were no specific individual acts cited, 
nor a bill of particulars dealing with each accused. They had no understanding of the specific 
charges they had to meet and yet the prosecution had more than two months to prepare these 
simple statements. Surely this was grounds for immediate dismissal. 278 
A lengthy motion to quash the indictment and to have the case against the nine 
accused thrown out by MacDonald on day one of the trial was dismissed. Instead the 
prosecution was granted recess and told to produce particulars setting forth why the CPC 
was an illegal organization. The prosecution also provided a second bill of particulars 
relating to the charge of seditious conspiracy which stated that the accused had conspired 
to carry out the CPC' s activities, which by nature were those of the revolutionary 
organization and therefore "seditious". The nine accused entered their plea of not guilty. The 
276Smith, All Mv Life. 132. 
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remainder of the first day was given over to other administrative and preliminary matters. 2'') 
On the second day of the trial, the clerk read the charges against the accused, the jury 
was selected, and Crown Counsel Norman Sommerville made his opening address to the 
jury. Smith later claimed that it was a ''stand pat" jury, and that it was rigged by prior police 
screening. 280 Betcherrnan argues that such was not the case because the majority were trades 
persons, members of the working class. 281 But this does not speak to Smith's original claim 
they were biased. 
MacDonald proposed to submit evidence and make his case in two areas, the first 
being establishing proof of membership in the organization: that the accused were members 
of the CPC. 282 The second part, which would take up the vast majority of the trial, was to be 
spent establishing the aims and objectives of the organization to prove that a "seditious 
conspiracy" had taken place with the ultimate goal of overthrowing through revolutionary 
means (by force and violence), the federal government and establishing a Soviet 
Dictatorship in Canada.283 
Over the next week a dozen witnesses were questioned, primarily members of 
various police departments involved in the raids. In addition, examinations and cross-
examinations of the accused were conducted. The testimony of a steady mix of witnesses 
and accused was augmented by the introduction of 103 exhibits as part of the Crown 
279-getcherman, The Little Band. 184-185; AGO, reel37, Supreme Courter of Ontario, Rex v. (9) 
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Counsel's case. 284 
The contribution that the RCMP and ··o" Division made to the court proceedings, 
was enormous. LaChance and a Force lawyer provided expertise to the prosecution which 
was largely unfamiliar with communist motives and means. In addition, Frank Zaneth, John 
Leopold and George Fish appeared before the courts. Between them they had over 40 years 
experience in em investigations and considerable experience in an anti-labour capacity. 
Fish and Zaneth had both participated in the raids. Fish had led the botched raid on Tom 
Ewen's house, which resulted in the arrest of Mike Golinski. 285 Zaneth had gone to Tim 
Buck's home during the arrests. 286 Both took the stand a couple of times early in the trial. 
Ofthe two Fish was the least competent. He was tripped up during cross-examination 
by defeqse council. He was accused ofbasically having arrested Golinski prior to taking him 
into the station which called into question the evidence he had secured from Golinski 
because the accused had not been read his rights. Justice Wright knew full well that this was 
the direction that MacDonald was leading the witness during the cross-examination and was 
forced to step in and stop this line of questioning. Otherwise, the case against Golinski was 
likely lost. 287 Zaneth was called and re-called as a witness on several occasions to 
corroborate evidence and also to explain how documents secured during the raid on Buck's 
residence were marked and removed thereby protecting their "integrity." Even this was 
285
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botched. Not all materials were marked in the same manner. 2 ~x 
Clearly the most important of the three was John Leopold. He spent hours on the 
stand and was called to testify on numerous occasions. He was the centrepiece of the 
prosecution's bid to prove that the accused were members of an unlawful association and 
that most of them had been for years. He was also the glue that stuck together the history of 
CPC, dealt with its activities and essentially made sense of many of the materials that would 
be submitted as exhibits for evidence. He did not just "help" convict the accused as some 
authors have suggested. No, without Leopold, or someone like him, a former secret agent 
on the inside, it is extremely doubtful that the prosecution's case would have held.:89 
Both the lead prosecutor and Justice Wright in several instances stepped in to defend 
Leopold during courtroom proceedings. His credibility as a "witness" was constantly under 
attack. In providing evidence against the accused, Leopold relied on copies ofletters he had 
reproduced by memory, the originals he had destroyed years earlier, he claimed. The defense 
council questioned the "weight of them." Justice Wright even at first was skeptical. The 
Force probably only told him once it recessed that many of them were secret intelligence 
reports and hence their desire not to produce them. But the jury was never informed. Even 
if they were, what justice is derived by information used in a prosecutorial manner where 
originals are not presented? Ultimately Wright allowed this material in as evidence and in 
time seemingly it was as acceptable as other materials entered.290 
Throughout the trial Leopold downplayed his role in the CP. In so doing, he misled 
the jury during his entire testimony. He stated that he had never been very active in the 
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organization. 291 Cross-examination by defense counsel subsequently proved otherwise. 
Leopold confessed that he had established the Regina branch, that he had encouraged others 
including Bruce among the accused to join the CP, that he had provided funds regularly for 
the CP's upkeep and was active in many ways. 292 Only once in his career was he '·called 
down" for "slaking" by central office293 According to Buck's testimony, Leopold was "the 
man with the vehicle," the individual who would put a party member up and provide all sorts 
of assistance when needed. Even his participation in the Toronto Sacco and Vanzetti arrests 
was brought to light during the cross-examination, and rather suggested, that he was a 
"prime mover. "294 
All Sommerville could do during reexamination was to try to reestablish Leopold's 
credibility and to make clear that he was "acting under orders'' as a "policemen." Leopold's 
arrest at the Sacco-Vanzetti demonstration was seemingly some of the best evidence 
presented which suggested otherwise. It was probably convincing to a jury that had little 
exposure to "radical" politics and therefore was not of the same ilk as the accused despite 
Betcherman's claim. Not surprisingly, to raise doubts Sommerville cleverly addressed this 
specific question making it clear to the jury that Leopold had not organized the Sacco-
Vanzetti demonstration. When Buck took the stand and lambasted Leopold during 
questioning Justice Wright interjected and cut him off. Only because most members of the 
jury knew nothing about the labour movement was Sommerville's argument successful. 295 
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During their defense, Buck and the others emphasized the '"normal" activities they 
had legitimately participated in, such as elections through the 1920s, as clear proof that they 
were working to transform the system in a manner that was in keeping with the democratic 
process. Furthermore, they informed the jury that once Leopold was exposed, he was still 
treated with a degree of "courtesy" that as events then made clear he never deserved. His 
character was far more despicable than that ofHonest Bob McSnore, the fictitious archetype 
of the so-called labour movement's 'friend' who could never quite fully come around to 
accepting its principles, who meant well but was an impediment to working-class 
consciousness, a roadblock along the road to socialism?)(, 
Whenever this kind of logic was employed Justice Wright insisted that the accused 
were not being tried for what they did, what legal and constitutional means they employed 
for reform or revolutionary change but rather what they did or suggested through writing or 
deed that was illegal. Whenever Buck or others turned to provide a definition or 
understanding of key words such as "revolution" they were told that they were not entitled 
to because "interpretation" was the task of the jury. Nevertheless, when Wright wanted a 
definition or an explanation, he interjected and demanded it from Buck only to cut him off 
if the definition failed to support the prosecution's case. "-97 
A5 in Winnipeg, the Toronto trial from start to finish, from the very theatre and 
conditions under which it was established (swarms of mounted police and motorcycles 
blocked the entrance to the courthouse), to the indictment, to the reading of charges, to the 
calling of witnesses and the accused, to the way in which evidence was entered and the 
scope of questioning narrowed, meant that its outcome was largely predetermined. The 
~%ibid., 247-248; Ewen, The Forge Glows Red, 93-123. 
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accused were convicted on all counts. Seven were sentenced to serve tive years and the other 
two. With the guilty verdict read, as Smith later wrote, ·'communism became a 'crime in 
Canada."29K The CP was placed under a ban. Subsequent appeals overturned the convictions 
for seditious conspiracy, but upheld the Section 98 convictions which meant sentences were 
not reduced. 299 The major lesson of the trial that Smith took away was that the Canadian 
working class must have a "strong party oftheir own'' and as well that "the historic period 
has arrived when a great step forward must be made by human society. "300 
Conclusion 
With the trials behind them life slowly returned back to "normal'' for the Division's 
intelligence personnel. But what was "normal" anyhow? In the 1920s it had often meant 
developing a primary penetration agent and sending him into core Toronto branches of the 
CP for extended periods of time, sitting on committees at the branch, city, district and even 
brie±1y national level. It also meant participating in street-coming demonstrations, chairing 
meetings, distributing flyers, organizing events. In the aftermath of Leopold's exposure 
"normal" meant something substantially different. By early 1929 it meant relying primarily 
on OSINT as the RHQ CIB' s primary modus operandi. Some personnel achieved a subtle 
refinement in their reading and scanning of newspapers for critical information (although 
since they did not initialize in the margins their underlining of passages it is impossible to 
tell exactly who, when and where at times). The new period also meant relying more on 
plainclothes constables and other regulars instructed to attend open-air meetings and other 
29~Smith, All Mv Life, 139. 
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public demonstrations and occasionally developing other operatives to secure additional 
intelligence. Senior intelligence personnel (or those individuals who concerned themselves 
with these matters) developed stronger informal ties, a working relationship, with other 
government departments at the federal, provincial and municipal level. 
But what assessments and lessons can we draw by way of conclusion about the 1928-
1931 period in the RHQ CIB's core Toronto CP counter-subversion operations? The 
reorientation of"O" Division RHQ CIB's core intelligence network began a new period in 
its operational history although it is important not to exaggerate the transformation taking 
place. For several years following there was a significant shift in the CIB's primary modus 
operandi, from the development of penetration agents in succession overto OSINT and more 
passive investigations. One lesson to note is that this transformation occurred largely as the 
result of a mistake rather than any planned consideration on the part of Division personnel. 
What is impossible to draw any conclusions about (however much one might like to) was 
the full impact that the adverse publicity surrounding Leopold's exposure, and a more 
careful and sophisticated CP had, in applying pressure discouraging the development of 
another penetration agent. We can say with a greater level of certainty that for several years 
"0" Division's core Toronto CP operations functioned without a penetration agent. 
Another lesson was that although OSINT's development as a tool helped to prepare 
the Force for its struggle to confront mass mobilization with the unemployed and popular 
front movements of a later day its effectiveness was limited. By early 1931, a change in 
governmental policy, deteriorating economic conditions, and a better organized and more 
confrontational CP and its subsidiaries, placed the Force under enormous pressure to 
participate in more coercive forms of social control. As a result tension increased between 
Starnes and Jennings over the Division's intelligence capabilities without an agent inside the 
Toronto CP. The arrests followed and the full limits of OSINT became known. 
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For "'0" Division· s CIB the August 19.31 arrests accomplished at least two things. 
Internally they highlighted a need on the part of Division personnel to rethink existing 
strategies in its counter-subversive program and to take steps to strengthen them. These 
changes followed and will be discussed in the next chapter. The second impact the raids had 
was that in their aftermath, they opened up a wealth of intelligence on the CP, its 
subsidiaries and for "0" Division specifically the CP's activities in District's #3 to #5. 
The raids provided tens of thousands of pages of additional intelligence much of 
which was already known to the Force but a great deal of which was not. This intelligence 
shed considerable light on the purges of the past three years and the struggles between 
various party factions. Furthermore, it exposed a great deal of the \VUL's, the WLL's, the 
YCL's, language and other wnbrella organization's work: both successes and failures. 
Specifically, it identified pitfalls in the Toronto CP's industrial and trade union work, and 
among youth and women. It also helped the ern till in some of its PHFs identifying who had 
left the city, the region and the country, for what purposes, and often under what 
circumstances. Intelligence from CP Districts 1-9 right across the country was gathered in 
the arrests. This provided the RHQ ern with the kind of insight into the CP it had certainly 
been without in Toronto for years. 
But like most other matters in life, the wealth of intelligence gathered had its positive 
and negative sides. Ultimately the intelligence gathered from the raids not only filled in gaps 
and created possibilities for fueling dissension but it also confinned many of the Force's 
worst fears. While the intelligence allayed fears that much in the way of financial support 
was being funneled from Moscow through the Anglo-American Secretariat to Toronto (no 
more than about $13,000, most ofwhich anived early in the CPC's history), it did little to 
:256 
off-set general concerns about the det.'Tee to which the CPC was under foreit.rn control. 301 
~ ~ ~ 
Furthermore, intelligence personnel could only now marvel at the amount of thought and 
consideration gone into mapping out strategies, slogans and policies for work being 
conducted. For intelligence personnel, the "Age of OSINT' was one of both success and 
failure. Early failure in 1928 helped prepare the Division for later periods. The success of 
the 1931 arrests and the trove of seized intelligence put intelligence personnel on sounder 
footing. Only now the larger and more immediate problem became the fact that movement 
was "headless" and soon functioning underground. 
Jut Financial support from Moscow ebbed and flowed during the CPC's history. In 1999, according 
to Christopher Andrew, Canadian intelligence services had embarked on a study which was to be completed 
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The Communist Party of Canada has, during the past year, and since the conviction 
of the eight leaders in November, 1931, been somewhat disorganized although, 
owing to the unemployment situation and general unrest prevalent, had great 
opportunity to sow the seeds of discontent. 1 
Superintendent C.H. King, 1932 
("0" Division OC) 
Chapter V 
"Reconfiguration. Reorientation. and Redeplovment": 
"0" Division's Core Toronto CP Intelligence Operation. 1932-1939 
Even though Superintendent King had misjudged the strength of the communist movement 
his RHQ CIB emerged in 1932 better positioned to keep tabs on the CP. With the party 
illegal and operating underground, before long "0" Division reduced its reliance on OSINT 
in favour of a mixed operational strategy. To monitor the mobilization of the unemployed 
the Division relied upon detectives and eventually operatives. For periods they turned 
increasingly to other police forces whose own intelligence operations were expanded. 
In the mid-1930s the CP entered a period of resurgence of activity. RCMP 
Commissioner James Howden MacBrien reported that "[t]he Communist Party and its 
subsidiaries have again been energetic in their efforts during this period of acute 
unemployment... "2 The CP changed its strategies and tactics and established a popular front 
through organizations such as the Canadian League Against War and Fascism ( CLA WF) and 
its successor, the Canadian League For Peace and Democracy (CLPD). The Spanish Civil 
1RCMP, Annual Report, 1932, 68. 
2RC!'vfP, Annual Report, 1935, 13. 
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War broke out in July 1936.·1 The Canadian left mobilized more than I ,600 men for overseas 
service and they established a Canadian Battalion and a domestic support body, the Friends 
of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion (Fl'vl.PB). Communists became extremely effective in 
providing material and moral assistance to antifascist activists and in aiding victims of 
international agb:rression. By October 1937, in just two years, the CP had nearly tripled its 
membership to 15,000.4 
"0" Division RHQ CIB intelligence personnel responded to all these changes 
revolutionaries made by making adjustments to their operations in light of the tremendous 
economic upheaval and political instability before them. But just how effective were CIB 
personnel? Were their 1930s networks able to provide the same level of coverage as earlier 
ones? To what extent did the Liberal Party in power differ from its predecessor in its 
willingness to engage the Force in an anti-communist program? The 1930s experience raises 
many important questions. With the economy in a state of disrepair in 1932 clearly there was 
some need to make adjustments to the government's key political policing apparatus. 
5.1 
Superintendent King, the establishment of a new modus operandi 
and the unemployment crisis in the early 1930s 
3 An important addition to the security and intelligence field in the popular front period is tvlartin 
Henry Peter Lobigs, "Canadian Responses To The l\.1ackenzie-Papineau Battalion, 1936 To 1939,'' MA 
Thesis, The University of New Brunswick, l\.1ay 1992; standards include, William C. Beeching, Canadian 
Volunteers. Spain 1936- 1939 (Regina, 1989); Victor Hoar, The Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion- The 
Canadian Contingent in the Spanish Civil War (Ottawa, 1986). 
4Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] R.C.M.P. Securitv Bulletins: The Depression Years Part II. 1935, SB 
#781, 13 November 1935, 577; ibid., #780, 6 November 1935, 569; John Manley, "Introduction," in Kealey 
and Whitaker [eds.) RC.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Depression Years. Part IV. 1937, 2; ibid., SB# 874, 
27 October 1937, 422; Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada, 115; Gordon Skilling, "The Popular 
Front," Canadian Forum 16, 193 (February 1937), 11-12. 
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In t 932 the federal government negotiated an agreement with the provinces whereby 
it would foot half their provincial policing bills if provinces agreed to disband their separate 
provincial forces and instead contracted the work out to the RCN1P. 5 In April, the Force 
absorbed provincial police forces in Nova Scotia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and on 1 May 
and 1 June, Prince Edward Island and Alberta. 6 A massive budgetary increase was granted 
and across Canada the RCNlP grew by leaps and bounds. 7 Detachment numbers more than 
doubled from 197 to 443 and personnel numbers increased by 73 per cent from 1,351 to 
2,3 84 all ranks. 8 
Even in those provinces such as Ontario where the Force never assumed provincial 
policing duties in 1932 the Force expanded because it undertook Customs and Excise 
Preventive Service (PS) work for the Department of National Revenue (DNR). 9 This work 
was taxing. It required considerable manpower, long hours and a steady hand. Illegal 
distilling and the smuggling of contraband were two of the more important duties Southern 
Ontario personnel faced in their efforts to clean up the corruption that had formerly 
5RCMP, Annual Report, 1932, 5; Fetherstonhaugh, The Roval Canadian Mounted Police, 243-245. 
6Kelly and Kelly, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, I 7'2; Fetherstonhaugh, The Roval Canadian 
Mounted Police, 243-245; RC!VIP, Annual Report 1932, 5. 
1 Auditor General's, Annual Report, 1931 - 1932, RCMP, X; Rivett-Carnac, Pursuit in the 
Wilderness. 322; For instance, Depot Division was radically expanded and divided into two Divisions "one 
to look after the policing end of affairs and another to train recruits, each operating separately with a 
different officer in charge." 
8RCMP, Annual Report, 1932, 5; Rivett-Carnac, Pursuit in the Wilderness, 292-293, In 1931 the 
strength of the Force was 59 officers, 1 154 non-commissioned officers and constables, and 138 special 
constables, or 1 351 in all. On 30 September 1932, the Force numbered 91 officers, 1 911 non-
commissioned officers and constables, and 346 special constables, or 2 348 all ranks. 
~Ctv!P, Annual Report, 1932, 6; Kelly and Kelly, Policing In Wartime, 48; Saskatchewan and 
Alberta had an RCMP provincial Force since 1928. 
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·'permeated'' DNR.to In 193:2 "0'' Division's strength increased from 46 to 73 as a 
consequence and its detachment numbers doubled to 20. 11 
Progressives roundly condemned the Force's expansion. Many viewed it as a further 
sign of "political reaction," a response to the latest series of crises such as wage cuts and 
reductions in living standards which, they asserted, had forced the capitalist class to become 
"panicky" about the "growing tide of resistance". Expansion, for all practical purposes, was 
also seen as a step away from meaningful democracy since control over much of the 
country's provincial policing apparatus was removed to Ottawa. 12 
Similar to the pattern that had emerged in the 1920s many "0" Division RHQ 
personnel who concerned themselves with intelligence matters in the early 1930s were tirst 
generation immigrants from the British Isles. 13 The CIB was led by Scotsman Inspector 
Albert Reames, the Division's second-in-command, and beneath Reames CIB 
responsibilities were divided between Corporal Hugh Patrick Mathewson, who was in charge 
of CIB operations across the Western Ontario District, and Staff Sergeant George Fish, 
1~ora and William Kelly, The Roval Canadian Mounted Police, 172-173. 
11RC~lP, Annual Report, 1932, 69; Auditor General's, Annual Repo!l, 1931 • 1932, RC~IP, X-11; 
Auditor General's, Annual Report, 1932- 1933, RC~, X-19; Even its sundry expenses for RHQ and 
detachment upkeep increased by more than 400 per cent and went from $40,086.80 to $162,330.45. 
12RC~, Annual Report. 1932,5-6; "The RC.M.P. Take Over Police Work of Alberta," The 
Worker, 30 January 1932, 4; "RC.M.P. Gradually Taking Over Policing of the Country," The Worker, 20 
February 1932, 4; "RC.M.P. to Police Nova Scotia Also," The Worker. 20 February 1932, 4. 
13
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, January- December 1932; In early 1932 "0" Division RHQ had 25 
Force personnel stationed in the city. By the end of the year the RHQ had 31 on its roster although a few 
more were about to be transferred out and were off duty. The few gains did not appear to be in the CIB 
branch, more PS work. 
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senior ofticer in charge of Toronto detectives. t.J While Fish's career was sketched earlier in 
this study, Mathewson had joined the Division in 1922. Subsequently he worked in Toronto 
and on command throughout Western Ontario. He earned probationary detective status in 
late 1925, was confirmed in rank in 1927 and promoted corporal in 1930. ts 
Lower in rank at RHQ and concerned with intelligence work on a part-time basis 
were ten to twelve staff. The support staff consisted of CIB clerk Constable R.A.K. Jones, 
who had maintained these important files ever since his transfer over from the Assistant 
Receiver General's Toronto Office (ARGO) in September 1930.t6 The position ofCIB 
chauffeur was filled by Constable H.J. Burrough, an appointment made the previous fall, and 
he joined the investigative staff on a part-time basis. t7 Others attached to the CIB eventually 
included three single female civilians stenographers: Miss E.M. Cullen, Miss W. Bottoms, 
and Miss M.G. Dickson, all of whom remained in the Division beyond the scope of this 
1~NAC RG 18, holdings of the RCMP, vol. 3455, file 0-203, service record of Albert Edward 
George Oakleigh Reames 
George OakLeigh Reames. was born in Scotland in June 1886. Prior to joining the Force Reames 
was a tramway inspector and motorman. He had lived in Middlessex, England, was C. of E. He had had 
served in the 18th Hussars from November 1897 to December 1900. He joined the Force on 1 September 
1909, was promoted Inspector 1 January 1920, Acting Superintendent 1 'March 1935, Superintendent 1 July 
1935 and retired to pension in January 1938. He died in Vancouver in June 1941. 
15RCMP G.O. 3593, 1-9-22; RCMP G.O.'s 6416 and 6417, 1-4-27; RC:MP G.O. 8625, 1-8-1930; 
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, August 1930; "0" Division, Nominal Rolls, January 1932; RC~:lP. Quarterlv, 
21,4 (April 1956), 360, "Obituary of Superintendent Hugh Patrick Mathewson," see chapter four for his 
biographical sketch. 
1
""'0" Division, Nominal Rolls, September 1930; ibid., January and February 1932; See chapter four 
for R.A.K. Jones' biographical sketch. 
17
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, January- May 1932; RCMP G.O. 9645, 1-7-32. 
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study. 18 Later on in the decade they would be joined by translators. 1 ~ 
With the pressure gone from the arrests and the preliminary trials at the beginning 
of 1932 Frank Zaneth was transferred to Montreal em to concentrate on mobsters, 
moonshine, money laundering and prostitution rings. For several months Corporal Max 
Veitch, Constables Michael Walsh and Reginald Warner served as the RHQ CIB's staple 
under Fish's command. 20 Of the three Veitch was senior in rank and Warner junior. Veitch 
had worked in Toronto with Zaneth on a part-time basis for a couple of years and had further 
honed his detective skills travelling to centres leading investigations throughout 
Southwestern Ontario. 21 Walsh was the Irish expatriate who had joined "0" Division in 1920 
and had failed miserably at Sault Ste. Marie. He had conducted piecemeal political 
investigations in the Division ever since, and after a pair of trial runs, in 1928 Walsh was 
18The stenographers were granted a grade 2 wage of between $1,026 to $1,242 per annum, but 
unfortunately I have uncovered almost nothing further concerning their backgrounds and careers. 
19S.W. Horrall, "R.C.M.P. Translation Services," RCMPOuarterly. 54,1 (Winter 1987), 16-21; 
Although translators were used in the Force since its earliest days the written history of translation largely 
began during World War I with the hiring ofFrancis H. Colam, as a special agent on 8 October 1914. He 
quit in 1916 but by the mid-1920s a substantial volume of material was being translated. At NHQ George 
Harold Deighton was engaged in 1925 (seemingly the first permanent translator since Deighton). He was 
succeeded by M. Babuka in October 1927 (both their specialities had included Russian and Ukranian). She 
was joined by Special Agent M.H. Aroni in 1931 and the field blossomed in the 1930s and during World 
War II. Translators at Divisions was largely a 1930s phenomenon. 
20
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, January 1932; RCMP G.O. 9600, 1-1-32; Dubro and Rowland, 
Undercover. 
21 Dubro and Rowland, Undercover; "0" Division. Nominal Rolls, January- June 1932; RC.MP 
G.O. 6501, 1-6-27; RCMP G.O. 8512, 19-6-30; RCMP G.O. 9243, 6-7-31; RCMP G.O. 4758, 1-5-37; 
Kelly and Kelly, Policing in Wartime. 13; Walsh earned his promotion to detective two months after 
Mathewson back in 1927 and by the end of the following decade had risen to the rank of Detective Sergeant 
filling Fish's post (after Mathewson and several others) as NCO in charge of Toronto detectives and 
sometime duty officer. 
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promoted detective.=: Warner, being the novice, had only joined the Force in early 1931 and 
following a brief stint at Regina Depot, "0" Division RHQ was his first posting. 23 
Although the experiences of RHQ CIB personnel varied, in general, few reports on 
CP activities were generated in Toronto in the winter of 1932. Toronto municipal elections 
were poorly monitored (entirely by newspaper clippings) and in January the only other 
intelligence deposited on the core Toronto CP file was a report that identified a dozen 
stalwarts active in local communist circles. Constable Jones and Superintendent Jennings 
checked it against existing records but most individuals mentioned were previously unknown 
to intelligence personne\.24 
The CP at this juncture was acutely aware of continued RCMP designs. Party 
stalwarts remained at a heightened state of alert. They claimed they had learned a lot since 
Leopold "trapped" Buck and the others and in taking the movement underground they were 
no longer prepared to "come out in the open" to "expose" themselves. They had developed 
"a secret system of communication" and "no longer all lived in the same city. "25 Whenever 
necessary subsequently arrangements were made whereby "contact between the groups was 
22RCMP G.O. RCMP, Quarterly, 32,3 (October 1966), obituary ofMichael John Walsh, 78; 
Michael John Walsh was born in 1883 in Ireland. He served in the CEF and joined the Force in 
1919. His career was spent at Regina, Sault Ste. 1\ifarie, Bridgeburg, Niagara Falls, Toronto, London, 
Hamilton, Kitchener, Rockcliffe, Ottawa and Montreal. He retired to pension originally in 193 8, but re-
engaged in 1939 in Ottawa for World War II and served until 1946. He died in Guelph in 1965. 
23RCMP, Quarterly, 23,1 (July 1957), obituary of Reginald Robert Warner, 96; 
Reginald Robert Warner was born in 1911 or 1912 (place not known). He joined the Force in 1931 
and was invalided to pension in 1946 at the same rank never rising above constable. Warner served overseas 
during World War II as a member of No. 1 Provost Company (RCMP). He had been stationed at Regina, 
Toronto, Hamilton, Cobourg, Timmins, Sudbury and Kirkland Lake. He died in May 1957 at South 
Porcupine. 
24CPC TO 1930s, "Results of Vote for Board of Control," Toronto Globe, 2 January 1932; ibid., 
report, source deleted and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 20 and 26 January 1932. 
2sCPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 16 May 1933. 
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minimized ... .'' As communists they ·•teamed to live with constant intimidation and to joke 
about the omnipresent undercover policeman from the Red Squad assigned to their 
surveillance." They also developed a "reflex sense of survival: never talk party business on 
the phone or talk elliptically or, if Jewish, in Yiddish; notice if you're being followed; 
identity members of the Red Squad.''26 
As a consequence Toronto intelligence personnel had considerable difficulty 
regaining its command over the movement and its activities. It was not until late 1933 that 
intelligence personnel learned that the CP had re-established a "District Bureau Committee" 
in Toronto as a "secret body" which doubled as the national executive. Furthermore, it was 
not until much later on in the decade that RHQ CIB personnel gained knowledge of internal 
branch and CCC activities in a manner even remotely consistent with earlier times. 27 
In the winter of 1932 with the CP leadership eclipse~ operating in semi-underground 
status, more overt work was being conducted by the NUW A and WUL which had both 
established city offices the previous fall. In these months the Red Squad paid these 
organizations daily office "visits" to disrupt their activities. The TCPD had become more 
effective in its coordination of anti-communist operations, in general, drawing upon the 
support of a variety of public and private institutions and pulling them into its intelligence 
ambit. 28 Toronto Catholic Archbishop Neil McNeil (and then James McGuigan after 1934) 
had deployed lay deities as "snitches" in parishes and eventually hired Catherine de Hueck, 
26Weisbord, The Strangest Dream, 29-30. 
27Kealey and Whitaker [eds.], R.C.M.P. Securitv Bulletins: The Depression Years. Part I. SB #677, 
20 October 1933, 44. 
28
'Maurutto, "Private Policing,"38-54;; "Officialdom of Furriers Union Put Through Wage Cut," 
Workers' Unitv, 1,5 (30 October 1931), 4; "12% pay cut to Youth In Chocolate Factory," Workers' Unitv, 
1,5 (30 October 1931 ), 4; "Red Squad Is On Rampage," The Worker, 30 January 1932, 2. "A Toronto 
Attention,"Workers' Unitv. 1,6 (2 December 1931), 4. 
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a Russian emigre who t1ed the revolution, to penetrate the Toronto CP. De Hueck produced 
a 95 page report on communist activities for McNeil and others in 1932 and kept tabs on the 
CP through a variety of means until she left for the US in 1938.29 
In February 1932 the Supreme Court of Ontario on appeal upheld two of three counts 
upon which Tim Buck and the other CP leaders were convicted during their 1931 trials. 30 
Together they faced a total of 37 years in prison. Buck and six others were taken 
immediately to Kingston Penitentiary and began serving sentences of five years; while Tom 
Cacic received a two-year sentence followed by deportation. 31 
The day following the sentencing Superintendent Jennings was relieved of duties as 
"0" Division OC and a week later he was promoted to Assistant Commissioner and 
transferred to NHQ to assume the position of DCI. His promotion signaled further 
consolidation of Commissioner MacBrien's views on intelligence matters as increasingly 
bold initiatives were rewarded. As DCI Jennings succeeded Superintendent Newson. He 
served in this capacity until October 1936. As such he oversaw the implementation of the 
Force's wiretapping program which although in its infancy had commenced operations a 
year earlier. Although Montreal-based J.E. White, an engineer, was eventually hired by the 
Force and would improve vastly upon this program several years later, in his capacity as DCI 
Jennings can lay claim to paternal rights. In April 1937 Jennings was promoted Deputy 
Commissioner, a position he held until retirement a year later.32 
~aurutto, "Private Policing,"38-54; Valverde, The Age of Light. Soap. and Water; AS. Whitely, 
"The Church And Social Control," The Canadian Forum. 12, 139 (April 1932), 251-253. 
3l>Smith All My Life. 140-141; Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada, 87-88. 
31 0n Cacic's life in particular see, Access Request, 96-A-00 146, NAC RG 146, vol.4670, file 1-2, 
P.HF ofT om Cacic. 
32NAC RG 18, vol. 3447, file 0-147, Service Record of George Leslie Jennings (hereafter cited as 
RCN1P Personnel File- G.L. Jennings) "Deputy Commissioner G.J. Jennings, O.B.E." N.D.; ibid., "Former 
RCv1P Officer Lt.-Col. Jennings Dies,"Ottawa Citizen, 27 December 1958; RCMP G.O. 9744, 1932; RCMP 
G.O. 9787, order-in-council PC 174/617, 1 March 1932; RCN1P, Annual Report. 1932, 67-68. 
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·'Q" Division's tifth OC illspector Charles Herbert King was transferred to the 
Division in mid-February and his appointment was quickly followed by a promotion to 
Superintendent as of l March. 33 King developed a strong interest in political policing and 
brought both administrative and practical Cffi experience to "0" Division. Following in the 
footsteps of Newson and Jennings, King eventually served as DCI in 1938 and was 
responsible for "internal security" a year and a half later with the outbreak of hostilities 
before retiring to a pension in May 1941 at the rank of Deputy Commissioner. 34 
In 1932 King faced several early challenges as "0" Division OC. Some were internal 
matters which properly should have been taken care of by the adjutants department, while 
others concerned coordinating the Division's resources to meet its perceived immediate 
security obligations. In early 1932 RHQ CIB personnel were exhausted from months oflong 
hours and weekend work. With the CP leadership's appeal concluded King granted George 
Fish two-months furlough. Yet not everyone owed time could be temporarily relieved; others 
who requested furlough were forced to remain on duty, and only weeks later Constable Jones 
and Sam Wrigglesworth, a constable being trained as a possible replacement for Jones, 
became ill.35 Similar difficulties were experienced elsewhere in the Division, and 
33RCMP G.O. 9789, Privy Council, Order-in-Council, 172/617; NAC RG 18, file 3452, 0-177, 
Service Record ofC.H.King, memorandum, S. K. Rathwelt, Provincial Conservative Section, Saskatchewan 
to Prime Minister Borden, 19 July 1913. 
34NAC RG 18, vol. 3452, file 0-177, Service Record of Charles Herbert King (hereafter cited as 
RClVlP Personnel File- C.H. King) "Ex-Deputy Commissioner Charles Herbert King"; ibid., "Memorandum 
For Fyle No: -Officer 177," 
Charles Herbert King was a British emigrant from Kent, England. A staunch Conservative who 
joined the Force in 1905, King served overseas in the CEF during the War, conducted detective 
investigations in both Canada and the US early in his career and held senior (but not top) appointments in the 
1920s in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ottawa. He died in February 1955. 
3
'RCMP, Nominal Rolls, December 1932 -March 1933; RC::.\IIP, Quarterlv, 37,1 (January 197:2), 
obituary of Samuel Wrigglesworth, 80; 
Samuel Wrigglesworth was born in 1905, a British emigrant from Bradford, Yorkshire, 
Wrigglesworth had joined the Force October 1931 in Lethbridge. He rose to the rank of Sergeant, retired to 
pension in January 1952 and died in September 1971 at Victoria, BC. Most of his career was spent in 
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Calgary Commanding Officer King prepares to leave 
for Toronto to succeed "0" Division OC George Jennings in the winter of 1932. 
Source: NAC RG 18. Service Record ofC.H. King. 
(Originally taken from the Catgarv Herald, 1 February 1932) 
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replacements brought in as a stop-gap measure were either novices or had not conducted 
investigations in the city for years, and intelligence work sutTered as a consequence. 36 
A series of well-planned demonstrations were scheduled for centres across Ontario. 
The earliest events were set simultaneously for Toronto and Ottawa just days after King had 
assumed command. King acted quickly. 37 He drew upon past experiences in Calgary, in his 
previous post, where he had utilized the municipal police. In Toronto he quickly established 
a working relationship with the OPP and the TCPD who provided him with immediate 
intelligence on communist activities which he considered useful. 3)! He turned to other 
Divisions and other government departments for infonnation, and he expanded Inspector 
Reames' role in coordinating "0" Division's response. 39 King and Reames had worked 
together earlier on similar kinds of operations in Western Canada when Reames was officer 
in charge of Winnipeg and Vancouver Division CIBs and also as OC Lethbridge SDHQ.40 
Regina, Ontario, and in the Maritimes. 
36
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, December 1931- March 1932; RCMP G.O. 117 transfers from 
Depot to "N'Division, 1 March 1920; For instance, Constable Warner was sent to Hamilton to fill a gap in 
that detachment's operations which hurt Toronto. Constable Donald Robinson replaced Warner and his 
intelligence experience was limited, while Ted Weeks, another member of the RHQ detailed to conduct 
political investigations had not done so for years. 
37E. Cecil-Smith, "Unemployment," Masses, 1,1 (April 1932), 2; L.C. Marsh, "Public Works and 
Relief," The Canadian Forum, 13, 149 (February 1933), 188-190; "Toronto Conference Sets Tasks in 
Preparing the Provincial Marchers," The Worker, 6 February 1932, 1; "Ontario Hunger Marchers In 
Toronto February 15th," The Worker, 13 February 1932,3. 
38 Journals OfThe Legislative Assembly Of The Province Of Ontario, 18 ~farch 1935, 84; At 387 
the OPP's personnel numbers were almost five times "0" Division's in 1932. 
39CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, Inspector King to OC "D" Division, 1 l'vfarch 1932; ibid., reply, 16 
March 1932; ibid., report, Superintendent R. Field to Commissioner, 16 March 1932; ibid., report, 
Superintendent King to OC "D''Division and to the Commissioner, 1 March 1932; ibid., report, Assistant 
Commissioner Belcher to AL. Jolliffe, Commissioner of Immigration and Colonization, 18 March 1932; 
ibid., reply, 30 March 1932; ibid., Assistant Commissioner Belcher to OC "0" Division, 1 April 1932; ibid., 
report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 16 March 1932; ibid., memorandum, Assistant 
Commissioner Belcher to OC "0" Division, 11 April 1932; ibid., reply, 12 April 1932; ibid., report, Assistant 
Commissioner Belcher to OC's "C", "F" and "0" Division, 29 March 1932; ibid., reply, Superintendent King 
to Commissioner, 5 April 1932; ibid., report, Inspector Reames to Commissioner, 3 March 1932; ibid., 
report, Superintendent King to MacBrien, 1 March 1932; ibid., memorandum, C.F. Hamilton to Inspector 
Charron "A" Division, 2 March 1932; ibid., telegram, Superintendent King to MacBrien, l March 1932; 
~AC RG 18, vol. 3455, file, 0459, Service Record of Albert Edward George Oakleigh Reames .. 
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Through the preliminary measures King adopted Commissioner MacBrien was 
forewarned of communist plans in Toronto for the "movement" of stahvarts to Ottawa on 
3 March. "A" Division's OC was given ample time to respond as licence plate numbers were 
obtained and coded telegrams were wired to NHQ. Other events were also effectively 
reported. 41 In Toronto city police Chief Inspector of Detectives Murray identified local 
NUW A leaders for King since a quick check of"O" Division's own records revealed that 
many files were not up to date. 42 King also instructed Reames to "tour the grounds" at 
Queen's Park with TCPD Deputy Chief Guthrie on days scheduled for demonstrations in a 
bid to reestablish control over local revolutionary activities. 43 
The Division's intelligence operations saw improvement by April. That month Fish 
had returned to work, by then Jones' health had improved, and before long Ted Weeks, who 
was detailed to conduct political investigations in the absence of several other personnel, 
was demonstrating competency as a detective. 44 As well, by this juncture King had jettisoned 
a few additional personnel changes - RHQ constables whom King felt were "unsuitable" 
were discharged- while several others were transferred out of the Division.45 
In April, Inspector Robert Eldridge Mercer was transferred into the Division to 
41 CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, Commissioner MacBrien to OC ~A" Division, 1 March 1932; 
ibid., telegram, Inspector King to Commissioner, 1 March 1932; ibid., report, Superintendent King to 
Commissioner, 1 March 1932. "Stop Press," The Worker, 5 March 1932, 1; "When Iv1archers Left for 
Ottawa," The Worker, 5 March 1932, 2. 
~2CPC TO 1930s, report. Superintendent King to Commissioner, 1 March 1932. 
43ibid., report, report, Inspector Reames and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 3 Ivlarch 1932. 
44RC:MP, Quarterly, 40,4 (September 1975), obituary of Edward George Weeks, 78; 
Edward George Weeks was born 24 April1900 in Southharnpton, England. He joined the Force in 
1919. He graduated from Regina Depot the following year with many key "0" Division intelligence 
personnel such as Ivlathewson, Nelson and Allen, (and also Clifford Harvison). Weeks was promoted 
Sergeant in the 1920s and served extensively throughout "0" Division during much of his career (Hamilton, 
Niagara Falls, Walkerville and Windsor). He made many contributions to dossiers and organizational files. 
He rose as high as Staff Sergeant, a position he was promoted to in 1944 two years before he retired to 
pension. He died in Winnipeg on 15 April 1975. 
4;.'0" Division, Nominal Rolls, Ivfarch- April 1932. 
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establish a new Sub-Division Headquarters (SDHQ) at Walkerville and only weeks later he 
had completed this assignment. -1(> Mercer's arrival strengthened existing Division operations 
since he had vast intelligence experience which included stints as officer in charge ofRegina 
CIB in the 1920s and several years as Leopold's handler_-17 From Walkerville, Mercer 
supervised the work of seven detachments in an area that included southern Ontario west of 
a line drawn from, and including, Owen Sound, south to Lake Ontario.48 He reported directly 
to King, performed effectively, and in a matter of months was granted a pay increase.49 
In April, MacBrien arrived in the city for a quick Division inspection tour and a 
speaking engagement at a Vimy Anniversary banquet where he let some "gems·· fall on the 
subject of radicalism, reaffirming his continued support for increased deportations and the 
use of vigilante groups of veterans against communists. 50 NHQ also informed Superintendent 
King that they were in receipt of information that for May Day communists in "0'' 
Division's jurisdiction planned to organize demonstrations in Hamilton and in Oshawa, and 
at the same time "to set on foot in Toronto a demonstration sufficiently impressive to 
prevent the Toronto police from reinforcing either place." They asked King, "Have you 
heard anything of this?" and ordered him to investigate the "situation" and report "fully" and 
46RCl\1P, Quarterly, 39,2 (April 1974), obituary of Superintendent Robert Elderidge Mercer, 83; 
Robert Elderidge Mercer, was born 31 July 1885 in Sialkot, Punjab, India. His parents were both 
from Great Britain. Mercer first joined the Force in 1905, he purchased his discharge in 1909 to take the 
appointment of clerk of the District Court at Macleod, Alberta. He rejoined the Force on 26 July 1913 \VaS 
promoted to Corporal 1 September 1914, and Sergeant 23 October 1916. He served in the Siberian Cavalry 
Draft during World War I, was demobilized on 15 July 1919, promoted Staff Sergeant 1 October 1922 and 
"""llS Commissioned Inspector 1 October 1929. He gained extensive experience in the 1920s across Western 
Canada. Mercer eventually made "0" Division OC, was promoted Superintendent in August 1939 and 
retired to pension 30 September 1945. He died at Victoria, British Columbia, on 31 October 1973. 
~7Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 450. 
~8RC:MP, Quarterly, 39,2 (April 1974), obituary of Superintendent Robert Elderidge Mercer, 83; 
Mercer had served earlier as OC Regina CIB and then OC York.-ton Sub-Division, difficult centres that senior 
Force personnel felt had required extensive policing of political activities. 
~~Cl\1P, G.O. 9807, 1 April1932; RCJMP, G.O. 10316, 1 October 1932; 
50
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"as quickly as possible. ··st 
Superintendent King believed that his Division's May Day preparations were well 
in hand. Along with the changes already made and mentioned above, effective liaison with 
TCPD Chief Draper and Colonel Hertzberg ofMilitary District #2 in Toronto, King felt, had 
produced results. Together Draper and RHQ CIB personnel pursued Toronto May Day's 
leadership. They arrested James Bryson, a resourceful WUL unemployed organizer and CP 
stalwart, whom King had squared off against earlier in the decade in Calgary putting earlier 
experiences to use once again. 52 Both police forces also met with the Trustees of Massey 
Hall to prevent the CLDL from holding a "huge" May Day demonstration there. 53 Elsewhere 
in the Division additional preventive measures were adopted. For two weeks prior to the 
event unemployed in Hamilton were arrested and authorities there also arranged for 104 
Firemen to be sworn in as special constables. 54 For Oshawa, Reames and Colonel Hertzberg 
met to discuss strategies and subsequently arranged a military exercise for 200 non-
51CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Belcher to OC "0" Division, 22 April 
1932. 
52Bryson first came to authorities attention in Calgary in December 1930 during demonstrations 
ther. Consequently, CIB personnel generated a PHF. Bryson died in 1934 but in just four years and largely 
under King's supervision at both centres hundreds of pages of reports and other items had been deposited on 
his PHF. In fact, more than 35 Force personnel played an active role in work being conducted against 
Bryson in this relatively short period. 
53CPC TO 1930s, report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 23 April 1932; ibid., report, 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 29 April 1932; "Toronto Police Try to Stop Preparations for May 
Day," The Worker. 23 April1932, 2; "Arrest Toronto's Jobless Leaders," The Worker. 30 April1932, 2; 
J.W. White, "Deportations," The Canadian Forum. 12,142 (July 1932), 367-368; Manley, "Audacity," 11; 
Petryshyn, "Class Conflicts and Civil Liberties"; Weisbord, The Strangest Dream. 39; Harassment of the 
CLDL only intensified as it became the recognized public voice of the CP and its membership more than 
doubled from 10,000 to 25,000 in the year and a half after September 1931 and by 1934 had risen to 43,000. 
5~CPC TO 1930s, report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 27 April 1932; ibid., report, 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 26 April 1932: ibid., report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 
29 April 1932; "100,000 Workers Out on the Streets Throughout Canada for Demonstrations Againts [sic] 
RB. Bennett's Government," The Worker, 7 May 1932, 1. 
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permanent militia to be followed by a Church purade. 55 King's tina! intelligence report 
before May Day predicted "little trouble'' throughout the region. 56 
Thus May Day 1932 was a prime example of both the successes and failures of 
Division intelligence operations in Superintendent King's early administration. Despite 
many precautions taken by authorities pamphlets, flyers, and other propaganda materials 
from the US, flooded Canadian cities entering the country via Windsor. On May Day 
100,000 workers emptied their homes and took to the streets across Canada to protest the 
Bennett administration's policies. 57 However, with municipal and provincial police prepared, 
many arrests took place and crowds were quickly dispersed. In fact, one Ontario paper 
truthfully noted that advanced intelligence across the Division had played an important role 
in preparing all police forces concerned. 58 
Sudbury was one centre in "0" Division's jurisdiction where no "problems" were 
anticipated. However, results there were unacceptable to King as the town's mayor and 
several others had been injured in demonstrations. 59 The Force's direct experience in that 
centre was limited since Sudbury after all was one of "0" Division's detachments 
established months earlier. While undoubtedly intelligence personnel were familiar with 
55CPC TO 1930s, telegram, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 1 May 1932; ibid., telegram, 
E.RS. Pink to OC "0" Division, 1 May 32; ibid., report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 2 May 
1932; "Brutal Police Onslaught As Thousands Pour Into The Streets on May Day," The Worker. 7 May 
1932, 1; Dubro and Rowland, Undercover, 40; Glen Makahonuk, "The Saskatoon Relief Camp Workers' 
Riot of May 8, 193 3: An expression of Class Conflict," Saskatche\\llln History, 3 7,2 (September 1984 ), 62; 
James D. Leach, "The Workers' Unity League And The Stratford Furniture Workers: The Anatomy Of A 
Strike," Ontario History. 60,2 (June 1968), 43. 
56CPC TO 1930s, report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 29 April 1932. 
57
"100,000 Workers Out on the Streets Throughout Canada for Demonstrations Againts [sic] RB. 
Bennett's Government," The Worker, 7 Nfay 193 2, 1. 
58CPC TO 1930s, "Co-operation of Press Helps to Forestall Disturbance by Reds," Mail and 
Empire, 2 May 1932. 
59The town's Mayor and a Sergeant were injured, eighteen arrests followed and a series of raids 
were conducted which resulted in three revolvers, a bunch of literature, an RCMP scarlet jacket and 
Canadian Militia Army uniforms being secured. 
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many Sudbury radicals tht! militancy achieved there on May Day was largely spontaneous 
which made it virtually impossible to anticipate.~>0 
Superintendent King responded by sending Inspector Reames to Sudbury to evaluate 
the situation. Reames meet with Sudbury Constable Earl Pink, the Division regular in charge 
of that detachment, and carried instructions to impress upon Pink the need to keep his use 
of telegrams to a minimum. 61 Reames then met with municipal authorities to discuss an 
'appropriate' response.62 It was in this context that days later police in Sudbury raided the 
offices of the Finnish radical newspaper Vapaus and arrested Arvo V aara, the paper's editor, 
and Martin Parker an associate editor and young local activist, and "seized" many 
"documents."63 Vaara, Parker and several others (such as Dymitr Chomicki/ Dan Holmes 
Winnipeg Secretary of the United Front Election campaign) were "spirited away" and sent 
to Halifax to face deportation hearings. 64 J.S. Woodsworth raised the issue in the House of 
Commons. The matter was debated but labour M.P.s received little satisfaction. 65 Constable 
~ealey and Whitaker [ eds. ], R. C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Early Years. 383-451, provides a 
list with some Sudbury subjects; CPC TO 1930s, telegram, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 1 May 
1932; ibid., report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 2 May 1932; "Workers' Leaders Spirited Away," 
Being Held For Immediate Deportation by Ottawa Order," The Worker, 7 May 1932, 1; Dubro and 
Rowland, Undercover, 40; Laurel Sefton MacDowell, 'Remember Kirkland Lake': The Gold :Miners' Strike 
of 1941-1942 (Toronto, 1983), 61; Its establishment was probably linked to the communist led MWUC 
which established a local there under the WUL early in the Depression. However, it was dissolved in 1934. 
61ibid., report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 2 May 1932. 
62CPC TO 1930s, telegrams, E.R.S. Pink to OC "0" Division, 1 May 32; Earl Pink had 
considerable intelligence experience and had conducted investigations on a piecemeal basis ever since his 
transfer into the Division from Ottawa back in November 1926. In 1929 he had even joined the RHQ CIB 
staff and had conducted a variety of special plain clothes assignments in Toronto the following year. During 
the Sudbury demonstrations Pink had sent a several telegrams to his OC explaining the situation which he 
considered alarming. 
6\bid., report, Constable Pink, 7 June 1932; ibid., report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 20 
June 1932. 
64 
"Workers' Leaders Spirited Away, Being Held For Immediate Deportation by Ottawa 
Order,"The Worker, 7 ~lay 1932, 1; Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations. 184-185; Smith, All My Life, 
147. 
65Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 6 May 1932, 3249. 
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Pink reported on the cases as they worked their way through the courts.''6 Superintendent 
King later reported that he did his best to make sure that those arrested and charged in 
Sudbury during May Day demonstrations were "dealt severe sentences."07 
In the aftermath of the May Day arrests protest meetings were held. At one event 
near Owen Sound with delegates present from Winnipeg to Montreal and Detroit, a contact 
reported that a motion was debated to hold Minister ofimmigration and Colonization W.A. 
Gordon's family in "retaliation" for those individuals "kidnapped" in Sudbury and sent to 
Halifax. 68 Superintendent King had Reames further investigate this matter and MacBrien 
personally reported the results to Gordon. He informed the minister that, although certain 
precautions were being taken, his lead Toronto investigator felt that the information was 
likely a lot of"hot air" and that the source was probably trying to create a job for himself 
with one of the various police organizations. 69 MacBrien also recommended that the 
precautionary measures (not specified) being taken to protect the Minister and his family 
be dropped and the case dismissed. 70 However, months later following the Supreme Court 
of Canada's dismissal of Habeas Corpus proceedings introduced by Vaara and the others, 
Gordon refused their appeal from the decision handed by the Board of Inquiry which 
ordered deportation. 71 One progressive was sent to Poland where he was arrested by 
authorities, while another leftist deported was brought to the "attention" of the Gestapo and 
66CPC TO 1930s, report, Constable Pink, 7 June 1932; ibid., report, Superintendent King to 
Commissioner, 20 June 1932; Auditor General's, Annual Report 1932·1933, RCMP, X-19. 
67RCMP, Annual Report. 1932, 69. 
68CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, 8 May 1932. 
69ibid., memorandum, Commissioner ~IacBrien to W.A Gordon, Minister of Immigration and 
Colonization, 12 May 1932. 
70ibid., memorandum, Commissioner MacBrien to Minister ofimmigration, W.A Gordon, 16 May 
1932. 
71
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surely a death sentence awaited both. 72 
Before intelligence work temporarily eased m ·'U' Division a few important 
changes were made to the Division CIB following May Day. Most importantly, Constable 
Robert W. Irvine rejoined Toronto RHQ CIB's statTafter several months absence in Regina 
on 'special duty'. 73 Irvine had originally transferred into the Division in early 1928. He 
joined the RHQ CIB in August 1931 and monitored local CP activities that fall such as a 
series of CP street-comer meetings against the arrest of Tim Buck and the others.'-1 
Confirmed in rank as a Detective in January 1932, when he returned to Toronto in May he 
was promoted Corporal and re-confirmed in rank as a Detective and his addition 
strengthened CIB operations. 75 As well, Irishman Sergeant Ron Smyly, a 25-year force 
veteran, was transferred into the Division and sent to Niagara Falls to strengthen border-
area operations. 76 Smyly's staff at the Niagara Falls detachment were instructed to increase 
their coverage of local revolutionary activities in the border cities region to prevent 
revolutionary literature from entering Canada through the US. Smyly also increased liaison 
with the town's municipal Chief Constable and before long a noticeable improvement 
72Penner "How the RCl\1P Got Where It Is," in Mann and Lee, The RCl\1P vs The People. 116-
117. 
73
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, February 1932, as of 3 February 193:. 
74RCl\1P G.O. 6925, 1-2-28; "0" Division, Nominal Rolls, 1929-1932; CPC TO 1930s, report, 
Constable R W. Irvine and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 2 October 1931; ibid., Constable 
R W. Irvine and Superintendent Jennings to Commissioner, 8 October 1931; Irvine spent most of 1928-
1930at ARGO and in Toronto on general duty. His activities :Uso included brief stints as a taxation guard 
and working on command in Muskoka for the Secretary of State. 
75
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls,January 1932; RCl'v1P G.O. 9645, 7-l-32; i!lliL May, 1932, RCrviP 
G.O. 9972, 1-5-32; RCl\1P G.O. 9946, 1-5-32. 
76 RCl\1P, Quarterly, 37,1 (January 1972), obituary of Ronald Smyly," 79; Born in June 1887 in 
Ireland, he joined the Force in 1907, was promoted to corporal in 1928 and to sergeant in 1929 and retired 
to pension in 1934. He died in Vancouver in 1971. 
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resulted in investigative work being conducted. 77 
For several reasons RHQ surveillance activity slowed following May Day. First of 
all, what little intelligence work was being conducted suggested that party branches were 
either inactive or "right up against it for funds" and that Draper and his Red Squad were 
performing "etiectively", harassing progressives, paying them frequent "office visits;' 
refusing many groups permits to hold parades, marches and demonstrations. Draper was 
even in the midst of negotiating with provincial authorities to extend the TCPD's Red 
Squad activities into the suburbs. 78 
Another reason intelligence work slowed was that for months there were simply 
fewer personnel available to conduct these investigations. Many personne 1 were being over-
worked by added seasonal duties such as providing guards for Income Tax offices at 
Toronto, Hamilton and London, and extra guards at the Assistant Receiver General's Office 
(ARGO). Workloads also rose since in these months new Division detachments were 
established at Amherstburg, Cobourg, Cochrane, Fort Erie, Leamington, Lindsay, Owen 
Sound, Port Lambton, St. Thomas and Simcoe which required attention. 79 The Division 
also lost several of its more experienced investigators. Michael Walsh was transferred to 
"N" Division and George Fish was sent on command special duty to "E" Division following 
77CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 25 
.N1ay 1932; Auditor General's, Annual Report, 1932-1933, RCMP, X-18; notes that it was the third most 
expensive detachment to operate after Walkerville and Hamilton; CPC TO 1930s, report, Sergeant Smyly 
and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 16 and 17 May 1932; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 25 May 1932. 
78CPC TO 1930s,report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 6 July 1932; ibid., report, 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 25 June 1932; ibid., report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 
27 May 1932; "Starvation Rampant In Toronto Suburbs,"The Worker. 7 May 1932, 3; "Red Squads Will 
Extend Activity,"The Worker, 2 June 1932,2. 
~CMP, Annual Report. 1932, 145; For instance, "0" Division personnel investigated 7,500 
applications for naturalization in 1932 (a good portion of which was conducted during the summer) which 
kept 4-5 Toronto constables busy full-time while registering and filing these applications occupied the 
"complete attention" of another member. 
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May Day and was transferred there in June ending his illustrious inter-war ''0'' Division 
career. ~° Finally, a new graduated pay-scale for detectives was also introduced. It was the 
first major change of its kind since 1924 and was a disincentive which cut by half extra 
remuneration for detective work and Detective Irvine was immediately atTected by this 
development while others were in time. 31 
By the summer, only months into his job as "0" Division OC, Superintendent King 
found himself in the same predicament as his predecessor. Short-staffed and ill equipped 
he refused to grant any personnel long leave. 82 No officer in the Division took even a day's 
leave for months after the Division took over Preventive Service (PS) duties and by 
September, as a direct consequence of expansion, more than half of "0" Division's 
personnel were new to the Division. 83 Given the personnel crisis and other obligations it 
was not surprising that even Commissioner MacBrien' s occasional summertime request for 
intelligence on prominent subjects active in the city turned up little new infonnation.M 
It was in this context that in July a somewhat less experienced and more fragile 
RHQ CIB's gaze was directed toward the Workers' Economic Conference (WEC) which 
800" Division, Nominal Rolls, l\1ay and June 1932; RCMP G.O. 10063; RC:MP G.O. 10087, 1 July 
1932. They included: D.H Mason, ME. Bell, RA Waugh and W.H Hamilton; RC~JP G.O. I 0043, 1-6-32; 
Walsh eventually was transferred to "A" Division in 1932 where he conducted numerous plainclothes and 
undercover operations throughout much of the 1930s. 
81RCMP G.O. 2893,23 July 1924; RCMP G.O. 9645 n.d.; RCYJP G.O., 10125, order-in-council 
P.C. 1358 of25 June 1932; Formerly most detective personnel were granted a per diem of$1.00 for this 
work. Under the new regulation NCOs and Constables during probationary period received an allowance of 
25 cents per diem. Upon completion of probationary period a Detective Constable or Acting Corporal 
earned 50 cents, Detective Corporals and Acting Sergeants earned 7 5 cents, and Detective Staff Sergeants 
and Sergeants a maximum of $1.00 per diem. 
82RCMP, Annual Report, 1932, 69-71. 
83 ibid., 68. 
84NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, 175P/l741, John l"viacDonald file, report, source deleted and 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 10 and 19 July 1932; ibid., memorandum, Superintendent King to 
Commissioner, 25 July 1932; ibid., memorandum, Commissioner MacBrien to OC ~o" Division, 27 July 
1932; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 28 July and 3 August 1932; 
ibid., report, memorandum, Commissioner l\1acBrien to OC "0" Division, 21 July 1932 
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was held in Ottawa in August 1932. Toronto operations were led by King and Reames but 
the detective work was run by Senior Detective Hugh Patrick Mathewson who was being 
tested as a possible permanent successor to Fish. 85 
The WEC' s story and place in Canadian history has been well documented 
elsewhere.~(> Workers planned to mobilize an alternative forum in opposition to the business 
and trade focus of the elite Imperial Economic Conference R.B. Bennett had planned. 87 
From the very outset the RHQ CIB acquired and compiled OSINT on steps progressives 
were taking to promote the success of their alternative forum. They also conducted passive 
investigations. The WEC was important to Superintendent King and other Division 
personnel because before long, they felt, it further highlighted the need to strengthen 
existing intelligence operations and improve work being conducted. 
Expansion of Division operations first occurred when the DCI instructed 
Superintendent King to arrange a meeting with the heads of the Investigation Departments 
of both railways, the TCPD's Chief Constable, and the Commissioner of the OPP, since 
WEC delegates were planning to "ride the rails". 88 At the meeting containment strategies 
such as "wholesale arrests," the preparation for "extra gaol accommodation," were gone 
into in great length as were plans to establish check points along rail lines in a joint public/ 
private police initiative. Subsequently, eighteen "0" Division personnel (many of them with 
85
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, July 1932; Mathewson's former job had likely gone to Mercer and 
several other personnel such as Detective Sergeant C. C. Brown stationed at Windsor, who were in a better 
position to provide daily supervision of CIB work being conducted at the detachment and SDHQ level. 
86Smith, All My Life. 148-151; Thompson and Seager, Canada, 1922- 1939, 222-223; Hilliker, 
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previous inte II igence and anti-labour experience) such as Pink, Span ton, Robinson, T rolove 
and Smyly, were all given CP and CN passes. 89 
Unlike King's previous test, during the WEC intelligence was also secured by an 
operative placed among the ranks of the Toronto unemployed. The operative established 
ties to the CLDL and used them to attend WEC meetings in late July where Ottawa-bound 
protesters' final travel arrangement plans were made and resolutions drafted. He eventually 
joined the marchers when they left the city at the end of the month. 90 The attempt to 
develop an operative was an obvious move. Whether it was going to succeed was another 
matter. 
Both DCI Jennings and Superintendent King believed WEC protesters were more 
experienced and better prepared than in previous demonstrations. The signs everywhere 
confirmed this analysis. WEC organizers positioned scouts along the route to warn fellow 
demonstrators of police locations.91 Communists had also published checkpoint locations 
in The Worker suggesting workers planning to attend take altemati ve routes. 92 Even a stoo 1-
pigeon, Julius Buji, a Hungarian who assumed the alias "Harry Black" employed by the 
Port Colbourne police department to infiltrate the CLDL during these events, was 
eventually exposed on route to Ottawa when questioned by class-conscious workers.93 
For two weeks leading up to the event intelligence personnel operated their check 
89CPC TO, 1930s, report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 12 July 1932; ibid., report, 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 13 July 1932; ibid., report, Inspector King to Commissioner, 14 July 
1932; ibid., report, Inspector King to Commissioner, 15 July 1932; ibid., report, Inspector A.E. Reames to 
Commissioner, 23 July 1932. 
90ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner 23 and 26 July 1932; ibid., 
report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 25 July 1932. 
91CPC TO, 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 29 July 1932. 
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points, conducted search~s, mad~ arrests and turned back potential protestors. Many 
protestors initially escaped detection so the RCNfl' established a number of additional 
check points to try to prevent their arrival to Ottawa. There was a tlurry of correspondence 
over further containment strategies, points to be covered across Ontario and provision for 
"extra gaol accommodation." True to form private detective agencies panicked.'>4 
The result of all the steps taken by security forces was that the WEC fell well short 
of its original goals. A Mail & Empire editorial piece explained the WEC's "virtual 
collapse" attributing the poor turnout of agitators to the city to the "successful" work 
undertaken by the RCMP and its "secret service" who for weeks had kept tabs on "[ e ]very 
move made by the agents of Moscow" and whose "spies" walked among the "contingents 
marching toward the capital on foot" and other "secret service" personnel who had been 
most "efficient". 95 Superintendent King agreed with this analysis. 96 What troubled King 
simply was the Mail & Empire author's lack of discretion in reporting the event and he 
drew the Commissioner's attention to the particular passage that mentioned spies.97 Even 
progressives who viewed the WEC in a much more positive light were forced to concede 
that the coercive role of the Force and other political police had limited popular dissent. 98 
In the WEC's wake federal policies were toughened to prevent further national 
protest of a similar kind when months later authorities decided to "discourage" any further 
94CPC TO 1930s, report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 27 July 1932. 
95 ibid., "A Communist Demonstration At Ottawa Well in Hand," The Mail & Empire. 1 August 
1932. 
96RCMP, Annual Report, 1932, 69. 
97CPC TO 1930s, report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 2 August 1932; C.F.H. stamped 
his initials in the margin of this report. Likely because it had mentioned spies it was brought to his attention. 
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·'free" transportation on the '"nation's railways''. Toward this end CNR Police and the 
RCiviP began the enforcement of a new edict prohibiting "riding the rails .. , In Northern 
Ontario to halt the eastward flow from western Canada they chose Sioux Lookout, a 
community as yet inaccessible by road, to stop every train and remove transients.~9 
These developments also coincided with the establishment of Department of 
National Defense (DND) ''relief' camps (provinces had created their own camps as early 
as 1931 ), which in the three and a half years they operated, saw more than two hundred 
camps opened across the country and more than 170,000 men entering them. too With 37 
camps in Ontario, the province had the second largest number in Canada (British Columbia 
had 57). By June 1933 more than 8,000 men in Ontario had entered them through the 
National Employment Service (NES) offices, which opened the previous November. tot 
Relief camps across Canada served many purposes. Much has been written about 
them. In addition to the minimal food, clothing, shelter and pay they provided, camps 
functioned as a so-called "safety valve" to reduce the potential threat of mass protest 
elsewhere since most were deliberately isolated from the rest of society. There was a strong 
element of 'compulsion' on the part of municipal authorities to force men to go into the 
camps. Once inside, they lost basic civil liberties, freedom of speech and the right to 
organize, and although there were no leave restrictions formally placed on the men who 
entered the camps, unless they left for medical reasons, found employment elsewhere or 
~igley, O.P.P., 201; Kelly and Kelly, The Roval Canadian Mounted Police, 180. 
1oor.aurel Sefton MacDowell, "Relief Camp Workers in Ontario during the Great Depression of the 
1930s," Canadian Historical Review, 76,2 (1995), 214; Plans for relief camps were floated around Ottawa in 
the summer and fall. Then in October, on 19 hours notice, Major-General A. G. McNaughton, chief of the 
General Staff was instructed to draw up a plan which was presented to Bennett and cabinet and the scheme 
was implemented under PC 2248, the first of 23 OC's concerning relief camps. 
101Lorne Brown, \Vhen Freedom Was Lost (Toronto, 1987); MacDowell, "Relief Camp Workers," 
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the project was finished, their way out was not paid. 10z 
For intelligence purposes for DND, the RCivrP, and other authorities, the camps 
served several important functions. tn addition to those already mentioned camps became 
a potential intelligence source since communists and other progressives were interned in 
them. Men in relief camps built the country's aerodromes which strengthened the Force's 
operations since MacBrien used airplanes to enhance all aspects of work the Force 
conducted since, as he put it,"speedy t1ights cut to pieces old patrol times."t03 Camps also 
freed up valuable Force resources so time outside could be spent conducting other 
investigations. 
[n September 1932, as plans to establish camps were being debated, Superintendent 
King reflected on the level of subversive activity in his jurisdiction. By this point his CIB's 
political operations had somewhat improved. Although its strength lay in their ability to 
broaden the basis of their mixed operational strategy, another key was simply that an 
operative was successfully developed. 
Taking stock of revolutionary activity in his jurisdiction at this juncture King 
concluded that since the conviction of the eight CP leaders the CP has "been somewhat 
disorganized" and "not so bold." As further proof of the CP' s weak state, he added, 
"[d]ifferent branches, "such as the CLDL, the WESL and others "have been careful to state 
that they are not part and parcel of the Communist Party." The CP was "badly in need of 
w
2Makahonuk, "The Saskatoon Relief Camp," 5 5-72; MacDowell, "Relief Camp Workers.,; 
Sometimes they failed miserably and had deadly consequences as the Saskatoon "riot" demonstrated. There 
were far fewer incidences of 'reported' militancy in Ontario camps than those found in western Canada. One 
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funds and their chief cry at the present time (through the Canadian Labour Defence League) 
is money and more money for the defense of Communists who are ordered deported.'' 104 
Superintendent King also felt that " ... owing to the unemployment situation and 
general unrest prevalent [the CP] had great opportunity to sow the seeds of discontent. ''w5 
In something of a repeat tall perfonnance RHQ Cffi personnel placed an operative in the 
unemployed movement in Toronto. It was likely the same individual from the WEC simply 
being rolled over. w6 The operative had dropped out of sight during much of August and 
most of September when he resumed activity and began attending National Committee of 
Unemployed Council (NCUC) meetings. 107 RHQ CIB success during the WEC ultimately 
was responsible for slowly encouraging a more pennanent return to penetration 
strengthening day-to-day operations. 
In mid-October the operative attended local demonstrations held in support of the 
single unemployed at places such as Seaton House, Wellington House, the House of 
Industry and similar institutions across the city: These "flop houses" referred to as "dens 
of horror" were places where living conditions were simply awful. 108 These institutions 
were part of the "tangled regime" of services established to assist the poor, a strange mix 
of private and quasi-public agencies responsible for shelter, clothing and in the case of the 
House of Industry for all food relief for the city in the early Depression, at least until the 
Department of Public Welfare (DPW) (established in June 1931) consolidated its control 
104RC!v1P, Annual Report, 1932, 68-69. 
105ibid., 68-69. 
106CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 3 and 6 
October 1932. 
107CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted 28 September 1932; ibid., report, source deleted, 3, 5, and 
6 October 1932. 
10M"Successful United Front Conference In Toronto,"The Worker, 8 October 1932, 4; CPC TO 
1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 15 October 1932; "Wellington 
House Toronto Flop House, Den of Horror," The Worker. 14 January 1933, 5. 
283 
in 1934 over all aspects of unemployment relief for both families and single unemployed 
males. These flop houses also became among the best points to mobilize the urban transient 
unemployed. 109 
On 17 October 1932 only a few weeks after the operative reemerged, a riot 
commenced at Kingston penitentiary and three days later Tim Buck was repeatedly shot at 
in his cell. While the true circumstances surrounding the episode are not known, whether 
guards were acting on orders, or as progressives declared, it was a botched assassination 
attempt, the following week likely through his NCUC contacts the operative joined the CP 
after a demonstration at the House of Industry. 110 He attended branch meetings. 111 ln 
November, he eventually secured a position on the Toronto CCC and he attended its weekly 
meetings until late December. 112 With an RHQ operative performing effectively in Toronto 
Superintendent King rewarded Hugh Mathewson and Constable Jones with promotions. 
The former was appointed Acting Sergeant whilst employed as senior detective at Toronto 
and the latter Acting Corporal as Division CIB Clerk. 113 
More often in the fall Toronto CIB personnel remained content to let Chief Draper 
and the TCPD pursue more overtly coercive policies. 114 Instead, they concentrated on 
December municipal elections being held for the first time in the Depression under a CP 
1~larcus Aurelius Klee, "Between the Scylla and Charybdis of Anarchy and Despotism: The State, 
Capital and the Working Class in the Great Depression, Toronto, l929-1940,"Ph.D. Dissertation, Queen's 
University, 1998, 35, 37-39; Klee argued that centralization under the DPW's control was unplanned and 
occurred in an "ad-hoc"manner as part of the state's larger goal to reduce costs and that often businesses 
stood as much to gain as the unemployed by its creation. So did the RCvlP. 
11
°Canadian Labor Defence League, Is Tim Buck a Political Prisoner. Or a Criminal') (Toronto, 
1933); "Political Prisoners,"The Canadian Forum. 13, 147 (December 1932), 84. 
111NAC RG 146 CSIS, 175P/ 392, A.E. Smith file, cross ref. sheet, 18 October 1932. 
112CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 20 and 25 
October 1932. 
113RC:MP G.O., 10519, 1 November 1932. 
11~CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 8 and 16 
November 1932; In November, the TCPD raided the offices of The Worker, which the operative reported, 
but there is no evidence that CIB personnel participated in the event. 
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United Front platfonn.tt 5 Detective Irvine and the operative attended many election 
meetings across the city and they uncovered the tensions between the various factions, the 
progressives and 'labour fakirs' for whom communists had little patience. tlli 
From where CIB personnel stood the CP's electoral prospects looked anything but 
promising. The intelligence they secured revealed the poor state of CP finances, the 
disinterest on the part of language organizations to participate, and the premature hope 
some stalwarts had that they just might be able to reinvigorate the CP and give it a "new 
working basis" through election propaganda. 117 
For these reasons Detective Irvine and Superintendent King downplayed the CP's 
chance of success at the polls. With Buck and the others in prison, and a semi-underground 
CP leadership proving itself even more "in thrall" with Moscow, election results 
subsequently proved them right. tJg Superintendent King forwarded the election results to 
NHQ highlighting the fact that none of the United Front candidates were elected, each lost 
by large majorities. 119 
115
"Toronto Conference Nominates Four Workers' Candidates for Elections," The Worker. 3 
December 1932, 1. 
116CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 8 and 16 
November 1932; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 31 December 
1932; "Toronto Election Campaign Under Way; Seven Candidates are Chosen,"The Worker. 10 December 
1932,1. 
117CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 12 and 15 
November 1932; ibid., report, source deleted and AE. Reames for Supt. to Commissioner, 26 and 28 
November 1932; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 30 November and 
6 December 1932; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 2 and 6 
December 1932; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 13 and 14 
December 1932; ibid., report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 20 December 1932; ibid., report, 
Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 21 and 22 December 1932; ibid., 
report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 3 January 1933. 
mJohn Manley, "Canadian Communist, Revolutionary Unionism, and the 'Third Period': The 
Workers' Unity League, 1929-1935," Journal ofthe CHA 1994, 177. 
119CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 12 and 15 
November 1932; ibid., "Results of Vote for Board of Control."" Aldermanic Retums"and "Board of 
Education,"The Toronto Globe, 3 January 1933; and ibid., report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 4 
January 1933. 
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During December increased OSINT was gathered on unemployed mobilization in 
the city and nearby townships. With the NES offices established the previous month 
municipal authorities began 'steering' militants toward relief camps as social conditions 
across Canada deteriorated. l:o Before long, RHQ intelligence personnel learned that the 
jobless were preparing a National Hunger March Day for 17 January. 121 
In early January the operative was instructed to attend a meeting of single 
unemployed from the Coliseum, Seaton and Wellington Houses, held to discuss the role of 
organizers at the proposed Toronto events which included a march on Queen's Park. He 
predicted these events would be "more dangerous" than previous ones since the CP had 
"learned a lot" from "past demonstrations." 122 Superintendent King agreed. King knew that 
there were about 3,000 unemployed single men housed at similar institutions across the city 
and felt that "if properly organized" that they "could no doubt cause plenty oftrouble." 123 
Superintendent King met with OPP Commissioner Williams and TCPD Chief 
Draper to "discuss" the unemployed "situation." Inspector Reames shared information with 
the Toronto City Welfare Relief Office which was now being used as a coercive instrument 
as it tightened its grip on the dispensation of aid. Detective Irvine met with several police 
chiefs in nearby towns, while the operative kept the intelligence flowing by attending 
120
"Jobless To March On Ont. Government For Relief,"The Worker. 17 December 1932, 2; "Free 
Unemployed Insurance To Be Demanded by Canada's Jobless on January 17th," The Worker, 24 December 
1932,1; Glen Makahonuk, "The Saskatoon Relief Camp Workers' Riot of May 8, 1933: An Expression of 
Class Conflcit," Saskatchewan History, 37,2 (Spring 1984), 56-57. 
121
"Toronto Jobless Learning Strength of United Action,"The Worker, 24 December 1932, 3; "Plan 
Ontario Hunger March,"The Worker, 24 December 1932, 5; "Jobless Mobilizing Behind Preparations for 
Jan. I 7th National Hunger March Day,"31 December 193 2, l. 




several additional meetings where further plans were arranged. 124 
Superintendent King's discussions resulted in a TCPD-led raid on the Bathurst 
Street Ukrainian Labor Temple and the arrest of 45 single unemployed who intended to 
participate as the 'shock troops' at the planned demonstration. Most were charged with 
vagrancy while their two leaders were singled out and charged with disturbing the peace, 
a more "serious" crime to induce a "chilling effect" and to prevent them from being able 
to secure their release in time to participate. 125 When the event materialized anyway, Irvine 
attended and filled out lengthy reports, as in these weeks, in general, he rose to the fore of 
RHQ CIB counter-subversion investigations. 126 
Detective Corporal Irvine later reported that once again the police had made a 
difference. The Hunger March and demonstration was a "complete fizzle," he noted, largely 
because of the early actions taken by his OC and the TCPD. 127 Long after the demonstration 
passed Irvine monitored the outcome of the Bathurst Street arrests as they worked their way 
through the courts. 128 The bondholders were identified, their names and addresses were 
forwarded to Ottawa for "review" by Colonel Hamilton, and all intelligence concerning the 
12%id., report, Inspector Reames to Commissioner, 13 January 1933; ibid., "Police Forces Plan 
For Hunger Marchers,"Mail And Empire, 11 January 1933; ibid., report, Inspector Reames and 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 13 and 14 January 1933; ibid., report, source deleted and 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 9 January 1933; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent 
King to Commissioner, 16 and 17 January 1933; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent 
King to Commissioner, 5 and 6 January 1933. 
125 ibid., report, Detective Corporal R W. Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 14 
January 1933. 
126ibid., report, Detective Corporal RW. Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 18 
January 1933; A cordon of city foot and mounted police '-""3.5 posted around the Queen's Park buildings to 
"maintain order" and OPP reserves were kept hidden in the basement "in case of an emergency". The 
deputation which entered the building to place its demands before government was identified and additions 
to dossiers subsequently made. 
127ibid., report, Detective Corporal R W. Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 19 
January 1933. 
128 ibid., report, Detective Corporal R W. Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 8 and 9 
February 1933. 
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court cases was also shared with Vancouver"s OC, Superintendent Wood, who had learned 
of the arrests through the ''Weekly Intelligence Summaries .. , At this time Vancouver's 
unemployed were becoming more militant. Perhaps Wood was considering pursuing a 
similar response? 129 
For several months afterwards a slowdown in RHQ intelligence investigations 
followed. The number of operative's reports diminished. Detective Irvine also became ill 
and as of March was off-duty convalescing from influenza. 130 But other issues also 
indirectly influenced work being conducted. Morale likely sunk among Force regulars and 
to a certain extent even more senior personnel felt more constrained by new rules being 
introduced. RCMP general orders adopted in these months discouraged plainclothes 
allowances as OC' s lost some control over their discretionary power to grant extra pay and 
had to follow "guidelines" when submitting their recommendation to NHQ. 131 Further pay-
scale "adjustments" were also announced "as a measure of economy" and their adoption 
in April clawed back extra pay for part-time detective and undercover work which was of 
a duration of less than seven consecutive days. Without penetration agents in key Toronto 
CP branches during much of this period most intelligence work being conducted fell into 
this category. 132 Consequently, when adopted the new pay schedule affected 186 personnel 
including over one third of"O" Division RHQ (eight personnel such as Mathewson, Veitch, 
129ibid., report, Detective Corporal R.W. Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 6 
February 1933; ibid., memorandum, Colonel Hamilton to OC "0" Division, 6 February 1933; ibid., 
memorandum, Superintendent Wood to Commissioner, 30 January 1933; ibid., memorandum, Colonel 
Hamilton to OC "E" Division, 6 February 1933. 
130
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, March 1933. 
131RCMP G.O. 310, for week ending 29 April 1933. 
132RCMP G.O. 43, orders for week ending 7 January 1933; CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted 
and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 25 and 30 January 1933; ibid., report, source deleted and 
Inspector Reames to Commissioner, 19 and 23 February 1933. 
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and Irvine, and four PS Start). 133 A few concessions and adjustments to the new wage scales 
were made, but they amounted to little. 134 While these actions took place at the same time 
a number of senior personnel, some former "0" Division staff and some future, were 
granted extra pay (Fish, Darling, King, Newson, Jennings, C.A. James and C.D. LaNauze). 
These orders were posted and available for all in Divisions to see. Economizing came at 
the expense of the junior personnel. 135 
In the spring of 1933 a few RHQ personnel such as Burrough, Hicks and Spanton 
were granted plainclothes allowances (at substantially reduced rates) and they joined others 
conducting piecemeal political investigations up until May Day which was monitored with 
less enthusiasm than in previous years. u6 Then in the summer over one fifth of the Division 
was transferred out while others formerly involved with intelligence work were returned 
to general duty as again countless days were lost toPS work, taxation, naturalization and 
supervising race track duty. 137 Work was so heary that CIB clerk Constable Jones was 
posted to ARGO for a month in July and Detective Irvine spent much of August attached 
to railway duty. 138 
Before long, intelligence personnel wanted an assessment of existing conditions in 
the Toronto CP, something they were without for months, and they also wanted intelligence 
on the WUL's upcoming Toronto National Convention and local delegates' plans 
uJ RCMP G.O. 43, orders for week ending 7 January 1933; and ibid., G.O. 207, week ending 25 
l\lfarch 1933. 
134RCMP G.O. 272, week ending 22 April1933. 
135 RCMP G.O. 157, week ending 41\lfarch 1933; ibid., G.O. 204.n.d. 
136May Day passed off"quietly" anyhow without any serious "disturbances." RCl\llP G.O. 322, for 
week ending, 29 April 1933; RCl\IIP G.O. 323, for week ending, 29 April 1933; CPC TO 1930s, report, 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 28 April 1933; ibid., report, Detective Corporal R W. Irvlne and 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 3 May 1933. 
137RCl\11P G.O. 391, 1933; RCMP G.O. 400, 1933; RCMP G.O. 451,1933; RCl\llP G.O 698, 1933; 
RCMP G.O. 699, 1933. 
138
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, July- August 1933. 
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concerning a National Congress on Unemployment scheduled for Ottawa in September. 139 
It was not surprising that the RHQ CfB's gaze fixed upon CP affiliates such as the WUl 
and the CLDL since they had entered 1933 stronger. The WUL had made organizing gains 
in the city's light industries and the CLDL was nearing the height of its popularity. t40 
In August an operative rekindled his association with stalwarts at a Toronto CP 
meeting and Superintendent King got the intelligence he requested.t 4 t Reports suggested 
that revolutionary organizations were "losing their hold upon the unemployed masses" and 
CP activities throughout the district were "practically at a standstill." This analysis was 
confirmed by stalwarts such as George Harris and Charlie Sims who spoke openly about 
poor conditions within the CP and of the need to entirely reorganize the party to "avert" its 
"complete collapse. "t42 
Industrial work was a remarkable exception. In August, after just five weeks, the 
Chesterfield and Furniture Workers' Industrial Union of Toronto (WUL) had organized 
local furniture workers and at eleven Toronto furniture plants men struck. t43 WUL organizer 
Fred Collins was arrested by the TCPD and charged in Toronto for "obstructing a Peace 
Officer" while leading a demonstration. t44 The Stratford furniture strike followed in 
13~ealey and Whitaker [eds.], The Depression Years. Part L SB #674, 29 September 1933, 29-30; 
"Unemployment Councils," The Canadian Forum. 13,155 (August 1933), 405. 
1~ealey and Whitaker [eds.], The Depression Years. Part L SB# 675, 6 October 1933, 41-
42;While WUL organizer George Drayton's claim that the League had led 130 of 180 key strikes in Canada 
during the past couple of years (and most of those it did not were spontaneous) was probably exaggerated, 
his larger point about its importance was not. 
141CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 3 and 8 
August 1933. 
142Kealey and Whitaker [ eds. ], The Depression Years. Part L SB# 673, 22 September 1933, 21; 
ibid., SB# 677, 20 October 1933, 50-51. 
143CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 19 and 21 
Nlarch 1933; "Arrest of Joe Derry Is Threat Against Young Communist League,nThe Worker, 29 April 
1933, 1; Manley, "Canadian Communists, Revolutionary Unionism,"178-179: Leach, "The Workers' Unity 
League," 40-41. 
144NAC RG 146, 175/4462, Fred Collins PHF, report, Detective Corporal Irvine, September 1933. 
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September. Its events are well known to historians and need not detain us here. However, 
it taught authorities more than simply that the days of calling out the troops were gone (or 
had serious consequences) but also that better intelligence was required because in the 
process it exposed the poor level of intelligence work being conducted by Division 
personnel. 145 Only when prompted several weeks later by OPP General Williams who along 
with Joe Sedgwick of the Attorney General's Department was "contemplating" prosecution 
of some of the Stratford "agitators" did King check his file on Fred Collins and other 
agitators noticing they were "very incomplete". 146 
Consequently, Superintendent King believed that repositioning his operative was 
critical. So in the fall the operative joined a Toronto CP branch and the Earlscourt 
Neighbourhood Council, part of the CP's united front program to stop evictions, shutting 
off water, gas, light, and other grievances. The operative attended their fall meetings and 
also an Eastern Canada Repeal Congress held in Toronto in November. 147 He secured 
copies of the Congress minutes and he obtained a three-page list identifYing delegates to 
the event. 148 He signed his reports as Agent 877 and his work eventually exposed further 
WUL plans to join forces with other organizations such as the YCL, the CLDL, to target 
145Desmond Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power: The Stratford Strikes of1933," in Irving Abella (ed.) 
On Strike, 79-91; Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before The Law. 183-184; Leach, "The Workers' Unity 
League"; John Taylor, "Relief from Relief': The Cities' Answer to Depression Dependency," Journal of 
Canadian Studies. 14,1 (Spring 1979), 16-23; "Stratford Strikers Maintain their Ranks Firm and Unbroken," 
The Worker, 14 October 1933, I; "The 'Red' Bogey Will Not Undermine The Stratford Strikers' 
Solidarity," The Worker. 7 October 1933, 5; CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 11 August 1933; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector Reames 
to Commissioner, 15 and 16 August 1933; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to 
Commissioner, 29 September and 2 October 1933; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to 
Commissioner, 3 and 5 October 1933. 
t-16CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, Superintendent King to the Commissioner, 3 October 1933. 
147Kealey and Whitaker (eds.], The Depression Years. Part l SB# 677, 20 October 1933, 51. 
148CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 5 October 
1933; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 7 October 1933; ibid., report, 
source deleted and Inspector Reames to Commissioner, 16 and 17 October 1933. ibid., report, source 
deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, l 0 and 13 November 193 3. 
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certain establishments such as the General Steelware Company, the railway shops at 
Spadina and in Mimico, and the Hamilton Mercury Mills, Ford Plants in Windsor and steel 
companies at Hamilton, Welland, Niagara, Kitchener and elsewhere. 149 
In November 1933, with at least one operative better positioned, and Irvine involved 
in a number of CIB political investigations, Hugh Mathewson was promoted to Sergeant 
and Ted Weeks was granted plainclothes allowance for an unspecified period. 150 A special 
telephone allowance was also introduced which gave the Commissioner the power to grant 
detectives and other key personnel a per diem in cases where telephone contact was 
"absolutely necessary" for duty off-setting some of their earlier losses. 151 Six "0" Division 
personnel were granted a telephone allowance and they included: Corporals A.M. Veitch, 
R. W. Irvine, Ted Weeks and Constable L.C. Turner, who were all involved in intelligence 
work. I 52 
Before long, intelligence work against local CP branches fell off. It did not improve 
14~ealey and Whitaker [eds.J, The Depression Years. Part L SB 677,20 October 1933, 51; CPC 
TO 1930s, report, Agent 877 and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 13 and 14 November 1933. 
1so.'O" Division, Nominal Rolls, October and November 1932; RCMP G.O. 844, 1-11-32; RCMP 
G.O. 846, 1-11-33. 
151NAC RG 146, 175/P2494, Stewart Smith PHF, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 23 and 24 October 1933; RCMP G.O. 805, P.C. 2516, 19 October 
1933; RCMP G.O. 806, 1933; In five Divisions (A, C, D, E, F) during this period 29 personnel in total were 
granted this special telephone allowance. A good number of them (including Frank Zaneth at Montreal and 
Staff Sergeant AG. Champion at "A"Division, Constable N.E. Macfarlane at "E"Division and Acting 
Sergeant AJ. Stretton at "F'Division) had a direct hand in monitoring and reporting on the activities of 
agitators such as Buck, both Smiths and James Bryson during this period and appear frequently in PHF's 
and core Division files. 
15~CMP G.O. 837, 1933; RCMP G.O. 1007, 1934; RCMP G.O. 844, 1933; RCMP G.O. 846, 
1933; RCMP G.O. 972, 1933; RCMPO G.O. 1003, 1933; Two others conducting investigations were 
Constables G.J. Haywood and H.J. Burrough; RCMP, Quarterly. 33,1 (July 1967), "obituary of ex:-CpL 
Lawrence Cecil Turner," 78. 
Lawrence Cecil Turner, born at Desborough, Northamptonshire, England, in 1898. He served the 
CEF in 1916-1919 and the Corps ofMiltary SaffClerks from 1919-1920. He joined the Force in February 
1921 and took his discharge to work with PS in 1927 and became a member of the Force again in Windsor 
on 1 March 1932. He retired to pension on 30 June 1938, having been station at Ottawa, Toronto, 
Leamington, Walkerville, Windsor and Sudbury. He died in Merriam, Kansas in 1966. 
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until much later the following year. For at least six weeks beginning in December an 
operative stopped reporting. But this was just the first of several developments that hurt 
RHQ CrB operations. Corporal Jones, who for three years had maintained CIB files, was 
returned to general duty, demoted to the rank and pay of constable, and eventually 
discharged from the Force as "unsuitable." 153 His position went to Constable Hubert 
Mansfield Childerstone, another British immigrant, but he lacked Jones' experience in CIB 
records.t 54 Then in January three other developments further eroded the CIB's strength: 
Constable H.J. Burrough, former CIB chauffeur/ detective (a casualty of earlier pay cuts) 
quit the Force as soon as his contract expired, Inspector Reames became ill and was listed 
off duty for two months and, to make matters worse still, the Division began running 
month-long instructional classes in Toronto which removed significant numbers of 
personnel from regular duties. tss 
Toronto CIB personnel were fortunate that most of Irvine's wintertime reports 
concluded that communist activity throughout the region was at a standstill. t56 By February, 
Superintendent King and an operative who resumed infrequent coverage during the winter 
153RCMP, Nominal Rolls, July 1933- January 1934; RCMP G.O. I013, 15 January 1934. 
154RCMP, Quarterly, 48,3 (Summer 1983), "obituary ofHubert .Mansfield Childerstone," 78; 
Hubert Mansfield Childerstone, was born at Acton, England, in 1904. He joined the RC1v!P in 
April 1927 and served briefly at "E" Division before leaving the Force temporarily and then rejoining in 
Ottawa at "A" Division in December 1931. On 7 October 1933 he was posted to "0" Division RHQ and I 
November 1939 transferred to Rackliffe to join the No. I Provost Company. He served overseas until 1946 
and was discharged to pension in 1947. He died in 1982 in Burnaby. 
''~CMP, Nominal Rolls, January· February 1934; RCMP G.O. 1055, 26-1-1934; NAC RG 18 Service File 
of Albert Reames, memorandum, A/ Supt. Kemp to "0" DOC, 9 December I933; Mathewson filled in for 
Reames during this period An operative attended the annual Lenin Anniversary meeting in Toronto, while a 
Premier's Conference in Ottawa in mid-January saw progressives send a deputation from Toronto by car to 
press for unemployment relief, and Sergeant l.\llathewson identified the group leaving from Toronto and 
provided the DCI with the car's license plate number. 
156CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, StaffSergeant B.H. James to DCL 16 January 1934; ibid., report, 
Superintendent King to Commissioner, 16 January 1934; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent 
King to Commissioner, 25 January 1934; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to 
Commissioner, 5 and 9 February 1934. 
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agreed. They reported that the reduction was true in the CLDL and "nearly every other 
organization which is an outlet for Communist propaganda." 157 They blamed the general 
slowdown on the cold weather the city had experienced. As temperatures improved, they 
felt, "agitation" would increase and there would be a ··more determined drive than there has 
been in the past" on the part of revolutionaries. 158 
Superintendent King and the operative both had good reason to believe that 
"agitation" would increase. Winter relief loads in 1934 had risen dramatically and two 
studies released on city housing conditions that year reported acute shortages. 159 As 
conditions in general for Toronto's working class continued to deteriorate, before long, a 
major national strike wave began. The 1934 strikes generally were more "offensive" in 
nature, in the sense that they were over changes in wages, conditions and recognition, and 
enjoyed higher rates of success. 160 Toronto strikes, in particular, were more numerous and 
violent in 1934 than in any year since the postwar upheaval. 161 With few available resources 
Division personnel were hard pressed to provide effective monitoring of these activities. 
Seen in this light A.E. Smith's March acquittal on charges of sedition dealt intelligence 
personnel a further blow because his release meant that scarce resources had to be 
mcpc TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner l'vlacBrien, 5 
and 9 February 1934. 
158ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner MacBrien, 5 and 9 
February 1934. 
1~ Cassidy, "Is Unemployment ReliefEnough?"The Canadian Forum, 14, 160 (January 
1934), 131-133; "Editoriai,"The Canadian Forum, 14, 167 (August 1934), 415; "Toronto Slums,"The 
Canadian Forum. 15, 171 (December 1934), 88; Klee, "Between the Scylla," 38; The city needed as many 
14,000 dwellings and this crisis was exacerbated only by the poor conditions in those existing homes. 
160Cruikshank and Kealey, "Canadian Strike Statistics," 96, 114-115 
161Kealey and Whitaker, RC.MP. Security Bulletins. The Depression Years. Part l SB #697, 9 
March 1934, 70-71; Klee, "Between the Scylla," 300; "Several Strikes Called In Toronto; WUL Lead,"The 
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channeled into paying more attention to his activities and would only assist the forces 
seeking to destabilize the position of authorities who already felt challenged. 16: 
These developments meant that May Day preparations went virtually unreported. 
Only the events themselves were monitored by Detective [rvine, Constable Spanton and an 
operative who joined the parade and the public meetings which were held in an "orderly 
manner" but there was nothing spectacular about the work being conducted. 163 Toronto 
intelligence operations temporarily improved afterward. The operative reported that the 
CP's city branches were being consolidated in the city's West end and while downtown 
"activity" is "a little quiet at present," he felt, it would "open up" as soon as the date for the 
provincial election was announced. 164 He was right Communists eventually contested 14 
ridings and polled nearly 9000 votes, which did little to ease concerns CIB personnel had 
about the CP's growth in the province. 165 
During the summer the RHQ CIB turned its gaze to national unemployed councils 
which were busily arranging protests and demonstrations across Canada. By July all greater 
Toronto municipalities with the exception ofForest Hill and Swansea were either bankrupt 
or under trusteeship. 166 The city of Windsor was placed under supervision and hunger 
march committees from across the province were meeting with plans to march on Queen's 
Park. With plans like these under way it was predictable that experienced personnel such 
162CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 28 and 29 
lY!arch 1934; "Big Bad Red,"The Canadian Forum. 14,163 (April 1934), 245. 
163CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 27 and 28 
April 1934; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, l and 3 
lYlay 1934; ibid., report, Superintendent King to Commissioner, 3 May 1934. 
t~>~cpc TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner MacBrien, 10 
May 1934. 
165Kealey and Whitaker [eds.], The Depression Years. Part L SB# 712, 23 June 1934, 93-94. 
166-yhompson and Seager, Canada 1922-1939. 
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as senior NCO Sergeant Smyly would be refused summer furlough. 167 
In July Queen's Park became a focal point for unemployed protest. The steps taken 
by the RCNlP to monitor the events were so similar to previous demonstrations held there 
that the story is simply not worth recounting in full. An operative attended Toronto 
unemployed council meetings in anticipation of these events and he joined the Provincial 
Hunger March Committee. OSINT was forwarded to NHQ and liaison increased with the 
TCPD. 168 Provincial and municipal authorities split over the proposed Hunger March. Five 
of the Kingston eight were released on parole and thousands turned out to Union Sta.tion 
to greet several of them. When RHQ CIB intelligence personnel also learned that a YCL 
demonstration, the CLDL's Ontario District Convention and even a CP National Plenum, 
were scheduled for Toronto for the same week as the Hunger March, it was not surprising 
that Superintendent King's concerns increased. 169 Local authorities anticipated trouble. 
167Taylor, "Relief from Relief," 18; "0" Division, Nominal Rolls, August- October 1934; RCtvfP 
G.O. 1703, 20-10-1934; ibid., SB #697, 9 March 1934, 68; #711, 20 June 1934, 85. 
168CPC TO, 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 27 June 
1934; report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 21 and 22 May 1934. ; ibid., report, 
source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 12 June 1934; ibid., "Join the Hunger 
('vfarch!"handbill obtained by source unknown, forwarded along with a report, Superintendent King to 
Commissioner, 28 July 1934; Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Depression Years 1933-34. SB #713, 4 July 
1934, 1 05; ibid., , SB# 715, 18 July 1934, 144; ibid., SB# 716, 25 July 1934, 154-155. 
169 Access Request, 93-A-00019, RG 146, vol. 2635, Hunger Marchers to Toronto- 1930s Up To 
1934; CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 28 and 29 May 
1934; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 31 May 1934; 
ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 2 June 1934; ibid., report, Detective 
Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 7 June 1934; ibid., report, Detective Corporal 
Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 8 June 1934; report, source deleted and Superintendent 
King to Commissioner, 5 and 6 July 1934; ibid., "Clash As Crowd Greets Release ofCommunists,"Ottawa 
Citizen, 4 July 1934; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 5 
and 6 July 1934; ibid.,report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 4 and 6 July 1934: 
ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 10 and 11 July 1934; 
ibid., memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Jennings, DCL to OC "0" Division, 14 July 1934; ibid., report, 
Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 18 July 1934; ibid., report, Detective 
Corporal Irvine and Inspector Reames to Commissioner, 20 July 1934; Kealey and Whitaker [ eds. ], The 
Depression Years. Part I. SB #715, 18 July 1934, 144; ibid., SB #717, l August 1934, 180-181. ibid., SB 
#715, 18 July 1934, 132, 144-145; ibid., SB3 717, I August 1934, 180. 
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Dozens of articles were clipped and deposited on tiles in these weeks. Reports were filled 
out and dossiers also saw a tremendous increase. Acting on intelligence provided them 
municipal authorities resorted to arrests to induce a "chilling effect" beginning two \veeks 
prior to the march. CIB personnel, propelled by similar fears, increased their monitoring 
of various umbrella organizations. But when disorder and chaos "failed to materialize'' the 
CIB's operative reported that radical activities in Toronto and Southern Ontario were on 
the decline. Quickly Superintendent King's assessment of conditions changed. They 
mirrored his operative's own views. 170 
The most significant consequence of the RHQ CIB 's preoccupation with the 
unemployed, the WUL, the CLDL and to a limited extent local CP branch life, was that 
intelligence personnel during Superintendent King's tenure in Toronto ignored the rise of 
anti-fascist organizations. NHQ intelligence personnel also downplayed the transformation 
taking place. In the summer of 1934 the IO reported that little anti-fascist work was being 
accomplished in Ontario and what little was was meeting with no success. 171 Plans to hold 
an August Youth Congress Against War and Fascism's (YCA WF) Convention in Toronto 
were reported briefly in June by the IO but little else followed. The event itself was 
completely overshadowed by the CIB's concern with other activities. 
In August, the IO mocked the YCA WF's claims of an "alleged" aggregate 
membership of over 100,000 and its national representation. 172 About the only Toronto anti-
fascist event to receive any coverage in core city files or in the IO' s SBs was an account of 
a picket held outside of the North German Lloyd Steamship Company's Toronto office 
170CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 5 and 6 June 
1934; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent King to Commissioner, 28 July 1934. 
171Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Depression Years. Part I. SB #718, 8 August 1934, 185; ibid., 
SB #719, 15 August 1934, 198-199. 
172ibid., 201. 
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(against the persecution of Ernest Thaelmann in Germany) because it had led to several 
arrests and was reported in the press. 173 Furthermore, the steamship company had a long 
history of putting its resources to use in the services of foreign agents. 
The Force's failure was not entirely a problem of its own making since even many 
leading stalwarts were uncertain about the direction the movement was heading. Stewart 
Smith in early 1934 under the pseudonym George Pierce released a study Socialism and the 
C.C.F. and had kept up with the rhetoric of the Third Period. In it Smith had stated that 
there was no difference between Fascism in Germany and capitalist democracy in Canada 
"'as they were both dictatorships of the same ruling class, the capitalist class." 174 This study 
gained a wide audience including some consideration by the DCI and other intelligence 
personnel. 175 But on balance, the failure to place more than a modicum of interest in anti-
fascist activities became the clearest sign that the mixed operational strategy adopted 
during Superintendent King's administration after two years still left something to be 
desired. 
5.2 
Phase 2: Reorientation and battling Anti-Fascism 
in the Popular Front 
The fall of 1934 brought significant change to both '"0" Division and the 
progressive movement. In September, Commissioner MacBrien ordered Superintendent 
173CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent King to Commissioner 
MacBrien, 28 July 1934; Kealey and Whitaker [eds.], The Depression Years. Part I. SB #718, 8 August 
1934, 195; ibid., "Toronto Communist Get Thirty Days' Tenn,"N.D.; Those arrested were Joe Derry, Peter 
Kozak and William Brennan. 
mPenner, Canadian Communism. 129. 
175NAC RG 146, 175P/ 2494, Ste-wart Smith file, report, Superintendent King toCommissioner, 6 
April 1934; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Inspector Reames to Commissioner, 24 July 1934; 
ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector Walter Munday and Acting Commissioner Wood to 
Commissioner, 21 and 24 July 1934. 
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King to report to Ottawa to assume command of "A'' Division. [twas a hurried transfer. 
However, his Toronto successor Superintendent C. D. LaNauze brought vast experience to 
the Division. LaNauze had worked at Toronto RHQ earlier supervising the occasional 
intelligence investigation in the late 1920s. He had also concerned himself with the Leopold 
Affair writing one of the more substantial reports for NHQ on the matter. 176 
Superintendent LaNauze made few personnel changes to the RHQ CIB. Inspector 
Reames remained senior officer in charge of the Division's CIB and beneath him Sergeant 
Mathewson and Max Veitch split supervision of daily operations with Constable 
Childerstone still in charge of CIB records and Detective Irvine as the lead Toronto 
investigator. 177 
In the fall change stemmed more from a shift in the RCMP's focus of investigations 
brought about largely as a consequence of international developments taking place. Hitler 
was not interested in renewing the Soviet-Gennan Friendship treaty (signed originally at 
Rapallo in 1922) so the USSR began to look elsewhere for alliances. In September, as the 
Soviet Union was granted membership in the League of Nations, new popular front 
organizations were established. 178 A reappraisal by NHQ intelligence personnel of popular 
front initiatives occurred during the CLA WF's first National Congress in Toronto in 
October. The Congress claimed 300 official delegates and 200 observers representing 200 
organizations and the interests of more than 330,000 Canadians. SeniorNHQ intelhgence 
176NAC RG 18, vol. 3452, file, 0-177, Service Record ofC.H. King, telegram, Commissioner 
MacBrien to Superintendent King, 6 September 1934; RCl\-tP, Quarterly, 18,2 (October 1952), 180; 
"obituary of Ex-Asst. Commissioner Charles Deering LaNauze", Lru."\J'auze joined the Force in September 
1908, was promoted Inspector 1 October 1914, Superintendent 1 April 1932. Acting Assistant 
Commissioner l July 1935, confirmed in rank 1 July 1936 and retired to pension of 1 April 1944. During his 
career he served extensively in the North, the Maritimes, Prairies, the West Coast, Toronto and Ottawa. He 
was a member of the 1911 Coronation Contingent and served overseas during WWl He died in 1952. 
177
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, September- December 1934. 
178Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, 212. 
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1 
RCMP Maritime Training Depot, Halifax, N.S., class • 1, January 1933 (members in RCMP uniform 
identified here were from the Nova Scotia Police). 1. Cpl. N.W. Churchill, 2. Cst. P.l. Bentley, 
3. Cst. W.O. Grimm, 4. Cpl. LN. Draper, 5. Cpl. M.V. O'Shaughnessy, 6. Cst. J.H. Campbell, 7. Cst. 
J. Bennison, 8. Cst. M.J. Black, 9. Insp. B. B. Currie, 10. Supt. C.D. La Nauze ("H" Division RCMP C.O.), 
11. Sgt. Major J. Clifford (RCMP service only), and 12. Cpl. A.D. Norman. Tentative identification is 
given of the 6th man back row as Cpl. M. Maclean, 7th man back row as Cst. D. MacKinnon, and 8th 
man back row as Cst. E.J. Richard. 
A temporary respite from "0" Division. 
C.D. LaNauze in Halifax as Maritime "H" Division OC in 1933. 
Source: Cst. R.C. Toner and D.C. Perrier, "Nova Scotia Police," 
RCivfP Ouarterlv 47,3 (Summer 1982), 42-43. 
299b 
personnel embraced these estimates believing that the movement had become a dangerous 
reality to be "reckoned with". 179 
Although the CP declared the Congress a success, a breakdown in understanding 
between NHQ and "0" Division RHQ CIB personnel over its importance occurred. The 
Congress quickly came to symbolize this fact. 180 LaNauze instructed Detective Irvine to 
attend the Congress' opening, while a second operative sat in its daily sessions. 181 Poor 
communication meant that Detective Corporal Irvine, who was "unimpressed" by the 
movement's sudden national presence and felt that its importance was "grossly 
exaggerated," provided mis-analysis of the event and the anti-fascist movement generally. 182 
DCI Jennings found Irvine's assessment "lacking" and in need of immediate "correction" 
because NHQ considered "the affair" a "decided success'' and "one of the most outstanding 
things accomplished in the CPC's history." DCI Jennings wanted as much intelligence on 
anti-fascist activities as Divisions could secure. 183 
Henceforth, Divisions made the CLA WF and eventually other anti-fascist 
organizations a priority. They were instructed to assess the extent of communist infiltration 
and to report their findings back to NHQ. 184 When delegates returned home following the 
''79j],id., SB #728, 17 October 1934, 328; John Manley is quick to remind us that the latter number 
in other similar events can be taken with a "handful of salt."Still NHQ spymasters soon felt differently. John 
Manley, "Introduction,"Kealey and Whitaker [ eds.] The Depression Years. Part II. 15. 
1
'"1<ealey and Whitaker [ eds.] The Depression Years. Part L SB# 728, 17 October 1934, 3 31. 
181ATIP request 96-A-00065, NAC RG 146, vol. 791, CSIS file, "League Against War and 
Fascism, Toronto, Ont. Oct. 1934,"(hereafter, CSIS LA WF), report, Detective Corporal Irvine, 9 October 
1934; ibid., report, source deleted and Inspector James for Superintendent to Commissioner MacBrien, 9 
October 1934. 
182CSIS LA WF file, memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Jennings, DCI, to OC "0" Division, 18 
October 1934; Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Depression Years. Part L SB #728, 17 October 1934, 328. 
183ibid. 
1114CSIS "LAWF"file, report, source deleted and Inspector James for Superintendent to 
Commissioner MacBrien, 9 October 1934; Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Depression Years Part L SB 
#728, 17 October 1934, 328; #729, 24 October 1934, 344;#730, 31 October 1934, 355;#738, 28 December 
1934,465. 
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Congress, public speeches they made were monitored by intelligence personnel in centres 
such as Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Montreal, Halifax and elsewhere. 185 
AtTecting this reorientation and firmly establishing anti-fascist activities was LaNauze' s 
primary contribution to the Division's 1930s intelligence operations. 
Following the Congress Detective Corporal Irvine made a few discreet enquires and 
obtained the address of the CLA WF' s Toronto 'Headquarters'. He secured a copy of the 
Congress Report and the DCI was informed that additional copies could be obtaineu upon 
request. The DCI wanted six more forwarded "as soon as possible" and by the end of the 
month four had been sent while NHQ pursued other copies elsewhere. 186 
Irvine attended November Anniversary Celebrations of the Russian Revolution at 
Massey Hall and reported the event was one of the "most openly communistic to be held 
in Toronto for some time, [and it] proceeded without any interference from the local 
police."187 Force personnel attended a small gathering arranged upon Buck's release from 
prison at the end ofNovember and also his massive welcome home before 17,000 at Maple 
Leaf Gardens on 2 December. 188 Municipal elections followed. They earned extensive 
coverage by Irvine and LaNauze who reported that communist and United tront candidates 
mibid., report, Source deleted and Assistant Commissioner Dann to Commissioner ivtacBrien, 16 
October 1934; Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Depression Years. Part L SB #731, 7 November 1934, 385; 
#733, 21 November 1934,400, 402; #734, 28 November 1934,423. 
186CSIS LA WF file, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent LaNauze to 
Commissioner MacBrien, 23 October 1934; ibid., memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Jennings, DCL to 
OC "0" Division, 26 October 1934; ibid., Superintendent Mead, OC "C" Division, to Commissioner 
MacBrien, 3 November 1934. 
187NAC RG 146 CSIS, 175P/ 2494 Stewart Smith file, report Detective Corporal Irving and 
Inspector Reames to Commissioner, 7 and 9 November 1934. 
188NAC RG 146 CSIS, 175P/ 2035, Tim Buck file, report, source deleted and Superintendent C.D. 
LaNauze to Commissioner, 26 November 1934; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Inspector 
Reames to Commissioner, 4 December 1934; Kealey and Whitaker [eds.], R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The 
Depression Years. Part L SB #736, 12 December 1934, 439-444; Momentum for the release of Buck and 
the others had grown in successive years since the CLDL launched its original petition drive in 1932 and 
secured 459 000 names. 
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polled "slightly higher" than in previous years although numbers remained low enough that 
results were not yet cause for alarm. 189 When workloads increased during the winter Irvine 
was occasionally assisted by Constables Lamont, Porter and Spanton. 190 In January they 
attended several "Lenin, Liebk.necht, Luxemburg" meetings and other events arranged by 
the CP and its subsidiaries. 191 
Just as a noticeable improvement in RHQ CIB operations occurred, in February 
Superintendent LaNauze became ill. He remained off duty until he was transferred to '"A" 
Division in July. 192 In his absence Inspector Reames was temporarily placed in charge of 
the Division's entire operations. Reames was simultaneously responsible for his job as CIB 
head. 193 For several months intelligence work suffered as a consequence. 194 Some 
intelligence also dried up on account of plans revolutionaries made. Buck left the city for 
a western tour and spent two months out west and then quickly swung back to the east coast 
189CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent LaNauze to 
Commissioner, 14 and 15 December 1934; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent LaNauze to 
Commissioner, 26 December 1934; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent LaNauze to 
Commissioner, 27 December 1934; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent LaNauze to 
Commissioner, 3 January 1935. 
190
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, December 1934 and January 1935. 
191CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, 21 January 193 5; ibid., report, source deleted and 
Superintendent LaNauze to Commissioner, 21 and 22 January 1935; ibid., report, 29 January 1935; ibid., 
report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent LaNauze to Commissioner, 29 January 193 5. 
192
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, February 1935- July 1935; RG 18 vol. 3455, file 0-203, Service 
Record of Albert Edward George Oakleigh Reames, memorandum, Commissioner MacBrien to Minister in 
Control, RCMP, 6 Aprill935; ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Kemp, Adjutant to DOC "0" Division, 
27 May 1935; LaNauze replaced Cawdron as supply officer who was going on leave before retiring. 
193NAC RG 18, box 4941, file 0-203 Service Record of AE.G.O. Reames (Hereinafter cited as 
RCMP Service Record of Albert Reames), memorandum, Commissioner MacBrien to Minister in charge of 
RCMP, 6 April1935. 
194CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 4 January 
1935; report, source deleted, 20 April1935; ibid., report, source deleted and AJ Supt. Reames to 
Commissioner, 23 April 193 5; ibid., report, source deleted and A/Supt. Reames to Commissioner, 26 April 
1935; Rivett-Carnac, Pursuit in the Wilderness, 303; This 'doubling-up' of responsibilities was not unheard 
of even later periods and at higher levels too. In 1945, the office of DCI had "fallen vacant" with the 
retirement of its CO. Rivett-Camac was transferred to Ottawa to head the intelligence section and conjointly 
occupied the position ofDCI until a more senior officer could be transferred. 
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reducing a potential source. The next time he was '·spotted" in the region (and reported on 
in his dossier) was in mid-June. For two months nothing was deposited on the core Toronto 
CP file nor the CLA WF file and most intelligence acquired by Division personnel shifted 
to centres outside Toronto such as Windsor, Hamilton, Stratford and elsewhere. t95 
RHQ CIB operations slowly improved in April when an operative positioned 
himself in the revolutionary community in Toronto and Detective Irvine resumed his 
reporting on local activities. t96 They were joined by what appear to have been several other 
casual 'contacts' who reported on the infrequent meeting and then disappeared from the 
files. One operative attended a local "Worker Drive Festival" in support of a daily Worker, 
he also attended concerts, Toronto United May Day preparatory meetings and patticipat~u 
in a demonstration outside the Finnish Consulate in demand of the release of Toivo 
Antikainen, a prominent communist in Finland, awaiting trial on the charge of murder. 197 
Irvine and the operative attended May Day festivities which were monitored in the usual 
manner. This intelligence was shared with the OPP and the TCPD and across the Division, 
Reames reported, it "passed" without any "serious trouble" arising. t98 
195NAC RG 146 CSIS, 175P/2035, Tim Buck file, report, Constable Wilson, Inspector Mercer and 
Superintendent LaNauze to Commissioner, 4 and 6 February 1935; ibid., report, source deleted, 11 February 
1935; ibid., report, Constable Jesse, Constable Rehfeld and Superintendent LaNauze to Commissioner, 12 
and 15 February 1935; ibid., report, Corporal Williams, 17 and 18 June 1935. 
1~AC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CLPD file, report, Detective Irvine and N Supt. Reames to 
Commissioner, 27 and 30 April 1935. 
197NAC RG 146, CSIS, 17SP/2494, Stewart Smith File, report, C.F. Zryd, 20 Aprill935; One 
contact or operative's name was C.F. Zryd; CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, 20 April 1935; ibid., 
report, source deleted and N Supt. Reames to Commissioner, 23 April 1935; ibid., report, source deleted 
and N Supt. Reames to Commissioner, 26 April 1935. 
198CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, 3 May 1935; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
AJ Supt. Reames to Commissioner, 3 May 1935; report, Constable W.J Dickson, 24 April 1935; ibid., 
report, NSupt. Reames to Cst. IIC Sault Ste. Marie, 26 April 1935; ibid., report, source deleted, 3 May 
1935; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and N Supt. Reames to Commissioner, 3 May 1935; 
"Communist Admits Agitators Are Paid," Toronto Star, 2 May 1935; "~lay Day Loyalties Mixed Parade 
Puzzles Watchers,"Toronto Star. 2 May 1935; "Down With War And Fascism Too, Parade 
Demand,"Toronto Star, 2 May 1935. 
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In July, acting Superintendent Reames' was officially promoted to the rank of 
Superintendent and given full command of"O" Division. 199 His appointment from within 
made Walkerville SDHQ OC Robert Mercer the second in command of the Division. 200 In 
June, Mercer was transferred to Toronto, and while Reames kept the CIB portfolio, 
Mercer's assistance lightened his OC's workload. But technically, "0" Division was 
entitled to another senior member of the Force being transferred in from outside the 
Division. NHQ was trying to trim its overhead and Force adjutant Kemp informed Reames 
that in this instance "therefore no other officer is being detailed to "0" Division."201 
Mercer's former position as officer in charge ofWindsor SDHQ went to Ted Weeks 
but by this point in the Division's history several other detachments had grown sufftctemiy 
in strength such as Hamilton and Oshweken, for instance, so that they now competed with 
Windsor and had as many personnel stationed there (fluctuating between four and six) 
which reduced the latter's claim to SDHQ status. 202 Consequently, Windsor SDHQ reverted 
back to its original status as just another detachment and it was not until the 1950s that 
another SDHQ was established in the Division. 203 
Between May and November Detective Irvine and an operative were responsible for 
nearly all reports deposited on the core file. In May, a federal election was announced for 
October. In anticipation constituency meetings were held and attended by intelligence 
personnel and Detective Irvine secretly paid a visit to the CP's Federal Election 
1~CMP G.O. 2368, 1-3-35; NAC RG 18 Service Record of Albert Reames, memorandum, 
Commissioner MacBrien to Governor General in Council, 2 July 1935. 
2oo.'O" Division, Nominal Rolls, April 1935. 
201NAC RG 18 Service Record of Albert Reames, memorandum, Assistant Supt. Kemp, Adjutant, 
to DOC "0" Division, 27 May 1935. 
202
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, June 1935. 
203
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, June, July, November, 1935. 
304 
Headquarters to purchase copies of the party's election program. 204 In June, the operative 
felt so comfortable in the work he conducted that he graced a CP "Garden Party and Social" 
held at a local comrade's home where "Canada Bud Ale was served at 5c a glass" and 
"[b]ox lunches were raffled at various prices" and [a]U proceeds were donated to the 
FSU. 205 He participated frequently in Toronto CP activities, eventually he became a District 
#2 Ward #3 Secretary and by the fall served in a local leadership capacity. 206 With RHQ 
short-staffed and Irvine, in particular, swamped with other work, the brutal repression of 
the Ottawa-bound trekkers in Regina on 1 July earned scant coverage in Toronto files. 207 
In August DCI Jennings sent a memorandum to "0" Division's OC to the effect that 
Montreal reported that Stewart Smith was in the Soviet Union attending the Congress of 
the CI and he wanted that information verified. 208 It took Irvine several weeks to respond 
and his early reports proved inconclusive, while subsequent inquiries made around CP 
Toronto headquarters were stopped since they threatened to expose a contact. 209 
The October 1935 federal election was reported by RHQ CIB personnel. 210 During 
204NAC RG 146, CSIS, 175P/ 2494, Stewart Smith File, report, source deleted and Inspector 
Reames to Commissioner, 1 and 3 April 1935; CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and N 
Supt. Reames to Commissioner, 28 :May 1935. 
205CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and NSupt. Reames to Commissioner, 18 June 1935. 
W6CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 12 
December 1935. 
207Kealey and Whitaker [eds.], RC.M.P. Se~urity Bulletins. The Depression Years. Part II. SB 
#776, 9 October 1935, 523-525; However, Regina Trek leader Arthur Evans' speaking engagements at 
Toronto, Timmins, Hamilton, Guelph and elsewhere in the province later in the year as part of a national 
tour were reported extensively by CIB personnel. 
201NAC RG 146, CSIS, 175P/ 2494, Stewart Smith File, memorandum, DCI Jennings to OC "0" 
Division, 2 August 1935; ibid., report, source deleted, 26 October 1935. 
2~AC RG 146, CSIS, 175P/ 2494, Stewart Smith File, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 19 August 1935; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 21 August 1935; ibid., memorandum, DCI Jennings to OC "0" 
Division, 4 September 1935; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 6 
September 1935. 
21
°CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and N Supt. Reames to Commissioner, 27 and 
28 June 1935; ibid., report, source deleted, 28 June 1935; ibid., "Jobless Here Demand Probe,"The Toronto 
Globe, 6 July 1935; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and N Supt. Reames to Commissioner, 6 July 
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the election campaign both Detective Irvine and the operative pursued intelligence that 
provided insight into alliance and coalition building amongst progressives. 211 The CP ran 
candidates in 13 constituencies including: Scarlett in Rosedale, Salsberg in Spadina and 
Norman Freed in Trinity. 212 In addition to reporting on these activities Detective Irvine and 
the operative tried to keep tabs on funds being raised while responding as best they could 
to requests by the DCI that PHFs be generated on local activists who played a prominent 
role in the election campaign on behalfofCP and "United Front" candidates.213 From the 
intelligence RHQ CIB personnel secured Superintendent Reames concluded that meetings 
of communists in connection with the election, in general, were "drawing in very poor 
crowds in this City" and so were turnouts at other CP-sponsored events.214 
The October federal election resulted in a massive sweep with Liberals capturing 
173 of245 seats, a 100 seat majority, the largest since Confederation. However 'credible' 
their four-fold increase was across Canada, communists polled just 26,000 votes, elected 
none, and as Reames predicted fared poorly in Toronto.215 The Liberal campaign platform 
included a promise to Repeal Section 98.216 
1935; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 6 August 1935; ibid., 
report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 16 August 1935; ibid., report, source 
deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 26 and 27 August 1935. 
211Thompson and Seager, Canada 1922-1939, 272-276, 277-279; For the first time in a federal 
election with the CCF established two years earlier, rejection of the Tories as a "corollary" did not 
necessarily mean the election of the Liberals, Thompson and Seager, wrote. Yet the CCF hardly proved 
much of an alternative as its subsequent history demonstrated. 
212Kealey and Whitaker [eds.], RC.M.P. Security Bulletins. The Depression Years. Part II. SB 
#775, 2 October 1935,514. 
213CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, DCI to OC "0" Division., 31 August 1935. 
214CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 5 
September 1935; ibid., report, source deleted, and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 28 September 
1935. 
215Manley, "Audacity," 26; Avakumovic, The Communist Partv in Canada, 93-51; Manley views it 
as a 'credible result', Avakumovic a failure. 
21~rades and Labour Congress of Canada, Report ofThe Proceedings Of The Forty-Seventh 
Annual Convention, 193l,(Ottawa, 1931), 185-186; ibid., 1932, 22; ibid., 1933,21; ibid., 1934, 182-183; 
ibid., 1935, 167; J.W. Pickersgill, "The Decay ofLiberalism,"1935), 251-253; For four years in the late 
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Following the federal election the CP re-emerged in the '"open," as NHQ personnel 
predicted, and subsequently intensified its activities. 217 The Toronto CP took several steps 
to test the issue of its own illegality. They scheduled a meeting in Massey Hall in November 
under the CP banner the tirst time since the 1931 CP leadership's arrests. 218 CP city offices 
were opened first at 420 Parliament Street, then along Yonge Street, and eventually 
elsewhere and before long stalwarts ran a communist instructional school.219 
Intelligence personnel responded to these developments by alerting their political 
bosses to the CP's plans. 220 "Should no action be taken by authorities," the IO warned, "it 
is the intention of the Communists to come out openly in the whole Province of Ontario. "221 
Detective Irvine contacted the TCPD on the issue of the Massey Hall meeting but the event 
was left 'unmolested' and as a result was filled to capacity. 222 Earl Browder, General 
Secretary of the CPUSA attended and Stewart Smith and Buck spoke on the CI Seventh 
1920s a motion was introduced and passed the House of Commons only to be overturned in the Senate. 
Then in the 1930s right up until 1936 each year a similar resolution was introduced and passed at the annual 
Trades and Labor Congress of Canada Conventions. 
217SB# 874, 27 October 1937, 422; It rose from 5,500 to 15,000; Avakumovic, The Communist 
Party in Canada, 115. 
218CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 
30 October 193 5; "Communist Party Sponsors Meeting,"Mail & Empire, 30 October 1935; ibid., report, 
source deleted, 5 November 1935; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to 
Commissioner, 5 November 1935; Detective Irvine noted Stewart Smith would report on his visit to 
Moscow and his attendance as a delegate to the Seventh Congress of the Cl 
21~ealey and Whitaker [eds.] R.C.M.P. Securitv Bulletins: The Depression Years. Part II, SB 
#780, 6 November 1935, 563; #781, 13 November 1935, 577; CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal 
Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 30 October 193 5; "Communist Party Sponsors 
Meeting, "Mail & Empire, 30 October 1935; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to 
Commissioner, 12 and 13 November 1935. 
22~ealey and Whitaker [ eds.] RC.M.P. Securitv Bulletins. The Depres,;.:m Y ~::<u;,. Pa.. L IT. SBt-: 
780, 6 November 1935, 569-570. 
221Kealey and Whitaker (eds.] RC.M.P. Securitv Bulletins. The Depression Years. Part II. SB# 
780, 6 November 1935, 570. 
222CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 
30 October 1935; "Communist Party Sponsors Meeting," Mail & Empire, 30 October 1935; Kealey and 
Whitaker, The Depression Years. Part II, SB., 781, 13 November 1935, 577, 580-582. 
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Congress's implications for Canada. 223 
News of the Soviet shift in foreign policy announced at the Cf's Seventh Conb:rress 
filtered back to Canada and was fully unveiled at the event. 2: 4 Tim Buck, was elected to the 
Executive Committee of the CI by the Seventh World Congress and news of his 
appointment had reached NHQ by November. This was the first time, the IO noted, that a 
member of the CPC was elected "to the general staff of the world revolution. "225 It was a 
phenomenal feat given the fact that the Canadian party represented at best 2 per cent of the 
Crs total membership (not including the Russian party) and virtually guaranteed his 
survival during the difficult period that followed with the reestablishment of "'trade-union 
unity" through amalgamation of third period revolutionary unions with the old 
internationals, if possible, but in all likelihood their disbandment and return to the latter. 
The CPC leaders met in early November in Toronto to hammer out a plan and less than two 
weeks later this was followed by the tina! WUL convention which basically approved tht! 
policy laid out at the Seventh Congress. 226 
Superintendent Reames was not going to sit idly by while the CP and its subsidiaries 
went unchallenged. So he gave RHQ CIB personnel the 'green light' to place an operative 
in the school. The operative joined 21 others for several weeks while the school thrived. 
Then a few speakers failed to keep their engagements, the operative reported, and a lack 
223CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 5 
November 1935. 
224Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, 188-189.; Kealey and Whitaker [eds.], R.C.M.P. 
Security Bulletins. The Depression Years. Part II. SB # 775, 20ctober 1935, 510-513. 
225 ibid., SB #780, 6 November 1935, 563. 
226Claudin, The Communist International, 106; Manley, "Audacity"; Buck carried the full authority 
of the international whose directives according to Claudin were akin to 'law' for all national sections: "it 
could expel members of groups or members belonging to any country, or entire national sections, it could 
change the leadership of a national section, even against the \o'lill of the majority of its members, and so on." 
The 'selling function' that Manley refers to one must emphasize occurred \o'lithin this framework. Buy if you 
like but leave if you don't. 
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of funds became another "obstacle'' in the path of the school. It closed temporarily in 
December and indefinitely the following February. 127 When the CP opened a "new 
elaborate Headquarters" on Adelaide Street in the "business centre of the city," Irvine 
secretly toured its facilities. 228 
The intensification of monitoring CP activities that took place at all levels was 
selective. With limited resources choices were made and sometimes alternative support was 
drawn by turning to elsewhere in the national network. In the fall Detective Irvine 
complained that the CLA WF was providing the CP with a "vehicle" to spread its "newly 
disguised doctrines" through "less militant parties." Consequently, both its Second CLA WF 
Congress and the WUL's Third National Convention held in the city in these months (the 
latter immediately following a CP National Plenun) were attended by Division personnel. 219 
But the CLDL, which held its National Convention in Toronto in October, was seemingly 
not attended by a Toronto operative. 230 Instead, this work was left to a Montreal operative 
who was better positioned. 231 
Municipal election coverage in 1935 was more intense than in some previous years. 
227CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 12 and 13 
November 1935; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 23 December 
1935; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames, 4 and 5 February 1936. 
228CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 
20 December 1935. 
22~ealey and Whitaker [eds.], RC.l'vlP. Security Bulletins. The Depression Years. Part II. SB 
#781, 13 November 1935, 577; ibid., SB #785, 11 December 1935, 622; CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective 
Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 20 December 1935; NAC RG 146, CSIS 
holding, 175P/ 2035, Tim Buck file, cross-reference sheet, 11 December 1935; ibid., cross-reference sheet, 
11 December 1935. 
23~ealey and Whitaker [ eds. ), R. C. M.P. Security Bulletins. The Depression Years. Part II, SB 
#778, 23 October 1935, 541; ibid., SB #780, 6 November 1935, 564-565; It claimed 10,775 CLDL branch 
members, 33,6000 trade union affiliates and 13,925 language and cultural mass organizations and other 
affiliates for a total of 58,300. 
231NAC RG 146, CSIS, 175P/ 392, AE. Smith file, report, source deleted, 26 October 1935; This 
was surprising because usually major conventions were attended by several operatives and normally one 
from the host city. 
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It began in late November when the operative attended a special meeting of all Toronto CP 
District Unit Secretaries at which time the names ofCP candidates were announced and the 
communist election program was "read and thoroughly discussed. "232 Early intelligence he 
secured suggested that the CP would be "well represented" which subsequently proved 
correct. Election meetings were attended by the operative, Detective Irvine, and when 
meetings multiplied Constable Reg Wamer. 233 When election results were sent to Ottawa 
Superintendent Reames emphasized the fact that communist candidates in general pollea 
"much higher" than previously even if none had been elected which confirmed Mac Brien's 
belief that Liberal policies were disastrous and that the CP's strategy was gamenng 
support.234 
By the winter of 1936 Detective Irvine believed that much of the CP's local 
political and industrial work was concentrated in the CLA WF and WUL. He was disturbed 
by the fact that, in general, the CP had "undergone a complete change during the past year" 
in that it no longer "profess [ es] to be an undercover organization ... " It bothered him that 
stalwarts derived "a great deal of satisfaction" because they were now "on the same 
footing" as other Labour organizations and he blamed federal authorities.235 His entire 
Toronto detective career began immediately following the CP' s period of illegality and in 
Toronto they were asserting their rights to an extent that he felt flaunted the law. 
232CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 26 and 27 
November 1935. 
233CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 12 
December 193 5; ibid., report, Constable Warner and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 20 and 21 
December 1935. RCMP G.O. 9018, 12-3-31 notes engagement of Reginald Robert Warner; "0" Division, 
Nominal Rolls, June 1931; RCl'vfP G.O. 9173, Transfer Depot to "0" 1-6-31 ;''0" Division, Nominal Rolls, 
January 1934. 
234CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 
3 January 1936. 
235CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 
20 December 1935. 
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In December the CP had established a club at the University of Toronto, Detective 
Irvine reported, and he complained that "trusted agents'' of Moscow were "operating" with 
the full consent of several college officials. He deplored the fact that at Hart House the 
"radical element" had a library at their "disposal" to enjoy "their reading of communistic 
literature without fear of interruption.'' He was extremely critical of University officials 
who encouraged prominent radicals such as Tim Buck to visit them in their studies for 
discussions on "present conditions. "236 In an endeavor to learn more Irvine briefly 
developed a dormitory operative at Hart House to report on CP campus activities. When 
provincial authorities "called" administrators to the Parliament Buildings for "discussions" 
on these matters he was pleased that action was taken. 237 
When Chief Detective Hugh Mathewson left Toronto in January 1936 for a three-
month refresher course at Depot, there was no noticeable decline in investigative work on 
the part of RHQ CIB personnel. 238 Instead, intelligence personnel demonstrated greater 
efficacy in the work they conducted. They split counter-subversive responsibilities with 
Detective Irvine concentrating on anti-fascist activities, an operative targeting WUL 
industrial organizing and its reentry into the A. F. ofL. and Constable Bob Warner hamlimg 
much of the mundane leg work and follow-up. 239 DCI Jennings also paid particularly close 
236CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 
20 December 1935; NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, 175P/ 2035, Tim Buck file, report, Detective Corporal 
Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 17 December 1935; CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective 
Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 4 and 5 February 1936. 
237NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, 175P/ 2035, Tim Buck file, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 17 December 1935. 
238
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, March and April 1936; RC:MP G. 0. 3626 for week ending 9 May 
1936. 
239CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 30 
December 1935; report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 12 
December 1935; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 6 
December 1935; "Near Riot Staged As German Agent Opens Office Here,"The Mail & Empire. 6 December 
1935; ibid., report, Constable Warner and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 8 and 9 January 1936. 
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attention to the counter-intelligence work RHQ CIB personnel conducted. Occasionally 
after reviewing reports that crossed his desk, he instructed his Division OC to send Irvine 
out into the field to verify intelligence secured and provide additional information. 240 In 
these months Detective Irvine, Constable Warner and the operative attended annual Lenin 
Memorial Meetings, local unemployment demonstrations and other events the CP 
announced were part of a "much larger" spring "campaign" stalwarts planned with 
organizers being sent into the "field" to Niagara Falls, London, Kitchener, Hamilton, east 
to Markham and Oshawa, and into relief camps with the goal of exploring the possibility 
of holding another trek in April. 241 
RHQ operations further improved in the spnng once Mathewson returned to 
Toronto having successfully completed the Regina course. 242 Before long, CIB personnel 
learned that a CP National Convention was initially scheduled for Toronto in July. The 
RHQ operative increased his pro tile within the Toronto CP and for the first time in years 
through his work the CIB acquired ward reports of branch unit activities.243 The April trek 
was cancelled. Constable Warner was sent to Timmins just before May Day in charge of 
SB #804, 29 April 1936, 178; In particular the operative focused on report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 12 December 1935; SB #804, 29 April1936, 178. 
240CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, DCI Jennings to OC "0" Division, 5 February 1936; ibid., 
report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 26 Tvfarch 1936; It is 
unfortunate that the original letter is missing and several lines of Irvine's report were deleted by CSIS. 
241 CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 9 and 11 
March 1936; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 7 and 9 March 
1936; ibid., report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 20 March 1936; ibid., 
report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 24 March 1936; ibid., report, source 
deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 4 April 1936; NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, 175P/ 
2035, Tim Buck file, cross-reference sheet of report by Constable E.A Snider, 23 and 28 February 1936; 
ibid., report, NCpl. Woods and Superintendent Reames to Commisioner, 22 and 23 April 1936; ibid., 
report, source deleted and Inspector Reames to Commissioner, 23 and 24 Tvfarch 1936; ibid., report, source 
deleted, 24 March 1936. 
2~2 As soon as a position became available he was in line for promotion to Sergeant. 
243CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 4 April 
1936. 
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that detachment which might have proved a setback for RHQ CIB intelligence work had 
several others with considerable detective experience not succeeded him in Toronto. 244 
For May Day 1936 RHQ intelligence personnel focused on CP relations with the 
National CCF which remained cool despite overtures by the former to forge a united 
front. 245 When the CCF rejected the CP's offer and then expelled three prominent Toronto 
CCFers and four district organizations for participating in united May Day celebrations, this 
intelligence was quickly forwarded to NHQ. 246 May Day events, in general, were reported 
more vigorously than in previous years. More intelligence became available with the 
operative well-positioned, with the appearance of several new weekly mimeographs, and 
with the conversion ofThe Worker to a daily and renamed the Daily Clarion as ofMay 1. 247 
In the summer of 1936 RHQ CIB operations slowed. The slowdown in activity was 
tempered partially by the seasonal nature of work and work rhythms. Many stalwarts left 
town in these months and flocked to northern industries -logging and mining camps. 248 The 
operative was temporarily withdrawn following May Day for reasons that are not known. 
For six weeks Irvine concentrated on other assignments, and several other RHQ personnel 
2
.w.'O" Division, Nominal Rolls, January - April 1936; They included Constables G.J. Hayward, 
L.C. Turner and E.S. Covell, all were granted plainclothes pay at Toronto RHQ. 
G.J. Hayward, engaged at "0" Division 19-8-1931 under RC:MP G.O. 9384 and was sent to Regina for 
training. He worked at "E" Division in 1932 as a detective and was transferred to "0" Division shortly 
thereafter where he remained conducting piecemeal detective investigations throughuui tht:: 1930s. 
mRCMP G.O. 3695,18 May 1936; RCMP G.O. 3726,6 May 1936; RCMP G.O. 3736,30 May 
1936. 
246CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 9 April 
1936; "Motion to Join In United Front Banned by C.C.F.,"The Gazette, 11 April 1936; "C.C.F. Will Eschew 
May Day Doings,"Mail & Empire. 15 April 1936; ibid., report, source deleted, 4 May 1936; ibid., report, 
Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 4 l'Vlay 1936; ibid., memorandum, 
Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 11 May 1936; ibid., "Ontario C.C.F. To Expel Three,"Ottawa 
Citizen. 11 May 1936. 
247SB# 798, 18 March 1936; SB #799, 25 March 1936, 135; SB 801,8 Apri11936, 153; SB 805,6 
May 1936, 189. 
248lan Radforth, Bush Workers and Bosses: Logging in Northern Onta.iiu. 1900- i ~~0 (Toronto, 
!987). 
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were pulled away trom detective and plainclothes duty.~49 Then in June Superintendent 
Reames was granted leave and Inspector Robert Mercer assumed temporary command of 
the Division. 250 Inspector Mercer and Detective Irvine both reported on July Toronto 
demonstrations held to celebrate the Repeal of Section 98 but little else followed. 251 
The decline in coverage was also the result of other factors. There was a shift in the 
focus oflocal CP activity. On the one hand a "slum clearance" campaign was pursued with 
progressives using existing mechanisms to apply pressure on various municipal and 
provincial authorities, while on the other, relief strikes, which were often spontaneous, did 
not lend themselves easily to monitoring.252 With an operative temporarily gone, industrial 
strikes too, became more difficult to monitor although some effort was made, while other 
opportunities dried up because key subjects like Tim Buck left the city for a western tour 
and then eventually headed overseas and was gone until November. 253 
Ever since "0" Division's 1932 expansion its resources in terms of infrastructure 
proved inadequate to the increased responsibilities its personnel faced. A growing roster, 
more support staff and greater requirements meant that like "E" Division out west (and in 
2~9CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, 4 rvlay 1936; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 4 rvlay 1936; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Inspector RE. Mercer to Commissioner, 22 June 1936; "0" Division, Nominal Rolls, June - August 1936. 
2~CMP G.O. 3588,31 May 1936; RCvlP G.O. 3657, 19 June 1936; RCMP G.O. 3862,12 
August 1936; Irvine, Veitch and Weeks demonstrated their continued enthusiasm for CIB investigatiuu:. by 
signing five-year contracts and re-engaging in the Force for periods lasting beyond the end of this study. 
mcpc TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Inspector Mercer to Commissioner, 22 
June 1936; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 6 and 7 
July 1936; NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, 175P/ 2035, Tim Buck file, cross-reference sheet, Detective 
Corporal Irvine, 6 July 1936. 
252CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Inspector Mercer to Commissioner, 7 July 
1936, "rvlass March on June 26," The Daily Clarion, 3 June 1936, 1; "Communist Party to Protest Slums," 
The Daily Clarion 6 June 1936, 1; "Tim Buck Urges Slum Clearance to Civic Board," The Daily Clarion, 11 
June 1936, 1-2; "Relief Strikes Spread, Involved Guelph, N. York," The Dailv Clarion. 3 January 1936, 1-3. 
mNAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, 175P/ 2035, Tim Buck file; CLPD file, report, Assistant 
Commissioner Dann to Commissioner, 8 July 1936; ibid., "Tim Buck, Now In Europe Outlawed From 
Canada,"Toronto Globe, 30 October 1936; report, detective corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to 
Commissioner, 12 and 13 November 1936; ibid., report, source deleted, 12 November 1936. 
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particular its CIB) Toronto RHQ was no longer able to function in its old premises on 
Charles Street East (Postal Station 'F'). 254 Space in the old quarters had become "entirely 
inadequate" and many offices "decidedly cramped." A search for a suitable alternative was 
initiated in the spring, eventually the funds required were made available and relocation to 
the Dominion Public Buildings at Bay and Front Streets (not a coincidence either that it was 
the west wing of the 'Customs Building') followed in September. This disruption added to 
the general shortage experienced by seasonal duties which drew personnel away from Clli 
activities. 255 
Superintendent Reames returned to duty in August and resumed full operational 
control of the Division. Before long, RHQ CIB operations improved. 256 Detective Irvine 
resumed his investigations and an operative was developed. The operative was well-
positioned since within weeks he obtained District Bureau monthly meeting minutes. 257 
The Spanish Civil War broke out in July. But it was another month before the Force 
fully directed its attention toward domestic activities concerning this event. 258 The first 
substantial rally in Toronto they monitored in support of Spain post the commencement of 
hostilities was held in mid-August at Queen's Park and the same week the IO reported that 
the Ontario District of the CP was preparing for a campaign in aid of the Spanish 
254n.a. "'E' Division Vignette," RCMP Quarterly 14,4 (April 1949), 223-225. 
m'"O' Division," RCMP Quarterly, 4,3 (January 1937), 219-220; This was the heart of the 
commercial activity in the city and tied the Force further into this culture. The building itself was of"modern 
construction" fully equipped with new "steel cabinets" and shelving which would house the secret 
intelligence files. All that would remain at the Charles Street facility was the Division Orderly and duties in 
connection with applications for naturalization. 
256AE. Smith's file, for instance, had nothing deposited on it from mid-January until late August. 
257CPC TO 1930s, DB minutes, 13 July 1936; ibid., DB minutes, 22 July 1936;ibid., DB, minutes, 
16 September 1936; ibid., DB, minutes, 10 October I936; ibid., "First Annual Rally Canadian Amateur 
Sports Federation, Program"and report, Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, II August 1936; ibid., 
report, source deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 14 August 1936; NAC RG 146, CSIS 
holdings, I75P/ 2035, Tim Buck file, cross-reference sheet, report, Detective Corporal Irvine 19 and 22 June 
I936; Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, I89. 
258Manley, "Audacity," 23. 
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Government. 259 
Nearly all fall-time intelligence reports deposited on core files and many on PHFs 
concerned anti-fascist activities and Spain.260 In September, NHQ learned a "United 
Committee to Aid the Spanish People's Republic" was established in Toronto to 
"coordinate" the collection of funds and that the organization planned to send money cables 
weekly overseas. In September, the King administration lifted its 1931 embargo on the 
importation of Soviet goods, mainly staples to Canada, and the Soviet government 
responded in kind. 261 Officially the federal government adopted a position of "neutrality" 
in the Spanish conflict, but in reality it aided the insurgents and Franco. 262 When the CP 
postponed its National Convention for a year in October the operative quit reporting on Db 
monthly meetings. 
In the fall Commissioner MacBrien firmly believed that action had to be taken 
against domestic organizations which provided support for democratic forces in Spain. He 
encouraged Minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, to move against the CLA WF. He reminded 
the Minister that the CLA WF is a "subsidiary" of the CP by which organization it is 
"directly controlled." He requested that Canadian authorities prevent delegates from the 
Madrid government from entering Canada for speaking engagements since it would 
2~9"7000 Meet to Support Spain," The Daily Clarion, 20 August 1936, l-2; Kealey and Whitaker 
[eds.] RC.MP. Security Bulletins: The Depression Years, Part lll SB #820, 19 August 1936, 345, 353. 
260ibid., SB #822, 2 September 1936, 368. 
261Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, 151, 216-217; Since May Mackenzie King had instructed 
Vincent ·Massey, Canada's high commissioner in London, to open dialogue with the Soviet Amba:.:.auu1 to 
the United Kingdom with the goal of"normalizing"trade relations with the Soviet Union by lifting the 1931 
embargo. 
262
"Canada and Spain," The Canadian Forum, 16, 190 (November 1936), 3-4; For instance, foreign 
trade figures for Canadian exports to Morocco (where many insurgents were recruited) in September 1935 
were $1,924 and a year later they stood at $296,752 and as even a Mail & Empire correspondent noted, 
"[t]he authorities have no delusions about where the shipments are going to ultimately- to General Franco, 
but they don't feel called upon to take any action." 
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_, ... infringe the neutrality agreement which is in effect insofar as the Dominion. "263 Lapointe 
ignored this protest. But MacBrien kept the pressure up. When the Spanish government's 
representatives toured the country in the fall, MacBrien responded by sending Force 
personnel to attend their meetings. Highlights of their meetings were reported in the IO's 
weekly summaries. Several months later Mac Brien forwarded Lapointe further intelligence 
on the CLA WF's Toronto activities, a group he labeled an "extremist radical faction."264 
In October, as MacBrien encouraged the federal authorities to adopt a tougher 
stance against anti-fascist organizations, Superintendent Reames strengthened "0" Division 
intelligence operations. Inspector R.E. Mercer was appointed to the position of senior 
officer in charge of the Division CIB. 265 Constable R.J. Cherry, who had joined the RHQ 
CIB months earlier, along with Detective Irvine was ordered to attend CP, CLA WF and 
CASD-sponsored public meetings.266 They also developed a source close to the CASD 
executive. 267 By December "0" Division CIB personnel began reporting on recruiting for 
overseas service. 268 
Momentum in monitoring anti-fascist activities was gaining in these months. It 
263NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CLPD, memorandum, Commissioner MacBrien to Minister of 
Justice, Ernest Lapointe, 15 October 1936. 
264NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CLPD, ibid., memorandum, Commissioner MacBrien to Minister 
ofJustice, Ernest Lapointe, 15 February 1937. 
265
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, October 1936. 
2~AC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CLPD, report, Constable RJ. Cherry and Superintendent Reames 
to Commissioner, 21 and 23 October 1936; "0" Division, Nominal Rolls, May 1936; ibid., December 1937; 
ibid., May 1939; RCl\IIP G.O. 30 April 1939; 
RJ. Cherry had joined the Cffi in May 1936. During the summer it appears as though he was 
conducting other investigations. He was appointed a detective the following December and he remained 
more or less stationed in Toronto undertaking an array ofCffi investigations right up until he purchased his 
discharge in April1939. 
267CPC TO 1930s, "$1,000 From Toronto To Aid Spanish Reds,"The Globe. 18 August 1936; ibid., 
report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames, 19 and 20 August 1936; ibid., report, source 
deleted and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 6 October 1936; 
268NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, memorandum, Superintendent Reames to Commissionet, 
28 December 1936. 
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continued right up until mid 1938 and it was in this context that many core anti-fascist 
focused organizational/ operational files were opened in successive years, among the 
earliest beginning in 1935 with a Canadian League Against War and Fascism file269 
(renamed the Canadian League for Peace and Democracy in 1937), a Recruiting For 
Spanish Army (RSA) operational file170 in October 1936, a Committee to Aid Spanish 
Democracy (CASD) file271 in early 1937, and a Friends of the Mackenzie-Papineau 
Battalion (FMPB) file272 in 1938. 
These three popular front antifascist organizations (the CLPD, the CASD and the 
FMPB) served different purposes. With different programs and goals their success levels 
across the country varied considerably.273 Although the CLPD, the CASD, and the FNIPB 
269CSIS CLPD file, "Peace and Democracy Is League's New Name," Citizen, 13 August 1937; see 
Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Depression Years Part IV. SB #868, 25 August 1937, 343. It was not 
closed until September 1970;The CLPD was voted into existence in August 1937 at a Toronto CLA WF 
National Committee meeting. With its name change the intelligence personnel drew upon earlier CLA WF 
reports and those of other organizations and back-filled its CLPD file beginning February 1935 when some 
of the earliest CLA WF intelligence had been gathered by "0" Division. 
27~AC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file; It was opened once intelligence personnel had become 
aware of the plans party stalwarts and other progressives had to send Canadians overseas to fight on the side 
of democratic forces. It was officially closed in August 1979. During the busiest periodl443 pages of 
material were generated. 
271It was opened following a visit to Canada by Walter Shevenels, the Secretary of the Amsterdam-
based International Federation of Trade Unions. 
272The FMPB file was opened in July 1938 when it was apparent that the state's primary interest in 
investigating progressives' activities had shifted away from overseas recruiting to providing aid for those 
returning home from the overseas campaign. The file remained open until May 1980. 
273CSIS CLPD file, secret report, "Re: Canadian League for Peace and Democracy," 15 September 
1970; CSIS CASD file, report, "Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy," Toronto, 19 January 1938; The 
CLPD extended the work of its predecessor and its main objective was to fonn committees across the 
country for the widest possible struggle with demonstrations in front of provincial and federal parliaments 
and foreign consular offices. Conversely, the CASD's main goal was to provide direct assistance to overseas 
projects such as the work ofblood transfusion, hospitalization, milk for children and the support of a youth 
home near Valencia and the Salem Bland home near 1\lladrid. Revolutionaries such as Tom Ewen described it 
as more of a "humanitarian endeavor." The F1vlPB served as an auxiliary to "combatants." It looked after 
their "needs and comforts." In its overseas work, it was an extension of the CLAWF in that it provided aid 
to antifascists. Its goal in this respect was to collect donations for the volunteers. More important still, it 
played an extremely important role in providing for the "wounded" and "maimed" Canadians who returned 
home "building up sentiment" based on their "heroism." 
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all claimed a national focus with Toronto as their national headquarters, their campaigns 
met with greater success in some parts of the country. The RCl'v!.P tailored its counter-
subversion operations accordingly. Recruiting campaigns were much more successful in 
Ontario and Western Canada than in the East. 274 Hence the CIB's early emphasis in its 
coverage of these groups focused more on Western Canada. :75 Toronto, Montreal and other 
locations in Southern Ontario served as the final Canadian destination point before recruits 
headed overseas. Hence there was an increasing priority attached to '"0" Division Toronto 
and "C" Division Montreal RHQs in this respect. Most veterans returning home passed 
through Halifax so consequently it played a much more significant role in 1938 and 1939 
in the CIB's coverage of the movement. 
There was a general shift from West to East over the years in antifascist surveillance 
coverage with Toronto and to a lesser extent Montreal as key anchors in national CIB 
operations. Table 5.1 identifies each of these four key antifascist file sets by organization/ 
operation, the "unofficial opening date"( when the earliest information was obtained), the 
"drop-off date" (when intelligence declined), their respective period of greatest activity (in 
terms of months), and their volume frequency. Table 5.2 provides a breakdown by 
intelligence material type gathered and deposited on each of these four key antifascist file 
sets. 276 Table 5.3 demonstrates how these subtle shifts in CIB geographic focus can be 
mLobigs, "Canadian Responses", 56-132, esp., 66-67. 
27
sibid., 66-68. Most recruiting activity occurred during 193 7 and early 193 8 and was centred in the 
following centres: Winnipeg (160), Regina (nearly 20), Saskatoon (at least 12), Edmonton and Calgary 
(more than 30 each), Lethbridge (at least 14), and Vancouver (200). Ontario had contributed about 500 
volunteers (250 from Toronto, and other important centres included Port Arthur-Fort William, Hamiltou and 
Windsor with 80, 40 and 30 respectively). 
276Intelligence volumes and deposit frequencies in core antifascist organizational/ operational files 
varied considerably. Some files saw a massive amount of material deposited upon them in a relatively short 
period of time. Still other files had very little deposited on them, the intelligence being thinly spread over 
several years which was a reflection ofthe expansion and contraction capabilities ofCIB operations to 
contend with real and imagined threats. It was also a reflection of the expanded activity of these groups. 
Deposit frequencies suggest something of the level of intensity as do operational and material types. The 
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gleaned by even a basic file set analysis of reports. 277 All these tables suggest a fairly 
rigorous, systematic, national intelligence strategy orchestrated and applied to CIB 
monitoring of counter-subversion popular-front organizations. It is within this framework 







"Organizational/ Operational files": 
NHO' s Average Monthlv Input During Files 
Peak Periods of Activitv 
Open/ Drop Dates Period of Greatest Repressive Input 
Activity Volume Frequencies 
Feb 1935- July l ')~() 66 Months k.,;s than l page per 
week 
Oct. 1936- Feb. 1939 29 Months 50 pages per month 
Apr. 1937 -Dec. 1939 22 Months 28 pago:s per month 
Aug. 1938- Dec. 1938 6 Months I 3 5 pages per month 
Sources: NAC RG 146 "Canadian League For Peace and Democracy" 
NAC RG 146 "Recruiting For Spanish Army" 
NAC RG 146 "Committee In Aid of Spanish Democracy" 
NAC RG 146 "Friends of the Mac Pap" 
CIS's CLPD file had 188-plus pages deposited on it during slightly more than five years of activity making 
it the thinnest of the sets detailed here. By comparison, the RSA operational file consisted of 1727 pages. 
Most of the RSA intelligence was generated during a relatively short window (29 months ofRSA peak 
activity averaging 50 pages per month). The CASD and the FMPB files rested comfortably in the middle in 
terms of total volume of materials deposited. Yet their deposit frequencies tell two very different stories. The 
CASD file consisted of 618-plus pages, most of it deposited over 22 consecutive months (an average of 28 
pages per month). Much more impressive was the FMPB organizational file which netted 818-plus pages of 
intelligence deposited in just 6 months (an astounding rate of 135-plus pages per month during its peak 
period). We must use qualify the number of each file sets pages with a "plus" or "at least" since materials 
may have been severed at some point and removed from the file. 
277In particular, the RSA file, the CASD and FMPB file sets demonstrate the priority associated 
with surveillance activities in the western provinces. Yet since the flv'IPB is also the major demobilization file 
it is not surprising that there is also a fair number of maritime reports contained within it. These numbers are 
even somewhat misleading because the coverage given demobilization and reintegration at Halifax was 













Rpts CRS Onl 
51 9 \ 
288 15 102 
152 20 2 
216 9 23 
708 52 1~8 
Table 5.2 
"Organizational/ Operational files": 
Material Breakdown of Intelligence, 
Total Volume bv Material Type 
Tel. Other CtlUrt CP Clps. 
Dept Mat Docs. 
-
z - 5 37 
l 183 11 9 257 
- - - -
90 
3 28 2 6 93 
~ 213 lJ 20 ~ ...... II 
Sources: NAC RG 146 "Canadxan League For Peace and Democracy" 






NAC RG 146 "Committee In Aid of Spanish Democracy" 







"Organizational! Operational files" 
Report Generation bv Region 
"0" "A" Que. Maritimes 
Div. Div. 
15 1 7 2 
53 5 57 1 
44 4 4 4 


















mThe material types here included: RCMP intelligence reports of detectives, agents and other 
operatives; Cross Reference Sheets; Orders; Telegrams; Correspondence with other Government 
Departments; Court materials; Communist Party Documents: Newspaper Clippings: Miscellaneous Items 
(anything else found in the file set). 
2~able 5.3's Prairie and Maritime data was aggregated since neither wa5 the primary focus of this 
study. Similarly, Ontario data was dis-aggregated separating out "0" Division and "A" Division (Ottawa) 
CIB intelligence sections' contributions so we can see how heavily "0" Division was involved in covering 
the national centre of these progressive movements' activities. 
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Sources: NAC RG 146 "Canadian League For Peace and Democracy" 
NAC RG 146 "Recruiting For Spanish Army'' 
NAC RG 146 "Committee In Aid of Spanish Democracy'' 
NAC RG 146 "Friends of the l\tfac Pap" 
While expansion in numerous directions occurrecl RHQ CIB personnel still had to 
monitor familiar developments such as municipal elections. This tension was present 
earlier in the 1930s with a strengthening national unemployed movement and a stronger 
CLDL and WUL It was again present with the anti-fascist organizations. With the operative 
inside the CP serving on the District Bureau until late October early election plans, 
strategies and tactics were secured as was a copy of the "People's Program" and a list of 
the slate of candidates for the various wards being contested. 280 Before long, it was also 
learned that the Toronto CP was planning to resurrect its Labour College. Although, with 
an operative working effectively from within the CP, the idea of using the Labour College 
as a possible entry point for an agent was not pursued. 281 
Both Detective Irvine and Superintendent Reames kept NHQ apprized of the 
December 1936 election outcome as in previous years through a mix of passive 
investigations and OSINT.282 The election results concerned them since there had been a 
tremendous increase in support for CP candidates over previous years. 283 Irvine attributed 
28
°CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, 10 October 1936; ibid., report, source deleted, 19 
October 1936; ibid., "People's Program," 20 October 1936. 
281 CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, 10 October 1936; ibid., circular, name deleted, 13 
October I 936. 
282CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 19 October 1936; ibid., 
"Toronto Civic Election Program for the year- 1937,"20 October 1937. 
283Stewart Smith won an Aldermanic seat in Ward 5, John Weir was elected to the Board of 
Education in Ward 4 and Ewart Humphreys was elected Deputy-Reeve in the York Township. At 31,342, 
Tim Buck's bid for Board ofControl had increased by over 21,000 votes since the election in 1935. 
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these gains to the success of the popular front strategy. 2lW 
Tim Buck predicted that 1937 would be a banner year for labour. In January he 
warned that danger might arise if the forces of reaction continued to gain momentum in 
Quebec. On both counts he was proven correct. However, 1937 was not a banner year in 
"0" Division surveillance of the CP, not at least its core Toronto branches. The year began 
poorly as intelligence volumes dropped and the quality and the quantity ebbed and flowed 
until the fall. Again much of the work being conducted was transferred over to the anti-
fascist organizations whose files were briefly described above. 
Other changes influenced the level of work conducted. Superintendent Reames took 
sick in December 1936 and remained otT-duty more or less until he was forced into 
accepting early retirement in October. 185 Intelligence sources also dried up with the 
amalgamation of the city's two morning papers The Globe and The Mail, with the loss of 
the operative by December, with CIB personnel being detailed to other duties, while others 
like Sam Wrigglesworth and Constable Spanton, longtime members of the RHQ CIB, were 
transferred or loaned to Ottawa Division. 286 
With Reames off duty Inspector Mercer was appointed temporary OC and 
284CPC TO 1930s report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Superintendent Reames to Commissioner, 
9 and 10 December 1936; ibid., "Claims Church Taught Lesson By Communists,"Evening Telegram. 27 
December 1937. 
285
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, February 1935 -July 1935; RG 18 vol. 3455, file 0-203, Service 
Record of Albert Edward George Oakleigh Reames, memorandum, Inspector Mercer (for OC) to 
Commissioner, 29 December 1936; ibid., memorandum, G.L. Jennings to DOC "0" Division, 28 May 193 7; 
ibid., , memorandum, Superintendent Kemp to DOC "0" Division, 2 September 1937; ibid., memorandum, 
Commissioner MacBrien to Reames, 10 September 1937; ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Reames to 
Commissioner, 14 September 1937; RCMP Quarterly, 11 July 1941, "Major AE.O. Reames. Noted RCIV£P 
Officer Dies Here"; Reames continued to meddle in "0" Division affairs even though his condition only 
marginally improved until he was forced into accepting early retirement in October 1937 which put 
enormous pressure on Mercer and turned ugly in September weeks before Reames left. 
286
"Your Morning Paper," The Canadian Forum. 16, 192 (January 1937), 6-7; RCMP G.O. 4358, 
1-1-37; "0" Division, Nominal Rolls, January- March 1937; MacDowell, 'Remembering Kirkland Lake' 41-
42. 
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eventually Stati Sergeant C. C. Batch was transferred from "'D" to "0'' Division RHQ to 
assist him. Batch eventually assumed duties as head of the Division CIB although 
seemingly seldom did he concern himself with intelligence work at this juncture. 287 Beneath 
him detective work remained split between Mathewson and Veitch while Irvine continued 
on as the principal Toronto investigator. Annual meetings such as the Lenin Memorial were 
attended by Division personnel but for months little of substance was obtained. 288 
Intelligence deposits made to the core tile also dried up as a consequence of a 
massive rebirth in strike and industrial activity, the largest increase since the postwar. In 
193 7 Ontario saw over halfthe strikes held nationally. :89 These events shifted CIB priorities 
and the late 1930s strikes concerned different groups than those earlier in the decade. More 
often these strikes were by unions that had experienced massive losses in the 1920s and 
early 1930s, especially mass production industries such as steel, meat packing, automobiles 
and heavy machinery, but had since rebounded and seen dramatic growth. 
The US Wagner Act of 1935 had codified workers' rights to belong to unions of 
their own choosing. It fostered conditions that helped facilitate the growth of the 
Committee oflndustrial Organizations (CIO) and herein lay one of the centres of working-
class power. 290 Born in 1935 as a breakaway of the AF of L, the CIO it took its "first 
hesitant steps" in Ontario in February 1937.29 t The 15-day Oshawa strike that followed in 
April earned some coverage by Division personnel. Hepburn requested the federal troops. 
MacBrien dispatched a contingent of 67 men in response and promised an additional 50 
287RCIVIP G.O. 4427, 1-2-37; RCIVIP G.O. 4671, l-4-37. 
288NAC RG 146, CSIS, 175P/ 2035, Tim Buck File, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Inspector Mercer to Commissioner, 26 and 27 January 1937. 
289Jamieson, Times of Trouble, 251. 
290Jamieson, Times of Trouble. 249-250. 
291 Abella, "The Oshawa Strike," 98. 
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from ''0" Division who were placed on stand-by.l92 This clearly disrupted what had become 
'traditional' patterns of surveillance activity. 293 
Although these events precipitated a revival in Division intelligence reportage, the 
gams were ternporary. 294 For months afterward the only worthwhile intelligence the 
Division secured seemed to be procured by Division personnel outside the RHQ. 295 Much 
of the CIO's activities in the province centred in the mining communities in Northwestern 
Ontario. For much of the year the employers Ontario Mining Association (01\1A) hired 
undercover men to spy on the labour organizations in the centers in which the OtvlA 
members operated. Their reports on CIO activities, and on union organizing and communist 
activity generally were forwarded to provincial authorities and to various policing 
agencies. 296 
Dissatisfied with the RHQ ClB's performance as early as March, DCI Wood asked 
his Toronto OCto improve work being conducted in the city. A Winnipeg secret agent 
reported that the CLDL was being forced to undergo a major reorganization and DCI Wood 
wanted Toronto ClB personnel to verify this intelligence. However, this was something that 
291NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CASD file, report, source deleted, TCPD, 13 May 1937. 
293CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, Commissioner MacBrien to ChiefDraper, 8 April1937; ibid., 
memorandum, Superintendent DCI Mellor to OC "0" Division. 9 April 1937; ibid., memorandum, 
Commissioner MacBrien to Chief Draper, 10 May 1937; NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CASD file, report, 
Toronto City Police Department, 13 May 193 7; ~laking matters more difficult Draper bypassed Toronto 
RHQ's OC altogether and sent intelligence on "CP/CIO activities" directly to NHQ to ~lacBrien and the 
DCI which suggested not only the level of urgency but hinted at friction between the RHQ and TCPD. 
294NAC RG 146, 175P/2035, Tim Buck File, report, source deleted, and AI Superintendent Mercer 
to Commissioner, 17 and 20 April 1937; ibid., report, source deleted, 20 April 1937; ibid., report, Detective 
Corporal Irvine, 3 l\llay 1937. 
2~AC RG 146, 175P/2035, Tim Buck File, report, Corporal Turner and A/Superintendent 
Mercer to Commissioner, 6 and 9 March 1937; For instance, personnel like Turner in Sudbury attended 
meetings revolutionaries like Buck held in that centre as part of a national tour. Their reports remained 
thorough even ifToronto reports were poor. 
:!%~Dowell, 'Remember Kirkland Lake' 63-64. 
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at this juncture "0'' Division CfB personnd were unable to accomplish. 297 All too often CtB 
personnel who assisted Irvine lacked experience like Scots Constable Durward Clarkson 
who had recently joined the CrB. 298 Or like Constable G.J. Hayward they were distracted 
by other duties such as PS work and consequently their intelligence work often turned up 
little new material. 299 
The decline in intelligence gathering on Toronto party branch activities lasted into 
the fall. It also extended elsewhere including deposits on PHFs. Nothing from Toronto, nor 
the Division for that matter, was deposited on Buck's file between mid-April and 
September. The same situation occurred in Stewart Smith's dossier where intelligence 
levels plummeted. Between mid-April and October only a couple of fleeting intelligence 
reports from "0" Division were deposited on his file and pretty much anything of value 
originated outside the city. Only later did both these files see an improvement once an 
operative had finally been developed. 300 
As government apprehension and RCMP concern about the Spanish conflict 
increased in these months, most work being conducted targeted specific anti-fascist 
297NAC RG 146, CSIS, 175/ P392, AE. Smith File, memorandum, DCI Wood to OC "0" Division, 
10 March 1937. 
29s.'O" Division Nominal Rolls, August 1936 -February 1937; CPC TO 1930s, report, Constable D. 
Clarkson and AI Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 6 April 1937; RC~, Quarterly, 48,4 (Fall 1983), obituary 
of Ex Cpl. Durward Clarkson, 
Durward Clarkson, born September 1905 at Falkirk, Scotland. He joined the Force in 1930 at 
Vancouver and served in "D" Division, "0" Division from August 1936 (mainly stationed at Long Lac and 
Toronto) until April 1938 when transferred to "A" Division and Halifax in July 1946. He retired to pension 
in 1957 and died in 1983. 
~AC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, report, Constable Hayward, Superintendent Mercer to 
NCO Hamilton Detachment and to Commissioner, 28 and 29 June 1937; ibid., , report, Constable Mason, 
Corporal Williams and AI Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 22 July 1937; ibid., report, Corporal Williams and 
AI Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 6 and 11 August 1937; NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings,_CASD file, report, 
source deleted and AI Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 19 and 20 May 1937; ibid., report, source deleted, 1 
April 1937; CPC TO 1930s, report, Constable G.J. Hayward and AI Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 27 May 
1937;ibid., report, Constable Hayward and AI Supt. Mercer, 30 June and 3 July 1937; 
~AC RG 146, CSIS holdings, 175P/ 2494, report, source deleted, 19 May 1937; ibid., 
memorandum, AI Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 11 August 1937. 
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activities such as demonstrations and rallies. 301 CIB personnel also began reporting the 
earliest veterans returning home from Spain. 302 For two years dozens of clippings would 
be deposited on the RSA and other anti-fascist tiles. From this OSINT exhaustive lists were 
generated so that [mmigration authorities would be in a position to refuse re-entry to 
Canada those persons who were either British Subjects by naturalization or British Subjects 
not born in Canada who had been absent more than a year and not adhered to the provisions 
in the immigration act while overseas. 303 
In June, Assistant DCI Superintendent Mellor forwarded all Divisions copies of the 
Foreign Enlistment Act (FEA) to familiarize personnel with its various sections. 304 Weeks 
later Mercer reported that stalwarts were concerned by the FEA's passage but had yet not 
made any decision to challenge the law. 305 It was in this context that in August, the DCI 
tasked Sergeant John Leopold to investigate the possibility of prosecution of anti-fascists, 
both at home and abroad once they returned, under the FEA. Leopold doubted that the 
legislation would hold up in court. 306 MacBrien agreed. He believed that neither the FEA 
nor a further OC making it specifically applicable to the war in Spain went far enough to 
stop recruits. Furthermore, with mostly passive investigations being conducted in "0" 
301NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CASD file, extract from Vapaus. 2 and 3 June 1937; A careful 
reading ofVapaus revealed to intelligence personnel that the FMPB had opened a permanent office in 
Toronto (its file was discussed briefly above) 
302NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CASD file, report, source deleted, 30 May 1937; ibid., report, 
source deleted, and Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 1 and 2 June 1937; ibid., report, Constable 
Warner, Corporal H.J. Nelson, and A/ Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 9 and 12 July 1937. 
303NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, memorandum, Commissioner r..IacBrien to Ernest 
Lapointe, 25 August 1937. 
304NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, memorandum, Superintendent Mellor to all Division, 5 
June 1937; Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations, 195-197. 
30
' AC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, memorandum, A/ Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 13 
August 1937. 
306NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CASD file, report, source deleted, 16 July 1937; ibid., report, 
source deleted, 22 July 1937; NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, report n.a., 6 July 1937; ibid., 
memorandum, Sergeant John Leopold to DCL 16 August 1937. 
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Division and likely elsewhere the Force was without the kind of intelligence it required to 
secure convictions under existing legislation. 
In September, MacBrien suggested to Lapointe in another memorandum marked 
"Secret & Personnel" that to "take action" against those persons responsible for recruiting 
for overseas service would require the services of "agents of a temporary nature whose 
duties would consist of the securing of evidence for purposes of prosecution and who would 
afterwards give evidence in Court." He asked Lapointe if the government required such 
action?307 If in March Lapointe had stated in the House of Commons that communists were 
best beaten at the ballot box; by the fall he supported a much tougher program. He felt a 
response was required, that those breaking the law overseas should not be "exempted" and 
that a conference should be arranged between Immigration, O.D. Skelton and one of the 
Force's officials to clarify the rnatter. 308 Then after further consideration Lapointe backed 
do\\-11 from his initial idea. He informed MacBrien that Section 19 ofthe FEA provided the 
Cabinet with the authority to make regulations for "prosecutions, seizures. detentions and 
forfeiture proceedings ... " He added, that until such were in place under this section, "no 
machinery is available for enforcing the provisions of the Act."309 
MacBrien certainly felt otherwise. He believed that drastic action was required and 
he tried to arrange meetings with Skelton on this matter,. but they were postponed 
indefinitely.310 By September Superintendent Mercer and other intelligence personnel 
307NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, memorandum, Commissioner MacBrien to Ernest 
Lapointe, 1 September 193 7. 
308NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, memorandum, Ernest Lapointe to Commissioner 
MacBrien, 13 September 1937. 
3~AC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, memorandum, Ernest Lapointe to Commissioner 
MacBrien. 15 September 1937. 
31~AC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, memorandum, Commissioner ~1acBrien to Skelton, 20 
September 1937; ibid., reply, M. McKenzie, Secretary to Commissioner, MacBrien 23 September 1937; 
ibid., F. C. Blair to Commissioner MacBrien, 29 September 1937. 
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across the national network had consistently demonstrated that there was a rise in CP 
activity in both the industrial and anti-fascist work the party undertook. Mercer shared 
intelligence on industrial unrest with officers commanding Military Districts One and Two. 
He also reported to NHQ numerous strikes in progress throughout the region. Jll It was clear, 
however, that "0" Division was only scratching the surface and that the RHQ CIB's 
intelligence work left something to be desired. Jt: 
As a consequence, in September and early October "0" Division RHQ em 
personnel reconsidered their existing operations. In light of Mac Brien's discussions with 
Lapointe and intelligence reports by Constable Hayward and other personnel who attended 
CASD and FlVfPB meetings which noted substantial turnouts and large sums raised, Mercer 
moved to install an operative. m 
The most pressing priority "0" Division em personnel faced became the CP's 
Eighth Dominion Convention set for Toronto from 8-10 October. It had originally been 
slotted for the fall of 1936 but was postponed a year 'officially' at least on account ofBuck 
being overseas. Acting Superintendent Mercer managed to get an operative inside the party 
in a position to gain access to the event. This was a remarkable development given the poor 
state of Toronto counter-subversion operations since the previous spring. The operative 
produced a substantial eight page report addressing nearly 50 points concerning the 
direction the party was heading and its assessment of existing conditions in Canada and 
abroad. In forwarding the report to NHQ, obviously impressed by the operative's 
311NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CASD file, memorandum, A/ Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 7 
August 1937; ibid., report, AI Supt Mercer to Ocs Military Districts One and Two, 7 August 1937. 
312NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CASD file, "Peace and Democracy Is League's New 
Name,"Ottawa Citizen, 13 August 1937. 
313NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CASD file, report, Constable Hayward and A! Supt. Mercer to 
Commissioner, 17 September 1937. 
329 
thoroughness, Mercer added, "[t]his is the tirst report received. ·•.ll-1 
Provincial elections in October also became a concern and they were monitored by 
an operative who managed to work his way into the anti-fascist movement. He attended 
traditional November 7rh Anniversary Celebrations which were reported. 315 Then the 
National Congress for Peace and Democracy was held in Toronto on 19-21 November. 316 
It was considered so important that in addition to a Toronto operative "C" Division's OC 
Acting Assistant Commissioner Fred Mead arranged to send an operative from Montreal 
to attend and lengthy reports followed. 317 
For several weeks in December the operative's work slowed. 318 Other CIB 
personnel concentrated on municipal election coverage. They relied heavily on OSINT 
which even at the best of times was a poor substitute for other investigations. Yet during 
one week alone intelligence personnel drew nearly two dozen articles. The elections were 
held during the second week of December. Communists and united front candidates fared 
314NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, 175P/2035, Tim Buck File, report, source deleted and AJ 
Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 14 and 15 October 193 7. 
315NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CASD file, report, source deleted and AJ Supt. Mercer to 
Commissioner, 25 and 27 October 1937. 
31~t claimed 155 delegates, (60 were trade union representatives, 41 observers and 75 visitors, 
representing the combined interest of300,000 Canadians) 
317NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, CLPD file, "Distinguished Speakers Open Peace Session,"Dailv 
Clarion, 20 November 1937; "Peace Congress Asks Canadians Boycott QQods,"Daily Clarion. 22 November 
193 7; ibid., report, operative, 19 November 1937; ibid., report, source deleted and N Supt. Mercer to 
Commissioner, 23 and 25 November 193 7; ibid., report, source deleted and N Supt. Mercer to 
Commissioner, 25 and 29 November 1937; ibid., report, source deleted and Acting Assistant Commissioner 
Mead to Commissioner, 29 and 30 November 1937; ibid., memorandum, N Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 
30 December 1937. 
313CPC TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and N Superintendent Mercer, 8 and 9 
October 193 7: ibid., report, source deleted and A/ Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 9 and 11 November 
1937; ibid., "Vote for These Candidates,"The Clarion, l December 1937; "More Exercised Franchise At 
City Election Monday,"Toronto Daily Star, 7 December 1937; ibid., "Personnel of Toronto Council And 
Education Board for 1938,"Toronto Daily Star, 7 December 1937; ibid., "Fervor of Election Lacking on 
Street,"Toronto Daily Star, 7 December 1937; "Dr. F.J. Conboy Is Winner In Board of Control 
Race,"Toronto Daily Star, 7 December 1937. 
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well and the results concerned Assistant Commissioner DCI Wood. 31 ~ 
In mid-December DCI Wood reviewed his Toronto election intelligence and he 
complained to his Toronto OC that work being conducted in this respect was sloppy. Wood 
noted that nothing on Buck's campaign was forwarded to NHQ. Wood was critical of his 
OC adding: "[i]t is presumed that the Globe and Mail and probably the other newspapers 
had some comment to make in this connection and if this is the case newspaper clippings 
relative to the election should be forwarded as soon as possible."320 Mercer believed that 
the best response under such circumstances was action and he made no excuse for the RHQ 
CIB's poor election coverage. He forwarded six clippings from various papers on Buck's 
campaign and added: "[T]he instructions contained in the memorandum under reply have 
been noted, and will be complied with in future. "321 
While election coverage was sloppy "0" Division CIB personnel were swamped 
with work elsewhere. In November and December they were following up complaints that 
potential anti-fascist fighters had obtained false passports and were using Poland as an entry 
point en route to Spain. Polish Consular officials wanted the matter investigated.322 
Canadian intelligence personnel also suspected the possible misuse of their passports by 
communists elsewhere. NHQ CIB personnel believed that they were being obtained 
illegally in Spain. They were right and although a fuller understanding of what had 
happened did not materialize untill945-1946 (and the consequences stemming from Soviet 
31~AC RG 146, CSIS, 175P/ 2494, Stewart Smith file, report, Detective Corporal Irvine, 9 
December 1937; ibid., report, source deleted, and A/Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 12 and 14 
December 1937; Stewart Smith, Alderman candidate for ward 5, was among those elected. Irvine reported 
Smith's tremendous increase at the polls: 8038 in December 1937 when compared with 3754 in 1936 
32
°CPC TO 1930s, memorandum Assistant Commissioner DCI Wood to OC "0" Division, 14 
December 193 7. 
321 CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, AI Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 18 December 1937. 
mNAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, RSA file, memorandum, Assistant Commissioner DCI Wood to 
OC "'C"Division, 2 December 1937. 
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Embassy clerk Igor Gouzenko's defection), already in 1939 W. G. Krivitsk.-y, a former chief 
of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe published a book, In Stalin's Secert 
Service which described the importance ascribed to US and Canadian passports. 323 It was 
also clear that the CI had established networks in North America that were functional at this 
point even if a fuller picture again came as a shock in the immediate postwar period. 32.\ 
In mid-December "0" Division personnel along with Montreal and Ottawa CIB 
personnel had suddenly become fully absorbed by plans to execute some sort of strike 
against anti-fascist recruiters and those being recruited and still domiciled in Canada. In the 
winter months the campaign intensified and considerable energy shifted to the building of 
a cadre of confidential contacts and informants. 325 By early 1938 RHQ CIB personnel 
managed to place an operative within the CASD temporarily. He pro tiled its local activities 
while confidential contacts at Hamilton and Windsor provided additional intelligence.326 
Toronto RHQ CIB personnel also briefly developed a secret agent #1005 (whose identity 
remains a mystery) within the city's anti-fascist community. He added a number of reports 
to the RSA file on local recruiting activities. 327 
323MacKenzie Commission, 541-563; W.G. Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service (London, 1939), 
the following year he also published, I was Stalin's Agent (London. 1940); NAC RG 146, CSIS holdings, 
RSA file, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Inspector Blake to Commissioner, 6 December 1937; 
Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 183-185; Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood. 84-109. 
324Haynes and Klehr, V enona. 93-115. 
325CSIS RSA file, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Acting Superintendent Mercer to 
Commissioner MacBrien, 31 December 1937; ibid., memorandum from Assistant Commissioner King, DCL 
to "0" Division OC, 23 March 1938; ibid., report, Detective Sergeant Weeks and Acting Superintendent 
Mercer to Commissioner, 29 and 30 March 1938; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Acting 
Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 30 and 31 March 1938; CSIS CASD file, report, Acting 
Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner MacBrien, 7 August 1937; ibid., report Acting Superintendent 
Mercer to Officer Commanding Military Districts, 7 August 1937. 
326CSIS CASD file, report, source deleted, 21 January 1938; By that summer "0" Division was 
generating nearly a third of all intelligence deposited on the CASD's file. 
327CSIS RSA file, report, S.A. 1005 and Acting Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner i\-lacBrien, 
12 January 1938; ibid., report, source deleted, Detective Corporal Irvine and Acting Superintendent Metcer 
to Commissioner MacBrien, 18 January 1938; ibid., report, source deleted, Detective Corporal Irvine and 
Acting Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner MacBrien, 20 and 21 January 1938; ibid., memorandum, 
By early 1938 much ofthe region's revolutionary recruiting network lay exposed. 
Through hard work "0" Division CIB personnel had located Toronto anti-fascist otlices, 
identifYing several key individuals responsible for this work as reports moved from the 
general to specific. 328 Detective Corporal Irvine submitted a full-length report which 
explained how contact agents were established in towns and districts across the country, 
how travel to Toronto was arranged, and to whom and where they went once recruits 
arrived in the city. Anti-fascist organizers such as Peter Hunter, whose story is well-known, 
were singled out for investigation.329 Irvine also highlighted the arrangements stalwarts like 
Hunter made for recruits until they were ready to leave for the next leg of their journey.330 
Intelligence reports were so detailed that travel arrangements such as the location and the 
specific time of day steamship tickets were handed out to recruits in Toronto was noted. 331 
They had identified and singled out Communist Jack Cowan who established Overseas 
Travel Limited in Toronto to purchase tickets, and another party organizer who conducted 
screening once recruits arrived in the city. These networks had ties to CI agents operating 
in New York and Washington and the agencies were used to protect stalwarts and to funnel 
monies into North America although how much the RCMP understood this then remains 
unknown. 332 Once they passed their second screenin~ recruits were given tickets for their 
journey to France. Groups had to be broken up into no more than twenty and this task 
Assistant Commissioner Wood, DCI, to OC "'C"Division, 21 and 28 January 1938. 
328CSIS RSA file, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Acting Superintendent Mercer to 
ComrnissionerMacBrien, 31 December 1937. 
3290n Hunter's involvement in this period's activities see his autobiography, Wbicb Side Are You 
On Boys . esp., 53-117. 
'
30CSIS RSA file, Detective Corporal R. W. Irvine and N Supt Mercer to Commissioner 
MacBrien, 5 February 1938. 
331CSIS RSA file. report, source deleted 16 July 1937. 
332Lobigs, "Canadian Responses,"l03, 105. 
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became Fred Collins' responsibility.m This kind of intelligence was put to use only weeks 
later to build cases against anti-fascist organizers and party stalwarts. 334 
As the campaign intensified the Division participated in NHQ's massive plans to 
destroy the recruiting networks and a substantial number of organizations involved in the 
process with a series of raids and arrests. 335 Plans to carry out this general clampdown were 
initiated by MacBrien and the DCI in consultation with a number of federal government 
departments including the PMO's office at the end of 1937. Frank Zaneth was placed in 
charge of this work. 336 Montreal became Zaneth' s operational base where he established 
a legal team to address the finer points of provincial and federal jurisdictions and to make 
sure that no aspect of the operation was overlooked. 337 He generated lists of individuals to 
be targeted in major centers across the country: Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Regina, 
Saskatoon, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. He worked closely with senior intelligence 
officers in each Division. He also traveled across the country early that winter and by mid-
March had established a series of RHQ CIB "special squads." During his trip he lectured 
RHQ CIB personnel on the materials he wanted them to obtain in raids that NHQ had 
planned. 338 
333CSIS RSA file, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Acting Superintendent Mercer to 
Commissioner MacBrien, 20 and 21 January 193 8; ibid., report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Acting 
Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner MacBrien, 18 and 20 January 193 8; Collins was a communist 
organizer, a TILC executive and a member of the Upholsterers and Carpet and Linoleum Mechanics Union. 
Preliminary SS reports were followed by enquiries as to the exact number who had booked passage on 
steamship lines. 
334CSIS RSA file, Secret Brief, Mr. F.P. Brais toW. Stuart Edwards, Deputy Minister of Justice, 
forwarded along with a cover letter by Acting Assistant Commissioner Mead, OC "C"Division to the 
Commissioner MacBrien, 26 and 27 January 1938. 
335Lobigs, "Canadian Responses,"chap. 5, 219-277. 
336Durbro and Rowland, Undercover. 229-236. 
337CSIS RSA file, memorandum, Mr. F.P. Brais toW. Stuart Edwards, Deputy Minister of Justice, 
forwarded along with report, Acting Assistant Commissioner Mead, OC "C"Division to Commissioner, 26 
and 27 January 1938. 
338CSIS RSA file, report, Detective Inspector Zaneth and N Commissioner Cadiz OC "E" Division, 
Vancouver, to Commissioner, 25 March 1938. 
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Final discussion with respect to the raids was conducted at NHQ by Acting Deputy 
Commissioner Wood and senior Department of Justice personnel. By early February both 
parties were heavily involved in considering whether or not successful prosecution was 
possible under FEA Sections 17 and 19. By 24 February these details had been worked out 
and the Force was given clearance to proceed with the raids. 339 "0" Division was kept fully 
informed ofthese developments. 140 
In Toronto, Detective Corporal Irvine remained in charge of much of the local leg 
work. When Zaneth stopped off in Toronto on his western tour, he handed his list of 
Toronto targets over to RHQ CIB staff. The list consisted of eight individuals [names 
deleted] and an undisclosed number of organizations [also deleted] that would be part of 
the series of raids. The names, addresses and locations were verified by Irvine and a series 
of final reports were forwarded to NHQ in late March and early April. 341 
Zaneth was in Vancouver by early April when the raids were about to be carried otT. 
He planned to remain there until after zero hour. He intended to gather information in each 
city stopping over for a day or two on his way back to NHQ. But recruiting died just as the 
raids were about to be conducted. Furthermore, fearing serious repercussions by 
progressives had they gone ahead and also equally concerned by the effect such actions 
might have on the RC~'s relations with at least Saskatchewan's Attorney General, on 6 
April Acting Commissioner Wood called the raids off. 342 
339CSIS RSA file, memorandum, Deputy Minister Edwards, Department of Justice, to 
CommissionerRCMP, 24 February 1938. 
340CSIS RSA file, memorandum, Acting Deputy Commissioner Wood to "0" Division OC, 5 
February 1938; ibid., memorandum, Acting Deputy Commissioner Wood to "0" Division OC, 10 February 
1938. 
J.ltCSIS RSA file, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and A/Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 5 and 15 
April 1938. 
342CSIS RSA file, memorandum, AI Supt. Mercer to Commissioner, 7 April 1938; memorandum; 
Assistant Commissioner King, DCI to OC "0" Division, 22 April 1938; and reply, Special Constable Black 
and Acting Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 4 May 1938. 
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5.3 
Phase 3: Black Days and Trolove: A Changing of the Guards, 
and a return to earlier practices, 1938-1939 
By the winter of 1938 both NHQ and "0" Division faced the realization that 
Toronto's CIB was not perfonning as effectively as was needed. 343 The Division's 
acquisition of CP intelligence had been poor. With the CIB' s attention focused on anti-
fascist activities and industrial unrest, 193 7 was one of the worst years in gathering core 
Toronto CP intelligence in the inter-war period. 344 For many months intelligence personnel 
lacked an understanding of Toronto CP recruiting and organizing and other work it was 
conducting. in this state of intelligence stasis "0" Division RHQ C IB' s staff had trouble 
meeting NHQ's occasional requests and those of other Divisions. 345 Fortunately for Division 
personnel, the economic upturn of 1937 quickly collapsed. Strike activity declined as a 
consequence and there were half as many strikes in 1938 as in 1937 and fewer still in 1939. 
Intelligence personnel gave the RHQ CIB's dismal coverage of core Toronto CP 
activities serious consideration. Initially, this problem's resolution appeared simple once 
they learned that the CP planned to open a permanent Labour College in Toronto in January 
1938.346 They would send an operative to attend its classes. This approach had worked 
previously in the inter-war period and proven an effective entry point for a serial agent. 
343By this point "0" Division RHQ had been reduced further having lost another staff member to its 
outlying detachments. 
344ln 1937 only 127 pages of material had been deposited on "0" Division's core Toronto CP file. 
With just 27 reports this represented the lowest since 1931. In fact, only 1923 after Secret Agent Catt had 
been withdrawn and 1930 once the "Free Speech"battle's press coverage waned (another year in which their 
was no secret agent operating within the party) had been worse. 
mcpc TO 1930s, report, Detective Corporal Irvine and Acting Superintendent Mercer to 
Commissioner, 21 March 1938; ibid., memorandum, Assistant Commissioner C.H. King (DCI) to OC 
"C"Division, 25 March 1938. 
346Kealey and Whitaker [eds.) The Depression Years. Part IV, SB# 879, 22 December 1937,487. 
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The course pro!:,rram the CP planned to establish in early 1938, like its earlier ones, 
intelligence personnel expected, would be modeled on similar programs elsewhere, at 
institutions such as Marx House in London and the New York Worker's School. Its 
curriculum would include a wide variety of subjects such as political economy, working-
class history, journalism and public speaking. Since its staff consisted of a whole cast of 
prominent communists such as J.B. Salsberg, Sam Carr, Charles Sims, Joseph Wallace, 
William Rigby, Charles Marriott and Oscar Ryan, not only would RHQ CIB personnel be 
in a position to get inside the CP, but they would also be able to stay on top of municipal, 
provincial, perhaps even national developments in revolutionary quarters. 34; J.B. Salsberg 
had just been elected to city council as Alderman for Ward 4, Sam Carr was serving as CP 
National Secretary, and Bill Rigby was the CP's national Director of Education. Each of 
these individuals' were under surveillance. So prominent a group were they that their 
activities made the IO's SBs. 348 
Through the school intelligence personnel would gain access to a whole host of 
ancillary organizations such as David Pressman's Toronto theatre group which since 1931 
had played an increasingly important role in advancing working-class consciousness 
through its activities. 349 CIB staff would also be able to keep abreast of other developments 
such as the CP's involvement in anti-fascist organizations. The timing was especially 
prescient since NHQ was preparing its massive assault against the CP and its umbrella 
organizations under various sections of the FE A. 
In February 1938 their operative reported that the journalism course at the Labour 
3~7Ibid., 489. 
3-lslbid., SB# 874, 27 October 1937, 441; ibid., SB #878, 10 December 1937, 478-479, 482. 
3-l~oby Gordon Ryan, Stage Left' Canadian Theatre In The Thirties. A Memoir (Toronto, 1981 ); 
On even earlier Toronto progressive theatre see, Robin Endres, "Introduction,"to Richard Wright and Robin 
Endres [ed.s.] EIGHT "MEN SPEAK and other plays form the Canad; ....... wu.~ ... ,· ths;c,:......, I_Toroulo, 1976), 
xi-x:xxvi. 
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College is "holding up well."Attendance on the evening of8 February, the source reported, 
was 19. 350 The students were paired up and were instructed to practice interviewing each 
other "on the general theme of why they are attending the Labour College, their previous 
activity in the labour movement, [and] what they intend to do when the course is 
tinished. "351 Their interviews were to be written down and turned in the following week. 352 
Caught off guard by this not-so-subtle screening process the RHQ must have decided that 
their plan to install an agent might fail. Their operative never returned to the course. The 
attempt was aborted and "0" Division RHQ' s CIB was temporarily forced to return to more 
passive modes of intelligence gathering. 353 
It is clear that NHQ had been involved in the original decision to launch the 
penetration operation at "0" Division. When the attempt failed, Acting Deputy 
Commissioner (ADC) Wood informed Special Constable Mervyn Black in Regina that he 
was to be transferred to "0" Division's RHQ as soon as possible to join its intelligence 
staff Wood felt that Black's experiences, his politics, and his "aptitude" for this "type of 
work" was exactly what "0" Division RHQ needed. His assessment was right on the mark. 
They had worked together earlier in the decade in Saskatchewan. Black had assumed 
command of "F" Division's intelligence operations when Wood was serving as the 
Division's OC. MacBrien had criticized Wood for giving Black such power since he was 
35
°CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Acting Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 11 
and 12 February 1938; Kealey and Whitaker, The Depression Years. Part V. SB #883, 9 February 1938, 61, 
64-65; #885, 1 March 1938, 81,87; With the exception of a Lenin Memorial and a coal handlers' strike little 
activity was being reported in Toronto in the IO's SBs in general during these weeks. Even the Labour 
College activities had gone unreported. The Coal Handlers and Truckers Union, Local 83, strike began on 
18 February and was answered by 1,500 men who were joined by 30 members of the International Hoisting 
Engineers Union. 
351CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted and Acting Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 11 
and 12 February 1938 
352Ibid. 
353Ibid. report, source deleted and Acting Superintendent Mercer to Commissioner, 2 and 4 March 
1938. 
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only a Special and not a regular member of the Force. Wood had defended Black on 
account of his skills and the Commissioner made an exception. 354 With this history between 
them in early 1938 Wood confidently informed "0" Division's OC that Black's "transfer 
will greatly strengthen your C. LB. by having him in charge of subversive investigations. "355 
Black was "to take charge of subversive activities" and the running of Secret Agents (one 
or two were temporarily positioned within the unemployed and anti-fascist movements) 
which Wood now felt was "most important from the Communist standpoint."356 Sensitive 
to Black's potential importance to the national intelligence network, Wood made it clear, 
that although Black was needed immediately in Toronto "It is not desired to cause Special 
Constable Black any hardship in connection with his transfer. Possibly his family and 
effects could follow at a later date. "357 
Mervyn Black was a Russian emigre born in 1890 in Petrograd. Black had left 
Russia following the Bolsheviks rise to power. He was fluent in seven languages (English, 
Swedish, Spanish, Slavic, Ukrainian, Russian, and German) and was a rabid anti-
communist. 358 He moved to Canada in 1925 and began farming near Kuroki, Saskatchewan. 
By 1932 his attempt at farming had failed so he put in an application with the Force 
emphasizing his special language skills and his early experiences in Russia. 359 Like Zaneth, 
354Betke and Horrall, Canada's Secun·ty Service, 398-399. 
mNAC RG 146,91 ATIP-0459, Service Record of Special Constable Mervyn Black (hereafter 
cited as RCMP Personnel File-- Mervyn Black), memorandum, Acting Deputy Commissioner Wood to OC 
"0" Division, 15 February, 1938. 
3~ibid., Acting Deputy Commissioner Wood to OC's Regina and Toronto, 15 February 1938. 
357ibid., memorandum, Acting Deputy Commissioner Wood to OC "0" Division, 15 February 1938. 
358ibid. "Briefre. Spl/Cst. Black, M. Personal History,'' Assistant Commissioner Ryan, CO 
"F'Division, Regina, 15 April and 3 !\-'lay 1936; ibid., letter, Mervyn Black to Acting Deputy Commissioner 
Spalding. Regina, 24 November 1932; He was the son of two Scottish-born emigres who had moved there in 
1886 when his father assumed the responsibilities of Managing Director of a manufacturing and saw miller's 
firm. Black was educated in Belfast, Dundee, Kelsingfors (Finland) where he completed courses in textile 
and mechanical engineering and mill management. 
3s9ibid., letter, Mervyn Black to Acting Deputy Commissioner Spalding, Regina, 24 November, 
1932. 
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Leopold and many others, Black was eventually hired. From the beginning he worked 
undercover as a Special Agent in Regina and Moose Jaw, where he submerged himself in 
the activities ofthe Doukhobors and was also keeping tabs on revolutionary organizations 
such as the CLDL. 360 
Special Constable Mervyn Black reported to Toronto RHQ on 1 March 1938.361 
Black was given time to adjust to his new environs. He was briefed on local communist 
activities and he soon began overseeing the Division's intelligence work. He needed very 
little guidance in this respect since he was already a leading expert on communism, 
arguably second in importance nationally to John Leopold, and Black's reliability, his 
special language skills, and his knowledge of Russian life arguably made him Leopold's 
equal in many respects. 362 Once Black settled into his work and was fully acquainted with 
the Division's intelligence operations, he was to replace Detective Corporal Irvine who was 
to be detailed to another branch. 363 
Seldom had NHQ intelligence personnel had a clearer appreciation of "0" 
Division's counter-subversion needs thanatthisjuncture in the Division's inter-war history. 
Acting Deputy Commissioner Jennings had headed ··o" Division earlier and he knew only 
too well from his own experience what could go wrong if the Division's CIB lacked 
360ibid., memorandum, Inspector Tait to CO Yorkton, Saskatchewan, 25 November 1932; ibid., 
report, Detective Sergeant Anderson, Inspector Moorhead to OC Saskatchewan District, Regina, 9 
December 1932; ibid., report, Inspector Nicholson, i/c CIB Halifax to OC "H''Division, Halifax, 21 Febraury 
1933; ibid., memorandum, Acting Assistant Commissioner Acland to Commissioner, 19 January 1933; ibid., 
memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Jennings, DCI to CO "F'Division, Regina, 28 January 1933.; NAC 
RG 146 CSIS, ATI Request 94-00014, vol. 4157, PHF 175P/392, AE. Smith file 1930-1939, report, 
Mervyn Black and Inspector Munday, Saskatoon, to CO Southern Saskatchewan to Commissioner, 21 July 
1934. (Hereinafter cited as NAC RG 146, CSIS 175P/392, AE. Smith file) 
361RCMP Personnel File, Mervyn Black, 'Record of Service,' n.a. finalized 16 October 1957. 
362Carl Betke and Stan Horrall, Canada's Security Service: An Historical Outline. 1864-1967 
(Unpublished manuscript, R.C.M.P. Historical Section, 0tta'Wa, 1978), released by the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS) in response to Access-to-Information request, 117-90-107, 397. 
363RCMP Personnel File- Mervyn Black, report, Acting Deputy Commissioner Wood to OC "0" 
Division, 15 February 1938. 
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Special Constable Mervyn Black. A translator with the Force from 1933-1957, 
Black's role was of central importance to many 1930s Toronto political police investigations. 
Source: S.W. Horrall, "RC.M.P. Translation Services," 
RGv£P Quarterly, 52.1 (Winter 1987), 19 
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sufficient intelligence. The same month Black arrived to the Division Assistant 
Commissioner King assumed responsibilities as DC I. 364 With King's appointment as DCI 
the lines of communication between "0" Division and NHQ were further strengthened. 
Now Leopold too, was working in Ottawa. Both former "0" Division OCs knew the 
Tor onto policing community intimately. 365 
While there would be a remarkable improvement in "0" Division RHQ CIB's 
intelligence-gathering capacity, the Force soon also had to contend with the fact that a 
second front was slowly being opened. As of February 1938, just as the operative began 
attending the Toronto Labour College and weeks prior to Black's arrival, the IO began 
reporting on Fascist movements in Canada. 366 Yet, as some scholarly work has convincingly 
argued, the Force's response to Fascist organizations such as the Canadian Union of 
Fascists (CUF), whose head offices were maintained in Toronto, more often met with 
"indifference. "367 Nevertheless, this work to a limited extent did open up another 
surveillance front and required more efFort from intelligence personnel at all levels. Its 
impact, for instance, meant thatthe IO' s SBs now had a second focus. No wonder there was 
364RCMP, Annual Report. 1938, 49. At NHQ, Superintendent C.H. King, DCL worked alongside 
former "0" Division OC Assistant Commissioner C.D. LaNauze who now served as OC "A" Division and 
doubled as NHQ Supply Officer. Superintendent V.A.M. Kemp, the Force Adjutant, would be transferred to 
"0" Division as OC a year later. 
365He had succeeded Jennings as its DOC in early 1932 and had worked with Draper and the Red 
Squad during the Workers' Economic Conferences and the hunger marches in the mid-1930s. 
3~ealey and Whitaker [eds.} R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins. Part IV, SB# 884, 17 February 1938, 
71-76. 
367Michelle McBride, "From indifference to internment: an examination ofRCMP responses to 
nazism and fascism in Canada from 1934 to 1941," MA Thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 
1997; Only a few SS files appear to have been opened up on fascist organizations prior to 1938. Those listed 
in NAC RG 146 CSIS holdings include, Adrian Arcand, file 4163, records dating 23 February 1934 until 27 
June 1939; ibid., a few on the "Aukland Organization of the National-Sozialistische Deutsche Abbeiter 
Partei, Canada"; ibid., "German Canadian Federation"; ibid., "Italian Fascist Party"; ibid., "Nazi Clubs 
Canada"; ibid., "Ordine Italo Canadese". The positioning of the IO's intelligence in Security Bulletins, 
reflected this reality. After an initial zealousness in reporting of fascist groups they were pushed down in SBs 
and communists and other leftists remained the number-one priority. 
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a delay in their production and they were reduced slightly to a bi-weekly format as of 
February 1938.368 
During Black's transition Acting Superintendent Mercer kept a close watch over 
Black's earliest Toronto reports. He digested Black's intelligence assessments and added 
his own analysis prior to forwarding reports to NHQ. OC's were always required to carry 
out such activity with their intelligence section and particularly the work of the Force's own 
undercover personnel, but Mercer's coverage of Black's work was especially rigorous. 369 
As an appointment from within "0" Division and its former ern head, Mercer had a special 
interest in making sure that intelligence work was being conducted in an efficient manner. 
With Mercer overseeing his work, Black's adjustment and his familiarization with local 
issues and activities was proceeding smoothly. 370 But before his immersion was completed 
orders arrived that Mercer was to be transferred to "K" Division in June so Corporal 
Irvine's transfer out of the RHQ ern was delayed as a result. 371 
Mercer's replacement was carefully selected. With the CP's and its subsidiaries' 
strength increasing and eventually the prospect of war growing Mercer's successor had 
many challenges ahead. The Commissioner chose Superintendent Walter Munday for the 
assignment. Munday proved a good choice. He was nearing the end of his career, he had 
vast experience in policing workers in the Lethbridge strikes of 1906, the Saskatoon Relief 
368Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Depression vears. Part V SB #884, 17 February 1938, 71; SB 
#885, I March 1938, 81. 
369CPC TO 1930s, report, Special Constable Mervyn Black and Acting Superintendent Mercer to 
Commissioner, 4 and 5 April 1938; ibid., report, Special Constable Mervyn Black and Acting Superintendent 
Mercer to Commissioner, 3 May 1938. 
371Thid., report, Special Constable Mervyn Black and Acting Superintendent Mercer to 
Commissioner, 19 and 21 Aprill938; ibid., 5 May 1938. 
371 
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, June 1938. The transfer took place under RCMP GO 5878 dated I 
June 1938; CPC TO 1930s, report, Superintendent Munday OC "0" Division to Commissioner, 17 June 
1938. By that point, in addition to RHQ, "0" Division consisted of22 subdistrict headquarters and 
detachments with a staff ranging from seven at Windsor to one at each of the following: Cobourg, Kirkland 
Lake, Lindsay, Owen Sound at Sudbury. 
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Camp Workers' Strike in 1932 and other local events.m Munday had also served with the 
CEF "B"Squadron which went to Siberia. He had worked previously at "0" Division in the 
early 1920s: he was an ''0" Division original who was responsible for leading the first 
contingent from out west once Beyts and a handful of other personnel had established the 
Division and for several years (as noted earlier in this study) Munday headed the Niagara 
Falls detachment. m His Toronto appointment, in part, was a reward for his long service. 
"0" Division after all was a plum posting. Unlike prairie Divisions and those east of 
Quebec, "0" Division seldom interfered in provincial policing matters. As a result many 
Force personnel viewed "0" Division in a comparable manner to both Montreal and 
Vancouver as one of those Divisions where a OC's workload was less than elsewhere. 374 
Yet it got better. He had much in common with other Division intelligence personnel. He 
was British born and had even worked in the textile business like Black prior to his 
engagement. 375 More important still, Munday was an ideal candidate to supervise the 
process of stepping up the Division's intelligence work because he and Special Constable 
Mervyn Black had already worked together on intelligence matters several years earlier 
372Luta Munday, A Mountv's Wife (London, 1930), 25. 
373ibid., letter Inspector Munday to Commissioner Starnes, 31 January 1924; ibid., memorandum, 
V.AM. Kemp to "0" Division OC, 8 April 1938; ''Supt. Munday ofRC.M.P. to Take Over Ontario 
Post,"Regina Leader Post 14 Aprill938; In the 1920s and 1930s Munday worked at numerous places 
across the West and North such as: Chesterfield ("F'Division), Regina, Prince Albert, Winnipeg, and 
Saskatoon. 
374Kemp, Without Fear. 200. 
37~AC RG 18, vol. 3456, file 0-217, Walter Munday Service Record Part I, ~fP Form# 59. 
n.d. (hereafter cited as RCMP Personnel File B Walter Munday); ibid., reference letter, n.d. Henry M. Cooke 
Director to Messrs. W. & J. Sloane, New York. ; ibid., letter Fred White to ~lrs. Scholfield, 13 l'vlay 1908; 
ibid., Commissioner Perry to Fred White and reply 16 May and 22 May 1908; ibid., letter, Mayor, the Pas to 
Minister of the Interior, Robert Rogers, 2 July 1912. ibid., letter, Munday to DOC "F'Division, 2 January 
1914. We also learn here that his stepmother was related to Thomas Birkett an ex. l'vfP. ibid., letter Munday 
to Senator George Taylor, 30 May 1918; and ibid., Commissioner Perry to Taylor, 22 July 1918. Munday 
worked as a carpet salesman in New York when he first made the transatlantic voyage in 1895. He had 
moved to Canada in late 1902 or early 1903 and first applied to join the Force in September 1903. 
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when Munday was Inspector in charge of the Force· s Saskatoon operation. 376 Munday 
trusted Black's ability and judgement much in the same manner King had trusted Reames 
and came to rely upon him increasingly at "0" Division. 377 
By early 1938 the RHQ Cffi staff consisted of nine Force personnel. A year and a 
halflater it would be split between its General CIB and Intelligence Section duties and the 
latter had a staff of 21. Staff Sergeant Charles Batch was the Division's senior CIB 
officer.378 Yet his workload was heavy and increasingly he concentrated more on the 
supervision of the enforcement of other Federal Statutes dealing with Customs, Excise, 
Indian, and the Opium and Narcotic Acts leaving supervision of the Division's intelligence 
work to Black. 379 
As Division workloads increased the expanding intelligence section relied more and 
more upon Miss W. Bottoms, Miss. E.M. Cullen and Miss M.G. Dickson, civilian personnel 
employed as stenographers who brought continuity to CIB work offsetting the many 
personnel changes taking place. By July 1938 the Division also gained its first civilian 
translator. 380 If the RHQ CIB staff was in a transitory phase, in decline during much of the 
preceding year, by mid-1938 enough rebuilding had taken place that it was brimming with 
376NAC RG 146 175P/392, AE. Smith file, report, Special Constable Mervyn Black and Inspector 
Walter Munday, 21July 1934. 
377CPC TO 1930s, For instance, report, Special Constable Mervyn Black and Superintendent 
Munday to Commissioner, 16 August 1938; ibid., 17 September 1938; ibid., 22 September 1938; ibid., 
report, Special Constable Mervyn Black and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 7 and 11 October 
1938. 
378
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, January- February 1937; As noted earlier the transfer took affect as 
of 1-2-37 underRCMP G.O. 4427; He had arrived to "0" Division on a transfer from .. D"Division in 
January1937 and was appointed officer in charge of"O" Division RHQ's CIB a month later. 
37~CMP, Annual Report. 1937, 45- 47, 126-135; "0" Division Nominal Rolls, April 1937; ibid., 
November 1938; ibid., April 1939; ibid., September 1939. He was promoted Sub-Inspector in November 
1938. Yet in September 1939 Batch became officer in charge of the Division's vastly expanded Intelligence 
Branch. Batch brought a number of important investigations such as counterfeit, theft, smuggling, drugs and 
illegal distilling, to successful conclusion. 
380 
"O"Division Nominal Rolls, July 1938. The translator, employed as a civilian, was Mr. E. 
Gronberg. 
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G. D. Pavcl~y (pcnsloned u :loCrgunt, li,·ing in Ou.awa); A/Cpl j. V. Sd:uon (now k'tgco~nc JUtioneJ .a ~·e~·burn DC'ud1mcm}. 
Looking forw~r~, looking back. Many future key "0" Division personnel forged relationships 
and shared sumlar experiences in the early years including ·'B" Squadron members, Walter 
Munday, Robert Mercer and Arthur Duffus. 
Source: RCl\£P Ouarter!v. 9,2 (October 1941 ), 194. 
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talent. Many "0" Division RHQ em pt!rsonnel had gained considerable experience in and 
around Toronto, while still others with intelligence experience, had been drawn from 
elsewhere in the Force. These RHQ personnel filled the gap occasioned by the unsuccessful 
placement of an agent within the CP. 
Despite the RHQ Cm 's adjustments and improvements by the summer of 1938 "0" 
Division RHQ CIB still had one crucial step to take to fully reinvigorate their operation. 
Toronto intelligence personnel relied heavily upon ChiefDraper and the TCPD who once 
again had promised the ''closest cooperation" and "assistance" in keeping tabs on 
communist activities.m However, the need to expand was apparent because intelligence 
personnel had been trying to track several agitators on trips through Northern Ontario since 
the spring, to no avail. They were not cutting the mustard. Detectives were showing up at 
events only to learn that they had been canceled. 382 The CP was increasing its presence 
nationally, its membership was growing at a phenomenal rate. A May Dailv Clarion 
subscription drive had exceeded its quotas in Northern Ontario by 142.9 per cent and in 
Southern Ontario by 108.3 percent. 383 In June, in Toronto, the 13th Plenum of the Central 
Committee of the CPC had been a decided success with hundreds of guests and foreign 
delegates such as Earl Browder, General Secretary of the CPUSA, and Bias Roca, Secretary 
of the Communist Party of Cuba, in attendance. 384 Even CP umbrella organizations such 
as the American Lithuanian Workers' Literary Association were reporting substantial gains 
in recruiting drives. While they had fared poorly in Toronto, they had done remarkably well 
381 CPC TO 1930s, report, Special Constable Mervyn Black and Superintendent Walter Munday to 
Commissioner, 9 August 1938. 
382NAC RG 146 file "'Recruiting for Spanish Army,"memorandum, Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 5 August 1938. 
383Kealey and Whitaker [eds.] The Depression Years. Part V SB #892, 25 .May 1938, 166. 
384ibid., SB #893, 7 June 1938, 183. 
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elsewhere, once again exceeding their objective. m Likewise, in its two years of existence 
the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee (SWOC) reported remarkable gains at its 
Ontario conference in June. [twas brokering peace between AFL and CIO. unions. John 
Weir had even successfully arranged a secret ballot for the Toronto Artists Union who 
voted to apply for affiliation to the CIO. 386 Restaurant workers were on strike in the city and 
the unemployed had become more militant and had "taken possession of the Bandstand" 
at Queens Park and earned a police response. 387 These were just a few events taking place 
receiving coverage by the Division and the IO's SBs, while many other events had gone 
unreported. To be effective intelligence personnel had to expand their operation further 
passive investigations were recognizably a poor substitute. 
"0" Division RHQ's CIB needed someone who could operate undercover, who had 
experience in this capacity and whose background would be protected provided the CP 
made inquiries. Corporal Robert Leaconsfield Trolove fit this profile. In July, 
Commissioner Wood sent Superintendent Munday a memorandum which read, "Owing to 
the fact that I find it utterly impossible to arrange an Inspection of your Division within the 
near future, it will be necessary for you to come to these Headquarters. There are several 
matters dealing with the organization, particularly, that it is desired to confer on. "388 
Munday made the trip to Ottawa. Intelligence work was likely discussed since weeks later 
Trolove was transferred to "0" Division RHQ CIB. 
Ronald Leconsfield Trolove was born in England ( Narborough, Leicestershire) in 
1901.389 An English public school boy during World War I he served with the First 
385Jbid., 185-186. 
386ibid., SB #894, 24 June 1938, 198-199. 
387ibid., SB #897, 4 August 1938,242. 
388ibid., RCMP Personnel File B Walter Munday, memorandum, Commissioner Wood to 
Superintendent Munday, 26 July 1938. Wood arranged a meeting for 29 July 1938 at I 0 am. 
3890bituary "RL. Trolove,"RCMP Quarterly 53,2 ( 1988). 
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Battalion Machine Gun Corps and later the Seaforth Highlanders until being discharged as 
"under age" in September 1917. 390 He was part of the wave of postwar British recruits that 
included Constable J.T. Goudie. Trolove joined the Force in July 1920 at Ottawa. Once 
Trolove had completed basic training in Regina he was posted to "E" Division, British 
Columbia, where he served at Vancouver. By 1921, "mounted, wearing red sash with 
hammer and sickle," according to RCMP historians Carl Betke and Stan Horrall, Trolove 
was leading Vancouver demonstrations with communists in the Canadian National Union 
of Ex-Servicemen. The following year Trolove posed as a returned soldier in search of 
work and he joined a "throng'' of unemployed men camped in Hastings Park protesting 
against the system.39 t He managed to get into the \VPC but was soon exposed and had to 
be withdrawn thereafter. 392 
Likely for security purposes, to protect their Mountie, in December 1922, Trolove 
was transferred to "D" Division and stationed at Winnipeg. 393 In April 1925 Trolove was 
transferred to "0" Division. He worked for a decade at several "0" Division detachments 
including: Hailebury, Oshaweken, Camp Borden, Windsor and Toronto.394 In the early 
3~etke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service,446; RL. Trolove, "Musical Ride 1921," RCMP 
Quarterly 35,3 (January 1970), 50-52; Since his service record has been destroyed little else is known about 
his early life. 
391 ibid., 374 (c); See overleaf behind photo ofTrolove. This incidentally was one of the 
organizations that Constable Henry Catt was affiliated with in Toronto to gain access to the revolutionary 
movement 
392ibid., 446-447. 
393For that purpose he had been attached to "N' Division. Trolove then served in Edmonton at 
"G"Division. He performed in 1925 with the Musical Ride at the British Empire Exhibition, Wembley Park, 
in London, England. 
394 
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, January 1929 until August 1930 Camp Borden; ibid., September 
1930 to June 1931 Haileybury and promoted Corporal 1-7-31 under RCl\tfP G.O. 9234; ibid., July 1931 to 
December 1932 Ohsweken; ibid., January 1933 to March 1933, On Command Regina; ibid., Aprill933 to 
September 1933 Ohsweken; ibid., October 1933 to February 1934 Walkerville; ibid., ~larch 1934 to January 
1935 Windsor; ibid., March 1935 'on lone' to Rockcliffe pending transfer to "N' Division, transfer 1-3-35 
under RCMP G.O. 2236. 
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1930s he had participated in the surveillance campaigns against Ottawa-bound trekkers 
heading for the WEC and lost an old friend Inspector L.J. Sampson who died during the 
May 1933 "disturbance" in Saskatoon when he fell from his horse. He was twice 
recognized for his work (some of it detective), in the Commissioner's Annual Report. 395 
In March 1935 Trolove was transferred to "N" Division and in December back to 
"D" Division, Winnipeg RHQ where again he was attached to the CIB. He functioned first 
as a detective and then became a "successful" Special Agent in Winnipeg. He joined the 
Single Unemployed Men's Association (Sillv!A) using the alias of"Benson." Eventually 
he was made SUMA's Secretary. 396 He also began reporting on local recruiting for Spain 
activities. He was one of the tirst agents in Western Canada to report on these activities and 
one of the best. 397 He was well established in Winnipeg's revolutionary circles. In addition 
to getting inside SUMA and eventually the CP, he had built up a cadre of trustworthy 
informants with whom he had developed a good rapport. 398 
mRCMP, Annual Report 1926, 35; ibid., 1932, 45; It was opened in September. It was 
"established to cope with conditions said to be existing among the Indians in that district. "First in 1926 when 
he established a new Divisional detachment at Moose Factory. Then in 1932 for undercover work in 
Southwestern Ontario; While in charge of the Ohsweken Detachment he became aware that Indians of the 
reserve were obtaining wine and spirits from a bootlegger in Hamilton. He went undercover and joined four 
Indians in a buy at the bootlegger's house in Hamilton. The bootlegger's house was raided and a quantity of 
spirits was found on the premises. 
396Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 447. 
397 AC RG 146 file "Recruiting for Spanish Army", on SUMA see report, Corporal Trolove, 11 
January 1937; On Spain see, ibid., report, Corporal RL. Trolove and Assistant Commissioner Dann "D" 
Division OCto Commissioner, 15 January 1937; CPC TO 1930s, report, source deleted, 16 November 
1938; NAC RG 146, "Recruiting for Spanish Army"file, report, Corporal Trolove and Assistant 
Commissioner Dann "D" Division to Commissioner, IS January 1937; ibid., report, Corporal Trolove and 
Assistant Commissioner Dann "D" Division to Commissioner, 18 January 1937; ibid., report, Corporal 
Trolove and Assistant Commissioner Dann "D" Division to Commissioner, 20 January 1937. 
398ibid., "Recruiting for Spanish Army,"file, report, Corporal Trolove and Assistant Commissioner 
Dann "D" Division to Commissioner, 10 February 193 7; ibid., report, Corporal Trolove and Assistant 
Commissioner Dann "D" Division to Commissioner, 13 February 1937. He also reported extensively on anti-
fascist file sets. For instance, when he learned that five recruits for Spain had alluded authorities and "gotten 
away over the weekend" Trolove informed his OC that this was likely since he had always found his source 
"reliable." 
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Other operatives were developed in Winnipeg during 1937. A replacement for 
Trolove was successfully positioned in SUMA. 399 As a result, Trolove's future as an 
undercover agent was discussed between his OC and Assistant Commissioner Wood, the 
DCI, during the spring. 400 At first they agreed that Trolove would keep operating 
undercover until May Day events had passed since there was considerable fear that 
increased numbers of single unemployed men were becoming more militant.'~01 Trolove 
remained undercover for several months and then as the perceived threat dissipated was 
returned to regular duty. But by the following winter it was clear that Trolove' s talents were 
being wasted in Winnipeg especially when Toronto was having considerable difficulty 
resurrecting its principal RHQ CIB Toronto CP counter-subversion operation. 
Following the meeting Munday had in Ottawa with the Commissioner in July 1938 
arrangements were made to further improve "0" Division's intelligence operations. In 
September 1938 Trolove was transferred to "0" Division RHQ.402 With Trolove's return 
Superintendent Munday had all the key ingredients in place. For the first time in a long 
while intelligence personnel prepared to open up and broaden the depth of their Toronto 
CP operations. Now Munday and Black were ready to push the RHQ CIB intelligence 
operations hard returning them to the covert counter-subversion practices of an earlier 
period. 
Within a week of his Toronto transfer Trolove once agam was covenng 
revolutionary activities. He had likely maintained his alias "Benson" because it certainly 
399CPC Winnipeg 1930s, memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Wood to DOC "D"Division, 17 
April1937. 
-IOOibid. memorandum, Superintendent T. Dann to Commissioner, 22 April 1937. 
401 ibid. 
4020bituary "RL. Trolove,"RCMP Ouarterlv 53, 2 (1988). In March 1940 Trolove was sent to 
"A"Division, Otta..va, before being relocated to "C" Division Montreal RHQ. He was promoted Corporal on 
1 July 1931, and Sergeant 12 December 1944. He was retired to pension as of 1 January 1948 and died on 
19 February 1988 at Burk's Falls, Ontario, at age 86. 
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made sense to keep up his cover. He contacted someone at Toronto CP offices and 
subsequently turned out to hear an A.E. Smith lecture.~03 Days later he attended a Clarion 
staff banquet and the following day a house party that had likely been arranged to welcome 
him to the city.404 
Trolove knew many party stalwarts. He had known Leslie Morris, for instance, for 
sixteen years. 405 Becky Buhay also confided in him. At the house party Buhay informed 
Trolove that she was terribly shaken by the fact that she and Ewen had separated and that 
he had moved to British Columbia.~06 Trolove also attended a peace rally held at Queen's 
Park in late September and reported on local CP organizing troubles his comrades were 
facing. 407 
Although Trolove had been reintegrated into revolutionary circles he still needed 
to strengthen his cover so at some point he began posing as a machine fitter. Yet this 
occupation was a poor choice as in time he would be working six days a week and as many 
as twelve hours a day to keep up his cover. This led to a flurry of correspondence between 
NHQ and RHQ over whether or not he was entitled to keep his pay. 408 
Trolove' s cover also influenced to a certain extent the focus of some of his early 
investigations. At the beginning of November the Toronto Street Railway Employee's 
ol0
3ibid., report, (source deleted up top), Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 17 September 1938. 
404ibid., report, source deleted, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 22 September 1938. 
40
s 217ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday, 18 
and 24 March 1939. 
406ibid., report, (source deleted up top), Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, September 1938; ibid., report, source deleted, Special Constable Black and Superintendent 
Munday to Commissioner, 22 September 1938 . 
.j()
7ibid., report, source deleted up top, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 27 September 1939; ibid., Cross Reference Sheet, source deleted and Special Constable 
Black and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 29 September 1938 . 
.j()
1Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 447; How it was resolved remains a mystery. 
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Union was preparing to strike over health and occupational safety issues such as shorter 
hours and the implementation of one-man street cars which was going into effect on the 
city's busiest routes.'~09 Trolove attended a couple of these meetings. Management feared 
the union was full of communists, which was unfounded. Although supported by the CP in 
their demands, about the only ties Trolove uncovered was that "every member of the Street 
Railwaymen's Union received a copy of the Daily Clarion, gratis, through the mail."410 If 
anything, the T.T.C. had become more a home for RC:MP operatives and agents. Through 
the help of the transit authority a decade earlier it had provided Special Agent Goudie with 
a base.411 The Force had a quid pro quo arrangement with the transit authority. The Force 
passed intelligence to them when it concerned labour unrest, contract negotiations with 
their unions, and the transit authority reciprocated by providing employment for operatives 
or agents. 
As Trolove's general workload increased the RHQ CIB tried to relieve some of the 
pressure he was experiencing. They wanted to acquire more intelligence to improve their 
analysis and broaden their understanding of local revolutionary developments before they 
committed Trolove to a particular CP branch or perhaps even an ancillary organization in 
the city. Toward that end they pulled in Constable S.O.F. Evans from Niagara Falls at the 
beginning of November to attend a civil liberties' meeting being held at a Toronto 
collegiate in opposition to Quebec's Padlock Law. His main assignment was to assess 
.w9CPC TO 1930s, report, Corporal Trolove, 6 November 1938; ibid., "Would Delay T. T.C. 
Order,"Giobe & Mail. 7 November 1938; ibid., "Strike Talk Is Heard Among T.T.C. Workers As Winter 
Fair Near,"Toronto Daily Star. 7 November 1938; ibid., "Asserts Tram Union >Not Talking Strike,"Toronto 
Dailv Star, 8 November 1938. 
~10ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, 6 November 1938; ibid., memorandum, Superintendent Munday 
to Commissioner, 9 November 1938. 
411Goudie had maintained his cover as a janitor working the night shift for the transit authority. 
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where within the city the most activity was taking place.~ 1 : 
Evans remained in the city aftef'Nards. He continued working for the CIB initially 
as a detective (yet in time his job was expanded) and as the scope of revolutionary activities 
increased Special Constable Black also sent Constable LeRoy Yeomans out on several 
occasions to cover other public events.413 For instance, both Black and Yeomans attended 
a CP Massey Hall mass meeting to get a better sense of the support the CP had and what 
activities it was then undertaking.-lt-1 
Trolove, who at this point was still shopping for a "home" within one of the many 
progressive groups active in the city, began attending HvfPB meetings, dances, and other 
local events. He also reported on CP plans to initiate a recruiting drive for China. He was 
watching SUMA's local activities and also began to involve himself in upcoming municipal 
elections.415 
Yet despite these initial modest gains in "0" Division RHQ CIB's intelligence 
gathering, in late November the DCI was still dissatisfied with its overall performance. He 
wanted information from one of Trolove's early reports verified. It had noted that the 
Winnipeg and Toronto CPs had launched an overseas recruiting drive for China.4L6 But 
412ibid., report, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 15 and 16 
November 1938. 
413RC~, Quarterly, 36,3 (January 19710, "Obituary of ex-Sgt. LeRoy Hamilton Yeomans," 79; 
born, 26 August 1905 at Rockville, N.B., joined the RCl'viP on 31 July 1929. He was promoted to Corporal 
in November 1945, sergeant in November 1952 and retired to pension in July 1955. He was stationed at 
Rockcliffe, Toronto, Oshweken, London, Ottawa, Montreal, Port Burwell and Port Harrrison. He died in 
August 1970 at Merrickville, Ontario. 
4uibid., report, Constable Yeo mans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, I 0 and 11 
October 1938. 
41~AC RG 146 "Friends of the r...-Iackenzie-Papineau Battalion"(FMPB) file, report, Corporal 
Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 26 and 29 November 1938; 
CPC TO 1930s, report, Corporal Trolove, 23 November 1939; ibid., secret memorandum, Superintendent 
Munday to Commissioner, 29 November 1938. ibid., Corporal Trolove, 16 November 1938. 
416CPC TO 1930s, memorandum, Assistant Commissioner King, DCI to OC "D"Division, 22 
November 1938; ibid., report, source deleted (Toronto), 16 November 1938. 
352 
without better access Trolove was unable to provide this intelligence. He had to get inside 
the CP. The DCI's request sped up the decision as to where and when Trolove would be 
positioned. Days later, Trolove attended his first meeting of the CP's Riverdale Branch in 
a working-class neighborhood. Fittingly, Sam Scarlett's address that night was titled "Why 
you should be a Communist."417 
Even with Trolove positioned inside the CP the DCI's impatience with RHQ CIB 
operations mounted. So much so in fact that the DCI sent Munday a stem memorandum: 
We do not appear to have received a report on particulars concerning 
the meeting held at Toronto to celebrate the 21"1 anniversary of the Soviet 
Revolution. Presumably such a meeting took place and, in such instances, 
and also on the occasion of other important meetings held, it is desired to 
have full particulars regarding the identity of the speakers and the subject 
matter of their address together with the number of persons who attended the 
meeting and the general reaction to the speeches, etc., etc.'~ 18 
CIB personnel scrambled to try to meet his request. Superintendent Munday blamed 
this apparent oversight on Special Constable Black and briefly distanced himself from the 
matter. He demanded Black provide an answer and waited for an official response. It took 
two weeks before Black answered in a memorandum addressed to his OC which reported 
that with the exception of an ULFT A Hall meeting no event had been held. Furthermore, 
to appease the DCI, and echoing responses by senior RHQ personnel made earlier in the 
Division's intelligence history, Black assured him that'"[ a ]ll important meetings held under 
the auspices of the C.P. or its affiliated organizations have been covered wherever possible 
and this policy will be continued in the future, as per instructions. "419 
In December 1938 "0" Division RHQ CIB substantially increased the number of 
intelligence reports it generated. The majority of its field investigations were conducted by 
417ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 25 and 29 November 1938. 
m ibid., Assistant Commissioner King, DCL to OC "0" Division. 25 November 1938. 
mibid., memorandum, Special Constable Black to OC "0" Division. 
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Trolove and then reviewed by Black and Munday. Trolove was sent to spy on a housewives' 
association being organized in the city, then an East Toronto Humanity Club. Many 
community-based women's associations had sprung up across Canada and somehow it 
became Trolove's responsibility to keep tabs on these "militant mothers'"and their city 
activities. 420 
Municipal elections were less than a month away. Trolove now began participating 
more fully in the CP's city Ward life. He attended the regular meetings of the CP's 
Riverdale Branch. At one of them he was invited to act as an election scrutineer, a position 
he accepted.42l Trolove also began working in the CP's Ward One committee rooms 
"assisting" in Tim Buck's election campaign. 422 He attended a scrutineers' meeting just 
days prior to the election.423 He reported that both the Humanity Club and the Housewives' 
420ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 7 and 12 December 1938; ibid., "First Annual Convention of the Housewives' 
Association,"30 November 1938; ibid., "When Housewives Unite,"by Margaret Gould reprinted from The 
Toronto Daily Star. 11 October 1938; ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and 
Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 1 December 1938; ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special 
Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 6 and 9 December 1938; The SS opened up 
a file on Housewives' associations in Toronto and Montreal during these years. See, NAC RG 146 file 3440 
"Housewives Consumers Association: Communist Activities Within Toronto," opened, 29 November 1937, 
closed, 22 July 1947; ibid., NAC RG 146 file 3394 "Housewives League Montreal" opened, 27 November 
1939, closed, 7 December 1947; Joan Sangster, Dreams ofEguality: Women On The Canadian Left. 1920-
1950 (Toronto, 1989), 137-142; In 1937 intelligence opened up files on these housewife's organizations in 
both Toronto and Montreal and their files remained active for a decade and were superceded by groups like 
the Houewives' Consumer Association (HCA). 
421CPC TO 1930s, report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday 
to Commissioner, 25 and 29 November 1938; ibid., report, source deleted, Special Constable Black and 
Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 30 November 1938; ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special 
Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 29 December 1938 and 5 January1939. 
mibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 14 and 17 December 1938; ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and 
Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 29 December 1938 and 5 January 1939. Jewish Women who 
turned out to assist Buck were referred to by Trolove as "Jewesses". 
~23Ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 29 December and 3 January, 1938-1939. 
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Association simply were established to further progressives' success at the polls. 424 As 
important, he noted, was the work the Toronto Labour Representation Association 
undertook, which met in offices on Wellington Street each Friday night leading up to the 
election.425 Trolove had infiltrated that organization too. Trade Union delegates comprised 
the majority of those who attended its meetings, the CP "guided" them, Trolove reported, 
and they went back to their unions to tell their membership whom to vote. 426 
Intelligence personnel instructed Trolove to keep tabs on communist election 
preparations throughout December. On election day Trolove was at the Ward One Tim 
Buck committee room by 8:30a.m. to assist at the polls. He returned in the evening to hear 
the radio results. He submitted a full three-page report on the election outcome. His primary 
sources of intelligence were longtime associate Leslie Morris and Sam Scarlett whom he 
had befriended. 427 The 1939 elections were heavily reported. Newspaper clippings taken 
from Toronto papers were forwarded to NHQ. The names of communists and progressives 
who had run were underlined as were their election results. Like previous years these results 
were eventually packaged and reported in the IO's quarterly intelligence summary.428 
After the elections Trolove broadened his work. He left the Riverdale branch and 
424ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 29 December and 3 January, 1938-1939. 
425A..E. Smith, All My Life: An Autobiography (Rpt., Toronto, 1977), 195 ; Penner, Canadian 
Communism,146. 
426CPC TO 1930s, report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday 
to Commissioner, 12 December 1938. 
427ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 3 and 6January 1939. Although the party had polled better in each of the Wards the narrow 
defeat of Buck for Board of Control was a major disappointment. 
mibid., "Aldermanic Vote Throughout City,"and "'Result of Voting For School Board,"and 
"Scarboro and Aurora Upsets Mark Elections,"Toronto Daily Star, 3 January 1939; See Kealey and 
Whitaker [eds.] RC.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Depression Years. Part V, Civil Security Intelligence 
Summary, No. 1, January-March, 1939, 373-377. 
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joined the CP's Ward Two branch where a great deal oflocal activity was conducted.429 By 
attending Ward Two meetings Trolove soon learned of plans the CP had to split the ward's 
branch since it had grown significantly and was now well in excess of fifty members. The 
CP also planned to establish a new branch that would push into Ward Three with the 
ultimate goal of extending and enlarging the CP' s presence in north Toronto. 430 By the end 
of January both these feats had been accomplished. The Ward Three branch was 
established. Both A.A. MacLeod and Major Ed Cecil-Smith had openly joined it and were 
playing a significant role in its activities.431 With a reinvigorated FMPB during the winter 
of 1939, it was not surprising that intelligence personnel instructed Trolove to get close to 
MacLeod and Cecil-Smith. Furthermore, there was considerable growth occurring in Ward 
Three. The CP had consolidated its position in Ward Three by quickly establishing a Ward 
YCL branch and an unemployed organization.432 Trolove's workload shot up dramatically 
in this period. He was kept busy attending both wards' activities.433 He also attended other 
significant local CP events increasing his contacts and broadening his support base.434 
Fearing the continued rapid growth of the Toronto CP, Assistant Commissioner RR 
Tait, who had replaced King as DCI by this juncture, prepared to open up the Toronto CP 
429CPC TO 1930s, report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 15 and 16 January 1939. 
430CPC TO 1930s, report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 15 and 16 January 1939; ibid., Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent 
Munday to Commissioner, 19 January 1939. So many new recruits were being endorsed and accepted into 
the party that it was felt that only by expanding its geographic presence could they meet this demand. 
431 ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday, 27 January 
and l February 1939. · 
432ibid., report, Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 27 February 1939. 
433 ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 2 and 9 February 1939; ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and 
Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 5 and 9 February 1939. 
434ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 22 and 24 January 1939; ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and 
Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 22 and 24 January 1939. 
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intelligence network further. Toward this end he sent Munday a memorandum requesting 
that CP membership cards be secured. In addition, Tait wanted RHQ CIB personnel to 
evaluate old cards to make sure that the cards they secured were authentic. To avoid 
suspicion, if stalwarts kept a tight reign over the cards and would notice any missing, then 
cards were to be duplicated and returned quickly. This operation was to be undertaken with 
extreme care .. m Special Constable Black oversaw this assignment. He obtained several 
cards from an undisclosed source (perhaps Trolove ). One card was from 1930, another from 
1938, and a third from 1939. Black subsequently reported that the text of the three cards 
were essentially the same. He also reported that he was uncertain as to whether or not all 
cards were printed in Toronto for all the Districts. Yet at the same time he believed that this 
would be the "logical procedure." Otherwise, he felt, that the CP' s ability to "control" the 
"checking of dues" in particular, would become a "somewhat troublesome matter for the 
centre."436 He promised that an agent or confidential contact would have that subject 
"investigated" and a further report would be submitted. 437 
NHQ's interest in local CP activities increased during this period. The volume of 
RHQ intelligence gathered by this point also grew as a consequence. Both factors brought 
about a further realignment of RHQ intelligence personnel. Detective Inspector F.W. 
Zaneth joined the Division's RHQ CIB staff in January and remained "attached" (with a 
brief exception when he was sent to "C" Division Montreal for February) until the end of 
August. 438 The RHQ CIB also drew upon the services of Inspector R.E. Webster (the 
Division's Duty Officer) and Inspector C.H. James (the Officer in charge of Preventative 
mibid., memorandum DCI to OC "0" Division, 11 January 1939. 




"0" Division Nominal Rolls, January~September1939. 
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Service Branch). They lent assistance to the CIB in February acting brietly as handlers 
reviewing intelligence reports. 439 Constable Evans' status within the CIB operations was 
also elevated. He began to run' confidential contacts' along with Special Constable Mervyn 
Black who, although still in charge of the CIB's intelligence operations, was also involved 
in a series of other ongoing federal investigations in the southwestern part of the province. 
For several months Evans replaced Black as Agent Trolove's handler:wJ In February 
Constable H. W. Kirkpatrick was moved from RHQ general duty over to the CIB. The 
following month he was also dispatched to cover revolutionaries' public meetings.+~ 1 
Trolove's burden was enormous. For more than a month he covered the activities 
oftwo Wards; he attended the meetings of the Beaver and Jack Murray Branches in Ward 
Two and the Uptown branch in Ward Three; and he had gone back and forth every couple 
of nights to a CP function. 442 So in February intelligence personnel managed to get another 
operative placed within the Toronto CP using the membership cards they had obtained. Not 
only did this move lighten Trolove's responsibilities, but it provided insurance in the event 
something happened to Agent Trolove. By this juncture intelligence personnel simply felt 
they needed another source. +~J 
439CPC TO 1930s, report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Inspector Webster, 14 and 
18 February 1939; ibid., report, source deleted, Constable Evans and Inspector James, 15 February 1939. 
+Wibid., report, source deleted, Constable Evans, and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 6 
and 7 January 1939; ibid., report, Corporal Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday, 12 and 
13 January 1939; ibid., report, Constable Kirkpatrick and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 13 
April 1939. 
441
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, January-March 1939; CPC TO 1930s, report, Constable Kirkpatrick 
and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 14 March 1939. 
442 He was enduring in three jobs that he held: 1) as a machine fitter, 2) as a party stalwart and 3) as 
an RCNlP Special Agent. He was working six days a week, 12 hour days and then expected to participate in 
party life. He was then expected to fill out reports on his outings for the SS. 
443CPC TO 1930s, we know that a second agent had been placed because of report, source deleted, 
Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 12 April 1939. Munday wrote at the bottom 
of a report, "Reg. No. 9539 also submitted a report on this meeting, the contents of which are confirmed in 
the above report."It had been a joint meeting of Ward 2 and 3 CP branches ofCP. 
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In March and April Trolove's workload lessened. RHQ intelligence personnel 
carved up the city's North and East Ward and an agreement was reached whereby the 
operative would continue to attend Ward Two meetings, while Trolove would remain more 
actively engaged in Ward Three CP life. Before long, a third operative joined Trolove and 
the Ward Two sleuth as local intelligence networks were expanded further. He kept tabs 
on developments at the city's easternmost point (and just beyond) attending an East 
Toronto branch's regular Sunday Forum. He reported that the CP was making inroads 
offering classes in Scarborough and although its Scarborough Heights branch was not very 
"active," he reported, its YCL group was "one of the best" in the region. 444 
The intelligence that "0" Division RHQ's sleuths were gathering increased again 
by this point. By the spring Trolove was submitting on average several reports weekly 
which ended up in "0" Division RHQ CIB's core Toronto CP file. So was the Ward Two 
operative. All three were also producing other reports which were being deposited on other 
files. Yet of the three, Trolove's work was the most impressive. By mid-March he had 
joined Ward Three's Uptown Voter's Association and had begun attending its weekly open 
forums. 445 He was also sent to attend a regional unemployed congress held in the city in 
April and he subsequently increased his coverage of the CP's efforts to mobilize the 
unemployed. 446 He kept tabs on the Clarion offices and reported that its staff was having 
a hard time "making a go of it" and that branches were under considerable pressure to raise 
444ibid., report, source deleted, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 15 
and 17 April 1939; ibid., report, source deleted, Constable S.O.F. Evans and Superintendent Walter Munday 
to Commissioner, 20 and 21 April1939. 
-145ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 17 and 23 March 1939. 
446ibid., report, source deleted, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 2 
!\.fay 1939, This report refers to one that Trolove had filled out on the event.; ibid., report, Special Agent 
Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 25 and 29 April 1939, This report 
refers to SUMA city activities. 
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funds. One solution stalwarts pursued was the establishment of cooperatives across the city 
in the hope that their pro tits could be used to fund other CP activities. Trolove learned that 
15 cooperatives had been converted. Seven cooperatives he identitied by name and 
provided their addresses. 447 
Trolove also began detailing the steps his branch took to arrange a series of weekly 
street-comer meetings. Through the intelligence he gathered CIB personnel identified a 
contact within the TCPD whom branch members planned to approach to secure a permit. 
The permit was granted and the tirst street-comer meeting was held on 4 June. Like others 
that followed during the summer it was attended by Agent Trolove and reports were written 
and forwarded to NHQ.448 
Efforts to shore up the CP's alliance in the city's trade union movement were also 
being reported by Agent Trolove during this period. Yet this work met with little success. 449 
In fact, most of the CP's efforts during June were absorbed arranging an International 
Picnic. It was to be the principal money raiser for election campaigns at all levels and other 
projects the CP had planned. Trolove attended several organizing meetings and reported 
splits with respect to securing the use of Eldorado Park as well as troubles the CP had run 
447ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 18 and 26 May 1939. 
448 ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 24 and 27 March 1939; ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and 
Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 4 and 7 June 1939; ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, 
Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 12 and 19 June 1939; ibid., report, Special 
Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 17 and 21, July 1939: ibid., 
report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 11 and 12 
July 1939; ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 3 and 4 July 1939. 
449ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 27 March 1939. 
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into with the Food Workers' Union who had operated the concessions at the previous year's 
festival and gone unpaid. Operatives later reported that the event had proved a bust. 450 
After several months' absence Special Constable Mervyn Black resumed handling 
responsibilities and stepped up his direct supervision of agents and operatives. 151 Since his 
workload was heavy, Constable Evans continued in a similar capacity. 452 Superintendent 
Munday had taken ill in February and in mid-March he announced his plans to retire to 
pension after 35 years service at the end of July. 453 Inspector Frederick William Schutz was 
attached to the Division in May as second in command.454 In June, Schutz was appointed 
head of "0" Division's CIB . .j55 This was the final major Divisional RHQ intelligence 
change until August, just before Canada declared war. Schutz's appointment, tirst as CIB 
head, then as temporary officer in command of the Division was an exceptionally good one. 
450ibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 3 and 19 June 1939; ibid., report, source deleted, Constable Evans and Superintendent 
Munday to Commissioner, 9 June 1939. 
451 ibid., report, source deleted, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 23 and 24 June 1939 . 
mibid., report, Special Agent Trolove, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 23 June 1939. 
453RCl'vfP Personnel File-- Walter Munday, memorandum, Commissioner Wood to Superintendent 
Munday, 16 March 1939. 
454NAC RG 18, vol. 3460, file 0-239, Service Record of Frederick William Schutz (Hereinafter 
cited as RCl'vfP Personnel File-- F.W. Schutz): Like so many other Mounties Schutz was born in Britain, in 
1884. A staunch Church of Englander, Schutz emigrated to Canada in 1902 and shortly thereafter had taken 
up farming at Brandon. By1908 he had given up on farming and in May that year joined the Force. As a 
rookie he served in the North Mackenzie river valley and the Yukon. He was discharged in May 1913 and 
re-engaged in August 1914. Like so many others, Schutz served in Siberia from August 1918 to July 1919 
and upon returning served in Regina, Prince Albert and Weybum. In 1931 he was promoted Inspector and 
sent to Regina HQ. He was Officer Commanding Prince Albert, then transferred to "0" Division in May 
1939. 
455 
"0" Division Nominal Rolls, June 1939, Transfer "F' to "0" Division, 1/600. 7058; ibid., July 
1939, Inspector James, retired to pension as of 6 July 1939, under RCMP G.O. 7306. 
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He had all the requisite experience like most of his predecessors and would become "0'' 
Division's OC in 1943.~56 
By the summer Trolove had risen marginally in the CP and was sitting on the Ward 
Three executive while the Ward Two operative was now positioned on the East Toronto 
Section Committee.457 While Trolove's position on the executive enabled him to get more 
involved in local activities only a slight improvement was made in the quality of the 
intelligence he secured. 458 His focus remained local CP activities such as branch 
membership recruiting and efforts to expand the popular front in the city with organizations 
such as the East Toronto CCF.459 Another group the CP were trying to bring under its 
control, he noted, was the Veteran's Welfare Committee and he was also active in local 
CLPD functions. 460 He was also filling in details on the activities of revolutionaries in June, 
July and August, adding to their dossiers. For instance, he had reported on Leslie Morris' 
poor financial situation, identified his Toronto address and provided details about his wife 
and children living in Winnipeg. 461 Yet consistently Trolove's summertime reports noted 
that the CP's democratic-front initiatives were met with indifference. Despite the repeated 
statements to the contrary made by CP leaders such as A.E. Smith, whose talks at Ward and 
4~C:MP Personnel file, F. W. Schutz. In September 1942 Schutz was appointed Acting 
Superintendent OC "0" Division, and confirmed as of 1 May 1943. He retired to pension on 1 January 1945 
and died in Vancouver on 23 February 1956; Kemp, Without fear.202. 
457CPC TO 1930s, report, Secret Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 21 June 1939. 
mibid., report, Secret Agent Trolove, another operative (name deleted), Constable Evans and 
Inspector Schutz to Commissioner, 7 and 10 July 1939. 
459ibid., report, Secret Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday, 25 and 26 
l\lay 1939. 
-160 ibid., report, Secret Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday, 25 and 31 
May 1939; NAC RG 146 CSIS holdings, file "FMPB,"report, Secret Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and 
Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 5 and 9 May 1939. 
461NAC RG 146, ATI Request, 94-A-00011, vol. 857, Leslie Thomas Morris, file, PHF, 175/P2440, 
report, Secret Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Inspector Schutz to Commissioner, 11 and 12 July 1939; 
ibid., report, Secret Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 12 June 
1939. 
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branch meetings stressed the importance of cooperation, the CP was slowly being 
isolated. 462 Several operatives confirmed Trolove's analysis of the situation in the city. For 
instance, they reported that the CP's "cosy" relationship with W.O. Herridge's "New 
Democracy" movement was "besrinning to cool. '"'63 Nor was much happening on the trade 
union front. In general, since the May Clarion sustaining drive, CP city work was dismal..j64 
Secret Agent Trolove attended Ward Three executive committee and East Toronto 
CP meetings in July. But somewhere within the network and for unknown reasons Trolove 
had also fallen under suspicion. 465 He operated undercover for a further seven weeks 
reporting the occasional piece of intelligence. He survived the outbreak of hostilities and 
Canada's entry into War as an agent working undercover. 466 But within a couple of weeks 
he could not shake off whatever confidence he had lost. Intelligence personnel had to assess 
the situation, weighing the value of his intelligence against the larger interests of regional 
and national intelligence operations. Ultimately they decided that the damage his exposure 
might cause to the organization significantly outweighed the value of the intelligence he 
was able to secure. Furthermore, with a number of other operatives well positioned within 
the network, they had insurance which they had been without during the 1920s fiasco. As 
a result Trolove's career as an undercover agent abruptly ended. By the fall "0" Division 
intelligence personnel had relocated Trolove and stationed him at Muncy detachment. In 
a matter of weeks he had gone from being an agent inside the Toronto CP and was now 
46~PC TO 1930s, report, Secret Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Inspector Schutz to 
Commissioner, 12 June 1939. 
-163ibid., report, source deleted, Constable Evans and Inspector Schutz to Commissioner, 20 and 21 
July 1939. 
464ibid., report, Secret Agent Trolove, Constable Evans and Superintendent Munday to 
Commissioner, 18 and 26 May 1939; ibid., 25 and 31 May 1939. 
-165Betke and Harral!, Canada's Security Service, 44 7. 
466NAC RG 146, CSIS, 175P/ 392, AE. Smith File, report, Secret Agent Trolove, Constable Evans 
and Superintendent Kemp to Commissioner, 20 and 26 September 1939. 
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simply a Force regular running a small detachment with a staff of two. Another undercover 
career had come to a close. 467 
"0" Division RHQ' s 1930s counter-subversion operations met with mixed success. 
In general, the 1930s was a more ditlicult period for ClB personnel in trying to establish 
operations and acquire intelligence from the Toronto CP. First of all for years the RHQ CIB 
found it virtually impossible to penetrate the underground party, this was exactly what 
Starnes had feared might happen in the late 1920s under such circumstances. Entirely 
unable to develop long-term penetration agents meant that early RHQ CIB reports more 
often lacked the luster, the basic depth and understanding of the CP's internal workings 
achieved by 1920s penetration agents. Reportage was superficial and focused primarily on 
issues such as crowd control at demonstrations, disruption of treks and while often effective 
(given the circumstances) more often it highlighted the fact that CIB personnel lacked an 
effective long term strategy for 'dealing' with communists and other revolutionaries. 
In the mid-1930s slowly RHQ CIB personnel in conjunction with NHQ intelligence 
personnel began to make adjustments and refocus their investigations. Better guidance only 
began following a failure on the part of CIB personnel to realize the substantial 
transformation taking place in the CP during 1934. For several years operatives had joined 
Irvine, but their restricted access had limited the kinds of questions that could be asked. 
Furthermore, their temporary development more often meant that they were never able to 
provide a regular flow of intelligence at even the most rudimentary level. Work conducted 
was not steady and concentrated but rather haphazard. 
467
"0" Division, Nominal Rolls, August- October, 1939. 
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Despite the massive increase in attention paid intelligence work during late !9.30s 
the RHQ CIB still encountered enormous difficulties. Although better positioned to access 
information and certainly further ahead over earlier Depression work conducted 
intelligence operations faced other hurdles equally as challenging. Toronto personnel often 
lacked the requisite skills that would make for more effective gathering such as a sound 
knowledge of communism, languages, or even a basic intelligence savvy. Quite often 
structural and bureaucratic impediments hurt 1930s operations as did the Force's 
parsimonious attitude and poor remuneration toward this work and its many obligations 
elsewhere. By the end the forced withdrawal of Corporal R.L. Trolove from undercover 
work was just one of the more obvious signposts that the RHQ Cffi was not all it was 
supposed to be. 
In some respects 1930s Divisions still remained technological backwaters. 
Symptomatic of much larger problems was an early 'Plflv1A' operation, namely the CIB's 
attempt to secure party membership cards. While gaining access was not likely to be a 
problem in this specific operation Black complained that as late as January 1939 there were 
still no facilities for making photostat copies at the Division Headquarters. Instead, his 
intelligence personnel would have to work within a tight schedule to try to get the cards to 
NHQ and then back to the Division so they could be returned before their loss were 
noticed. 468 Other seemingly basic equipment such as radio receivers for cars was not readily 
available which also made intelligence work more difficult than it might otherwise have 
been.469 These were just a few of the problems the CIB encountered. 
-163CPC TO 1930s, report, Special Constable Black and Superintendent Munday to Commissioner, 
30 January 1939. 
46~C:MP, Annual Reoort. 193 8, 9; On technology in policing in general see Greg Marquis, Policing 
Canada's Century: A History ofthe Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (Toronto, 1993), 168-174. 
365 
Thus the key to understanding the l930s is in recognizing that it was a decade of 
discord in terms of the Force's evolution of its key intelligence operations. Unlike the 
1920s there was no neat and tidy string of agents to develop a narrative upon. Yet there was 
an overriding story had a certain coherence to it. Political investigations intensified in the 
1930s and ern networks were transformed going through several stages. First detective 
work was the basic modus operandi, then ern personnel adopted a mixed operational 
strategy with a series of operatives run alongside a primary detective. This clearly was how 
continuity achieved in earlier periods by anchoring the ClB' s work in OSINT or a serial 
penetration agent run inside key CP branches was realized for most 1930s investigations. 
Coverage was increased whenever possible on an as-per-required basis. Sometimes when 
the work became particularly taxing investigative duties wer~ divided amongst the ranks. 
Finally by the end of the decade agents were reestablished. In general, the early 1930s saw 
the state rely upon its most extreme forms of overt coercion, namely courts and jail 
sentences. In this period intelligence services relied more upon OSINT, then passive 
investigations. As the 1930s progressed and liberalism (however constrained) enabled the 
CP to forge a larger open public space, the secret state resorted to more intrusive forms of 
monitoring the CP and its umbrella organizations activities. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation has otTered the first in-depth analysis of an inter-war Canadian 
domestic intelligence operation in which the RC!'v1P and its personnel are as central to 
the story as those individuals and organizations placed under surveillance. It goes beyond 
the intriguing work of Mark Leier and James Dubro and Robin Rowland whose studies 
are largely biographical, focused entirely on the work of a single agent, and in the case 
of the former preoccupied with the agent's ties to labour and mysticism and in the latter 
many issues outside the political policing context. l My study enables us to see how 
intelligence networks changed over time and how penetration agents, operatives and 
informants were only just part of the period's intelligence story. This advance, I argue, 
is more in keeping with those intelligence historians who suggest that penetration agents 
reflect only a small part of what intelligence agencies do and the kinds of operations they 
conduct. 
I approached the period's history by adopting a methodology similar to authors 
such as Nigel West and Chapman Pincher and yet in doing so turned on its head their 
perspective passing it through a historical lens much more sympathetic to the aspirations 
of the Canadian Left.2 I also built upon the work of Steven Hewitt, whose nicely-crafted 
Ph.D. dissertation clearly demonstrated that class, gender and ethnicity matter in 
intelligence studies and are important tools of historical analysis. 3 However, in echoing 
his sentiment I believe that I move the debate fornrard (or at least shifted its focus) by 
lLeier, Rebel Life; Dubro and Rowland, Undercover; Porter, Plots and Paranoia, 8; I accept 
Bernard Porter's definition of a political police which can be defined as "a body of men [and women] 
whose duty is to keep tabs on the political opinions, activities and intentions of the subjects of a state." 
2Nigel West, Mole-Hunt: The Full Story ofthe Soviet Spv in lvfi5 (London, 1987); Chapman 
Pincher, Their Trade Is Treachery (London, 1981 ); Unlike West I refuse to reduce an assessment of 
any service to the three functions of 'integrity', ability to conduct operations, and skill at making the 
best use ofthe product. Nigel West, Games Ofintelligence: The Classified Conflict of International 
Espionage (London, 1989). 
3Hewi.tt, "Old Myths Die Hard" 
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choosing to consider how the RCMP's intelligence operations constantly reinvented 
themselves to keep their political bosses apprised of activities in the revolutionary 
community. My work, influenced by scholars such as Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, 
joins those individuals who view "the state" as something more than a benign force, but 
rather as an agency working to uphold the interests of a privileged minority . .~ In this 
process of inverting West and Pincher and accepting Miliband's and Panitch's views on 
the state, instead of a hunt for 'moles' worthy of' rooting out,' the story becomes one of 
members of the Force, who invaded progressive organizations, seeking to destabilize and 
destroy a progressive politics however misguided and misplaced, at times, that politics 
might have been. 
Although NHQ set national objectives through a senes of Confidential 
Memorandums (C.M.s) and General Orders (G.O.s) domestic intelligence operations 
were, in the last instance, rooted in the communities in which they functioned, and lived. 
We need to keep in mind that much of the daily decision making occurred at the local 
level, which in many respects is truly the 'front-line' for intelligence work to borrow 
former CIA chief Allen Dulles' military metaphor. 5 Therefore, as this thesis has 
demonstrated, intelligence history is often best explored from the "bottom up." 
After a brief introduction and literature survey my study began by exploring the 
rise of the national intelligence apparatus and it broke important ground by considering 
in detail the manner in which the Western Ontario "0" Division was created in the 
winter of 1920 and its reception in the communities it entered. Earlier studies, such as 
Carl Betke and Stan Horrall's (1978) internal history of the RCMP and its security and 
4R.alph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Societv: an analysis of the Western system of power 
(New York, 1969); Leo Panitch, [ed.] The Canadian State: political economy and political power 
(Toronto, 1977); Susan Watkins, "A Socialist Cassandra," New Left Review 19 (Jan/Feb 2003), 152-
160 review of Michael Newman, Ralph Miliband and the Politics of the New Left (London, 2002). 
5Dulles, The Craft of History 
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intelligence service, suggested that the absorption of the DP had occurred with little 
difficulty. Only a few "disgruntled" personnel such as A.J. Cawdron felt slighted by the 
process.6 My exploration of the i.rise of "0" Division suggested otherwise. A more 
accurate picture is only possible once we begin to study the grass-roots response within 
each of the Eastern Divisions. The transformation from one policing regime to another 
could prove just as bumpy as the arrival of a new detachment to the region. Class lines 
were drawn in the process but tensions also cut across them and conflict in the 
nationalization and absorption process came from sources previously not expected. 7 
In my study I have restored human agency to members of the police, something 
neglected in much labour writing which often chooses to simply dichotomize 
organizations into opposing camps of good and evil. Time and time again through a case 
study approach my work demonstrates that the fledgling inter-war Canadian intelligence 
service was more egalitarian than previously assumed. s Within the RCMP intelligence 
work was often rewarded and, in fact, for many inter-war personnel intelligence 
experience served as a stepping stone to important portfolios and was part of the training 
required to make it into the Commissioned ranks. 9 
For the first time in Canadian history we get a detailed sense of the establishment 
~etke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service. 
7The rapid entry of the Force into Eastern Canada drew the ire not only of progressives and 
their organizations but also other government departments and other elite groups many of whom had 
enjoyed the relationship that they had already established with the DP. 
8Sawatsky, Men In The Shadows, 15-16; Miles Copeland, Without Cloak and Dagger New 
York, 1974); Philip Agee, Inside the Company. A CIA Diary (London, 1975); Mann and Lee, RCMP 
vsThe People. 137-139. 
9Cortlandt Starnes was rewarded for his work conducted during the Winnipeg General Strike 
and was appointed Commissioner in 1923. S.T. Wood, Clifford Harvison, George McLellan, were only 
a few other notables whose careers included considerable intelligence work and who made the leap from 
DCI/ DSI to Commissioner before their retirement. At "0" Division numerous additional examples can 
be cited. Both Superintendents Newson and Jennings, were promoted for their intelligence work during 
the Winnipeg General Strike. Mercer, Fish, Darling, Reames and Mathewson also benefitted because of 
this work. 
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of a RHQ in 1920, its organization and evolution, and specifically an appreciation for 
the formation of an RHQ CIB. All previous published studies are weak on this process 
and the early period more generally. 10 In addition, we learn a great deal about t1edgling 
Division personnel and specifically members of the Cffi, their backgrounds, their 
strengths and weaknesses in the kinds of work they conducted, and their contributions 
to these early operations. 11 In mapping out the contours of the Division and the way in 
which it evolved, we also learn something about the presence of stenographers, 
chauffeurs, clerks, readers, officers in charge, translators, and other personnel 
instrumental to the intelligence supply chain. 
In the immediate aftermath of nationalization, spying in Southern Ontario was 
socialized and brought increasingly under the control of the RCN!P. Spying had become 
too important to be left in the hands of private firms. Consequently, the material 
contribution private firms made to the total volume of intelligence obtained in 
successive years declined in the early 1920s. At "0" Division RHQ in core CP files it 
stood as high as 70-80 percent in 1920, but by 1923 had dropped to a maximum of 5-10 
percent of the total in the core Toronto file. In the changeover that took place my 
discussion of the running of the early CIB explained how a triumvirate of sorts emerged 
as the dominant form of intelligence gathering. DOCs and Officers in Charge of the CIB 
served in a liaison capacity with informants, operatives and secret/penetration agents 
gathering intelligence, writing up detailed reports which became increasingly 
standardized before forwarding the material to NHQ for further indexing and filing and 
10Sawatsky, Men in the Shadows; Mount, Canada's Enemies; Hewitt, Spving lOl; R.C. 
IVIacleod, The North-West Mounted Police and Law Enforcement 1873-1 905 (Toronto, 1976). There is 
a great need to bring similar detailed attention to the study of the RCl\IIP, albeit from a much more 
critical vantage-point, that R.C. Macleod showed when studying the Force's early history in Western 
Canada. 
11 This builds upon the work done by Gregory S. Kealey at the national level. See Kealey, 
''Spymasters, Spies and Subjects". 
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additional action. The Division as a whole, like the intelligence networks that were 
constructed, adapted to economic and social circumstances. 
The Force's post-war "power grab", its expansion nationally as a political police, 
paralleled changes elsewhere. The RC'tv'IP's emergence as the federal government's most 
coercive instrument and as a replacement for the militia, was part of a much larger 
tapestry that included: a narrowing industrial legal regime, a new labour discipline 
imposed on progressives by conservative unions who increasingly dominated the labour 
side in the ongoing struggles between capital and labour, corporate mergers, mass 
production industries, company welfare strategies, a homogenized and mass marketed 
working class culture, and burgeoning government bureaucracies who played an 
expanded role in all facets of social lifeY The "Cold War" had its origins in the 1917-
1920 period and not in the 1940s as a vast historiography still seeks to suggest in 
claiming that it was the outcome of a series of events between the great powers which 
led to both positive and negative assessments ofthe tive decades that followedY It is 
obvious that for the RCI\1P and their political bosses the Cold .War commenced in the 
aftermath of the Russian Revolution. 14 
12Paul Craven, 'An Impartial Umpire': Industrial Relations and the Canadian State 1900-1911 
(Toronto, 1980); Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, The Assault On Trade Union Freedoms (Toronto, 
1988); Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before The Law; Doug Owram, The Government Generation: 
Canadian intellectuals and the state 1900- 1945 (Toronto, 1986); Struthers, No Fault of their Own; 
Palmer, Working-Class Experience. 
13 A few of the more well known include: John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the 
Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1947 (New York, 1972); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacv (New York, 1972); Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill. America. and 
the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986); Denis Smith, Diolomacv of Fear: Canada and the Cold 
War 1941-1947 (Toronto, 1988); for a historiographical survey of the domestic focus origins in the US 
writings see, John Earl Haynes, "The Cold War Debate Continues: A Traditionalist View of Historical 
Writing on Domestic Communism and Anti-Communism," Journal of Cold War Studies. 2,1 (Winter 
2000), 76-115. 
14Kealey, "The Surveillance State"; and Kealey, "State Repression"; Horrall, "The Royal 
North-West Mounted Police"; Horrall, "Canada's Security Service"; Betke and Horrall, Canada's 
Ser.--urity Service. 
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My third chapter explored a series of intelligence ''operations'' during the first 
wave ofRHQ CIB activity which broadly speaking went from 1920-28. It reconsidered 
in light of Ian Angus' and William Rodney's studies the level of infiltration by 
operatives in the progressive movement in Toronto and eventually the fledgling WPC/ 
CP as it emerged as the main voice on the Left in the city in this period. 15 The period's 
first of three RHQ CIB penetration agents was Constable Henry (aka Harry) Catt. I 
detailed his Force career from 1921 until his departure from the CP in late 1922/ early 
1923 and his eventual discharge from the Force in 1925. I then examined the secret 
career of James Thomas Goudie from the time ofhis RCrv1P recruitment by former Force 
Comptroller Lawrence Fortesque in England in 1920 through his arrival at "0" Division 
RHQ in early 1924 and withdrawal from undercover work by early 1927. Johan (John) 
Leopold's (aka J. W. Esselwein' s) more familiar story and his brief undercover career in 
Toronto was studied next. In general, through examining local operations in my study, 
I showed a great deal more about how agents entered the party, who they befriended, and 
what kind of information they were able to secure. This contributes to the field of social 
history by providing a partial reconsideration of key events in Canada's past such as a 
more complete understanding of the founding meeting of the CPC and A.E. Smith's 
radicalization and ascendency to the presidency of the CLP. 
The uncovering of Leopold in May of 1928 ended one period in the Division's 
operations. How Leopold had fit into "0" Division's 1920s operations has not been 
previously examined. Nor does the historiography offer an assessment of the 
consequences his uncovering had on intelligence operations. Only by studying the 
interplay between those who organized and run the em intelligence operations, their 
agents and informants and other operatives do we get a sense of what happened at the 
local level. Agents did not operate in a vacuum, but as part of a larger plan. When 
13 Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks; Rodney, Soldiers of the International. 
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something went wrong, if they were exposed, then there were serious repercussions for 
the network as a whole. If the 1930s emerged as the heyday of penetration agents in the 
international cold war geopolitics with the presence of the Cambridge ring, then what 
emerged from my story is the sense that the 1920s was largely the period in which the 
Toronto RC:NIP was often most etTective at getting their key penetration agents, run 
serially, inside local CP branches and on national committees. 
Chapter four considered what happened in Toronto at "0" Division once news of 
Leopold's uncovering became public~ By studying hundreds of intelligence materials 
deposited on the core Toronto file and by turning to PHFs on subjects placed under 
surveillance it became clear that after Leopold's exposure a new period emerged in 
Toronto activities. It was a period that lasted up until the end of 1931. The major change 
that took place in the 1928-31 period, with the loss of penetration agents as the basis for 
operations, was an increased reliance upon Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). The 
major kind of OSINT deposited on the core file and in the Toronto segment of PHFs 
suddenly became newspaper clippings. This shift in focus coincided with the 
appointment of Toronto city police Chief Draper, who quickly moved to establish a red 
squad modeled on similar bodies found in US cities. Nicely captured in the work of 
Michael Horn and Lita-Rose Betcherman, until now the "Free Speech" battles on the 
streets of Toronto has not received any treatment from an intelligence perspective. 16 In 
my study not only was Canada being kept "Canadian" by the RC:rv!P, but the security and 
intelligence apparatus was also being kept alive in Toronto by the publicity the "Free 
Speech" debate earned in the bourgeois press, and through this transformation to OSINT 
was preparing itself on an operational level for Depression-era challenges. 
In this context, personnel changes in the Division are discussed. So too were 
16Hom, "Free Speech within the Law"; Hom, "Keeping Canada 'Canadian"'; Betcherman, The 
Little Band. 
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problems ofobtaining accurate and timely infonnation and the stren.gths and weaknesses 
ofbeing able to expand the network by relying on others to support the local CIB in the 
gathering of infonnation. However, whether the Division· s intelligence operational 
change with Leopold's exposure was symbolic of a larger national debate over 
intelligence practices is a question this study raises and yet cannot answer until much 
more work is undertaken. Had the 'moralism' of those who believed that spying was 
something distasteful and largely outside the proper sphere of policing in the English 
realm briefly triumphed in the aftennath of 1928? It certainly appears so at "'0" 
Division. But the experience elsewhere at centres right across the country from 
Vancouver to Halifax still needs to be examined to continn this hypothesis. 
There was a pseudo-scientific quality to gathering intelligence through more 
'passive' means such as OS INT. To a certain extent this process could be improved upon 
just like report writing. Passages that identified the ethnicity of crowds, their size and 
evidence that either supported the notion that there was increased militancy or that 
support for a particular organization or movement was waning were underlined. By the 
end of the 1920s something of a new intelligence operational story was beginning to 
unfold. The graph below nicely captures the essence of the main contour of "0" 
Division's shifting operations in its core inter-war Toronto file. The substantial peak in 
OSINT reflected a marked change in the way the core network functioned. 
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Leopold's uncovering, the Depression, and eventually the mobilization of the 
unemployed through the WUL and organizations such as the NUW A induced fear among 
Ottawa officials and especially the newly-elected Bennett administration. As pressures 
being applied on the Force to curb protest increased, tensions escalated over intelligence 
practices between NHQ and Toronto "0" Division personnel during the winter of 1930-
31. Commissioner Starnes' confidence in Superintendent Jennings' and his CIB staffs 
abilities was eroding quickly. Jennings felt that the crisis was simply that the Division 
had been unable to secure much useful intelligence without a penetration agent. 
Leopold's legacy, simply put, was this failure. His uncovering and the tum to OSINT had 
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set the basis for the Division's intelligence operational framework for its participation 
in the 1931 round-up and arrests of the CPC leadership. This is a dimension missing 
entirely from the interpretations of these events in the treatment by earlier scholars. 17 
Starnes was not 'dreamily' thinking about retirement in the heady winter months of 
1931, as Betcherrnan claimed, but instead was looking to escape Ottawa for a Western 
tour at the earliest possible movement. However, the planning prior to the raids, the 
lengthy winter/spring session in the House of Commons and pressures by Bennett were 
preventing this departure. "0" Division personnel made a significant contribution to the 
court trials that followed something also largely overlooked by other writers. Only by 
knowing the contributions Fish and other personnel made to 1920s operations can a more 
complete assessment of their involvement in events such as the trials be achieved. Ill 
Thus the success and failure of the Canadian State's use of its most coercive 
instrument in the 1931 arrests and the lessons learned in the years following Leopold's 
uncovering along with the Force's plans to expand its policing organization in the spring 
of 1932, resulted in a series of changes to "0" Division. Ultimately, the CPC's entry into 
a new period of illegality and consequent return to operating underground forced a 
reconsideration of existing intelligence practices. The limits of OSINT became known 
during the arrests and by the end of 1931 enough distance had been put between 
Leopold's debacle to begin considering a return to more obtrusive forms of intelligence 
gathering. It was in this context that 1930s operations at "0" Division emerged and that 
the Division reconstituted the intelligence work that it undertook. 
In 1930s "0" Division RHQ CIB operations more emphasis was placed on the use 
of detectives sent out to cover meetings. Less emphasis was directed toward a reliance 
17Betchennan, The Little Band; Adams "The 1931 Arrest and Trial"; Adams, "The Anti-
Communist Role". 
18Smith, All Mv Life; Ewen, The Forge Glows Red. 
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on newspaper clippings. Periodically, informants were pulled into the loop to provide 
intelligence and there was the occasional flirtation with the development of penetration 
agents. For much ofthis period the Toronto ClB relied on the work of Detective [rvine 
and for many years a mixed operational strategy. Irvine functioned as a surrogate for 
penetration agents during the tremendous rise in unemployment and even later on in the 
Depression. His career on the one hand highlighted the benefits of having at least one 
individual who provided consistency to the operational work being conducted especially 
as the challenges "0" Division personnel faced shifted dramatically. On the other he 
represented the limits of an operation without a penetration agent. 
As the Depression worsened in the winter of 1932-33 and the CPC capitalized on 
its early turn to "popular-front" strategies by working within broad umbrella 
organizations, first at the local and then eventually national level, the RCl\1P responded, 
in part, by making changes to its organization at the RHQ level. Former Division 
intelligence personnel went to Ottawa to assume even more important intelligence posts. 
Herbert Darling became the Assistant to the DCL Superintendents Newson, Jennings and 
King eventually served as DCis. By the 1930s Toronto increasingly became the ideal 
training ground for intelligence personnel since it was the national centre of the 
communist movement. 
Not everything was entirely satisfactory in the running of the Division nor the 
intelligence work that its RHQ CIB conducted in the mid 1930s. Some senior personnel 
were more interested in intelligence work and were better at it then others. In the 1932-
34 period the inability of the Division to place long-term penetration agents within the 
CP meant that both it and NHQ, despite Irvine's efforts, functioned for much of the 
worst years of the Depression without the kind of, nor quality of, intelligence they had 
grown accustomed to in the 1920s. Nowhere was this clearer than in their coverage of 
the emergence of anti-fascist popular front movements in the summer and fall of 1934. 
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For much of 1934 neither NHQ nor many Division personnel had paid attention 
to the rise of these anti-fascist organizations. Student youth congresses in the summer, 
for instance, had gone largely ib'Tlored, and events elsewhere were poorly covered. By the 
time of the CLA WF' s First National Convention in the fall of that year NHQ and 
Division personnel split once again over the need to cover the movement in a much more 
thorough manner. Division personnel, failing to see the importance of the mass 
mobilization of the popular front, through broad-based anti-fascist coalitions which tried 
to sink their roots into the middle class broadening their influence across Canada, were 
'lectured' on the need to make these organizations a priority. 
Henceforth a reorientation took place and we have the beginning of the opening 
up of a number of 1930s investigative fronts on the part of Toronto CIB intelligence 
personnel. The closest that anyone comes to my work in detailing aspects of these 
operations is Martin Lobigs' fine treatment of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and the 
various phases of its struggle against the State and the RCJ\1P, and in a few papers 
notably Paul Axelrod's study of student protest. 19 
In my analysis of the Depression campaign, my chapter five title "Reconfiguration, 
Reorientation and Redeployment" nicely encapsulates the changes underway within the 
Division in the 1930s. Issues such as the strength of various progressive organizations, 
the debates that captured their attention and their method of protest significantly 
influenced how intelligence personnel at Toronto "0" Division responded. But many, 
many, other issues also affected investigations such as seasonal nature of work, 
obligations elsewhere, and for the Force: pay and working conditions, transfers, periods 
of sickness and leave and so on and so forth. Although security networks could be 
expanded to tackle issues such as regional marches or those on Ottawa, they operated 
under many constraints. The CP was able to elude the Force on numerous occasions, for 
1 ~obigs, "Canadian Responses"; Axelrod, "Spying on the Young" 
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instance, by taking the movement underh,rround, screening candidates tor membership 
and in the treks by publishing the location of RCl\IIP checkpoints in the working class 
press. 
In the 1930s the Division's Toronto intelligence network has become much more 
closely linked to the national framework which reflected a maturation ofNHQ CIB and 
also the ties forged with the Division. The 1931 Arrests, the rise of a national and 
international anti-fascist movement and the shift away from agents all culminated in the 
193 7-3 8 wintertime plan to strike again at the heart of this movement. Leopold 
• 
reemerged, but at the last minute a strike against the CP was called off by the Liberal 
administration. By the winter of 193 7-38 once again it became increasingly clear to NHQ 
and Division personnel that the latter was not getting the quality of information that was 
needed. Especially with a massive anti-fascist campaign and strike wave on the home 
front and as the evidence mounted overseas that Canada might likely be headed for 
another conflict. Once again the Division RHQ intelligence networks would adapt. 
The steps "0" Division RHQ personnel took to transform its intelligence operations 
during 1938-39 completed this narrative. My final chapter explained many of the changes 
taking place within the Division linking the late 1930s to the earlier phases in the 
Division's intelligence history. My study identified the transfer of new personnel into the 
Division and the decision to resurrect old tried and true methods. After months of 
rejigging the Division personnel rosters and sorting out what intelligence was missing and 
after a failed bid to install an agent NHQ and Division personnel moved to install another 
agent by transferring Corporal Robert L. Trolove (aka Benson) into the Division. Before 
long his entry into the CP was completed and further insurance was provided by the 
placement of two additional operatives in Ward Branches in the city. For reasons that are 
not known, Trolove was withdrawn as the 'hour' darkened and Canadians headed 
overseas to participate in a new war. 
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Wartime marked a massive change in social conditions in Canada and the context 
in which the political police operated. Civil liberties were eroded and the CP was 
outlawed and again moved undeq=>rround. 1939 marked a significant cleavage in the 
domestic story. In the fall of 1939 "0" Division underwent a massive transformation. In 
October, following NHQ's earlier lead, the Division's CIB separated its intelligence 
section from other investigative duties. 20 The creation of a new intelligence section was 
a significant development in the history of the Division and specifically its political 
policing operations. Its arrival meant that the importance of intelligence duties had finally 
filtrated down to the Division RHQ level and was being further embedded by 
Commissioner Wood within the RCN1P bureaucratic structure. Such a move served as an 
internal vote of confidence for intelligence duties even if ministerial approval for the 
elevation of intelligence duties to a separate branch status was only to follow later. 
In late 1939 "0" Division's intelligence branch staff subsequently increased to 
more than twenty making it the largest intelligence section outside of NHQ and it 
remained so for the duration of the War. 21 In additio~ "0" Division expanded its civil 
service staff which went from six to 60 and hired additional translators, 120 Reserves, 
and 225 veterans. The translators were reclassified and they joined the security branch 
as did most of the Reserves who formed the "anti-subversive squads" which "roamed the 
province," while the veterans guarded strategic works. The result was that "0" 
Division's total strength soared from a peacetime figure ofless than 80 to more than 350 
personnel making the increase the largest in the Division's history and an appropriate 
2~vett-Carnac, Pursuit in the Wilderness. 294; Betke and Horrall, Canada's Secunty Service, 
510-513,612. 
""'O" Division, Nominal Rolls, October 1939; Betke and Horrall, Canada's Security Service, 
511 - 513; In early 1939 the entire intelligence section at NHQ consisted of five personnel: Rivett-
Carnac, one Staff Sergeant, one Lance Corporal and two Stenographers. In 1940 it grew to 19 plus 
civilian support and by early 1941 it consisted of82 personnel. After "0" Division RHQ was Montreal 
"C" Division with a staff of about 16. 
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ending point for this study of domestic intelligence operations at the locallevel. 22 
In my examination of Canada's domestic intelligence past, my study has 
demonstrated how information and patterns within file sets can become a key to 
unlocking many of the period's puzzles. There is a significant ditierence of analytical 
approach in my study from others in the field. There is a great gulf between my work and 
the conservatives and liberal institutionalists on the one hand and social historians in the 
field on the other. With the former my story is largely at right angles because the central 
protagonists are less than noble and the subjects of their surveillance have been elevated 
in stature. With the latter we differ over the question of "agency," that of balancing 
different stories and storylines, and deciding where the 'true' deficiency in the field lays. 
In trying to recover the voices of the working-class and the subjects under surveillance 
we need to know a great deal more about the institutions and those targeting them. 
Painting all members of the police force with the same political brush creates a rather 
static and uni-dimensional understanding of the motivations and ideas that all people 
have about class and society. Through the new story that emerges within these pages we 
begin to see how an intelligence network was organized and how it transformed itself 
during three significant periods of operation: 1) the 1920-192 8 period or the early years 
with agents as the modus operandi; 2) 1928-31 a heavy reliance on OSINT and; 3) 1932-
39 a period of rebuilding, reorientation and finally a return to earlier practices bringing 
my study full circle. "0" Division RHQ CIB personnel had a mix of both success and 
failure in the intelligence operations they conducted during the inter-war period. 
However, with a political police organized nationally and functioning in the interests of 
the privileged elite in a systematic and sustained manner, labour capital relations in 
22Kemp, Without fear. favour. or affection, 201-202, 229-230; S.W. Horrall, "R.C.M.P. 
Translation Services," RCMP Quarterly, 54,1 (Winter 1987), 18, notes that ''0" Division's translation 
service was headed by Black and had a staff of nine under him which included: A Cal zone, M. Ellis, G. 
Hausman, A Moroz, M. Secombe-Hett, E. Weiser, B.M. Ylinen, E.W. Elfvengren., and M.E. Szekely 
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'·O" Division {nter-war 
Commanding Officers/ Acting OCs 
Name Years 
Walter James Beyts 1920 
Arthur W. Duffus 1920-1922 
Henry Montgomery 1922-1928 
Newson 
George Leslie Jennings 1928-1932 
Charles Deering LaNauze 1929 
(Acting OC) 
Charles Herbert King 1932-1934 
Charles Deering LaNauze 1934-1935 
Albert E.G.O. Reames 1935-1937 
Robert E. Mercer 1937-1938 
Walter Munday 1938-1939 
Vernon AM. Kemp 1939-1943 




""0" Division [nter-war 
OtTicers T n Charge of CIB/ rs 
Name Years 
George W. Fish 1920-1921 
Hebert Darling 1921-1931 
George W. Fish 1931 
Albert E.G.O. Reames 1932-1936 (as of 1935 also OC) 
Hugh Patrick Mathewson 1932-1938 (i/c Western Ontario 
District and senior Toronto 
detective) 
Robert E. Mercer 1936-1937 (as of January 1937 also 
temporary OC) 
Charles Batch 1937 -194? 
Source: "0" Division, Nominal Rolls. 
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NOTE ON SOURCES 
The major portion of this study consisted of security and intelligence files released under 
provisions and guidelines in the ATI Act. They are held at the National Archives of Canada 
and contained in NAC Record Group 146 - the holdings of the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS). Many tiles were consulted at both the CSIS reading room and 
at the Gregory S. Kealey private archives in Fredericton, New Brunswick. In addition, James 
Naylor provided me with access to several RG 146 file sets from his collection. 
1 -Gregory S. Kealey Archives and NAC RG 146 Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
(CSIS) Records, key tiles viewed at both locations: 






























2- Holdings onlv consulted at the Grego(\! S. Kealev Archives. St. John's. Newfoundland 
-Federal Bureau ofinvestigation, "Subject: Royal Canadian Mounted Police'' (cited as fB[ 
1930s RCMP file) 
NAC RG 146 Organizational/ Operational files: 
The Canadian League for Peace and Democracy (CLPD) 
The Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy (CASD) 
The Friends of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion (FMPB) 
Recruiting for the Spanish Anny (RSA) 
RCMP "0" Division Nominal Rolls 
RCMP General Orders 
3 -James Naylor Private Collection (drawn from NAC RG 146) 
CLWF First Convention 1934 
Youth Congress Against War and Fascism 1934 




a. National Archives of Canada. Ottawa. 
MG28 IV 4. Communist Party of Canada Papers 
MG 30 A 94. J.L. Cohen Papers 
MG 30 E 173. Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Collection 
MG 32 G3. Tim Buck Papers 
RG 7 Governor Generals Records 
RG 18 Records of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
RG 146 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Records 
b. Other Archives Holdings 
Communist Party of Canada, Toronto Office Collection 
Fisher Library, University of Toronto, Robert Kenny Collection 
Kealey, Gregory S., Archives, Fredericton, New Brunswick 
Provincial Archives of Ontario, RG 4-32, Attorney General's records 
United Church Archives, Victoria College, A.E. Smith Papers 
Contemporary Press 




The Unemployed Worker 
The Worker 
b) Newsoaoers: 
The Canadian Forward 
Cotton's Weekly 
Industrial Banner 
The Labor News (Hamilton) 
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One Big Union Bulletin 
Toronto Globe 
Toronto Mail & Empire 
Toronto Daily Star 
Western Labour News 







Canada, Census, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Census, 1901, 1911, 1921. 
Canada, Commission of Inguirv Concerning Certain Activities of the Roval 
Canadian Mounted Police (McDonald Commission) Second Report, 
Freedom and Security under the Law, vol. 1 (Ottawa, 1981) 
Canada, Department ofLabour, Annual Reports, 1920-1936 
Canada. House of Commons, Debates 
-Annual Reports on Labour Organization in Canada, 1920-1939 
Canada, Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the 
Circumstances Surrounding the Communication. bv Public Officials and 
Other persons in Positions of Trust. of Secret and Confidential 
Information to Agents of a Foreign Power, Report (Ottawa, 1946) 
Canada, Labour Gazette, 1920-1939 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1920-1939 
NWMP, Annual Reports, 1900-1903 
Ontario, Sessional Papers, 1920-1939 
Province of Ontario (PO), Legislative Assembly, 1919-1939 
RNWMP, Annual Reports, 1904-1919 
RCMP, Annual Reports, 1920-1939 
Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, Report of The Proceedings Of The 
Annual Conventions. 1920-1939 
Interviews 
Himmelfarb, Lil (nee Ilomaki), interview with author, December 1995; Notes 
in interviewer's possession. 
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